

IV

(Informacje)

INFORMACJE INSTYTUCJI, ORGANÓW I JEDNOSTEK ORGANIZACYJNYCH UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

PARLAMENT EUROPEJSKI

PYTANIA PISEMNE Z ODPOWIEDZIĄ

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**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000821/14
an die Kommission**

Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)

(28. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: Türkei und Menschenrechte

Die Annäherung der Europäischen Union und der Türkei wurde vor allem in den vergangenen Jahren in besonderem Maße politisch unterstützt und begrüßt. Dessen ungeachtet breitet sich bei den europäischen Bürgerinnen und Bürgern immer mehr Skepsis aus, und es stellt sich die Frage, ob die europäischen Werte mit der türkischen Innen- und Außenpolitik in Einklang gebracht werden können. Besonders die Proteste der türkischen Bevölkerung, die auf brutalste Weise von Premier Erdogan unterbunden wurden, fallen sehr negativ ins Gewicht. Die Türkei missachtet demnach alle Werte, für die die Europäische Union einsteht, nicht zuletzt die Propagierung der Demokratie und die Wahrung der Menschenrechte.

1. Wie erklärt die Kommission, dass die Türkei nach wie vor die Bezeichnung „Beitrittskandidat“ innehat, obwohl eine gänzliche Annäherung immer unwahrscheinlicher wird?
2. Wie erklärt die Kommission, dass ein Land, in dem die Menschenrechte systematisch verletzt werden und die Bevölkerung unterdrückt wird, überhaupt als Beitrittskandidat bezeichnet werden darf?
3. Seit Beginn der Annäherungsverhandlungen zwischen der Republik Türkei und der Europäischen Union im Jahr 2005 gab es viele Rückschläge, und sieben der 35 zu verhandelnden Kapitel gelten als suspendiert, darunter der freie Warenverkehr, Finanzdienstleistungen sowie Landwirtschaft und ländliche Entwicklung. Wieso zieht die Kommission einen Beitritt der Türkei trotzdem weiterhin in Erwägung?

Gemeinsame Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission

(31. März 2014)

Der Europäische Rat vom Dezember 1999 hat der Türkei den Status eines Kandidatenlandes zuerkannt. Die Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei wurden im Oktober 2005 auf der Grundlage eines einstimmigen Beschlusses der EU-Mitgliedstaaten eröffnet. Bislang wurden 14 Kapitel in Angriff genommen, von denen eines vorläufig abgeschlossen wurde. Die Kommission verfolgt aufmerksam die Entwicklungen in der Türkei und erstattet, insbesondere im Rahmen der Fortschrittsberichte, regelmäßig im Herbst Bericht.

Die Frau Abgeordnete sei auf den Fortschrittsbericht 2013 ⁽¹⁾ über die Türkei verwiesen, in dem auch die Bedenken der Kommission in Bezug auf den unverhältnismäßigen Einsatz von Gewalt durch die Sicherheitskräfte bei den Protesten vom Juni 2013 im Gezi-Park zum Ausdruck kommen. Die Antworten der Kommission auf die schriftlichen Anfragen E-792/2014 und E-1370/2014 enthalten nähere Angaben.

Die Türkei ist ein Kandidatenland und ein strategischer Partner für die Europäische Union. Die von der Frau Abgeordneten angesprochenen Fragen machen deutlich, wie wichtig es ist, dass die EU ihre Zusammenarbeit mit der Türkei im Bereich der Grundrechte verstärkt. Die Fortschritte bei den Beitrittsverhandlungen und bei den politischen Reformen in der Türkei gehen Hand in Hand.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/tr_rapport_2013_en.pdf

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001211/14
alla Commissione
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(6 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: Richiesta di informazioni circa lo stato dei negoziati di adesione della Turchia all'Unione europea

I processi di allargamento sono sempre problematici e caratterizzati da numerose implicazioni politiche, economiche e socio — culturali.

La strategia di allargamento adottata dall'Unione europea sancisce la centralità di alcuni criteri fondamentali di adesione quali lo Stato di diritto, le questioni relative alle riforme giudiziarie, alla lotta contro la criminalità organizzata e la corruzione e al rispetto dei diritti umani.

I negoziati con la Turchia sono stati avviati nell'ottobre 2005, ma sono diversi gli aspetti problematici emersi nel corso delle trattative concernenti l'adesione. In particolare, si manifesta forte preoccupazione riguardo a violazioni dei diritti umani e al ricorso ad un uso sproporzionato della forza da parte del governo nei confronti di una manifestazione essenzialmente pacifica iniziata nel maggio 2013 al parco Gezi. Inoltre, si sottolineano le difficoltà riscontrate in diverse materie dal governo turco nel raggiungimento degli obiettivi minimi richiesti per aderire all'Unione europea.

Considerato quanto ciò premesso, si chiede alla Commissione:

1. se può fornire un quadro generale sulla situazione dei negoziati di adesione con la Turchia?
2. Se può fornire informazioni relative agli elementi indicati in questo testo?
3. Se può illustrare la propria posizione in merito alle presunte violazioni dei diritti umani e al ricorso a un uso sproporzionato della forza da parte del governo durante le proteste al parco Gezi?

**Risposta congiunta di Štefan Füle a nome della Commissione
(31 marzo 2014)**

Il Consiglio europeo del dicembre 1999 ha concesso alla Turchia lo status di paese candidato. I negoziati di adesione con la Turchia sono stati aperti nell'ottobre 2005 sulla base di una decisione unanime degli Stati membri dell'UE. Finora sono stati aperti i negoziati su 14 capitoli, uno dei quali è stato chiuso in via provvisoria. La Commissione segue attentamente l'evoluzione della situazione turca e riferisce in proposito, soprattutto nelle relazioni sui progressi compiuti che presenta ogni anno in autunno.

Si invitano gli onorevoli parlamentari a consultare la relazione sui progressi della Turchia del 2013⁽¹⁾, in cui fra l'altro la Commissione esprime le sue preoccupazioni circa l'uso sproporzionato della forza da parte delle forze di sicurezza durante le proteste svolte nel parco Gezi nel giugno 2013. Ulteriori informazioni figurano nella risposta della Commissione alle interrogazioni scritte E-792/2014 ed E-1370/2014.

La Turchia è un paese candidato e un partner strategico dell'Unione europea. Le questioni sollevate dagli onorevoli parlamentari sottolineano l'importanza che l'UE si impegni maggiormente con la Turchia in materia di diritti fondamentali. I progressi nei negoziati di adesione e i progressi nelle riforme politiche in Turchia sono due facce della stessa medaglia.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/tr_rapport_2013_en.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-000821/14
to the Commission
Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)
(28 January 2014)**

Subject: Turkey and human rights

Particularly in recent years, the rapprochement between the European Union and Turkey has been strongly politically supported and welcomed. Despite this, the people of Europe are increasingly sceptical, and it is questionable whether European values can be reconciled with Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. Notably, the protests by the Turkish people, which have been very brutally repressed by Prime Minister Erdoğan, have had a very adverse impact. Turkey disregards all the values espoused by the European Union, including the propagation of democracy and respect for human rights.

1. How does the Commission explain the fact that Turkey is still classified as a candidate for accession, although a complete rapprochement is becoming less and less likely?
2. How does the Commission account for the fact that a country where human rights are systematically breached and the people are repressed can be regarded as a candidate for accession at all?
3. Since the beginning of the rapprochement negotiations between the Republic of Turkey and the European Union in 2005, there have been many setbacks, and seven of the 35 chapters in the negotiations are officially suspended, including those concerning the free movement of goods, financial services and agriculture and rural development. Why is the Commission still considering accession for Turkey?

**Question for written answer E-001211/14
to the Commission
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(6 February 2014)**

Subject: Request for information on the status of negotiations for the accession of Turkey to the European Union

The enlargement processes are always problematic and characterised by multiple political, economic and socio-cultural implications.

The enlargement strategy adopted by the European Union sanctions the centrality of certain fundamental accession criteria, such as the rule of law, matters associated with judicial reform, the fight against organised crime and corruption and respect for human rights.

Negotiations with Turkey began in October 2005. However, a number of problematic aspects have emerged during the accession negotiations. In particular, strong concern has been expressed with regard to the breach of human rights and the use of disproportionate force by the Government in response to an essentially peaceful demonstration organised in May 2013 at Gezi Park. Attention must also be drawn to difficulties encountered on various matters by the Turkish Government in achieving the minimum objectives required for accession to the European Union.

In consideration of the above, the Commission is asked:

1. Can the Commission provide an overview of the status of the accession negotiations with Turkey?
2. Can the Commission provide further information on the matters referred to above?
3. Can the Commission illustrate its position on alleged breaches of human rights and the use of disproportionate force by the government during the protests at Gezi Park?

**Joint answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(31 March 2014)**

The European Council of December 1999 granted Turkey the status of candidate country. Accession negotiations with Turkey were opened in October 2005 on the basis of a unanimous decision of the EU Member States. So far, accession negotiations have been opened on 14 chapters one of which was provisionally closed. The Commission follows developments in Turkey closely and reports in particular in the context of Progress Reports every autumn.

The Honourable Members might wish to refer to the 2013 Progress Report ⁽¹⁾ on Turkey, which also reflects the Commission's concerns as regards the disproportionate use of force by the security forces during the Gezi Park protests in June 2013. The Commission reply to written questions E-792/2014 and E-1370/2014 provides further information.

Turkey is a candidate country and a strategic partner of the European Union. The issues raised by the Honourable Members underline the importance for the EU to enhance its engagement with Turkey on fundamental rights. Progress in the accession negotiations and progress in the political reforms in Turkey are two sides of the same coin.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/tr_rapport_2013_en.pdf

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000822/14
an die Kommission
Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)
(28. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: Türkei und Korruption auf höchster Ebene

Die Annäherung zwischen der Europäischen Union und der Türkei wurde vor allem in den vergangenen Jahren in besonderem Maße politisch unterstützt und begrüßt. Dessen ungeachtet breitet sich bei den europäischen Bürgerinnen und Bürgern immer mehr Skepsis aus, und es stellt sich die Frage, ob die europäischen Werte mit der türkischen Innen- und Außenpolitik in Einklang gebracht werden können. Besonders die Proteste der türkischen Bevölkerung, die auf brutalste Weise von Premier Erdogan unterbunden wurden, fallen sehr negativ ins Gewicht. Die Türkei missachtet demnach alle Werte, für die die Europäische Union einsteht, nicht zuletzt die Propagierung der Demokratie und die Wahrung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte.

1. Wie erklärt die Kommission, dass ein Land, in dem angebliche Gegner der Justiz zwangsversetzt und/oder ihres Amtes enthoben werden, trotzdem als „Beitrittskandidat“ der Europäischen Union bezeichnet werden kann?
2. Wie erklärt die Kommission, dass die Annäherungsgespräche mit der Republik Türkei immer noch fortgesetzt werden, obwohl die Regeln des Rechtsstaates und der Gewaltentrennung systematisch missachtet werden?
3. Wie gedenkt die Kommission sicherzustellen, dass in der Türkei Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Strafverfolgung praktiziert werden?
4. Wie gedenkt die Kommission mit einem Land zu verhandeln, in dem an einem Gesetzesentwurf gearbeitet wird, der den Hohen Rat der Richter und Staatsanwälte noch stärker dem Justizministerium unterwerfen würde?
5. Wieso trägt ein Land, das bekanntlich unter Korruption auf höchster Ebene leidet, nach wie vor die Bezeichnung „Beitrittskandidat“? Wieso erhält ein solches Land die Möglichkeit der weiteren wirtschaftlichen Bereicherung, da die Bezeichnung „Beitrittskandidat“ mit signifikant erhöhter finanzieller Unterstützung verbunden ist?

Gemeinsame Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission
(2. April 2014)

Der Kandidatenstatus wurde der Türkei im Jahr 1999 vom Europäischen Rat zuerkannt. Im Oktober 2005 wurden die Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei auf der Grundlage eines einstimmigen Beschlusses der EU-Mitgliedstaaten eröffnet.

Die Aspekte Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Grundrechte stehen im Mittelpunkt der Beitrittsverhandlungen. Die Kommission hat mit den türkischen Behörden zusammengearbeitet, um darauf hinzuwirken, dass die Türkei die europäischen Standards in diesen Bereichen schrittweise erfüllt. In ihrem jährlichen Fortschrittsbericht veröffentlicht die Kommission ihre Bewertung der Entwicklungen im Bereich der Rechtsstaatlichkeit und legt insbesondere dar, welche Defizite noch bestehen und von der Türkei ausgeräumt werden müssen. Die Kommission erörtert diese Fragen mit der Türkei bei allen geeigneten Gelegenheiten auf politischer und fachlicher Ebene.

Die Kommission hat der Türkei ihre Bedenken hinsichtlich der neuen Bestimmungen über den Hohen Rat der Richter und Staatsanwälte mitgeteilt und dabei auch auf die potenziellen Auswirkungen des neuen Gesetzes auf die Unabhängigkeit und Unparteilichkeit der Justiz und die Gewaltenteilung in der Türkei hingewiesen. Die Kommission wird das Gesetz eingehend prüfen und seine Umsetzung unter besonderer Beachtung des Aspekts einer wirksamen Korruptionsbekämpfung bewerten.

Mit den finanziellen Mitteln, die für die Türkei im Rahmen der Heranführungshilfe (IPA) bereitgestellt werden, soll die Türkei bei ihren Vorbereitungen auf die EU-Mitgliedschaft, unter anderem bei der Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften an die Standards und die Politik der EU unterstützt werden. Ein erheblicher Teil der Mittel fließt in Projekte im Bereich der Rechtsstaatlichkeit, dem auch bei der finanziellen Unterstützung im Zeitraum 2014 bis 2020 eine Priorität eingeräumt wird.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002377/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(3 Μαρτίου 2014)

Θέμα: Ανεξαρτησία της δικαιοσύνης στην Τουρκία

Σε πρόσφατη δήλωσή της, η Διεθνής Αμνηστία εξέφρασε σοβαρές ανησυχίες σχετικά με την ανεξαρτησία της δικαιοσύνης στην Τουρκία, αναφέροντας, μεταξύ άλλων:

«Στις 15 Φεβρουαρίου, το Τουρκικό Κοινοβούλιο ενέκρινε νομοθετικές τροποποιήσεις που αυξάνουν σημαντικά την επιρροή του Υπουργού Δικαιοσύνης επί του Ανωτάτου Συμβουλίου Δικαστών και Εισαγγελέων (ΑΣΔΕ) ... Η Διεθνής Αμνηστία ανησυχεί ότι οι τροποποιήσεις που συνδέονται με το ΑΣΔΕ ενέχουν τον κίνδυνο να υπονομεύσουν την ανεξαρτησία της δικαιοσύνης ... παρέχοντας στον Υπουργό Δικαιοσύνης, ως Πρόεδρο του ΑΣΔΕ, αυξημένες εξουσίες διορισμού και λήψης αποφάσεων στους κόλπους του σώματος αυτού.»

Ζητείται από την Επιτροπή να απαντήσει στις ακόλουθες ερωτήσεις:

1. Συμμερίζεται τις ανησυχίες της Διεθνούς Αμνηστίας για το ως άνω ζήτημα;
2. Είναι η νέα νομοθεσία, την οποία έχει θεσπίσει το Τουρκικό Κοινοβούλιο, συμβατή με το κοινοτικό κεκτημένο και με τις υποχρεώσεις της Τουρκίας ως υποψήφιας προς ένταξη στην ΕΕ χώρας;
3. Προτίθεται η Επιτροπή να λάβει οιαδήποτε μέτρα προκειμένου να πείσει την Τουρκία να συμμορφωθεί με τις υποχρεώσεις της ως υποψήφιας χώρας όσον αφορά την ανεξαρτησία της δικαιοσύνης;

Κοινή απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(2 Απριλίου 2014)

Το καθεστώς της υποψήφιας χώρας χορηγήθηκε στην Τουρκία από το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο το 1999. Οι διαπραγματεύσεις προσχώρησης με την Τουρκία ξεκίνησαν τον Οκτώβριο του 2005 με βάση ομόφωνη απόφαση των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ.

Το κράτος δικαίου και τα θεμελιώδη δικαιώματα βρίσκονται στο επίκεντρο των διαπραγματεύσεων προσχώρησης. Η Επιτροπή βρίσκεται σε επαφή με τις τουρκικές αρχές προκειμένου να διασφαλίσει ότι η Τουρκία θα αρχίσει να ανταποκρίνεται σταδιακά στα ευρωπαϊκά πρότυπα στους εν λόγω τομείς. Η Επιτροπή προβαίνει σε αξιολόγηση των εξελίξεων αυτών και την δημοσιεύει στην ετήσια έκθεση προόδου, η οποία αποτελεί ένα σημαντικό σημείο αναφοράς όσον αφορά τον εντοπισμό των κενών που καλείται να καλύψει η Τουρκία. Η Επιτροπή και η Τουρκία συζητούν τα θέματα αυτά με κάθε ευκαιρία, τόσο σε πολιτικό, όσο και σε τεχνικό επίπεδο.

Η Επιτροπή έχει εκφράσει ήδη στην Τουρκία τις ανησυχίες της σχετικά με τον νέο νόμο που αφορά το Ανώτατο Συμβούλιο Δικαστών και Εισαγγελέων, καθώς και την ανησυχία της για τις πιθανές επιπτώσεις του στην ανεξαρτησία και την αμεροληψία της δικαιοσύνης, καθώς και στη διάκριση των εξουσιών στην Τουρκία. Η Επιτροπή θα μελετήσει εις βάθος το νόμο και θα αξιολογήσει την εφαρμογή του, μεταξύ άλλων και από την άποψη της αποτελεσματικής καταπολέμησης της διαφθοράς.

Η οικονομική ενίσχυση προς την Τουρκία βάσει του μηχανισμού προενταξιακής βοήθειας έχει ως στόχο να βοηθήσει την Τουρκία ώστε να προετοιμασθεί κατάλληλα προκειμένου να γίνει μέλος της ΕΕ και να εναρμονισθεί με κάθε πρότυπο και πολιτική της ΕΕ. Ένα σημαντικό μέρος της βοήθειας διατίθεται για ενέργειες υπέρ του κράτους δικαίου. Ο τομέας αυτός θα αποτελέσει επίσης μία από τις προτεραιότητες για χρηματοδότηση κατά τα έτη 2014-2020.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001732/14

alla Commissione

Mario Borghezio (NI)

(17 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Il governo turco contro l'anticorruzione

L'opposizione turca ha accusato il premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan di usare una legge di riforma della giustizia all'esame del parlamento per fare approvare misure per insabbiare la «tangentopoli del Bosforo», che coinvolge decine di personalità vicine al governo. La riforma prevede fra l'altro l'abolizione delle corti speciali istituite dalle leggi contro il terrorismo: fra i 22 articoli della normativa si nascondono misure per bloccare le inchieste anticorruzione.

Si chiede alla Commissione:

1. se sia vero che le nuove norme trasferiscono al ministro della Giustizia diverse prerogative del Consiglio supremo dei giudici e dei procuratori;
2. se sia vero che la nuova legge renderà più difficile indagare su dipendenti pubblici sospettati di corruzione, effettuare intercettazioni, congelare i loro beni; che non sarà possibile procedere senza autorizzazione del governo contro dirigenti della polizia che rifiutino di effettuare gli arresti richiesti dai magistrati come è avvenuto nelle inchieste anticorruzione;
3. se sia vero che le nuove norme mirano a «assolvere coloro che sono coinvolti nelle inchieste di corruzione» e che il governo turco intende sottomettere all'esecutivo il giudiziario, in violazione della costituzione;
4. come valuta quanto sopra in relazione al processo di adesione della Turchia all'UE, impegnata fortemente nella lotta alla corruzione.

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002582/14

alla Commissione

Barbara Matera (PPE)

(6 marzo 2014)

Oggetto: Prevenzione dell'indipendenza giudiziaria in Turchia

La nuova legge sul Consiglio superiore dei giudici e dei pubblici ministeri, approvata dal parlamento turco e firmata dal Presidente Gül, limiterà l'indipendenza giudiziaria. Essa comporta una serie di cambiamenti che ristrutturerà il Consiglio superiore dei giudici e dei pubblici ministeri (HSYK) turco con l'attribuzione di maggior potere al ministro della giustizia che opera nel ramo esecutivo. Di conseguenza, la legge ignora l'importanza della separazione dei poteri e conferisce invece maggiore autorità al ramo esecutivo. Nel suo contesto, ad esempio, i nuovi presidente e Vicepresidente del comitato di controllo del HSYK saranno nominati dal ministero e riferiranno al ministro della giustizia. Inoltre, il ministro della giustizia avrà d'ora in poi il potere di autorizzare indagini nei confronti di membri del Consiglio per «cattiva condotta e questioni disciplinari», indagini che potrebbero avere motivazioni di ordine politico, dati i recenti sviluppi in Turchia, come le accuse di corruzione nei confronti di coloro che dispongono di contatti con il governo e delle migliaia di poliziotti e avvocati degradati e trasferiti.

Eminenti Commissari dell'UE hanno fatto eco alle dichiarazioni di importanti ONG che si oppongono alla legge, ma è ancora necessaria un'azione specifica.

1. Si prevede che la dichiarazione rilasciata dal Commissario europeo per l'allargamento e la politica di vicinato sarà seguita da un'azione?
2. Quale sarà l'impatto della nuova normativa sui negoziati di adesione UE-Turchia?

Risposta congiunta di Štefan Füle a nome della Commissione

(2 aprile 2014)

Lo status di paese candidato è stato concesso alla Turchia dal Consiglio europeo nel 1999. I negoziati di adesione con la Turchia sono stati avviati nell'ottobre 2005 con decisione unanime degli Stati membri dell'UE.

Lo Stato di diritto e i diritti fondamentali sono elementi centrali dei negoziati di adesione. La Commissione si impegna attivamente, nei contatti con le autorità turche, affinché il paese si allinei progressivamente agli standard europei in materia. La Commissione pubblica la sua valutazione degli sviluppi a livello di Stato di diritto nella relazione annuale sui progressi, che costituisce un importante punto di riferimento per individuare le carenze a cui la Turchia deve ancora ovviare. La Commissione discute di tali questioni con la Turchia in tutte le sedi opportune, a livello politico e tecnico.

La Commissione ha espresso alla Turchia le proprie preoccupazioni circa le nuove disposizioni applicabili al Consiglio superiore dei giudici e dei pubblici ministeri, che riguardano anche la possibile incidenza della legge sull'indipendenza e sull'imparzialità della magistratura e la separazione dei poteri in Turchia. La Commissione sottoporrà la legge a un esame approfondito e ne valuterà l'applicazione, anche per quanto riguarda l'efficacia della lotta alla corruzione.

Il sostegno finanziario alla Turchia nell'ambito dell'assistenza preadesione (IPA) mira a sostenere i suoi preparativi per l'adesione all'UE, compreso l'allineamento con gli standard e le politiche dell'Unione. Una quota consistente dei fondi è destinata a progetti relativi allo Stato di diritto, un settore che rimarrà prioritario per i finanziamenti anche nel periodo 2014-2020.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000822/14
to the Commission
Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)
(28 January 2014)

Subject: Turkey and corruption at the highest level

Particularly in recent years, the rapprochement between the European Union and Turkey has been strongly politically supported and welcomed. Despite this, the people of Europe are increasingly sceptical, and it is questionable whether European values can be reconciled with Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. Notably, the protests by the Turkish people, which have been very brutally repressed by Prime Minister Erdoğan, have had a very adverse impact. Turkey disregards all the values espoused by the European Union, including the propagation of democracy and respect for human rights, including civil rights.

1. How does the Commission explain the fact that a country where alleged opponents of justice are compulsorily transferred and/or dismissed from office can nonetheless be classified as a candidate for accession to the European Union?
2. How does the Commission account for the fact that the proximity talks with the Republic of Turkey are still continuing even though the rule of law and the principle of the separation of powers are systematically disregarded?
3. How will the Commission ensure that the rule of law is observed and criminals are prosecuted in Turkey?
4. How does the Commission propose to negotiate with a country where draft legislation is being prepared which would subject the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors to even stronger control by the Justice Ministry?
5. Why does a country which is known to be suffering from corruption at the highest level still have the status of a candidate for accession? Why is such a country being given the opportunity for further economic enrichment, as that status is associated with significantly increased financial support?

Question for written answer E-001732/14
to the Commission
Mario Borghezio (NI)
(17 February 2014)

Subject: The Turkish Government against anti-corruption measures

The Turkish Opposition has accused Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of using a law reforming the justice system being examined by Parliament to gain approval for measures to hush up the 'Bribesville of the Bosphorus' affair, which involves dozens of persons close to the government. Among other things, the reform provides for the abolition of the special courts established by anti-terrorism laws: the 22 Articles of the legislation conceal measures to block anti-corruption investigations.

The Commission is asked:

1. If it is true that the new regulations transfer a number of prerogatives of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors to the Justice Minister?
2. If it is true that the new law will make it more difficult to investigate public officials suspected of corruption, intercept telephone calls and freeze assets? Will it be impossible to proceed without government authorisation against police officers who refuse to make the arrests requested by judges, as has been the case in anti-corruption investigations?
3. If it is true that the new regulations are designed to acquit persons involved in corruption investigations and that the Turkish Government intends to make the judiciary subject to the executive, in breach of the constitution?
4. How it evaluates the above in the light of the process for the accession of Turkey to the EU, which has a strong commitment to the fight against corruption?

**Question for written answer E-002377/14
to the Commission
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(3 March 2014)**

Subject: Independence of the judiciary in Turkey

In a recent statement, Amnesty International expressed serious concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary in Turkey, stating, among other things:

'On 15 February, the Turkish parliament adopted legislative amendments that significantly increase the influence of the Minister of Justice within the Higher Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HCJP)... Amnesty International is concerned that amendments relating to the HCJP risk undermining the independence of the judiciary ... by giving the Minister of Justice, as Chair of HCJP, increased powers of appointment and decision making within the body.'

The Commission is asked to reply to the following:

1. Does it share the concerns of Amnesty International on the above subject?
2. Is the new legislation enacted by the Turkish parliament compatible with the *acquis communautaire* and with Turkey's obligations as a candidate country for EU accession?
3. Does the Commission intend to take any action with a view to convincing Turkey to abide by its obligations as a candidate country, as regards the independence of the judiciary?

**Question for written answer E-002582/14
to the Commission
Barbara Matera (PPE)
(6 March 2014)**

Subject: Prevention of judicial independence in Turkey

The new law on the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors passed by the Turkish Parliament and signed by President Gül will restrict judicial independence. It entails a series of changes that will restructure the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) in Turkey by giving more power to the Minister for Justice, who serves in the executive branch. Therefore, the law ignores the importance of the separation of powers and instead grants greater authority to the executive branch. For example, under it the new inspection board chairman and deputy chairman of the HSYK will be appointed by the ministry and will report to the Minister for Justice. Furthermore, the Minister for Justice will henceforth hold the power to authorise the investigation of council members for 'misconduct and disciplinary matters' — which could be politically motivated, given recent developments in Turkey such as the corruption charges brought against those involved with government connections and the thousands of police officers and lawyers being demoted and transferred.

Further to prominent NGOs having spoken out against the law, so too have leading EU Commissioners, but specific action is still needed.

1. Will the statement made by the EU Commissioner on Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy be enforced by any action?
2. What will be the impact of the new legislation on EU-Turkey accession talks?

**Joint answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2014)**

The status of candidate country was granted to Turkey by the European Council in 1999. Accession negotiations with Turkey were opened in October 2005 on the basis of a unanimous decision of the EU Member States.

The rule of law and fundamental rights are at the core of the accession negotiations. The Commission has been engaging with the Turkish authorities to ensure that gradually Turkey meets the European standards in these areas. The Commission publishes its assessment of the developments in field of the rule of law in its annual progress report, which is an important point of reference as regards the identification of gaps which Turkey still needs to address. The Commission discusses the issues with Turkey on all relevant occasions, at political and technical level.

The Commission has informed Turkey about its concerns regarding the new provisions regulating on the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which included the potential impact of the law on the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, as well as the separation of powers in Turkey. The Commission will examine the law in detail and will assess its implementation, including from the point of view of an efficient fight against corruption.

The financial support to Turkey in the framework of the pre-accession assistance (IPA) aims to help Turkey in its preparations for EU membership including alignment with EU standards and policies. A significant share of the funds is channelled to projects in the area of the rule of law. This area will be also a priority for financing in the years 2014-2020.

(Verżjoni Maltija)

Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-000844/14
lill-Kummissjoni
Marlene Mizzi (S&D)
(28 ta' Jannar 2014)

Suġġett: Votazzjoni elettronika

Il-partecipazzjoni tal-votanti fl-elezzjonijiet għall-Parlament Ewropej ilha tonqos b'mod kostanti sa mill-ewwel elezzjoni fl-1979.

Il-Kummissjoni tikkunsidra li tipproponi l-introduzzjoni ta' votazzjoni elettronika sabiex thegġeg ic-ċittadini jivvotaw u b'hekk tiżdied il-partecipazzjoni elettorali?

Tweġiba mogħtija mis-Sur Hahn fisem il-Kummissjoni
(22 ta' April 2014)

Skont l-Artikolu 223(1) TFUE, huwa xogħol il-Parlament Ewropej li jfassal proposta biex jistabbilixxi d-dispożizzjonijiet meħtieġa għall-elezzjonijiet tal-Parlament Ewropej skont proċedura uniformi jew skont il-prinċipji komuni għall-Istati Membri kollha. Il-prinċipji komuni għall-Istati Membri kollha huma stabbiliti fl-Att tal-1976 dwar l-elezzjoni tal-membri tal-Parlament Ewropej b'vot dirett universali, kif emendat l-aħhar bid-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2002/772/KE, Euratom tal-25 ta' Ġunju u tat-23 ta' Settembru 2002. Il-prinċipji komuni inklużi fiha ma jkoprox il-votazzjoni elettronika. Għaldaqstant, l-introduzzjoni ta' proċeduri elettorali li jippermettu għal votazzjoni elettronika taqa' f'dan l-istadju fil-kompetenzi tal-Istati Membri.

L-inkoraġġiment u l-iffacilitar tal-partecipazzjoni taċ-ċittadini tal-UE fil-hajja demokratika tal-UE huma prijorità ewlenija għall-Kummissjoni. Din hija r-raġuni għaliex dan l-aħhar il-Kummissjoni pproponiet miżuri li jiffacilitaw il-partecipazzjoni taċ-ċittadini fl-elezzjonijiet tal-Parlament Ewropej u li jsahhu d-dimensjoni Ewropea ta' dawn l-elezzjonijiet. L-inizjattivi jinkludu Komunikazzjoni ⁽¹⁾ u Rakkomandazzjoni ⁽²⁾ għal aktar titjib tat-twertiq demokratiku u effiċjenti tal-elezzjonijiet Ewropej.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2013)126 finali.

⁽²⁾ ĠU L 79, 21.3.2013, p. 29.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-000844/14
to the Commission
Marlene Mizzi (S&D)
(28 January 2014)**

Subject: Electronic voting

Voter turnout in the European Parliament elections has been steadily declining since the first round of elections in 1979.

Would the Commission consider proposing the introduction of electronic voting in order to encourage citizens to vote and thereby increase electoral turnout?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2014)**

In accordance with Article 223(1) TFEU, it is for the European Parliament to draw up a proposal to lay down the provisions necessary for the European Parliament elections in accordance with a uniform procedure or in accordance with principles common to all Member States. Principles common to all Member States are laid down in the 1976 Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, as last amended by Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom of 25 June and 23 September 2002. The common principles included therein do not cover electronic voting, therefore introducing electoral procedures allowing for electronic voting falls at this stage within the competences of the Member States.

Encouraging and facilitating the participation of EU citizens in the democratic life of the EU is a high priority for the Commission. This is why the Commission recently proposed measures to facilitate citizens' participation in the European Parliament elections and to strengthen the European dimension of these elections. Initiatives include a communication ⁽¹⁾ and a recommendation ⁽²⁾ for further enhancing the democratic and efficient conduct of the European elections.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2013) 126.

⁽²⁾ OJ L79, 21.3.2013, p. 29.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001337/14
an die Kommission
Andreas Mölzer (NI)
(10. Februar 2014)

Betrifft: Fernsteuerung zum Stoppen von Autos

Eine Arbeitsgruppe europäischer Strafverfolger der „Europol Platform for Experts“ soll mehrere mögliche künftige Maßnahmen aufgelistet haben, darunter den Ausbau der automatischen Nummernschilderkennung und Open Source Intelligence (zur Auswertung von Datenquellen im Internet, in Bezug auf Großveranstaltungen ebenso wie bei der Verbrechensaufklärung). Die europäischen Strafverfolger wollen einen Standard entwickeln, um Autos ferngesteuert stoppen zu können. Künftig soll dann jedes Fahrzeug, das auf dem europäischen Markt angeboten wird, damit ausgestattet sein.

1. Wie steht die Kommission zum Ausbau der automatischen Nummernschilderkennung?
2. Inwiefern ist diese Maßnahme mit den EU-Datenschutzbestimmungen vereinbar?
3. Sind der Kommission die Pläne bezüglich Fernsteuerung zum Stoppen von Autos bekannt?
4. Wie ist die Haltung der Kommission zu diesem Thema?

Gemeinsame Antwort von Herrn Šefčovič im Namen der Kommission
(1. April 2014)

Der Kommission sind keinerlei Pläne in Bezug auf die von der Frau Abgeordneten erwähnten Fernabschaltung von Autos bekannt und ist auch nicht an einer derartigen Initiative beteiligt.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001018/14
aan de Commissie**

Patricia van der Kammen (NI)

(31 januari 2014)

Betreft: Stopsysteem voor auto's

Op 30 januari 2014 viel in de Britse krant The Telegraph te lezen dat de Europese Unie in het geheim werkt aan een systeem waarmee auto's op afstand (door de politie) kunnen worden stilgezet ⁽¹⁾.

1. Is de Commissie bekend met het bericht „EU has secret plan for police to remote stop cars” ⁽²⁾?
2. Is de Commissie op enigerlei wijze, direct dan wel indirect, betrokken bij ideevorming, planvorming, beleidsvoorbereiding dan wel wetsvoorbereiding inzake het op afstand kunnen manipuleren, besturen of beheersen van een motorvoertuig? Zo ja, kunt u een opsomming geven van alle initiatieven in dit kader?
3. Indien het antwoord op vraag 2 ontkennend is, is de Commissie op de hoogte van ideevorming, planvorming, beleidsvoorbereiding dan wel wetsvoorbereiding inzake het op afstand kunnen manipuleren, besturen of beheersen van een motorvoertuig bij of namens andere EU-instellingen of organisaties? Zo ja, kunt u een opsomming geven van de initiatieven en de betrokken organisaties? Zo nee, betekent dit dat de Commissie suggereert dat de berichtgeving niet op feiten is gebaseerd?
4. Indien er ontwikkelingen lopen betreffende het op afstand kunnen manipuleren, besturen of beheersen van een motorvoertuig, zijn deze op enigerlei wijze, procesmatig dan wel technisch, verbonden met het eveneens in ontwikkeling zijnde eCall?
5. Is de Commissie het met de PVV eens dat dergelijke apparaten een grove schending van de privacy zouden zijn, en de EU daarmee verregaande Orwelliaanse vormen zou aannemen? Zo nee, waarom niet?
6. Is de Commissie net als de PVV van mening dat COSI niet besloten zou moeten vergaderen, maar dat alle vergaderingen en documenten vrij beschikbaar moeten zijn voor alle EU-burgers?
7. Is de Commissie net als de PVV van mening dat COSI een uitermate ondemocratisch orgaan is, bijvoorbeeld omdat het zijn eigen takenpakket vaststelt, niet gecontroleerd wordt door de volksvertegenwoordiging en nimmer ter verantwoording wordt geroepen?
8. Wist de Europese Commissie ten tijde van de financiering van COSI van bovengenoemde plannen?

Antwoord van de heer Šefčovič namens de Commissie

(1 april 2014)

De Commissie is niet op de hoogte van de plannen met betrekking tot het stopzetten van auto's via afstandsbediening waarnaar het geachte Parlementslid verwijst en werkt ook niet aan een initiatief van die aard.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10605328/EU-has-secret-plan-for-police-to-remote-stop-cars.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/01/uk-fights-eu-speed-limit-devices>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001018/14
to the Commission
Patricia van der Kammen (NI)
(31 January 2014)**

Subject: System for stopping cars remotely

On 30 January 2014, the British newspaper The Telegraph reported that the European Union was secretly working on a system which would enable the police to stop cars remotely ⁽¹⁾.

1. Is the Commission aware of the report 'EU has secret plan for police to remote stop cars' ⁽²⁾?
2. Is the Commission in any way — directly or indirectly — involved in thinking, planning, policy formulation or drafting of legislation about systems for remote manipulation, driving or control of motor vehicles? If so, can the Commission list all the initiatives in this field?
3. If the answer to question 2 is negative, is the Commission aware of thinking, planning, policy formulation or drafting of legislation about systems for remote manipulation, driving or control of motor vehicles by or on behalf of other EU institutions or organisations? If so, can it list the initiatives and the organisations concerned? If not, does this mean that the Commission is suggesting that the report is not based on facts?
4. If developments are under way with the aim of remotely manipulating, driving or controlling motor vehicles, are these in any way — procedurally or technically — linked to eCall, which is also under development?
5. Does the Commission agree with the PVV that such devices would constitute a gross violation of privacy, and that, through its association with them, the EU would be taking big strides along a very Orwellian road? If not, why not?
6. Does the Commission agree with the PVV that COSI should not meet behind closed doors but that all EU citizens should have free access to all of its meetings and documents?
7. Does the Commission agree with the PVV that COSI is an extremely undemocratic body, for example because it decides its own remit, is not scrutinised by elected representatives and is never called to account?
8. When financing COSI, did the Commission know about the above plans?

**Question for written answer E-001337/14
to the Commission
Andreas Mölzer (NI)
(10 February 2014)**

Subject: Stopping cars via remote control

A working group of European public prosecutors from 'Europol Platform for Experts' has reportedly listed a number of potential future measures, including the development of automatic number plate recognition and Open Source Intelligence (for evaluating data sources on the Internet, both in relation to large events and for the purposes of crime detection). The European public prosecutors wish to develop a standard enabling cars to be stopped via remote control. The intention is that every vehicle that is offered for sale on the European market would then be equipped with this in the future.

1. What view does the Commission take of the development of automatic number plate recognition?
2. To what extent is this measure compatible with the EU data protection provisions?
3. Is the Commission aware of the plans relating to stopping cars via remote control?
4. What stance does the Commission take on this subject?

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10605328/EU-has-secret-plan-for-police-to-remote-stop-cars.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/01/uk-fights-eu-speed-limit-devices>

**Question for written answer E-002550/14
to the Commission**

Diane Dodds (NI)

(5 March 2014)

Subject: Creation of 'remote stopping' devices

It is understood that the European Network of Law Enforcement Technology Services (ENLETS) is currently investigating the feasibility of developing a 'remote stopping' device that would allow the police to disable vehicles as part of surveillance and tracking measures.

Can the Commission please provide assurances that it will oppose these types of measures, which would represent an unacceptable intrusion on the privacy of motorists across the Member States?

Joint answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission

(1 April 2014)

The Commission is not aware of the plans relating to stopping cars via remote control mentioned by the Honourable Member and is not working on any initiative of this kind.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001022/14
a la Comisión**

Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)

(31 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: El Consejo de Europa sobre el Real Decreto de Sostenibilidad del Sistema Sanitario

El pasado 29 de enero el Consejo de Europa publicaba un informe en el que consideraba el Real Decreto de Sostenibilidad del Sistema Sanitario que el Gobierno de España aprobó el pasado mes de abril de 2012 contrario a lo dispuesto en la Carta del Consejo de Europa.

En repetidas ocasiones he expresado a la Comisión Europea mi preocupación por dicha Ley. Desde mi pregunta E-005391/2013, se admite la existencia de un hueco en la legislación que permite el abandono de la salud de los migrantes. Sin embargo, la Comisión ya reconocía entonces, pese a la existencia de este vacío, la necesidad de que todos los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea «deben cumplir las obligaciones impuestas por este instrumento [el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos], en especial, el derecho a la vida».

El informe publicado por el Consejo de Europa es muy crítico y califica dicho Real Decreto del Gobierno de «regresiva legislación», afirmando que «la crisis económica no puede servir como pretexto para restringir o denegar el acceso al sistema sanitario, que afecta de una manera muy sustancial a estos derechos». El informe analizaba el periodo 2008-2011; por tanto, no plantea ningún incumplimiento por parte de España, pero advierte que, en caso de mantenerse, el Real Decreto no se podrá considerar conforme a las normas del Consejo de Europa, que han sido ratificadas por España.

¿Conoce la Comisión el citado informe publicado por el Consejo de Europa?

¿Piensa instar a España a que proteja la salud y la vida de los inmigrantes irregulares en su territorio?

¿Considera que el citado Real Decreto se ajusta a lo establecido en el artículo 168 del TFUE?

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001398/14
a la Comisión**

Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE)

(11 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Inmigrantes y acceso a la sanidad

Recientemente el Consejo de Europa ha llamado la atención al Gobierno del Reino de España por su decisión de dejar sin acceso a la sanidad a los inmigrantes en situación irregular. Esa decisión va en contra de la Carta Social Europea ratificada por España, según el Consejo de Europa. Señala dicho organismo que «los Estados firmantes de la Carta tienen obligaciones en términos de acceso a la atención sanitaria para los migrantes independientemente de su estatus de residencia». Otro de los asuntos en los que España incumple el tratado social que comparte con los países europeos es el relativo a las prestaciones por enfermedad. En este sentido, se indica que se queda en el 60 % del IPREM —el Indicador Público de Renta de Efectos Múltiples que se toma como referencia para la concesión de ayudas o subsidios—, lo que sitúa los ingresos que se obtienen por estas bajas en 4 473 euros. Esto significa que en este país se cobran unos 2 000 euros menos que en el resto de Europa en estos casos.

Según el dictamen del Comité Económico y Social Europeo de 27 de octubre de 2007 (2007/C256/22), los inmigrantes deben hacer frente a varios problemas jurídicos, lingüísticos, psicológicos o económicos, en particular cuando están en situación irregular. Esas dificultades impiden muchas veces el acceso a la sanidad. Además, según dice el Comité, esos inmigrantes se ven confrontados a problemas de salud que muchas veces son relacionados a las políticas nacionales, a la actitud de la sociedad frente a la inmigración, así que a otros factores determinantes para la salud, como la educación, el empleo y el alojamiento. En su resolución de 22 de abril de 2009 (2008/2331(INI), el Parlamento Europeo pedía a los Estados miembros que garanticen los derechos fundamentales de los inmigrantes, que estén en situación regular o no.

¿Conoce la Comisión la opinión del Consejo de Europa? ¿Qué opinión le merece?

¿Considera la Comisión que el Gobierno del Reino de España está cumpliendo en este caso las obligaciones impuestas por los Tratados firmados?

¿Piensa la Comisión hacer un seguimiento del dictamen del Comité Económico y Social y la resolución del Parlamento europeo y pedir a los Estados miembros que los cumplan?

¿Debería el Reino de España adoptar medidas para cumplir la Carta Social Europea?

Respuesta conjunta de la Sra. Malmström en nombre de la Comisión*(4 de abril de 2014)*

La Comisión remite a Sus Señorías a su respuesta a la pregunta escrita P-011320/2013 ⁽¹⁾. El artículo 168 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la UE dispone que «se garantizará un alto nivel de protección de la salud humana». El artículo 35 de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la UE establece que «Toda persona tiene derecho a acceder a la prevención sanitaria y a beneficiarse de la atención sanitaria».

Con arreglo a su artículo 51, la Carta obliga a los Estados miembros cuando aplican el Derecho de la Unión. Parece que en el asunto al que hacen referencia Sus Señorías, los Estados miembros no actúan conforme a la aplicación del Derecho de la Unión de conformidad con el citado artículo. Corresponde por tanto a los Estados miembros garantizar que se respetan sus obligaciones en cuanto a los derechos fundamentales derivadas, en particular, del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos (cuyo artículo 2 garantiza el derecho a la vida), de la Carta Social Europea del Consejo de Europa (cuyo artículo 11 garantiza el derecho a la protección de la salud) y de su legislación interna. La Comisión es consciente de las conclusiones adoptadas el 29 de enero de 2014 por el Comité europeo de derechos sociales sobre la aplicación de la Carta Social Europea en España.

Los artículos 14, apartado 1, letra b), y 16, apartado 3, de la Directiva de retorno ⁽²⁾ obligan a los Estados miembros a proporcionar atención sanitaria de urgencia y tratamiento básico de las enfermedades a los inmigrantes irregulares sujetos a procedimientos de retorno. A este respecto, le remito a la respuesta de la Comisión a la pregunta escrita P-05506/2013 ⁽³⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-011320&language=ES>

⁽²⁾ Directiva 2008/115/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 16 de diciembre de 2008, relativa a normas y procedimientos comunes en los Estados miembros para el retorno de los nacionales de terceros países en situación irregular; DO L 348 de 24.12.2008, p. 98-107.

⁽³⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-005506&language=ES>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001022/14
to the Commission
Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)
(31 January 2014)**

Subject: Council of Europe report on the Royal Decree-Law on the Sustainability of the National Health System

On 29 January last the Council of Europe published a report on the Royal Decree-Law on the Sustainability of the National Health System, which was promulgated by the Spanish Government in April 2012, and which is contrary to the Council of Europe's Charter.

I have expressed my concern about this law to the European Commission on many occasions. Since my Question E-005391/2013 the existence of a gap in legislation is admitted, which allows migrants' healthcare to be abandoned. However, despite the existence of this vacuum, the Commission then recognised the need for all EU Member States to 'fulfil the obligations imposed by this instrument [the European Convention on Human Rights], notably the right to life.'

The report published by the Council of Europe is very critical and calls the aforementioned Royal Decree-Law of the Spanish Government 'regressive legislation' and states that 'the financial crisis cannot serve as a pretext for restricting or refusing access to the healthcare system, which has a very significant effect on these rights'. The report analysed the period from 2008 to 2011 and, accordingly, does not suggest any breach by Spain, although it does warn that, if it is not amended, the Royal Decree-Law cannot be considered to comply with the rules of the Council of Europe, which have been ratified by Spain.

Is the Commission aware of the aforementioned report published by the Council of Europe?

Is it considering calling on Spain to protect the lives and health of irregular immigrants within its territory?

Does it consider that the said Royal Decree-Law complies with the provisions of Article 168 of the TFEU?

**Question for written answer E-001398/14
to the Commission
Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE)
(11 February 2014)**

Subject: Immigrants and access to healthcare

The Council of Europe recently called the Spanish Government to book for its decision to deny irregular immigrants access to healthcare. According to the Council of Europe, this decision contravenes the European Social Charter. It points out that 'the States Parties to the Charter have positive obligations in terms of access to healthcare for migrants, whatever their residence status'. Sickness benefit is another area in which Spain is failing to meet its obligations under the social treaty, which it shares with other European countries. This benefit currently amounts to 60% of the IPREM (the Spanish public income indicator used as a reference amount for the calculation of benefits) and stands at EUR 4 473 per year. This means that persons receiving sickness benefit in Spain receive EUR 2 000 less than their counterparts elsewhere in Europe.

According to the European Economic and Social Committee's report of 27 October 2007 (2007/C256/22), immigrants face numerous legal, linguistic, psychological and economic problems, particularly when they are in an irregular situation. These difficulties often obstruct their access to healthcare. Furthermore, as the Committee points out, these immigrants face health problems which are often linked to national policies, society's attitude to immigration and other factors with an impact on health, such as education, employment and housing. In its resolution of 22 April 2009 (2008/2331(INI), Parliament asked the Member States to guarantee the fundamental rights of immigrants, regardless of their legal status.

Is the Commission aware of the Council of Europe's opinion? What is its response?

Does the Commission consider that the Spanish Government is, in this respect, meeting its obligations as a signatory to the Treaties?

Does the Commission intend to follow up the Economic and Social Committee's opinion and the European Parliament's resolution by urging Member States to comply with their obligations?

Should Spain take steps to comply with the European Social Charter?

Joint answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission*(4 April 2014)*

The Commission would refer the Honourable Members to its answer to Written Question P-011 320/2013 ⁽¹⁾. Art. 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU states that a 'high level of human health protection shall be ensured'. Art. 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU stipulates that 'everyone has the right of access to preventive healthcare and the right to benefit from medical treatment'.

According to its Art. 51, the Charter is addressed to the Member States when they are implementing Union Law. It appears that in the matter referred to by the Honourable Members the Member States do not act in the course of implementation of Union law within the meaning of Art. 51 of the Charter. It is thus for Member States to ensure that their obligations regarding fundamental rights, resulting notably from the European Convention on Human Rights, whose Art. 2 guarantees the right to life, from the European Social Charter of the Council of Europe, whose Art. 11 guarantees the right to protection of health, and from their internal legislation are respected. The Commission is aware of the conclusions adopted on 29 January 2014 by the European Committee of Social Rights on the application of the European Social Charter by Spain.

When irregular migrants are subject to return procedures under the Return Directive ⁽²⁾, Art. 14(1)(b) and 16(3) of this directive oblige Member States to provide emergency healthcare and essential treatment of illness. In this respect, reference is made to the Commission's answer to Written Question P-05 506/2013 ⁽³⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-011320&language=EN>

⁽²⁾ Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals; OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, pp. 98-107.

⁽³⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-005506&language=EN>

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001028/14
a la Comisión**

Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE)

(31 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Contaminación química de las aguas

El documento de la Comisión de 2012 titulado «Plan para salvaguardar los recursos hídricos de Europa» señala que se desconoce el nivel de contaminación por compuestos químicos del 40 % de las masas de agua de la Unión.

Entre los compuestos sobre los que se desconoce en gran medida la gravedad de la contaminación se encuentran los plaguicidas, los compuestos perfluorados, las sustancias ignífugas, determinados medicamentos y los interruptores endocrinos como el bisfenol A y los ftalatos.

Por otra parte, el acceso de la ciudadanía a los datos disponibles sobre el estado químico de las aguas es insuficiente; en algunos casos, nulo.

La situación parece preocupante.

¿Considera la Comisión necesario establecer algún tipo de protocolo estandarizado y de obligado cumplimiento para monitorear y controlar la calidad química de las aguas?

¿Considera la Comisión necesario ampliar la lista de sustancias bajo control mediante la inclusión de los contaminantes emergentes, como pueden ser los compuestos perfluorados, determinados medicamentos (ibuprofeno, cloranfenicol o estrógenos) y los interruptores endocrinos como el bisfenol A?

¿Impulsará la Comisión medidas para garantizar el acceso de la ciudadanía a los datos sobre el estado químico de las aguas?

Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión

(13 de marzo de 2014)

En relación con los contaminantes químicos presentes en las aguas superficiales, tanto la Directiva marco sobre el agua (DMA) ⁽¹⁾ como la Directiva sobre normas de calidad ambiental (DNCA) ⁽²⁾ especifican cómo deben ser los controles que tienen que realizar los Estados miembros y cómo se deben comunicar los resultados correspondientes. El porcentaje que cita Su Señoría de masas de agua cuyo estado químico se desconoce se refiere al estado comunicado en los primeros planes hidrológicos de cuenca de los Estados miembros, que la Comisión ha evaluado. La situación está mejorando y, mediante el seguimiento de las evaluaciones, la Comisión pretende garantizar que, gracias a esos controles, siga mejorando el cumplimiento de la DMA, de manera que ese porcentaje se reduzca considerablemente y que los Estados miembros adopten medidas para lograr un buen estado químico.

El Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo han adoptado recientemente una Directiva que modifica la DMA y la DNCA en lo que se refiere a la lista de las denominadas sustancias prioritarias en el agua, en particular añadiendo doce más ⁽³⁾. Ya ha dado comienzo la siguiente revisión de la lista, y se tendrán en cuenta los datos más recientes sobre sustancias tales como las mencionadas en la pregunta que podría considerarse que presentan un riesgo significativo para el medio acuático o por su propagación a través del agua.

La DMA exige a los Estados miembros que comuniquen en sus planes hidrológicos de cuenca información sobre el estado químico y que, para ello, celebren consultas con la población. La Comisión hace públicos esos datos a través del Sistema de Información sobre el Agua para Europa (WISE) ⁽⁴⁾. La DNCA modificada obliga a los Estados miembros a publicar sus planes hidrológicos de cuenca por medios electrónicos.

⁽¹⁾ Directiva 2000/60/CE (DO L 327 de 22.12.2000).

⁽²⁾ Directiva 2008/105/CE (DO L 348 de 24.12.2008).

⁽³⁾ Directiva 2013/39/UE (DO L 226 de 24.8.2013).

⁽⁴⁾ WISE <http://water.europa.eu/> y Surface Water Viewer <http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/water/interactive/soe-wfd/wfd-surface-water-viewer>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001028/14
to the Commission**
Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE)
(31 January 2014)

Subject: Chemical pollution of water

The Commission's 2012 document entitled 'Blueprint to safeguard Europe's water resources' states that the level of contamination by chemical compounds of 40% of EU water bodies is unknown.

The chemicals whose polluting effects are largely unknown include pesticides, perfluorocarbon compounds, fire-resistant substances, certain medicines and endocrine disruptors such as Bisphenol A and phthalates.

Furthermore, access by individuals to the available data on the chemical status of waters is insufficient, and in some cases non-existent.

The situation appears to be worrying.

Does the Commission consider it necessary to establish some kind of standardised protocol of obligatory compliance to monitor and control the chemical quality of EU waters?

Does the Commission consider it necessary to extend the list of controlled substances to include emergent pollutants such as perfluorocarbon compounds, certain medicines (Ibuprofen, Chloramphenicol and oestrogens) and endocrine disruptors such as Bisphenol A?

Will the Commission promote measures to guarantee access by citizens to data on the chemical status of waters?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

For chemical pollutants in surface waters, the Water Framework Directive (WFD) ⁽¹⁾ and the Environmental Quality Standards Directive (EQSD) ⁽²⁾ together specify the monitoring that Member States should do, and how they should report the results. The mentioned percentage of water bodies of unknown chemical status relates to the status reported in the Member States' first River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs), which the Commission has been assessing. The situation is improving, and in following up the assessments the Commission aims to ensure that monitoring further improves compliance with the WFD requirements such that the percentage of unknowns declines significantly, and that Member States apply measures to achieve good chemical status.

The European Parliament and the Council recently adopted a directive amending the WFD and EQSD as regards the list of so-called priority substances in water, including by the addition of 12 substances ⁽³⁾. The next review of the list has begun, and will consider the latest available evidence on substances, such as those mentioned in the question, that might be identified as posing a significant risk to or via the aquatic environment.

The WFD requires Member States to report chemical status information in their RBMPs, on which the public must be consulted. The Commission makes the information available via the Water Information System for Europe ⁽⁴⁾. The amended EQSD requires Member States to make their RBMPs accessible to the public electronically.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2000/60/EC, OJ 22.12.2000 L 327/1.

⁽²⁾ Directive 2008/105/EC, OJ 24.12.2008 L 348/84.

⁽³⁾ Directive 2013/39/EC, OJ 24.8.2013 L 226/1.

⁽⁴⁾ WISE <http://water.europa.eu/> and Surface Water Viewer <http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/water/interactive/soe-wfd/wfd-surface-water-viewer>

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001032/14
à la Commission
Françoise Castex (S&D)
(31 janvier 2014)

Objet: Éventuel conflit entre la directive 95/46/CE et la loi Bertrand

Le 21 mai 2013, le gouvernement français a publié le décret d'application de la disposition de la loi relative au renforcement de la sécurité sanitaire du médicament et des produits de santé (dite «Loi Bertrand») relative à la transparence des avantages consentis par les entreprises produisant des produits de santé.

Sa mise en application implique un champ tellement large que des secteurs auxiliaires sont désormais également dans l'obligation de divulguer des données privées, impliquant sans doute la directive 95/46/CE sur la protection des données privées.

Nous interrogeons donc la Commission sur plusieurs points concernant l'existence d'un éventuel conflit entre la directive 95/46/CE et la loi Bertrand.

1. La Commission et en particulier les directions générales compétentes (Santé et consommateurs, Justice) sont-elles au courant de ce dispositif français?
2. À la lecture du texte et de son décret d'application, la loi Bertrand est-elle pour la Commission conforme aux exigences de la directive 95/46/CE?
3. La Commission trouve-t-elle fondées les craintes d'opérateurs européens, non français, qui pourraient se trouver mis en cause par leurs autorités nationales sur le plan de la protection des données privées, à la suite du transfert de ces données à des tiers?

Réponse donnée par M^{me} Reding au nom de la Commission
(31 mars 2014)

La Commission a connaissance de la législation française en question ⁽¹⁾, ainsi que du décret d'application auxquels fait référence l'Honorable Parlementaire dans sa question ⁽²⁾.

La Commission tient à confirmer que certaines des données qui devront être rendues publiques, conformément aux dispositions susmentionnées, sont des données à caractère personnel et que leur traitement, au sens de ces dispositions, entre dans le champ d'application de la directive 95/46/CE ⁽³⁾.

La directive 95/46/CE précise les situations dans lesquelles les données à caractère personnel peuvent être traitées ⁽⁴⁾. Le traitement de ces données est autorisé, entre autres, lorsqu'il est nécessaire pour respecter une obligation légale à laquelle le responsable du traitement est soumis ⁽⁵⁾ ou dans le cadre de l'exécution d'une mission d'intérêt public ou relevant de l'exercice de l'autorité publique dont est investi le responsable du traitement ou le tiers à qui les données sont communiquées ⁽⁶⁾.

D'après les informations disponibles, la Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés ⁽⁷⁾ (CNIL) a été consultée sur le projet de décret d'application et elle a rendu son avis le 21 mars 2013. Certains éléments de ce projet ont été modifiés par la suite ⁽⁸⁾. La CNIL sera également consultée sur le projet de décision du ministre français de la santé précisant, entre autres, les conditions de fonctionnement du site internet sur lequel les données seront rendues publiques ainsi que celles de l'autorité responsable de ce site.

⁽¹⁾ LOI n° 2011-2012 du 29 décembre 2011 relative au renforcement de la sécurité sanitaire du médicament et des produits de santé.

⁽²⁾ Décret n° 2013-414 du 21 mai 2013 relatif à la transparence des avantages accordés par les entreprises produisant ou commercialisant des produits à finalité sanitaire et cosmétique destinés à l'homme.

⁽³⁾ Directive du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 24 octobre 1995 relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l'égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel et de la libre circulation de ces données, JO L 281 du 23.11.1995, pp. 31-50.

⁽⁴⁾ Article 7.

⁽⁵⁾ Article 7, point c).

⁽⁶⁾ Article 7, point e).

⁽⁷⁾ Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés.

⁽⁸⁾ Par exemple, le seuil des avantages consentis qui doivent être rendus publics est porté à 10 euros, l'introduction d'une obligation d'exclure directement les données à caractère personnel identifiables de l'indexation par les moteurs de recherche.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001032/14
to the Commission
Françoise Castex (S&D)
 (31 January 2014)

Subject: Possible conflict between Directive 95/46/CE and the loi Bertrand

On 21 May 2013, the French Government published the implementing decree for the provisions of the Law on the Strengthening of Health Protection for Medicinal and Health Products (referred to as the '*Loi Bertrand*') that concern the transparency of benefits granted by companies producing health products.

Its implementation has such a broad scope that associated sectors are now also under an obligation to divulge personal data, and this will most likely fall under Directive 95/46/CE on the protection of personal data.

We would therefore like to question the Commission on several points concerning the existence of a possible conflict between Directive 95/46/CE and the *loi Bertrand*.

1. Is the Commission and, in particular, the competent Directorates-General (Health and Consumers, Justice) aware of this French legislation?
2. Upon reading the law and its implementing decree, does the Commission believe that the *loi Bertrand* is compatible with the requirements of Directive 95/46/CE?
3. Does the Commission believe that there is justification for the fears of European operators who are not French and may find themselves challenged by their national authorities in relation to the protection of personal data following the transfer of this data to third parties?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
 (31 March 2014)

The Commission is aware of the French legislation in question ⁽¹⁾ and of the implementing decree which the Honourable MEP mentions in her question ⁽²⁾.

The Commission would like to confirm that some of the data that will have to be made public under the abovementioned provisions are personal data and their processing, as envisaged in those provisions, falls within the scope of Directive 95/46/EC ⁽³⁾.

Directive 95/46/EC specifies the circumstances when personal data may be processed ⁽⁴⁾. Processing could take place *inter alia* when it is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject ⁽⁵⁾ or when it is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed ⁽⁶⁾.

According to the available information, the French Data Protection Authority ⁽⁷⁾ (CNIL) has been consulted on the draft implementing decree and delivered its opinion on 21 March 2013. Certain elements of the draft decree have been amended after that ⁽⁸⁾. The CNIL will also be consulted on the draft decision of the French Health Minister specifying *inter alia* the conditions of the functioning of the website where the data will be made public and of the authority in charge of that website.

⁽¹⁾ LOI n° 2011-2012 du 29 décembre 2011 relative au renforcement de la sécurité sanitaire du médicament et des produits de santé.

⁽²⁾ Décret n°2013-414 du 21 mai 2013 relatif à la transparence des avantages accordés par les entreprises produisant ou commercialisant des produits à finalité sanitaire et cosmétique destinés à l'homme.

⁽³⁾ Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31-50.

⁽⁴⁾ Article 7.

⁽⁵⁾ Article 7(c).

⁽⁶⁾ Article 7(e).

⁽⁷⁾ Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés.

⁽⁸⁾ E.g. the threshold of communicable benefits raised to 10 EUR, introduction of an obligation to exclude directly identifiable personal data from indexation by search engines.

(Dansk udgave)

Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-001035/14
til Kommissionen
Ole Christensen (S&D)
(31. januar 2014)

Om: Hjemmebasereglene, social sikring og arbejdstagere fra tredjeland

EU vedtog i april 2013 opdateringer til nugældende forordninger ((EF) nr. 883/2004 og (EF) nr. 987/2009) om koordinering af medlemsstaternes sociale sikringsordninger.

De nye opdateringer vedrører blandt andet social sikring for flypersonale. Med reglerne bliver begrebet »hjemmebase« indført, det vil sige, at ansatte nyder de sociale forhold, som gælder i det land, hvor de begynder og slutter deres arbejde.

Flyselskabet Norwegian flyver til destinationer uden for EU og EØS-landene, herunder i Thailand.

Flyene, der skal flyve f.eks. skandinaviske passagerer til Bangkok, er indregistreret i Irland. Kabinpersonalet er imidlertid fra Thailand, men lejes igennem Adecco i Thailand og anvendes som arbejdskraft på Norwegians langdistanceflyvninger mellem Europa og Asien. Piloterne er europæere, der ansættes som selvstændige entreprenører (self-employed contractors) i Singapore og udstationeres i Bangkok. Alle arbejdsretlige love og regler følger Singapore.

På baggrund af ovenstående bedes Kommissionen vurdere, om denne konstruktion, hvor kabinpersonalet og piloterne arbejder på fly, der er indregistrerede i EU, men hvor reglerne for løn og social sikring følger asiatiske regler, er i strid med gældende EU-lovgivning?

Desuden vil jeg bede Kommissionen vurdere, om kabinpersonalet, ligesom piloterne, ikke burde have arbejds- og opholdstilladelse i EU, når de arbejder på fly, der er registrerede i EU?

Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af László Andor
(9. april 2014)

1. I overensstemmelse med EU-lovgivningen om koordinering af de sociale sikringsordninger for så vidt angår EU-borgere med bopæl i EU, skal den kompetente nationale myndighed fastslå, om EU-lovgivningen finder anvendelse i forbindelse med flyvninger, der påbegyndes og/eller afsluttes i EU. EU har ingen kompetence med hensyn til løn.

Parterne i en grænseoverskridende ansættelsesaftale kan i princippet frit vælge den lov, der finder anvendelse på ansættelsesforholdet. Forordning (EF) nr. 593/2008 ⁽¹⁾ finder anvendelse, når en sag ved en tvist mellem parterne forelægges for en ret i en medlemsstat. Uanset lovvalget kan en arbejdstager dog under visse omstændigheder være beskyttet af gunstigere ansættelsesvilkår, som finder anvendelse i det land, hvor eller hvorfra den pågældende sædvanligvis udfører sit arbejde, eller, hvis et sådant ikke foreligger, det land, hvor det forretningssted, som har antaget arbejdstageren, er beliggende, eller, hvis et sådant ikke foreligger, loven i det land, som aftalen har sin nærmeste tilknytning til.

2. En opholdstilladelse i EU er kun nødvendig, hvis man har bopæl i EU. Desuden er det op til medlemsstaten at afgøre, hvorvidt en tredjelandstatsborger skal have en arbejdstilladelse.

⁽¹⁾ Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 593/2008 af 17. juni 2008 om lovvalgsregler for kontraktlige forpligtelser (Rom I) (EUT L 177 af 4.7.2008, s. 6).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001035/14
to the Commission
Ole Christensen (S&D)
(31 January 2014)

Subject: 'Home base' rule, social security and employees from third countries

In April 2012, the EU adopted updates to Regulations (EC) Nos 883/2004 and 987/2009 on the coordination of Member States' social security systems.

The updates related *inter alia* to social security arrangements for flight crews. The rules introduced the concept of 'home base', which means that employees are covered by the social security arrangements applicable in the country in which they begin and end their work.

The airline Norwegian flies to destinations outside the EU and EEA countries, including Thailand.

The aircraft carrying, for instance, passengers from Scandinavian countries to Bangkok are registered in Ireland. Cabin crew personnel now come from Thailand; they are hired via Adecco in Thailand and work on Norwegian's long-haul flights between Europe and Asia. The pilots are Europeans who are engaged as self-employed contractors in Singapore and are based in Bangkok. All employment-related matters are governed by Singaporean legislation and regulations.

In the light of the above, does the Commission consider that this contrivance — cabin crews and pilots working on aircraft registered in the EU, but on the basis of pay and social security arrangements governed by Asian rules — breaches EC law?

Furthermore, does the Commission consider that both cabin crew personnel and pilots should have a work and residence permit in the EU if they are working on aircraft registered in the EU?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2014)

1. Under the EU legislation on social security coordination as regards EU citizens residing in the EU, the competent national authority is to determine whether the EU legislation applies as regards flights starting and/or ending in the EU. The EU has no competence as regards pay.

Parties to a cross-border employment contract are in principle free to choose the law governing their employment relationship. Regulation 593/2008/EC⁽¹⁾ will apply where, in the event of a dispute between the parties, the case is referred to a court in a Member State. However, irrespective of the law chosen, an employee may in certain circumstances be protected by more favourable employment conditions applicable in the country where or from which he or she habitually carries out his or her work, or, failing that, the country where the place of business through which the employee was engaged is located, or failing that, the law of the country with which the contract is most closely connected.

2. A residence permit in the EU is necessary only if one resides in the EU. Moreover, it is for the Member State to decide whether or not a third-country national needs a work permit.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 6.

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001038/14
à la Commission**

Catherine Grèze (Verts/ALE)

(31 janvier 2014)

Objet: Projet Aqua Domitia contraire à la directive-cadre sur l'eau

La directive-cadre sur l'eau (2000/60/CE) poursuit plusieurs objectifs tels que la prévention et la réduction de la pollution, la promotion d'une utilisation durable de l'eau et l'amélioration de l'état des écosystèmes aquatiques. Son objectif ultime — ambitieux mais nécessaire! — est de parvenir à un bon état écologique et chimique des eaux à l'horizon 2015, ce bon état s'appréciant à la fois d'un point de vue qualitatif et quantitatif.

En Languedoc-Roussillon, le projet Aqua Domitia est un programme global d'adducteurs composé de cinq maillons (Val d'Hérault, Biterrois, Nord et Ouest Montpellier, Littoral Audois et Minervois), visant à détourner l'eau du Rhône pour irriguer le Languedoc-Roussillon. Le coût de construction de ce réseau est évalué à 140 millions d'euros, auquel il convient d'ajouter une somme équivalente pour la réalisation des réseaux secondaires assurée par des maîtrises d'ouvrage locales à structurer.

Il y a lieu de s'interroger sur la compatibilité du projet Aqua Domitia avec la directive-cadre sur l'eau. Dans son état actuel, Aqua Domitia semble surtout répondre à une politique de l'offre, visant à satisfaire des besoins en eau grandissants, du fait d'une agriculture intensive, de l'abandon des cépages méditerranéens résistants au stress hydrique, de l'irrigation de golfs à «pelouse anglaise» sous climat méditerranéen, et du changement climatique. Pourtant, les objectifs fixés au niveau européen ne pourront être atteints sans véritable politique de réduction des consommations en eau. Cette réflexion sur les besoins doit être initiée sur tous les postes de dépense, notamment l'agriculture, qui ne représente pas moins de 24 % des prélèvements d'eau à l'échelle européenne.

Par ailleurs, d'après les conclusions du débat public qui s'est tenu en 2012, «si l'état écologique général de ce fleuve (Rhône) est plutôt satisfaisant, son état chimique l'est beaucoup moins en raison de la présence de polluants toxiques à caractère diffus, notamment des résidus médicamenteux dont les effets synergiques sont inconnus à ce jour». Cette pollution pourrait progressivement contaminer durablement les ressources en eau du Languedoc-Roussillon en traversant les karsts (calcaires) très perméables et en gagnant les aquifères.

1. La Commission est-elle informée de ce projet?
2. Des fonds européens vont-ils être attribués au projet alors qu'il va à l'encontre de la directive-cadre sur l'eau?

Réponse donnée par M. Potočník au nom de la Commission

(4 avril 2014)

La Commission n'ignore pas que le projet Aqua Domitia vise à détourner l'eau du Rhône pour irriguer la région du Languedoc-Roussillon. Selon les informations disponibles, le projet a fait l'objet d'un débat public qui a pris fin en avril 2012.

En ce qui concerne le respect de la directive-cadre sur l'eau (DCE) ⁽¹⁾, un transfert pourrait conduire à de nouvelles modifications des caractéristiques physiques de la masse d'eau donneuse et entraîner une dégradation du statut de cette dernière. Si tel est le cas, le projet ne pourrait être réalisé que si toutes les conditions énoncées à l'article 4, paragraphe 7, de la directive sont remplies. En particulier, le projet devrait être explicitement pris en compte dans le plan de gestion du district hydrographique, avec la justification du respect des dispositions de l'article 4, paragraphe 7. Des crédits du Fonds européen agricole pour le développement rural (Feader) n'ont été utilisés que pour la construction de réseaux d'irrigation secondaires reliant le projet Aqua Domitia aux exploitations agricoles.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2000/60/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 23 octobre 2000 établissant un cadre pour une politique communautaire dans le domaine de l'eau (JO L 327 du 22.12.2000).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001038/14
to the Commission
Catherine Grèze (Verts/ALE)
(31 January 2014)

Subject: Aqua Domitia project incompatible with the Water Framework Directive

The Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) has a number of objectives, including preventing and reducing pollution, promoting a sustainable use of water and improving the status of aquatic ecosystems. Its ultimate objective — ambitious but necessary — is to achieve a good ecological and chemical status for waters by 2015, from both a qualitative and a quantitative point of view.

The Aqua Domitia project is a global water distribution programme that comprises five links (Val d'Hérault, Biterrois, North and West Montpellier, the Audois Coast and Minervois) aimed at diverting water from the Rhône in order to irrigate the Languedoc-Roussillon region. The cost of constructing this network is estimated at 140 million euro. To this must be added an equivalent sum for construction of the secondary networks, to be undertaken by local contracting authorities as yet to be established.

There is reason to question whether the Aqua Domitia project is compatible with the Water Framework Directive. In its current state, Aqua Domitia seems above all to respond to a supply-side policy aimed at meeting the increasing need for water due to intensive agriculture, the decline in use of Mediterranean grape varieties resistant to water stress, the irrigation of 'English lawn-style' golf courses in a Mediterranean climate and climate change. And yet the European-level objectives will not be achieved without an effective policy of reducing water consumption. This reflection on needs must be conducted for all areas of expenditure, particularly agriculture, which accounts for no less than 24% of all the water abstracted in Europe.

Moreover, according to the conclusions of the public consultation that took place in 2012, 'Although the general ecological status of this river (the Rhône) is more or less satisfactory, its chemical status is far less so due to the presence of diffuse toxic pollutants, particularly medicinal residues, the synergistic effects of which are as yet unknown.' This pollution could gradually contaminate the Languedoc-Roussillon's water resources in the long-term, by crossing highly permeable karsts (limestone) and entering the aquifers.

1. Is the Commission aware of this project?
2. Are European funds going to be allocated to the project given that it is incompatible with the Water Framework Directive?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2014)

The Commission is aware that the Aqua Domitia project aims at diverting water from the Rhône in order to irrigate the Languedoc-Roussillon region. According to the available information, the project was subject to a public debate that ended in April 2012.

As regards compliance with the Water Framework Directive (WFD ⁽¹⁾), a transfer could lead to new modifications to the physical characteristics of the donor water body and may deteriorate its status. If this is the case, the project could only be implemented if all the conditions set out in Article 4(7) of the directive are fulfilled. In particular, the project should be explicitly included in the river basin management plan with a justification that the provisions of Art. 4(7) are fulfilled. Funding from the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) has been used only to construct the secondary irrigation networks connecting the Aqua Domitia project to farms.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-001048/14

an den Rat

Bernd Posselt (PPE)

(3. Februar 2014)

Betrifft: Europaschulen

Was unternimmt der Rat, um Bestrebungen entgegenzuwirken, die Rolle des katholischen oder evangelischen Religionsunterrichts an Europaschulen zu relativieren und zu schwächen, und wie kann gewährleistet werden, dass die Schüler an diesen wichtigen Einrichtungen auch künftig einen umfassenden Religionsunterricht in ihrer Muttersprache erhalten?

Antwort

(31. März 2014)

Der Rat hat die von dem Herrn Abgeordneten angesprochene Frage nie erörtert.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-001048/14
to the Council**

Bernd Posselt (PPE)

(3 February 2014)

Subject: European Schools

What is the Council doing to counteract the moves to reduce and water down the role of Catholic or Protestant religious education at the European Schools, and how can it be ensured that the pupils of these important institutions will continue in the future to receive comprehensive religious instruction in their mother tongue?

Reply

(31 March 2014)

The Council has never discussed the matter raised by the Honourable Member.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001052/14
a la Comisión**

Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)

(3 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Un solo sistema informático para la lucha contra el fraude

Hace unos días se ha difundido que un conocido ingeniero informático ha facilitado a las autoridades españolas-y probablemente también a las francesas, según los medios de comunicación franceses-un programa informático destinado a analizar las transacciones bancarias y detectar fraudes.

Ante las propuestas de consolidar un mercado único bancario, pregunto a esa Comisión:

¿No considera interesante que desde las instituciones europeas se fomente el uso del mismo programa informático en los Estados miembros para luchar contra los fraudes financieros?

Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión

(9 de abril de 2014)

Su Señoría pregunta a la Comisión si la adopción de un programa informático común para combatir el fraude financiero mediante el análisis de las transacciones bancarias y la detección de fraudes sería beneficiosa para las instituciones europeas.

Están muy desarrollados en Europa los programas informáticos diseñados para analizar las operaciones bancarias, sobre todo como consecuencia de los requisitos de la lucha contra el blanqueo de capitales, que hacen obligatorio el análisis de las transacciones bancarias y el seguimiento de un posible blanqueo o financiación de actividades terroristas.

La Comisión cree que ampliar este control de forma que detecte el fraude financiero, de no existir ya, sería, en efecto, ventajoso, sin perjuicio de las normas en materia de protección de datos, por supuesto. No obstante, incumbe a cada institución y órgano europeo o nacional decidir y escoger los programas informáticos que mejor se adapten a sus necesidades y su misión, ya que el fraude financiero puede producirse en situaciones diversas y un solo programa informático podría no cubrir todos los casos posibles.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001052/14
to the Commission**

Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)

(3 February 2014)

Subject: A single computer system for combating fraud

A few days ago it was reported that a well-known computer engineer has provided the Spanish authorities — and probably the French too, if stories in the French media are to be believed — with a computer program designed to analyse bank transactions and detect fraud.

In view of the proposals to set up a single banking market, I would like to ask the Commission the following:

Does it not think that it would be advantageous for the European institutions to implement the same computer program in order to combat financial fraud?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(9 April 2014)

The Honourable Member asks the Commission whether the implementation of a common computer programme in order to combat financial fraud by analysing bank transactions and detecting fraud cases would be advantageous for the European institutions.

Softwares designed to analyse banking transactions are well developed in Europe, notably as a result of the anti-money laundering requirements which make mandatory the analysis of bank transactions and the tracking of potential money laundering or financing of terrorism activities.

The Commission believes that extending this tracking in order to detect financial fraud, if not already in place, would be indeed advantageous, subject of course to applicable data protection rules. However, it is for each institution and authority at European or national level to decide and choose the software that best suits their needs and mandate since financial fraud can take place in various different scenarios and one software might not cover all potential cases.

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001054/14
à la Commission (Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante)**

Rachida Dati (PPE)

(3 février 2014)

Objet: VP/HR — Mission EULEX Kosovo

La mission EULEX Kosovo est une mission de l'Union européenne qui vise à renforcer l'État de droit au Kosovo. Son objectif est d'aider les autorités kosovares dans les domaines de la justice, de la police, des services pénitentiaires ainsi que des douanes. 2 500 personnes sont mobilisées pour cette mission depuis 2008, année de sa création, ce qui en fait la mission de l'UE la plus importante lancée dans le cadre de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense.

Son mandat actuel doit expirer en juin 2014. Cette mission doit être prolongée mais, selon Mme Ashton, haute représentante de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité, elle sera rebaptisée, ses effectifs devraient être largement réduits et la plupart de ses prérogatives lui seront enlevées.

Cette annonce est problématique: la situation du Kosovo n'est pas assez satisfaisante pour clore la mission EULEX Kosovo. La Commission européenne a publié un rapport en octobre dernier, où elle s'inquiète de la persistance des problèmes liés au crime organisé ou à la corruption. Cette mission devrait donc continuer après 2016.

C'est pourquoi je demande à la haute représentante pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité de me donner les raisons précises de l'affaiblissement puis de l'arrêt prochain de la mission EULEX au Kosovo, alors que ce pays nécessite plus que jamais notre aide pour installer un État de droit stable et démocratique.

Réponse donnée par la haute représentante/vice-présidente Ashton au nom de la Commission

(13 mai 2014)

Depuis le déploiement de la mission EULEX Kosovo en 2008, les capacités locales du Kosovo ont progressé. Les liens entre l'UE et le Kosovo se sont aussi enrichis depuis 2008. En voici des exemples: dialogue mené entre Belgrade et Pristina avec la médiation de l'UE et instruments supplémentaires mis en œuvre pour l'instauration de l'État de droit; en plus de la mission EULEX, un RSUE/chef de bureau de l'UE; négociations en vue de la conclusion d'un accord de stabilisation et d'association lancées en octobre 2013, avec réunions régulières du dialogue sur le processus de stabilisation et d'association, du dialogue sur les visas et du dialogue structuré de haut niveau sur l'État de droit, ce dernier étant mené par la Commission.

Vu ce contexte, l'objectif de l'examen stratégique répond à la nouvelle situation, en particulier dans le nord du pays. Un recalibrage de la présence d'EULEX est nécessaire et doit prendre en compte les problématiques qui subsistent. L'examen stratégique de la mission EULEX Kosovo a été présenté aux États membres au sein du Comité politique et de sécurité en février 2014.

L'examen propose de maintenir le mandat d'EULEX au Kosovo mais en opérant davantage une nette distinction entre les activités, en fonction des besoins (le nord du Kosovo étant doté de personnel d'exécution compte tenu de la mise en œuvre des accords et de la sécurité, les institutions centrales et le reste du Kosovo bénéficiant davantage d'un renforcement des capacités).

Le mandat d'EULEX expire le 14 juin 2014 et l'examen stratégique propose de le prolonger jusqu'en juin 2016. La mission EULEX Kosovo conservera son nom actuel.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001054/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Rachida Dati (PPE)

(3 February 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — EULEX Kosovo mission

The EULEX Kosovo mission is a European Union mission that aims to strengthen the rule of law in Kosovo. Its objective is to assist the Kosovan authorities in the areas of justice, policing, prison services and customs. Since 2008, when it was established, 2 500 people have been mobilised for the purposes of this mission, which makes it the most significant EU mission launched under the auspices of the European security and defence policy.

Its current mandate is due to expire in June 2014. This mission is to be extended but, according to Baroness Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, it will be renamed, its staff will be greatly reduced and most of its powers will be taken away from it.

This announcement is problematic: the situation in Kosovo is not sufficiently satisfactory for the EULEX Kosovo mission to be brought to an end. Last October, the European Commission published a report in which it expressed concern about the persistence of problems associated with organised crime and corruption. This mission should therefore continue beyond 2016.

This is why I am asking the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to provide me with the precise reasons why the EULEX mission in Kosovo is being weakened and will then be brought to an end at a time when that country has more need than ever of our help in establishing a stable and democratic state in which the rule of law is respected.

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(13 May 2014)

Since the deployment of EULEX Kosovo Mission in 2008, progress has been made in Kosovo local capacity. The EU-Kosovo relationship is also richer since 2008: EU-facilitated Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina and more instruments to work on Rule of Law apart from EULEX Mission: an EUSR/Head of the EU Office, negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) started in October 2013 — with regular Stabilisation and Association Process Dialogue (SAPD) meetings, Visa Dialogue and a Commission led High level ‘Structured Dialogue on Rule of Law’.

Given this context, the objective of the Strategic Review is responding to the new situation especially in the north. A recalibrated EULEX presence is needed, taking into account remaining challenges. Strategic Review of the EULEX Kosovo Mission was presented to Member States in Political and Security Committee in February 2014.

The Review proposes to keep a Kosovo wide mandate for EULEX but with clear distinction of activities depending on the different needs (north Kosovo more executive in the context of agreements implementation and security, central institutions/rest of Kosovo more capacity building).

EULEX’s mandate expires on 14 June 2014 and the Strategic Review proposes to extend its mandate until June 2016. EULEX Kosovo Mission will keep its current name.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001055/14
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(3 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: Clausole «Most Favoured Nation» e tutela delle aziende del settore alberghiero europeo

Lo scorso novembre, la Confederazione europea degli imprenditori del settore alberghiero (Hotrec), della quale la Federalberghi italiana è socio fondatore, ha chiesto ufficialmente alle agenzie viaggi online (dette anche OLTA — On Line Travel Agencies), di annullare le clausole della «nazione più favorita» (MFN — Most Favoured Nation) presenti nei contratti attualmente in vigore e di astenersi in futuro dall'uso di tali clausole in nuovi contratti. Secondo l'Hotrec, infatti, le agenzie di viaggio online sfruttano il proprio potere di mercato per obbligare gli hotel ad accettare queste clausole, negando ai cittadini europei la possibilità di godere di tutti i benefici della libera concorrenza.

A causa delle clausole MFN, gli hotel non possono offrire nessun tipo di incentivo esclusivo di prenotazione ai propri ospiti: ad esempio, non possono pubblicare sul proprio sito internet un prezzo finale di vendita inferiore a quello che figura sui siti internet degli intermediari. Le autorità garanti della concorrenza hanno avviato un'analisi delle clausole MFN usate dalle OLTA in Austria, Francia, Germania, Ungheria, Norvegia, Svezia, Svizzera e Regno Unito; le informazioni ad oggi disponibili indicano che tali clausole tendono ad essere viste come violazioni delle leggi nazionali e comunitarie e, quindi, sono da ritenersi illegali e nulle.

La Commissione:

1. è a conoscenza di questa circostanza?
2. Intende indagare il fenomeno e prendere i dovuti provvedimenti?
3. Come intende tutelare le aziende alberghiere, soprattutto le PMI del settore, cui viene impedito di svolgere liberamente il proprio ruolo attraverso comportamenti restrittivi della concorrenza?

**Risposta di Joaquín Almunia a nome della Commissione
(14 aprile 2014)**

La Commissione è a conoscenza delle preoccupazioni di albergatori relativa all'uso delle clausole della «nazione più favorita» da parte delle agenzie di viaggio online (OLTA).

Anche se per il momento la Commissione non ha avviato un'indagine nel settore delle prenotazioni online, sta raccogliendo informazioni e sentendo il parere delle varie parti interessate, compresi i rappresentanti dell'industria alberghiera.

Inoltre, la Commissione ha avuto frequenti discussioni negli ultimi mesi con le autorità nazionali garanti della concorrenza, dotate anch'esse del potere di applicare le norme di concorrenza dell'UE e in effetti diverse autorità nazionali hanno avviato indagini in merito. Le autorità britanniche e tedesche hanno di recente emesso decisioni ottenendo la modifica dei contratti utilizzati dalle agenzie di viaggio online. Secondo la decisione del Regno Unito relativa agli «impegni», gli alberghi e le agenzie di viaggio online possono ora offrire sconti ai clienti fedeli; il che rende meno restrittiva la clausola della «nazione più favorita». In Germania, è stato vietato all'agenzia di viaggio online HRS.com di utilizzare le clausole della «nazione più favorita» e il Bundeskartellamt sta attualmente indagando su tali clausole utilizzate da Expedia e Booking.com.

Considerate le differenze nella struttura del settore alberghiero tra gli Stati membri, è più opportuno che siano le autorità nazionali ad indagare su restrizioni che potrebbero ripercuotersi sul proprio territorio. La Commissione continuerà a garantire che le norme europee in materia di concorrenza siano applicate in modo coerente in questo settore, come in altri, e continua a sorvegliare la situazione.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001055/14
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(3 February 2014)

Subject: 'Most Favoured Nation' clauses and protection of hoteliers in Europe

Last November, Hotrec, the umbrella association of hotels, restaurants and cafés in Europe, of which the Italian hospitality association Federalberghi is a founding member, officially called on online travel agencies (OLTAs) to void 'Most Favoured Nation' (MFN) clauses across all agreements where such clauses exist and to forego future use of the clauses in new agreements. According to Hotrec, online travel agencies abuse their market dominance to force hoteliers into accepting MFN clauses, denying European customers the opportunity to enjoy the full benefits of competition.

Under the regime of MFN clauses, hotels may not offer any kind of booking incentive exclusively to their direct guests. For example, a hotel cannot advertise on its website a final selling price that undercuts the prices offered on brokers' websites. Competition authorities have begun an investigation into MFN clauses as used by OLTAs in Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and the information available to date indicates that these clauses tend to be seen as breaches of national and European laws and, therefore, are to be considered illegal and void.

1. Is the Commission aware of these facts?
2. Does the Commission intend to look into the situation and take appropriate measures?
3. How does the Commission intend to protect hoteliers, especially SMEs in the industry, who are being prevented from operating freely by the restrictive practices of the competition?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission
(14 April 2014)

The Commission is aware of the concerns of hoteliers relating to the use of Most Favoured Nation clauses by online travel agents.

The Commission does not currently have an investigation open in the online booking sector. However, it is conducting a fact-finding exercise and listening to the views of a range of stakeholders, including representatives of the hotel industry.

In addition, the Commission has had frequent discussions in recent months with the national competition authorities, which also have the power to apply the European competition rules and indeed a number of national authorities have ongoing investigations into this matter. The UK and German authorities have recently issued decisions and have obtained changes in the contracts used by OLTAs. The UK's commitments decision means that hotels and OLTAs may now offer discounts to loyal customers; this makes the MFN clause less restrictive. In Germany, online travel agent HRS.com has been forbidden from using MFN clauses and the Bundeskartellamt is now investigating the MFN clauses of Expedia and Booking.com.

Certain differences in the structure of the hotel sector between Member States mean that national authorities are well placed to investigate such restrictions affecting their territory. The Commission will continue to ensure that the European competition rules are applied consistently in this sector, as elsewhere, and continues to review the situation.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001064/14
aan de Commissie**

Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)

(3 februari 2014)

Betreft: Vervolgvrage E-013152/2013, E-013182/2013, E-013259/2013, E-013428/2013, E-013429/2013, E-013430/2013, E-013431/2013, E-013432/2013, E-013502/2013, E-013892/2013 en E-014145/2013

Op 31 januari 2014 heeft de heer Füle namens de Commissie een gezamenlijk antwoord gegeven op schriftelijke vragen E-013152/2013, E-013182/2013, E-013259/2013, E-013428/2013, E-013429/2013, E-013430/2013, E-013431/2013, E-013432/2013, E-013502/2013, E-013892/2013 en E-014145/2013. Daarin schrijft hij afwimpelend: „De Commissie verwijst naar de lopende toetredingsonderhandelingen met Turkije die ook betrekking hebben op de onderwerpen die door het geachte Parlements lid zijn genoemd. Deze toetredingsonderhandelingen gingen van start na een unaniem besluit van de lidstaten van de Europese Unie in 2005 en worden uitgevoerd overeenkomstig het onderhandelingskader van 3 oktober 2005. De Commissie rapporteert jaarlijks in detail aan de lidstaten en het Europees Parlement over de voortgang van Turkije bij de naleving van de criteria voor de toetreding en over aanhoudende punten van zorg.”

1. Welke verklaring heeft de Commissie ervoor dat zij de in de betreffende vragen aangekaarte individuele kwesties met slechts één gezamenlijk nietszeggend antwoord afwimpelt, waarin zij kortaf naar de „lopende toetredingsonderhandelingen” en haar „rapportages” verwijst? Betekent dit dat de Commissie niet op de kwesties wil/kan reageren?
2. Is de Commissie ertoe bereid zich een serieuze houding in dezen aan te nemen en elke vraag alsnog van een deugdelijk inhoudelijk antwoord te voorzien? Zo neen, beseft de Commissie dat zij hiermee de werkzaamheden van het Europees Parlement ondermijnt?
3. Indien commentaar van Commissiezijde op de in de betreffende vragen aangekaarte individuele kwesties daadwerkelijk door de „lopende toetredingsonderhandelingen” en haar „rapportages” tot uiting komt, kan de Commissie dan per vraag resp. per kwestie een expliciete bronvermelding/verwijzing verstrekken?

Voorts schrijft de heer Füle: „Deze problemen zijn ter sprake gebracht in regelmatige bijeenkomsten op alle niveaus met de Turkse autoriteiten, voorzover dit wenselijk is.”

4. Welke concrete resultaten hebben deze „regelmatige bijeenkomsten” gehad, en waarin uiten deze zich? Wanneer is het wel/niet „wenselijk” om „deze problemen” ter sprake te brengen, en waarop wordt dit gebaseerd?

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001065/14
aan de Commissie**

Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)

(3 februari 2014)

Betreft: Geen nieuwe grondwet Turkije (vervolgvrage)

De Turkse parlementscommissie die een nieuwe grondwet moest formuleren, wordt vanwege aanhoudende onenigheid opgeheven. De vier partijen die in de commissie zetelden, konden het niet eens worden. Een topman van de regerende AK-partij meldt dat het opstellen van een nieuwe grondwet daarmee voorlopig van de baan is.

Op 31 januari 2014 heeft de heer Füle namens de Commissie antwoord gegeven op schriftelijke vraag E-013164/2013 over voornoemde kwestie. Daarin schrijft hij onder andere: „Bij talrijke gelegenheden heeft de Commissie gewezen op het belang van het opstellen van een nieuwe civiele grondwet, en de Commissie zal doorgaan met het aanmoedigen van Turkije om de laatste hand te leggen aan deze inspanningen.”

1. Waarom is de Commissie in haar antwoord niet specifiek op de in E-013164/2013 gestelde subvragen ingegaan? Is de Commissie ertoe bereid dit alsnog te doen? Aldus:
 - Hoe ervaart en beoordeelt de Commissie deze ontwikkeling?
 - Wat vindt de Commissie ervan dat het opstellen van een nieuwe grondwet daarmee voorlopig van de baan is?
 - Is de Commissie thans teleurgesteld in Turkije? Zo ja, welke gevolgen heeft dat voor de toetredingsonderhandelingen tussen de EU en Turkije? Zo neen, waarop baseert de Commissie haar daarmee geïmpliceerde hoop op vooruitgang?

2. Wat vindt de Commissie ervan dat de door haar gedroomde hervormingen in Turkije simpelweg uitblijven? Wat vindt de Commissie ervan dat Turkije zich simpelweg niet wil en kan aanpassen, hoezeer zij het land ook „aanmoedigt”? Trekt zij hier conclusies uit?
3. Hoe verantwoordt de Commissie het dat zij zich, met name in antwoord op schriftelijke vragen, immer concentreert op hervormingen die Turkije zou moeten doorvoeren en de zogenaamde positieve gevolgen die daar vanuit zouden moeten gaan en dat zij stelselmatig de voor haar pijnlijke realiteit negeert, namelijk dat er van deze hervormingen niets terecht komt?

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002158/14

aan de Commissie

Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)

(24 februari 2014)

Betreft: Erdoğan erkent huidige grenzen Thracië niet (vervolgvraag)

Thracië is een regio die het noordoosten van Griekenland, het zuiden van Bulgarije en het noordwesten van Turkije gedeeltelijk beslaat. De premier van Turkije, Erdoğan, heeft gezegd dat Thracië echter óók Thessaloniki en Xanthi (Griekenland), Deliorman en Kardzhali (Bulgarije), Skopje en Vardar (Macedonië) en Pristina (Kosovo) zou omvatten. Hij noemde Thracië, inclusief bovengenoemde plekken die feitelijk niet tot Thracië behoren, „deel van de Turkse geschiedenis”: „Deze regio representeert onze hele Turkse geschiedenis ⁽¹⁾.” Bulgarije en Griekenland hebben fel gereageerd. Op 21 februari 2014 heeft de heer Füle namens de Commissie antwoord gegeven op schriftelijke vraag E-014144/2013 over de uitspraken van premier Erdoğan. Daarin schrijft hij afwimpelend: „De Commissie kan niet reageren op elke verklaring van de leden van de Turkse regering die in de media aandacht krijgt.”

1. Beseft de Commissie dat voornoemde uitspraken over Thracië niet komen van „zomaar een lid van de Turkse regering”, maar juist van de Turkse regeringsleider, premier Erdoğan, met wie zij nota bene over toetreding tot de EU onderhandelt? Waarom, aldus, weigert de Commissie veroordelend te reageren op de expansiezuchtige geschiedvervalsing van de regeringsleider van een kandidaat-EU-lidstaat?

Voorts schrijft de heer Füle: „[...] Turkije [dient] zich ondubbelzinnig in te zetten voor goed nabuurschap en voor de vreedzame regeling van geschillen conform het Handvest van de Verenigde Naties en, indien nodig, door een beroep te doen op het Internationaal Gerechtshof.”

2. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat, ondanks haar herhaaldelijke oproepen, Turkije zich geenszins inzet voor „goed nabuurschap en de vreedzame regeling van geschillen”, maar in dezen juist een niet-constructieve, zelfs provocerende houding aanneemt? Zo neen, hoe verklaart de Commissie dan, ten eerste, dat premier Erdoğan zich met zijn uitspraken over Thracië de woede van Bulgarije en Griekenland op de hals heeft gehaald en, ten tweede, dat Erdoğan's ontkenning van het bestaan van de Republiek Cyprus een allesbehalve positieve uitwerking heeft?

3. Is de Commissie bereid alsnog veroordelend op Erdoğan's uitlatingen te reageren door hem de onvermijdelijke conclusie mede te delen dat er nooit plaats voor Turkije in de EU zal zijn?

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002724/14

aan de Commissie

Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)

(7 maart 2014)

Betreft: Erdoğan wil internetvrijheid verder inperken

De Turkse premier Erdoğan heeft gezegd na de lokale verkiezingen van 30 maart 2014 de internetvrijheid verder te willen inperken (inclusief „verboden”).

1. Is de Commissie bekend met de door Erdoğan aangekondigde verdere inperking van de internetvrijheid resp. verdere inperking van de vrijheid van meningsuiting en expressie ⁽²⁾? Hoe beoordeelt de Commissie deze aankondiging?

2. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat (verdere) inperking van de vrijheid van meningsuiting en expressie enerzijds verwerpelijk is en anderzijds haaks staat op de oproepen van de Commissie aan Turkije om de vrijheid van meningsuiting en expressie juist te waarborgen?

3. Hoe beoordeelt de Commissie het dat Turkije — een kandidaat-EU-lidstaat! — totaal geen oren heeft naar de hervormingen die het (kandidaat-)EU-lidmaatschap voorschrijft?

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.novinite.com/articles/156341/>.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/16518/Rellen-in-Turkije/article/detail/1806833/2014/03/07/Turkse-premier-Erdogan-wil-Facebook-en-YouTube-verbieden.dhtml>.

4. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat Turkije bijgevolg niet aan de Kopenhagencriteria voldoet? Is de Commissie er dientengevolge toe bereid haar in §5 van het onderhandelingskader ⁽³⁾ neergelegde verplichting na te komen door de Raad te verzoeken de toetredingsonderhandelingen — op z'n minst! — op te schorten? Zo neen, waarom niet?

Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie

(30 april 2014)

De Commissie herinnert eraan dat de status van Turkije als kandidaat-lidstaat het resultaat is van een unaniem besluit van de Europese Raad, op basis van een aantal strategische overwegingen die sindsdien steeds opnieuw werden bevestigd, onder meer in de conclusies van de Raad. De Commissie brengt jaarlijks verslag uit over de ontwikkelingen in Turkije inzake de criteria voor toetreding en geeft hierbij zowel positieve als negatieve kritiek wanneer deze gerechtvaardigd is.

Het Europees Parlement heeft met de steun van een meerderheid van zijn leden op 12 maart 2014 zijn resolutie over Turkije goedgekeurd, waarin het zijn voldoening uitspreekt over het voortgangsverslag 2013 van de Commissie. In de resolutie trad het Parlement de Commissie ook bij in haar conclusies dat Turkije in de voorbije twaalf maanden belangrijke hervormingen heeft goedgekeurd, maar benadrukte tegelijkertijd enkele punten van zorg. Het verslag bevat ook een gedetailleerde analyse van de feiten, die een antwoord biedt op deze en vele andere door het geachte Parlementslid gestelde vragen, bijvoorbeeld over de vrijheid van meningsuiting en de betrekkingen van goed nabuurschap.

In dit verband neemt de Commissie nota van de evaluatie door het geachte Parlementslid van de reeds verstrekte antwoorden. De Commissie benadrukt evenwel dat zij alle vragen naar haar beste weten heeft beantwoord en concludeert dat er geen nieuwe elementen zijn ter aanvulling van de reeds verstrekte antwoorden en de gegevens van het periodiek verslag van de Commissie.

De bovengenoemde punten van zorg werden ook besproken tijdens regelmatige bijeenkomsten met de Turkse autoriteiten.

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001064/14
to the Commission**

Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)

(3 February 2014)

Subject: Follow-up question to Questions E-013152/2013, E-013182/2013, E-013259/2013, E-013428/2013, E-013429/2013, E-013430/2013, E-013431/2013, E-013432/2013, E-013502/2013, E-013892/2013 and E-014145/2013

On 31 January 2014, Mr Füle gave a joint answer, on behalf of the Commission, to Questions E-013152/2013, E-013182/2013, E-013259/2013, E-013428/2013, E-013429/2013, E-013430/2013, E-013431/2013, E-013432/2013, E-013502/2013, E-013892/2013 and E-014145/2013. In it he dismissively wrote: 'The Commission refers to the on-going accession negotiations with Turkey which also cover the subjects mentioned by the Honourable Member. These accession negotiations were opened upon unanimous decision of the EU Member States in 2005 and are carried out in line with the Negotiating Framework of 3 October 2005. The Commission reports yearly in detail to the Member States and the European Parliament on progress in Turkey's fulfilling of the criteria for accession and on persisting concerns.'

1. What explanation does the Commission have for the fact that it dismissed the individual issues raised in the above written questions with just one joint meaningless answer, in which it referred perfunctorily to the 'on-going accession negotiations' and its 'reports'? Does this mean that the Commission is not prepared to respond to the points raised, or cannot do so?
2. Will the Commission adopt a serious attitude here, and, albeit belatedly, give a proper, substantive answer to each question? If not, does the Commission realise that, by failing to give such answers, it undermines the work of the European Parliament?
3. If the 'on-going accession negotiations' and Commission 'reports' genuinely constitute comments by the Commission on the individual points raised in the above written questions, can the Commission give an explicit indication of the particular source/reference for each question/point?

Mr Füle also wrote: 'These concerns are brought up in regular meetings at all levels with the Turkish authorities as appropriate.'

4. What practical results have these 'regular meetings' yielded, and what form have these results taken? When is it 'appropriate', and when is it not, to bring up 'these concerns', and on what is this based?

**Question for written answer E-001065/14
to the Commission**

Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)

(3 February 2014)

Subject: No new Constitution for Turkey (follow-up question)

The Turkish parliamentary commission which has been given a remit to draft a new Constitution is being abolished because of persistent disagreements within it. The four parties represented on the committee were unable to reach a consensus. A senior member of the governing AKP party has stated that, as a result, the plans for a new Constitution have been shelved for the time being.

On 31 January 2014, Mr Füle, on behalf of the Commission, answered Written Question E-013164/2013 concerning the above matter. In his answer he wrote, *inter alia*: 'On numerous occasions, the Commission has stressed the importance it attaches to drafting a new civilian constitution, and will continue to encourage Turkey to finalise these efforts.'

1. Why did the Commission's answer not respond specifically to the subquestions put in Question E-013164/2013? Will it do so now? Viz.:
 - How does the Commission feel about and view this development?
 - What does the Commission think about the drafting of a new Constitution thereby being shelved for the time being?
 - Does the Commission now feel disappointed in Turkey? If so, what ramifications does this have for the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey? If not, on what is the Commission basing its thereby implied hope for progress?
2. What view does the Commission take of the fact that the reforms in Turkey of which it used to dream are simply not taking place? What does the Commission think about the fact that Turkey simply is not prepared to, and cannot, adapt, no matter how the Commission 'encourages' it? Does it draw any conclusions from this?

3. How does the Commission account for the fact that, particularly in answering written questions, it always concentrates on reforms which Turkey ought to implement and the so-called positive consequences which should flow from them, and that it systematically turns a blind eye to the reality — painful for the Commission — that these reforms fail to materialise?

**Question for written answer E-002158/14
to the Commission**

Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(24 February 2014)

Subject: Refusal of Erdoğan to recognise Thrace's current borders (follow-up question)

The region of Thrace extends over parts of north-eastern Greece, southern Bulgaria and north-western Turkey. The Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr Erdoğan, has claimed, however, that Thrace should also include Thessaloniki and Xanthi (Greece), Deliorman and Kardzhali (Bulgaria), Skopje and Vardar (Macedonia) and Pristina (Kosovo), adding that Thrace, including the abovementioned places — which are not actually part of Thrace — was 'part of Turkish history'. 'This region is representative of our entire history, (1)' he observed, thereby provoking angry reactions in both Bulgaria and Greece.

On 21 February 2014, Mr Füle, replying to question for written answer 0014144/2013 concerning Mr Erdoğan's utterances, observed dismissively: 'The Commission is not in position to comment on every statement made by members of the Turkish Government as reported by the media.'

1. Is the Commission aware that the above statements about Thrace were not made by 'just any member of the Turkish Government,' but by the Turkish Head of Government, the Prime Minister, with whom it is in the process of negotiating Turkish accession to the EU? Why, therefore, does the Commission refuse to condemn expansionist and historically inaccurate claims by the Head of Government of a candidate EU Member State?

Mr Füle went on to comment: 'Turkey needs to commit itself unequivocally to good neighbourly relations and to the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice.'

2. Does the Commission agree that, despite its repeated calls, Turkey is in no way committed to 'good neighbourly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes', but is instead assuming a non-constructive, not say provocative stance in this matter? If not, what view does it take of the Prime Minister's own observations regarding Thrace, which have incurred the wrath of Bulgaria and Greece, and of his anything but helpful refusal to recognise the existence of the Republic of Cyprus?

3. Is the Commission prepared to make its disapproval abundantly clear to Mr Erdoğan by stating the unavoidable conclusion that there can never be a place for Turkey in the EU?

**Question for written answer E-002724/14
to the Commission**

Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(7 March 2014)

Subject: Erdoğan's desire to further restrict Internet freedom

Turkey's Prime Minister Erdoğan has stated that, after the local elections on 30 March 2014, he wishes to further restrict Internet freedom (including by imposing 'bans').

1. Is the Commission aware of the further restriction of Internet freedom/further restriction of freedom of expression announced by Erdoğan? (2) What view does the Commission take of this announcement?

2. Does the Commission agree that further restriction of freedom of expression on the one hand should be condemned and on the other hand is at variance with the Commission's calls for Turkey, on the contrary, to guarantee freedom of expression?

3. What view does the Commission take of the fact that Turkey — a candidate for accession to the EU! — is totally disregarding the reforms which are required by such candidate status?

4. Does the Commission agree that Turkey is therefore not complying with the Copenhagen Criteria? Will the Commission therefore comply with its obligation under Article 5 of the negotiating framework (3) by asking the Council to suspend the accession negotiations, at the very least? If not, why not?

(1) <http://www.novinite.com/articles/156341/>

(2) <http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/16518/Rellen-in-Turkije/article/detail/1806833/2014/03/07/Turkse-premier-Erdogan-wil-Facebook-en-YouTube-verbieden.dhtml>

(3) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf

Joint answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2014)

The Commission recalls that Turkey's status as a candidate country is the result of a unanimous decision of the European Council, on the basis of a number of strategic considerations which have consistently been confirmed since then, including in Council conclusions. The Commission reports yearly on developments in Turkey in the light of the criteria for accession giving credit where credit is due and raising concerns when justified.

The European Parliament in its Resolution on Turkey adopted by majority of its Members on 12 March 2014 welcomed the Commission's 2013 Progress Report and shared the Commission's conclusions that important reforms were made in the preceding twelve months while also highlighting issues of concern. The report also provides a detailed factual analysis covering many of the questions raised in this and in other multiple questions previously submitted by the Honourable Member, for example on freedom of expression and good neighbourly relations.

In this respect, the Commission takes note of the Honourable Member's assessment of the replies already given. However, the Commission stresses that it replied to all questions raised to the best of its knowledge and concludes that there are no new elements that could supplement the replies already provided and the details contained in the Regular Report of the Commission.

Regular meetings with the Turkish authorities have also given the opportunity to address such issues of concern.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001066/14
to the Commission
Syed Kamall (ECR)
(3 February 2014)

Subject: Erasmus for Entrepreneurs business exchange in Italy

I have been contacted by a constituent, Mr Cheema, who tells me that he recently took part in an Erasmus for Entrepreneurs business exchange in Italy.

He tells me that he was due to begin work in a hotel called Hotel Borgovico in Como, North Italy, on Monday, 24 September. However, when the owner realised that Mr Cheema was a Sikh, he asked the Erasmus contact to tell him that he needed to cut his hair and shave his beard to work in the hotel. Erasmus then contacted Mr Cheema and asked him to do this and to remove his turban.

My constituent tells me that was not able to do this and, as a result, could not participate in the Erasmus programme.

My constituent tells me that when he asked for the issue to be taken further, the hotel owner was expelled from the programme, but there was no other recourse against his actions. He also believes that the staff who were involved in his exchange programme at the lower levels of Erasmus did not consider this to be discrimination and seemed to condone the views of the hotel. No action was taken against them.

Given that this clearly shows discrimination by the hotel and the Erasmus programme, could the Commission confirm:

1. what safeguards it can put in place to prevent this happening again?
2. whether it will review the attitudes of staff on the Erasmus programme?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(16 April 2014)

While this is an isolated case and no similar situation has been communicated to the Commission during the 5 years of existence of the programme, the Commission thanks the Honourable Member for the opportunity to elaborate on this important principle and regrets the experience of Mr Cheema.

This case was brought to the attention of the Commission in September 2013. The reaction of the Commission was very clear against any form of discrimination, with the result that the Host Entrepreneur was expelled from the programme as it was considered that his attitude was discriminatory.

This principle of no discrimination is explicitly mentioned in the Implementation Manual for Intermediary Organisations (Quality Manual) which governs the conduct of the Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs programme, to ensure that applications are evaluated against the eligibility and quality criteria defined for the programme, 'regardless of gender, ethnic background, religion, sexual orientation or any other irrelevant distinction'. This principle has equally been stressed during the periodic Network Meetings for the Intermediary Organisations and the Intermediary Organisation involved in Mr Cheema's case has been expressly reminded of the need to follow this principle.

To underline the Commission's strong commitment to avoid any future repetition of such treatment, the Commission will require the principle of no discrimination to be explicitly added to the text of the Commitment signed by all parties involved in each Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs exchange (i.e. the Host and the New Entrepreneurs and the two Intermediary Organisations involved).

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001067/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(3 Φεβρουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Προκλητικές τουρκικές δηλώσεις σχετικά με την πόλη της Μόρφου (Κύπρος)

Σύμφωνα με την τουρκοκυπριακή ημερήσια εφημερίδα *Gunes*, τόσο ο αρχηγός του Κόμματος Εθνικής Ενότητας, όσο και ο Πρωθυπουργός της Τουρκίας, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, έχουν δηλώσει ότι η κατεχόμενη πόλη της Μόρφου (Κύπρος) «δεν πρόκειται να δοθεί ποτέ πίσω, οποιοδήποτε σχέδιο και αν προκύψει» για την επίλυση του κυπριακού προβλήματος. Δεδομένου ότι η πόλη της Μόρφου κατοικείται ως επί το πλείστον από Ελληνοκύπριους (οι οποίοι αντιπροσώπευαν περισσότερο από το 80% του πληθυσμού) πριν από την τουρκική εισβολή του 1974, η Επιτροπή καλείται να απαντήσει στα εξής:

1. Ποιες είναι οι απόψεις της σχετικά με την επιστροφή της πόλης της Μόρφου και των γύρω χωριών στους νόμιμους Ελληνοκύπριους κατοίκους τους, οι οποίοι έχουν εκτοπιστεί από το 1974;
2. Πώς δύνανται να προστατευτούν τα νόμιμα βασικά και θεμελιώδη ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα των προσφύγων της Μόρφου εντός του πλαισίου της ΕΕ;
3. Θεωρεί η Επιτροπή ότι οι ανωτέρω δηλώσεις των Τούρκων και Τουρκοκυπρίων αξιωματούχων συμβάλλουν σε μία δίκαιη και βιώσιμη επίλυση του κυπριακού προβλήματος, καθώς και στη δημιουργία κατάλληλου κλίματος για την επανέναξη των διαπραγματεύσεων;

Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(9 Απριλίου 2014)

Το ζήτημα στο οποίο αναφέρεται το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου αποτελεί μέρος των διαπραγματεύσεων για τη συνολική διευθέτηση του Κυπριακού υπό την αιγίδα των Ηνωμένων Εθνών. Εναπόκειται στους πολιτικούς ηγέτες της ελληνοκυπριακής και της τουρκοκυπριακής κοινότητας να καταλήξουν σε συμφωνία, μεταξύ άλλων, για τα ζητήματα που θίγει το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001067/14
to the Commission**

Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)

(3 February 2014)

Subject: Provocative Turkish statements about Morphou (Cyprus)

According to the Turkish Cypriot daily newspaper *Gunes*, both the leader of the National Unity Party and Turkey's Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have stated that the occupied town of Morphou (Cyprus) 'will never be given back, whatever plan will emerge' for solving the Cyprus problem. Given that Morphou was overwhelmingly inhabited by Greek Cypriots (representing more than 80% of the population) before the 1974 Turkish invasion, the Commission is asked to answer the following:

1. What are its views regarding the return of Morphou and surrounding villages to their lawful Greek Cypriot inhabitants, who have been displaced since 1974?
2. How can the lawful basic and fundamental human rights of the Morphou refugees be safeguarded within the framework of the EU?
3. Does the Commission believe that the above statements by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials contribute to a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem and the creation of an appropriate climate for restarting the negotiations?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission

(9 April 2014)

The issue raised by the Honourable Member is part of the negotiations on a comprehensive Cyprus settlement under the auspices of the United Nations. It is for the leaders of both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities to find an agreement including on the matters raised by the Honourable Member.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001068/14
à la Commission
Sophie Auconie (PPE)
(3 février 2014)

Objet: Langues disponibles pour l'information sur le programme Erasmus+

Le nouveau programme Erasmus+ 2014-2020 est entré en vigueur le 1^{er} janvier 2014. Regroupant sept anciens programmes et intégrant pour la première fois le sport, il offre aux Européens de nombreuses possibilités pour étudier, se former, travailler ou mener des projets dans un autre pays que le leur. Il crée ainsi une attente auprès de tous ceux qui souhaitent partir vivre une expérience dans un autre pays de l'Union européenne ou monter un projet avec des partenaires européens.

La Commission a mis en ligne un site avec des informations sur ce nouveau programme Erasmus+. Mais la plupart de ces informations — et en particulier le guide officiel du programme et les informations relatives au volet «sport» — ne sont aujourd'hui disponibles qu'en anglais. Alors que ce programme est destiné à l'ensemble des Européens, voilà un très mauvais signal, car tous les Européens non anglophones se sentent ainsi exclus de ce programme.

Quand la Commission publiera-t-elle ces informations dans toutes les langues de l'Union?

Pourquoi la Commission fait-elle le choix de publier uniquement en anglais, créant ainsi un sentiment d'exclusion parmi tous les citoyens non anglophones, plutôt que d'attendre d'avoir une traduction dans toutes les langues avant de publier?

Réponse donnée par M^{me} Vassiliou au nom de la Commission
(1^{er} avril 2014)

La Commission invite l'Honorable Parlementaire à prendre connaissance de ses réponses aux questions écrites E-000509/2014, E-000550/2014, P-000721/2014 et E-000916/2014 ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fr/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001068/14
to the Commission
Sophie Auconie (PPE)
(3 February 2014)**

Subject: Available languages for the information on the Erasmus+ programme

The new Erasmus+ programme for 2014-2020 came into effect on 1 January 2014. Bringing together seven existing programmes and incorporating sport for the first time, it provides Europeans with a number of opportunities to study, train, work or carry out projects in a country other than their own. It thus creates an expectation among all those who wish to go and have an experience in another country of the European Union or set up a project with European partners.

The Commission has created a website containing information on this new Erasmus+ programme, but most of this information — including, in particular, the official programme guide and the information relating to the area of 'sport' — is currently only available in English. As this programme is intended for all Europeans, this does not send out a very good message because every European who does not speak English thus feels excluded from this programme.

When will the Commission publish this information in all the languages of the Union?

Why did the Commission decide to publish it only in English, thus creating a feeling of exclusion among all the citizens who do not speak English, instead of waiting until it had a translation available for all the languages before publishing?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission
(1 April 2014)**

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to written questions E-000509/2014; E-000550/2014; P-000721/2014; E-000916/2014 ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001069/14
alla Commissione**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(3 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Eruzione vulcanica a Sumatra

Secondo le più recenti informazioni, almeno 14 persone sarebbero morte a causa della lava e delle ceneri provocate dall'eruzione del vulcano Sinabung, sull'isola di Sumatra, in Indonesia, ma le autorità locali temono che il numero potrebbe aumentare nelle prossime ore. Proprio ieri i residenti a meno di 5 chilometri dal vulcano erano stati fatti rientrare nelle proprie abitazioni dopo l'evacuazione di gennaio scorso.

Le eruzioni del vulcano sono riprese nel 2010, dopo circa 400 anni di inattività, proprio negli ultimi mesi si sono intensificate e, trattandosi di uno stratovulcano, non è escluso il rischio di ulteriori eruzioni di tipo esplosivo ancora più dirompenti. I danni umani e materiali provocati dall'eruzione non sono stati ancora stimati completamente e si teme che prossime eruzioni possano provocare nuove vittime.

In merito al disastro naturale, può la Commissione chiarire se:

1. è a conoscenza di studi vulcanologici sull'attività del vulcano Sinabung tramite cui ipotizzare una mappa della futura attività vulcanica?
2. intende inviare aiuti umanitari per alleviare le conseguenze dell'eruzione e i rischi legati a possibili future eruzioni?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(2 aprile 2014)

1. Per rafforzare il monitoraggio e la risposta all'attività vulcanica, USAID fornisce attualmente, nell'ambito del suo programma di assistenza post-catastrofi vulcaniche in partenariato con l'U.S. Geological Survey, apparecchiature e assistenza tecnica in loco e a distanza al Centro indonesiano di vulcanologia e attenuazione dei rischi geologici.
2. La situazione umanitaria in seguito all'eruzione del vulcano Sinabung è stata monitorata attentamente dalla direzione generale Aiuti umanitari e protezione civile (ECHO) della Commissione europea attraverso i suoi uffici a Bangkok e a Giacarta. Una missione di valutazione sul campo effettuata dalla DG ECHO dal 7 al 10 febbraio 2014 ha riscontrato che la risposta fornita attualmente dal governo con l'aiuto di organizzazioni locali e private copre il fabbisogno di base delle popolazioni sfollate e che pertanto non occorre un sostegno supplementare.

Vista la frequenza delle catastrofi naturali, comprese le eruzioni vulcaniche, verificatesi in Indonesia negli ultimi 13 anni, la DG ECHO finanzia nel paese attività di preparazione alle catastrofi a livello di comunità che comprendono, ad esempio, azioni di informazione e sensibilizzazione in caso di eruzioni vulcaniche.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001069/14
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(3 February 2014)

Subject: Volcanic eruption on Sumatra

According to the latest reports, at least 14 people on the Indonesian island of Sumatra have been killed in the aftermath of the eruption of Mount Sinabung, and local authorities fear that the death toll could rise further in the coming hours. Just one day before the eruption, villagers from areas outside a five-kilometre danger zone had been allowed to return to their homes, having been evacuated in January of last year.

Mount Sinabung became active again in 2010 after lying dormant for around 400 years. The last few months in particular have seen intensified volcanic activity, and the risk of further explosive eruptions (due to the nature of the stratovolcano) with even more devastating effects cannot be ruled out. A comprehensive estimate of the human and material damage caused by the disaster is not yet available, amid fears that continuing eruptions could lead to further deaths.

1. In connection with this natural disaster, is the Commission aware of any volcanological studies concerning the volcanic activity of Mount Sinabung which could be used to map possible volcanic activity in the future?
2. Does it intend to send humanitarian aid to help with the fallout from the eruption and mitigate the risks accompanying any future volcanic activity?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(2 April 2014)

1. In order to strengthen volcano monitoring and response, USAID, under its on-going Volcano Disaster Assistance Program in partnership with the U.S. Geological Survey is currently providing on-site and remote technical assistance and equipment to the Indonesian Center of Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation.
2. The humanitarian situation following the eruption of Mount Sinabung has been closely monitored by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), through its offices in Bangkok and Jakarta. A field assessment mission was conducted by DG ECHO from 7 to 10 February 2014. It was found that the current response provided by the government with the support of local and private organisations covers the basic needs of the displaced populations and that therefore no extra support is required.

Given frequent natural disasters in Indonesia — including volcanic eruptions — over the past 13 years, DG ECHO has been funding community-based disaster preparedness activities in the country. They include for instance disaster awareness in case of volcanic eruption.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001070/14
alla Commissione**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(3 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Maggiori possibilità per le persone diversamente abili

Nel mondo sono un miliardo gli individui che convivono con la realtà della disabilità. A partire dal 1982, l'Onu ha dedicato particolare attenzione a tale tema, arrivando nel 2007 alla proclamazione della Convenzione per i diritti delle persone con disabilità. Attraverso tale serie di azioni, si intende porre le basi per fornire mezzi e risorse atte a concretizzarne l'effettiva inclusione sociale alle persone in condizione di disabilità.

In realtà, al di là delle disposizioni normative che discendono dal recepimento del documento ONU, molto spesso si riscontra scarsa attuazione delle stesse, con conseguente disagio per le persone diversamente abili.

In particolare, diverse associazioni di tutela e rivendicazione dei diritti delle persone diversamente abili in Europa lamentano l'insussistenza di una vera cultura dell'integrazione, che si riflette nelle carenze a livello dei servizi specifici e nell'inosservanza delle disposizioni che regolano il tema dell'abbattimento delle barriere architettoniche.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione precisare taluni elementi:

1. Quali sono le serie di iniziative che l'UE intende mettere in atto al fine di sensibilizzare maggiormente l'opinione pubblica e le istituzioni dei paesi membri nei riguardi del tema della disabilità?
2. Quali finanziamenti specifici intende l'UE destinare a tal tematica?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione

(14 aprile 2014)

1. La Commissione rinvia l'onorevole deputato alla propria risposta all'interrogazione scritta E-000112/2013.

La Commissione sostiene organizzazioni operanti nel settore della disabilità a livello UE tramite sovvenzioni di funzionamento o per azioni, ai fini, tra gli altri, di rafforzare la loro capacità di difesa nell'ambito del processo decisionale dell'UE e di finanziare attività di sensibilizzazione e comunicazione. Nel periodo di programmazione 2007-2013, tale finanziamento è stato erogato, in particolare, mediante il programma Progress. Un livello analogo di finanziamento è previsto nel quadro del nuovo programma «Diritti e cittadinanza» per il periodo 2014-2020.

2. I principali programmi di finanziamento dell'UE per il periodo 2014-2020, in particolare i Fondi strutturali e di investimento dell'UE (ESIF), in linea con la strategia europea sulla disabilità, promuoveranno l'inclusione, le pari opportunità, la partecipazione attiva alla società e all'economia, la possibilità di fruire dei servizi offerti dalle comunità e l'accessibilità all'ambiente fisico, ai trasporti e alle nuove tecnologie. Il Fondo sociale europeo destinerà almeno il 20 % all'inclusione sociale. Uno degli obiettivi consiste nel sostenere l'inclusione delle persone diversamente abili nella società e nell'ambiente di lavoro.

Gli Stati membri possono mobilitare le risorse ESIF al fine di sostenere l'istruzione, la formazione e lo sviluppo delle competenze delle persone diversamente abili. Tali risorse possono contribuire alla riforma dell'istruzione e finanziare le infrastrutture di insegnamento. Inoltre, Erasmus+, il nuovo programma europeo di finanziamento per l'istruzione, la formazione, la gioventù e lo sport, fornirà opportunità di finanziamento ad un'ampia gamma di soggetti che coopereranno tra di loro per migliorare la situazione dei discenti diversamente abili sotto il profilo dell'istruzione e per rendere i sistemi d'istruzione più inclusivi.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001070/14
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(3 February 2014)

Subject: Greater opportunities for people with disabilities

One billion people around the world are living with the reality of a disability. The UN has been paying particular attention to this subject since 1982, and in 2007 it announced the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The intention behind this series of actions is to lay the foundations to provide means and resources which can be used to successfully integrate people living with disabilities into society.

In truth, notwithstanding the legislative provisions resulting from the implementation of the UN document, there is often a failure to put these provisions into practice, resulting in difficulties for people with disabilities.

In particular, various associations representing the interests and asserting the rights of disabled people in Europe are critical of the lack of a true culture of integration, which is reflected in the absence of specific services and in the failure to comply with the provisions regulating the subject of the breakdown of architectural barriers.

In the light of the above, can the Commission clarify some aspects:

1. What series of initiatives is the EU planning to implement in order to increase awareness of the subject of disability among the public as well as among the institutions of the Member States?
2. What specific funding does the EU intend to set aside in order to tackle this issue?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(14 April 2014)

1. The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-000112/2013.

The Commission supports EU-level disability organisations through operating or action grants to, *inter alia*, strengthen their advocacy capacity in EU policy-making, and for communication and awareness-raising activities. In the programming period 2007-2013 such funding was provided in particular through the Progress Programme. A comparable level of funding is foreseen under the new Rights and Citizenship Programme for 2014-2020.

2. The EU's main funding programmes for the period 2014-2020, in particular the EU Structural and Investment Funds (ESIFs) — in line with the European Disability Strategy — will promote inclusion, equal opportunities, active participation in society and the economy, shift to the community based services, and accessibility of the physical environment, transport and new technologies. The European Social Fund will allocate at least 20% to social inclusion. One of the goals is to support the inclusion of people with disabilities in society and the work environment.

Member States can mobilise ESIF resources to support the education, training and skills development of people with disabilities. These resources can underpin education reform and also finance education infrastructure. In addition, Erasmus+, the new European funding programme for education, training, youth and sport, will provide funding opportunities to a broad range of actors working in partnership to improve the educational situation of learners with disabilities and for improvements for more inclusive education systems.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001073/14
a la Comisión**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(3 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Uso de Fondos FEDER para la planta de purines de Vall d'Alba

En la respuesta a la pregunta escrita E-004280/2012 sobre el uso del Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional FEDER con un coste de 6 645 630 euros para la construcción de la planta de tratamiento de residuos ganaderos (purines), se dijo: «La Comisión está en contacto con las autoridades competentes a fin de recabar información pertinente e informará de los resultados a Su Señoría. En el supuesto de que se hubiera cometido algún tipo de irregularidad, la Comisión velará por la recuperación de la totalidad o una parte de los fondos comprometidos en el proyecto».

Por todo ello, se pregunta:

1. ¿Qué información se ha recabado al respecto?
2. ¿Se cometió algún tipo de irregularidades?

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001631/14
a la Comisión**

Andrés Perelló Rodríguez (S&D)

(14 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Irregularidades en la actividad de cinco plantas de tratamiento de purines de la provincia de Castellón

La Diputación de la provincia de Castellón (Comunitat Valenciana) ha aprobado recientemente una modificación presupuestaria para recuperar cinco plantas de tratamiento de residuos ganaderos (purines) emplazadas en la Salzadella, Sant Mateu, Albocàsser, Vall d'Alba y la Todolella mediante el pago de 549 873 euros a la empresa concesionaria del servicio de gestión de los purines. De estas cinco plantas, tan solo una se encuentra actualmente en funcionamiento.

Tras esta adquisición, la Diputación está negociando vender o alquilar las plantas como naves comerciales, industriales o de almacenamiento, por lo que dejarían de estar destinadas al tratamiento de residuos ganaderos para el cual fueron proyectadas.

Las cinco plantas de tratamiento de purines de la Salzadella, Sant Mateu, Albocàsser, Vall d'Alba y la Todolella fueron construidas entre 1999 y 2003, con un coste presupuestario de 18 millones de euros cofinanciado por fondos del FEDER.

1. ¿Tiene conocimiento la Comisión de que solo una de las cinco plantas de purines anteriormente citadas está actualmente en funcionamiento? ¿Es correcto que la actividad de cuatro de las cinco plantas esté paralizada? ¿Supone ello una irregularidad en la utilización de los fondos del FEDER?
2. ¿Ha sido informada la Comisión del plan de la Diputación de Castellón de vender las cinco plantas que albergan la gestión de residuos ganaderos para otros fines comerciales?
3. ¿Considera la Comisión que la Diputación de Castellón está autorizada a destinar a otros usos y actividades estas cinco plantas de gestión de residuos ganaderos financiadas con fondos del FEDER?
4. En caso de llevarse a cabo este plan de venta de las plantas, ¿considera la Comisión que ello supondría una irregularidad en la utilización de los fondos del FEDER? ¿Debería la Diputación de Castellón devolver los fondos europeos comprometidos en el proyecto si las plantas se destinan a una actividad diferente de la gestión de residuos ganaderos?

Respuesta conjunta del Sr. Hahn en nombre de la Comisión

(4 de abril de 2014)

Los proyectos de construcción de instalaciones de tratamiento de residuos agrícolas (estiércol) en los emplazamientos de la Salzadella, San Mateu, Albocàsser, Vall d'Alba y la Todolella, ubicados en la provincia de Castellón, se cofinanciaron a través del Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional en el contexto del programa de la Comunidad Valenciana correspondiente al periodo 1994-1999.

En el marco del principio de gestión compartida, las autoridades nacionales y regionales competentes velan por la selección de los proyectos, así como por la legalidad y la regularidad de los gastos. Durante la ejecución del programa, la Comisión nunca tuvo constancia de elemento alguno para cuestionar la finalidad de los proyectos.

El informe de cierre se remitió a la Comisión en 2004. Los cinco proyectos que se mencionan anteriormente fueron objeto de una corrección financiera a raíz de una auditoría realizada en el marco del cierre que permitió identificar las disfunciones relativas al conjunto del programa. Como consecuencia de ello, la Comisión adoptó una decisión de corrección financiera ⁽¹⁾ con respecto a la totalidad del programa por un importe de 115 612 377,25 EUR.

⁽¹⁾ C(2010) 337 final de 28.1.2010.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001073/14
to the Commission**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(3 February 2014)

Subject: Use of ERDF funds for the slurry plant at Vall d'Alba

The answer to Written Question E-004280/2012 on the use of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) to pay for the construction of the treatment plant for livestock waste (slurry) at a cost of EUR 6 645 630 stated that 'The Commission is in contact with the competent authorities in order to obtain the relevant information and will inform the honourable Member of its findings. If any kind of irregularity has been committed, the Commission will ensure that all or part of the funds invested in the project are recovered'.

I would therefore ask the following questions:

1. What information has been obtained in this respect?
2. Has any kind of irregularity been committed?

**Question for written answer E-001631/14
to the Commission**

Andrés Perelló Rodríguez (S&D)

(14 February 2014)

Subject: Irregularities in five livestock waste treatment plants in Castellon

The regional authority of the Province of Castellon recently approved a budgetary amendment allowing it to recuperate five livestock waste (liquid manure) treatment plants in la Salzadella, Sant Mateu, Albocàsser, Vall d'Alba and la Todolella by paying EUR 549 873 to the company contracted to operate the waste treatment service. Only one of these five plants is currently in use.

Having reclaimed the plants, the authorities are now negotiating their sale or lease as commercial, industrial or warehousing premises, meaning that they would no longer be used for their planned purpose as livestock waste treatment facilities.

The five liquid manure treatment plants at de la Salzadella, Sant Mateu, Albocàsser, Vall d'Alba and la Todolella were built between 1999 and 2003 at a budgeted cost of EUR18 million and co-financed by European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) funding.

1. Is the Commission aware that only one of these five plants is currently operational? Is it correct for four out of five plants to be inactive? Does this indicate a misuse of ERDF funding?
2. Has the Commission been informed by the Castellon provincial authorities of their intention to sell the five livestock waste treatment plants for other commercial purposes?
3. Does the Commission consider that the Castellon provincial authority is authorised to change the use and activities of these five ERDF-funded livestock waste treatment plants?
4. If this plan to sell off the plants succeeds, would the Commission consider misuse of ERDF funding to have taken place? Should the Castellon provincial authority return the European funding committed to the project if the plants are used for an activity other than the treatment of livestock waste?

(Version française)

Réponse commune donnée par M. Hahn au nom de la Commission

(4 avril 2014)

Les projets de construction d'usines de traitement de résidus agricoles (déjections animales) sur les sites de la Salzadella, San Mateu, Albocàsser, Vall d'Alba et la Todolella situés dans la Province de Castellón ont bénéficié d'un cofinancement au titre du Fonds européen de Développement Régional dans le cadre du programme de la Communauté Autonome de Valence relatif à la période 1994-1999.

Dans le cadre du principe de gestion partagée, les autorités nationales et régionales compétentes assurent la sélection des projets ainsi que la légalité et la régularité des dépenses. Au cours de l'exécution du programme, la Commission n'a pas eu connaissance d'éléments permettant de mettre en doute la finalité des projets.

Le rapport de clôture a été envoyé à la Commission en 2004. Les cinq projets susmentionnés ont fait l'objet d'une correction financière suite à un audit effectué dans le cadre de la clôture qui a permis d'identifier des dysfonctionnements affectant la totalité du programme. Cela a conduit à l'adoption par la Commission d'une décision de correction financière ⁽¹⁾ pour la totalité du programme d'un montant de 115 612 377,25 euros.

⁽¹⁾ C(2010)337 final du 28.01.2010.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001074/14
a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)**

Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)

(3 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: VP/HR — Represión, persecución política y criminalización de Marcha Patriótica: plan sistemático para la eliminación del movimiento político y social de la escena política colombiana

La dramática situación de los derechos humanos y las garantías políticas que vive Marcha Patriótica, con 29 de sus miembros asesinados, tres desapariciones forzadas y 45 detenidos, entre ellos el dirigente de la Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) Huber Ballesteros, el profesor universitario Francisco Tolosa y Wilmar Madroño, dirigente campesino de Fensuagro, que se suma a los montajes judiciales en contra de compañeros de la Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), la destitución política del alcalde Mayor de Bogotá Gustavo Petro, las amenazas contra la vida de Iván Cepeda y la dura represión contra las manifestaciones y expresiones sociales y populares como el Paro Agrario, evidencia una vez más la sistemática violación de los derechos humanos y la falta de garantías políticas y espacios democráticos para los ciudadanos colombianos.

En concreto, los representantes de Marcha Patriótica de Colombia denuncian un plan sistemático diseñado para su eliminación del escenario político colombiano con cinco ejes para su ejecución: el lenguaje estigmatizador y el uso de los medios de comunicación, las amenazas directas por parte de grupos militares y paramilitares a líderes y organizaciones sociales que forman parte de Marcha Patriótica, el asesinato y la desaparición forzada de dirigentes locales y regionales en distintas zonas del país, la detención arbitraria de integrantes de Marcha Patriótica y miembros de sus directivas a través de recurrentes montajes judiciales, e inhabilitaciones desde la Procuraduría General de la Nación como se hizo, por ejemplo, con la ex senadora Piedad Córdoba Ruiz. Llama la atención que, en momentos en los que el Gobierno de Colombia y la insurgencia de las FARC se encuentran desarrollando un proceso de diálogo para acabar con la larga confrontación armada y alcanzar una paz definitiva, se reprima, asesine y encarcele a los movimientos sociales y políticos que desarrollan su actividad pacíficamente y que, como Marcha Patriótica, vienen representando una opción distinta y ejerciendo el derecho a la oposición política.

¿Piensa la Alta Representante expresar públicamente su preocupación y la necesidad de que el Gobierno de Colombia aplique medidas concretas y efectivas para que se den todas las garantías políticas para que Marcha Patriótica pueda ejercer sus derechos constitucionales de oposición política, poniendo fin así a toda clase de estigmatización, señalamiento y judicialización? ¿Considera necesario la Alta Representante que el Gobierno colombiano brinde la protección necesaria a los líderes y militantes de Marcha Patriótica para evitar que se repita el escalofriante genocidio que ocurrió con la Unión Patriótica? ¿Tiene constancia la Alta Representante de que el Gobierno colombiano esté actuando para conseguir esa necesaria protección?

Respuesta de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión

(10 de abril de 2014)

La AR/VP de la Comisión agradece esta pregunta a Su Señoría e indica que sigue de cerca la situación política de Colombia, en particular en lo referente a los derechos humanos.

La UE y Colombia han iniciado un diálogo sobre derechos humanos en cuyo contexto se tratan todos los asuntos relacionados con estos y con las libertades, en particular los referentes a medidas de protección efectivas para los defensores de los derechos humanos y otros activistas. Por otra parte, la Unión Europea, a nivel local, apoya a los defensores de los derechos humanos, incluidos los sindicalistas, a través de programas de cooperación y del contacto regular con organizaciones de defensa de los derechos humanos.

En referencia a algunos de los casos específicos mencionados en su pregunta, la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta señala que hay procedimientos judiciales en marcha y que, según la evolución de la situación, evaluará si se les deben plantear a las autoridades colombianas.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001074/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)
(3 February 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Repression, political persecution and criminalisation of the Patriotic March: a systematic plan for the eradication of the political and social movement from the Colombian political scene

The turmoil that the Patriotic March is currently facing over human rights and political guarantees, with 29 of its members murdered, three forced disappearances and 45 people arrested, including the director of the Central Workers' Unit (CUT) Huber Ballesteros, university professor Francisco Tolosa and Wilmar Madroño, the rural director of Fensuagro, in addition to the criminal charges raised against members of the Workers' Union (USO), the political dismissal of the Mayor of Bogotá Gustavo Petro, the death threats issued to Iván Cepeda and the ruthless repression of protests and social and popular movements such as Agricultural Unemployment, is further evidence of the systematic violation of human rights and the lack of political guarantees and democratic forums for Colombian people.

In particular, the representatives of the Colombian Patriotic March have condemned a systematic plan designed to eradicate them from the Colombian political scene, which consists of the following five steps: stigmatising language and use of the media, direct threats from military and parliamentary groups to leaders and social organisations that are part of the Patriotic March, the murder and forced disappearance of local and regional heads in different areas of the country, the arbitrary detainment of members of the Patriotic March and members of its executive committee through repeated criminal charges, and disqualification from the Office of the Inspector General of Colombia, for example that of ex-Senator Piedad Córdoba Ruiz. It is striking that, at a time when the Colombian Government and FARC insurgents are trying to establish a dialogue in order to put an end to the lengthy armed confrontation and achieve definitive peace, social and political movements that act peacefully and — like the Patriotic March — represent an alternative through the right of political opposition, are being repressed, murdered and incarcerated.

Is the High Representative thinking about publicly expressing her concerns and the need for the Colombian Government to implement specific, effective measures to ensure that every political guarantee is given so that the Patriotic March will be able to exercise its constitutional rights of political opposition, thus bringing an end to all manner of stigmatisation, labelling and prosecution? Does the High Representative think the Colombian Government should offer the necessary protection to the Patriotic March's leaders and militants to prevent a repeat of the shocking genocide that occurred with the Patriotic Union? Does the High Representative have proof that the Colombian Government is taking steps to provide the necessary protection?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2014)

The HR/VP thank the honourable member of the EP for this question. She follows closely the political developments in Colombia and in particular the issues related to human rights.

The EU and Colombia have established a dialogue on human rights in whose framework all issues concerning human rights and freedoms are addressed, in particular the issue of effective protection measures for human rights defenders and other activists. Moreover, the European Union, at local level, is supporting human rights defenders, including trade unionists, through cooperation programmes and regular contacts with human rights organisations.

In some of the specific cases mentioned in the present question, the HR/VP notes that judicial proceedings are underway and, in the light of the developments, will assess whether to raise them with the Colombian authorities.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001076/14
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(3 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Impuesto especial sobre la riqueza

El *Wall Street Journal* se ha hecho eco de la posibilidad propuesta por el Bundesbank de que, en un futuro, ante una crisis de deuda pública en la zona euro que requiera un rescate, se aplique un impuesto especial sobre la riqueza de los ciudadanos del país que necesite el rescate ⁽¹⁾.

Esta idea ya fue apuntada de manera tangencial por parte del FMI en su informe de octubre de 2013 ⁽²⁾.

La propuesta sería tomada en cuenta de cara a futuros rescates y, si fuera aplicada (en teoría), debería tener el consentimiento de la llamada troika (FMI-BCE-CE), de la que forma parte la Comisión Europea, así como del Eurogrupo.

A la luz de lo anterior,

¿Puede clarificar la Comisión cuál es su posición ante esta propuesta?

¿No cree la Comisión que aplicar tal medida en un país podría provocar situaciones de corralito bancario en el resto de la zona euro?

Respuesta del Sr. Rehn en nombre de la Comisión

(22 de abril de 2014)

Remitimos a Su Señoría a la respuesta dada a la pregunta P-011736/2013 ⁽³⁾, que se refiere a un asunto similar.

⁽¹⁾ <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304007504579346330639793674>

⁽²⁾ www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2013/02/pdf/fm1302.pdf

⁽³⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001076/14
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(3 February 2014)

Subject: One-off tax on wealth

The *Wall Street Journal* has reported on a possible solution, proposed by the Bundesbank, to a future public debt crisis in the Eurozone requiring a bail-out: the levying of a one-off tax on the wealth of citizens in the country that needs bailing out ⁽¹⁾.

This idea has already been suggested in passing by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its report from October 2013 ⁽²⁾.

The proposal would be taken into consideration in the event of future bail-outs and, if applied (in theory), it would have to be approved by the so-called troika of the IMF, European Central Bank and European Commission, as well as by the Eurogroup.

In light of the above:

Can the Commission state its position with respect to this proposal?

Does the Commission think that the application of such a measure in a country might perhaps create situations whereby bank deposits are frozen in the rest of the Eurozone?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(22 April 2014)

The Honourable Member is referred to the answer given to Question P-011736/2013 ⁽³⁾, which covers a similar issue.

⁽¹⁾ <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304007504579346330639793674>

⁽²⁾ www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2013/02/pdf/fm1302.pdf

⁽³⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001077/14
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(3 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Devoluciones de impuestos en el Estado español, 2013

Según parece, el Gobierno español ha vuelto a retrasar en 2013 el pago de las devoluciones a particulares y empresas con el objetivo de reducir nominalmente el déficit.

La diferencia entre los pagos comprometidos y efectuados sería equivalente a 6 000 millones, cantidad que eliminaría el aumento de recaudación de 2013 respecto de 2012, pues hasta noviembre se habían recaudado 154 937 millones en impuestos, frente a los 153 542 millones recabados a noviembre de 2012 ⁽¹⁾.

Hacer las devoluciones después del fin del ejercicio 2013 podría ser un factor que permitiera al Gobierno un cumplimiento nominal del objetivo de déficit.

A la luz de lo anterior:

¿Ha recibido datos la Comisión sobre el ritmo de devoluciones de impuestos en el Estado español?

¿Está preocupada la Comisión por los malos resultados de los ingresos fiscales (restadas las devoluciones pendientes) en relación con las subidas de impuestos aplicadas?

Respuesta del Sr. Rehn en nombre de la Comisión

(1 de abril de 2014)

1. La Comisión no ha recibido información sobre el calendario de devoluciones de impuestos previsto en España.
2. La evolución de los ingresos fiscales ha de analizarse en el contexto de la fuerte contracción de la economía española durante 2012 y 2013 y del desplazamiento estructural desde la demanda interior hacia las exportaciones netas que, por regla general, generan menos ingresos tributarios. Ante esta situación, no es de extrañar que los ingresos fiscales no hayan aumentado mucho a pesar de las medidas de subida de impuestos.

⁽¹⁾ <http://vozpopuli.com/economia-y-finanzas/37992-hacienda-vuelve-a-jugar-con-las-devoluciones-para-maquillar-el-deficit-de-2013>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001077/14
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(3 February 2014)

Subject: Tax refunds in Spain, 2013

It seems that in 2013 the Spanish Government has once again delayed the payment of refunds to individuals and companies in an attempt to nominally reduce the deficit.

The difference between the payments committed and those made would be equivalent to EUR 6 000 million, an amount that would wipe out the increased revenue in 2013 with respect to 2012, as up until November EUR 154 937 million was collected in tax, in comparison with the EUR 153 542 million raised in November 2012 ⁽¹⁾.

Paying the refunds after the end of the financial year 2013 could be a factor that would enable the government to nominally meet its deficit target.

In light of the above:

Has the Commission received any information on the schedule for tax refunds in Spain?

Is the Commission concerned about the poor results from fiscal revenue (minus the pending refunds) in relation to the tax increases that have been imposed?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(1 April 2014)

1. The Commission did not receive information on the schedule for tax refunds in Spain.
2. The evolution of tax revenues has to be seen in the context of the sharp contraction of the Spanish economy registered in 2012 and 2013 and the structural shift away from domestic demand towards net exports, which is generally less tax-intensive. Against this background, it is not surprising that tax revenues have not developed strongly despite a number of measures aimed at raising revenues.

⁽¹⁾ <http://vozpopuli.com/economia-y-finanzas/37992-hacienda-vuelve-a-jugar-con-las-devoluciones-para-maquillar-el-deficit-de-2013>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001078/14
to the Commission
Mairead McGuinness (PPE)
(3 February 2014)**

Subject: Purity of calcium carbonate in animal feed

Currently in the EU there is widespread use of calcium carbonate with high levels of impurities.

Can the Commission comment on why animal feed producers in the EU are obliged to declare only the percentage of calcium carbonate in feed and not the purity of the calcium used (i.e. 98% CaCO₃ or higher)?

Given our concerns about the food supply chain and its integrity, is the Commission considering changing these requirements to include details of the degree of purity of calcium carbonate so that buyers are aware of the content and feed manufacturers can provide assurances to farmers about the quality of the feed produced with calcium carbonate?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2014)**

Calcium carbonate is a feed material obtained by grinding limestone or by precipitation from acid solution. The Commission has no evidence about the widespread use of Calcium carbonate with high level of impurities.

Naturally, the purity of the feed material varies depending from the respective source and the manufacturing method. The exact calcium content of calcium carbonate and, if above 5%, the ash insoluble in HCl are mandatory labelling requirement according to the EU Catalogue of feed materials ⁽¹⁾. With respect to impurities, the Catalogue established limits for residues of grinding aids (0,1%) and propylene glycol (0,25%) in calcium carbonate. Furthermore, Directive 2002/32/EC ⁽²⁾ establishes maximum levels for residues of the potential undesirable substances in calcium carbonate and compound feed into which calcium carbonate had been incorporated. Thus, the integrity of the feed chain is assured.

The quality aspect of calcium carbonate in animal feed is addressed in Regulation (EC) 767/2009 ⁽³⁾: the content of calcium must be labelled for compound feed intended for all food producing animals.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EU) No 68/2013 (OJ L 28, 30.1.2013, p. 1).

⁽²⁾ OJ L 140, 30.5.2002, p. 10.

⁽³⁾ OJ L 229, 1.9.2009, p. 1.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001081/14
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Iva Zanicchi (PPE)

(3 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Gravissima situazione umanitaria nel Sud Sudan

Il Sud Sudan è il più giovane paese africano, il 193° paese membro delle Nazioni Unite, il 54° dell'Unione africana, nato dopo una lunga guerra civile, una delle più devastanti e lunghe del continente, in seguito alla quale si è reso indipendente dal Sudan il 9 luglio 2011.

La lunga guerra civile ha lasciato il paese in condizioni disperate di sottosviluppo e arretratezza, senza infrastrutture e con la maggioranza della popolazione priva del minimo necessario per la sopravvivenza.

Gli accordi di pace noti come «Accordo di Naivasha», siglati nel 2005, hanno portato un periodo di ripresa per quanto concerne le disperate condizioni di vita di questo paese ma la strada verso la normalizzazione è ancora lunga.

Purtroppo, dalla fine del 2013 violenti scontri stanno insanguinando il paese, provocando migliaia di vittime e mezzo milione di sfollati. La situazione umanitaria, a causa dei combattimenti, è ora drammatica: acqua e cibo scarseggiano tra le migliaia di sfollati, molte famiglie sono state divise durante gli scontri e arrivano preoccupanti notizie del coinvolgimento di minori come soldati tra le milizie.

L'asprezza degli scontri armati e la conseguente insicurezza nell'area rendono difficile, se non impossibile, raggiungere e portare assistenza alle persone in stato di necessità.

È l'Alto Rappresentante a conoscenza di questa drammatica situazione? Quali azioni intende intraprendere per portare aiuto alla martoriata popolazione del Sud Sudan?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(10 aprile 2014)

L'UE giudica allarmante la situazione nel Sud Sudan. Oltre alle pesantissime ripercussioni per la popolazione, l'Unione è preoccupata anche per il rischio che la crisi si estenda all'intera regione.

L'UE si è adoperata attivamente, insieme alla comunità internazionale, per cercare di evitare che la crisi degeneri in una guerra civile di stampo etnico e che l'instabilità si accentui ulteriormente nella regione. Il rappresentante speciale dell'UE Alex Rondos ha percorso la regione e ha sostenuto i colloqui di Addis Abeba, svoltisi con la mediazione dell'IGAD.

L'UE appoggia pienamente il ruolo guida dell'IGAD nella ricerca di una soluzione politica al conflitto. Esprimendo soddisfazione per la firma di un accordo di cessate il fuoco, l'Unione ne chiede l'applicazione immediata e auspica un processo politico e di riconciliazione inclusivo.

L'UE è stata la prima a finanziare la mediazione dell'IGAD con uno stanziamento di 1,1 milioni di EUR (Fondo per la pace in Africa/Meccanismo di reazione rapida), offrendo inoltre attrezzature per agevolare l'attivazione tempestiva del meccanismo di monitoraggio del cessate il fuoco.

L'Unione ha accolto con favore l'impegno dell'Unione africana di istituire una commissione d'inchiesta sulle violazioni dei diritti umani verificatesi dallo scoppio della crisi e sta riflettendo sui possibili modi di rafforzare il nostro sostegno a tal fine.

L'UE continua a fornire assistenza umanitaria urgente a chi ne ha bisogno. La Commissione europea sta predisponendo l'erogazione di 50 milioni di EUR nel 2014 per rispondere all'aggravarsi della crisi umanitaria nel paese.

L'Unione sta infine rivedendo, in stretta collaborazione con i suoi principali partner, il portafoglio e le strategie di sviluppo per rispondere in maniera più adeguata al nuovo contesto.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001081/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Iva Zanicchi (PPE)

(3 February 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Appalling humanitarian situation in South Sudan

South Sudan is the youngest country in Africa, the 193rd member of the United Nations and the 54th of the African Union. It came into being after one of the longest and most devastating civil wars in Africa, following which it became independent of Sudan on 9 July 2011.

The lengthy civil war left the country in a desperately underdeveloped and backward state. It had no infrastructure and most of its people lacked the basic necessities for survival.

The peace accord, known as the Naivasha Agreement, was signed in 2005 and led to a period of improvement in the country's desperate living conditions, but there is still a long way to go on the road to normalisation.

Unfortunately, since late 2013 the country has been shaken by violent, bloody clashes, which have made thousands of victims and forced half a million people from their homes. Because of the fighting, the humanitarian situation is now terrible: food and water are running short for the thousands of homeless; many families have been split up during the clashes; and worrying news is coming in of children being used as soldiers in the militias.

The fierceness of the armed clashes and the resulting lack of security in the area make it difficult, if not impossible, to reach and deliver help to the people who need it.

Is the High Representative aware of this terrible situation? What does she intend to do in order to deliver aid to the tormented people of South Sudan?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(10 April 2014)

The situation in South Sudan is of great concern to the EU. The human toll on the people has been huge and we are also concerned that the ongoing crisis risks affecting the wider region.

Together with the international community, the EU has been active in trying to prevent the crisis descending into an ethnic-based civil war and avoid further instability in the region. The EU Special Representative Alex Rondos has travelled the region and supported the talks in Addis Ababa, facilitated by IGAD.

The EU firmly supports IGAD's leading role in finding a political solution to the conflict. We have welcomed the signing of a ceasefire agreement and insist on its immediate implementation. We call for an inclusive political and reconciliation process.

The EU has been the first to finance the IGAD mediation, through EUR 1.1m (Africa Peace Facility/ Early Reaction Mechanism). The EU has also offered equipment to the cease-fire monitoring mechanism to facilitate its swift deployment.

The EU has welcomed the African Union's commitment to establish a Commission of Enquiry to look into the human rights violations that took place since the outbreak of the crisis and is exploring avenues to strengthen our support in this field.

We continue to provide lifesaving humanitarian assistance to those in need. The European Commission is making EUR 50 million in humanitarian funding available in 2014 to respond to the unfolding and intensifying humanitarian crisis in the country.

Finally, in close cooperation with key partners, the EU is currently reviewing its development portfolio and strategies to better respond to the new context.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001082/14
alla Commissione
Iva Zanicchi (PPE)
(3 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Drammatica situazione dei rifugiati siriani in Giordania

Il conflitto che sta insanguinando da più di due anni la Siria non sembra ridurre la sua intensità, e un flusso incessante di persone si spinge ogni giorno oltre i confini del paese per mettersi in salvo dai massacri.

La Giordania accoglie circa 550 000 persone fuggite dalla Siria, di cui l'80 % vive in contesti urbani e rurali, fuori dai campi gestiti dalle agenzie internazionali e dalle organizzazioni umanitarie. Le condizioni di vita per questi rifugiati sono terribili: lontani dalla loro terra, da amici e parenti, hanno lasciato dietro di loro il lavoro, la casa e tutto ciò che avevano, la stabilità e una quotidianità che lo scoppio del conflitto ha dissolto.

In Giordania, la maggior parte delle famiglie siriane rifugiate vive in alloggi in affitto, spesso sovraffollati e in condizioni strutturali e igienico-sanitarie precarie. Trovare un lavoro non è facile, il tasso di disoccupazione è alto e per queste famiglie sostenersi diventa sempre più difficile.

Con l'inasprirsi delle violenze in Siria, nelle ultime settimane, il flusso degli arrivi in Giordania si è intensificato notevolmente, registrando l'arrivo — ogni giorno — di circa 600 persone in stato di necessità.

Più della metà dei rifugiati siriani sono donne e bambini: sono loro i più vulnerabili e a rischio, corrono i pericoli maggiori anche dopo la fuga dalla Siria e sono i primi a soffrire per la scarsità di risorse del contesto in cui arrivano.

Quali azioni intende sostenere la Commissione affinché sia ripristinato il rispetto dei diritti umani e siano prestati aiuti umanitari e supporto psicologico ai rifugiati siriani?

Risposta di Kristalina Georgieva a nome della Commissione
(7 aprile 2014)

L'UE ha preso la guida della risposta internazionale alla crisi siriana in termini umanitari e di sviluppo e ha mobilitato un sostegno complessivo di oltre 2,6 miliardi di EUR proveniente dalla Commissione e dagli Stati membri. Più del 20 % dei finanziamenti umanitari erogati dall'UE in risposta alla crisi serve a coprire il fabbisogno all'interno del territorio giordano.

I finanziamenti umanitari mobilitati dalla Commissione a favore della Giordania, che ammontano complessivamente a 122,4 milioni di EUR, permettono di prestare assistenza di primo soccorso ai rifugiati siriani e di fornire aiuti alle comunità di accoglienza. Vengono inoltre attuati programmi di protezione per le donne e i bambini, che comprendono anche un sostegno psicologico. La Commissione, inoltre, promuove attivamente i diritti dei minori siriani, ad esempio tramite l'iniziativa «No Lost Generation».

Ad oggi lo strumento europeo di vicinato e partenariato ha erogato oltre 80 milioni di EUR a favore della Giordania, destinati principalmente all'istruzione, alla sussistenza, alla creazione di posti di lavoro e al sostegno per progetti relativi alle acque reflue presso le comunità di accoglienza vulnerabili. Lo strumento inteso a contribuire alla stabilità e alla pace ha erogato ad oggi 22,9 milioni di EUR per finanziare ulteriori misure volte a migliorare la protezione e l'assistenza a favore dei rifugiati siriani e delle comunità di accoglienza in Giordania. Questo sostegno comprende il rafforzamento delle capacità di accoglienza alle frontiere e il miglioramento delle strutture di gestione della sicurezza e di governance nei campi profughi.

Nel 2014 la Giordania riceverà inoltre dall'UE un'assistenza macrofinanziaria (AMF) per far fronte alle implicazioni macroeconomiche della crisi. Questo strumento di prestito di 180 milioni di EUR coprirà in parte il fabbisogno finanziario dei rifugiati e contribuirà ad allentare le pressioni di bilancio derivanti dal problema dei rifugiati.

La Commissione segue con attenzione la situazione umanitaria dei rifugiati siriani in Giordania attraverso il suo ufficio regionale di Amman.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001082/14
to the Commission
Iva Zanicchi (PPE)
(3 February 2014)**

Subject: Tragic situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan

The conflict that has turned Syria into a bloodbath for more than two years does not seem to be abating, and a steady stream of people crosses the country's borders every day to find shelter from the slaughter.

Jordan has taken in some 550 000 Syrian refugees, 80% of whom are living in towns and rural areas outside the camps run by international agencies and humanitarian organisations. Living conditions for these refugees are terrible: far from their own land and their friends and relatives, they have left behind their work, their homes and everything they owned, as well as the stability and daily routine that the outbreak of fighting destroyed.

Most Syrian refugee families in Jordan live in rented accommodation, which is often overcrowded and in poor structural and sanitary condition. Finding work is not easy as the unemployment rate is high, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for these families to support themselves.

With the worsening violence in Syria in recent weeks, the stream of new arrivals in Jordan has increased markedly, and around 600 people arrive in a state of need every single day.

Women and children make up more than half of these Syrian refugees. They are the most vulnerable and most at risk; they face the greatest dangers even after escaping from Syria and they are the first to suffer from the lack of resources at their destination.

What steps does the Commission intend to take to restore respect for human rights and to provide these Syrian refugees with humanitarian aid and psychological support?

**Answer given by Commissioner Georgieva on behalf of the Commission
(7 April 2014)**

The EU has spearheaded the international humanitarian and development response to the Syria crisis and mobilised over EUR 2.6 billion in total support from the Commission and its Member States. More than 20% of the EU humanitarian funding to this crisis goes to responding to needs inside Jordan.

The Commission's humanitarian funding mobilised for Jordan amounts to a total of EUR 122.4 million. It provides Syrian refugees with life-saving assistance and aid to host-communities. It also comprises protection programmes for women and children, including the provision of psychological support. Moreover, the Commission is actively advocating for the rights of Syrian children, for example through the 'No Lost Generation' initiative.

The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument has so far supported Jordan with over EUR 80 million with a focus on education, support to livelihoods, job creation and support to vulnerable host communities in wastewater projects. Further measures to improve protection and assistance for Syrian refugees and host-communities in Jordan are provided through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace with EUR 22.9 million to date. This support includes strengthening reception capacities at borders and improving refugee camp security management and governance structures.

Jordan will also benefit from Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) from the EU in 2014 to address the macroeconomic implications of the crisis. This EUR 180 million loan facility will cover part of the refugees' financing needs and will contribute to ease the fiscal pressures stemming from the refugee crisis.

The Commission is closely monitoring the humanitarian situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan through its regional office in Amman.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001084/14
alla Commissione
Iva Zanicchi (PPE)
(3 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: Emergenza siccità nella zona del Ciulo in Angola

Dal marzo 2012 le piogge sono state del tutto assenti nell'area del Ciulo, in Angola. La situazione peggiora di giorno in giorno e le prossime piogge sono previste per fine febbraio.

Le conseguenze di tale siccità sono devastanti: le scorte alimentari sono finite da un paio di mesi, gli ultimi raccolti sono andati persi e i corsi d'acqua della zona sono oramai secchi.

Le donne e i bambini, disidratati e malnutriti, devono andare sempre più lontano per trovare dell'acqua, che spesso è stagnante, putrida e dunque portatrice di malattie. Anche se non vi sono esami microbiologici disponibili, è evidente che l'acqua è contaminata e contribuisce alla diffusione di tifo, amebiasi e dissenteria.

Può la Commissione far sapere se è a conoscenza di tale situazione? Quali azioni intende predisporre per arginare l'emergenza?

**Risposta di Kristalina Georgieva a nome della Commissione
(3 aprile 2014)**

La Commissione europea ha seguito la situazione umanitaria in Africa australe e, fra l'altro, la siccità che ha afflitto l'Angola dal 2012. La Commissione ha mobilitato 15 milioni di euro del Fondo europeo di sviluppo, destinati ad essere utilizzati da ECHO, per fornire aiuti alimentari d'emergenza e assistenza per il recupero delle persone vulnerabili in Angola, Lesotho, Malawi e Zimbabwe. Nel 2013 per l'Angola sono stati stanziati 4 milioni di EUR per programmi destinati alle regioni colpite dalla siccità. Questi aiuti hanno contribuito a salvare la vita a più di 100 000 bambini colpiti da malnutrizione acuta e a sollevare la questione nell'ambito della reazione del governo alle emergenze e nella programmazione del ministero della Salute. La delegazione si è impegnata a garantire la sostenibilità e a migliorare gradualmente questi risultati.

Sembra che le piogge dell'inizio di gennaio abbiano leggermente attenuato la gravità della situazione che tuttavia rimane ancora critica. Il governo ha riesaminato il suo programma di assistenza alimentare e continuerà ad aiutare le sei province più gravemente colpite, fra le quali Huila, fino al luglio 2014.

Stiamo inoltre monitorando alcuni focolai di colera, ma il governo non ha ancora sollecitato assistenza da parte nostra. L'UE partecipa alla squadra delle agenzie dell'ONU per la gestione delle catastrofi sforzandosi di aiutare il governo ad aggiornare e potenziare la risposta automatica e il piano di emergenza del governo stesso per affrontare le calamità naturali. Partecipa inoltre al gruppo in materia di alimentazione, guidato dal dipartimento per l'alimentazione del ministero della Salute e destinato a migliorare le politiche generali per il trattamento della denutrizione e a ridurre la vulnerabilità in tal senso.

Poiché tali problematiche rischiano di diventare croniche, la Commissione europea ha messo in rilievo la resilienza, l'alimentazione e l'agricoltura sostenibile nel progetto di programma indicativo nazionale dell'11° FES sottolineando la questione dell'acqua e dei servizi igienico-sanitari.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001084/14
to the Commission
Iva Zanicchi (PPE)
(3 February 2014)**

Subject: Urgent situation of drought in the Kwilu area of Angola

There has been no rain in the Kwilu area of Angola since March 2012. The situation is getting worse every day and the next rains are not expected until the end of February.

This drought has had devastating consequences: food stocks ran out a couple of months ago, the latest harvest was lost and water courses in the area have now run dry.

Women and children, suffering from dehydration and malnutrition, must go further and further to find water, which is often stagnant, putrid and therefore a carrier of disease. Although no microbiological tests are available, it is clear that the water is contaminated and contributes to the spread of typhoid, amoebiasis and dysentery.

Is the Commission aware of this situation? What action does it intend to take to deal with the emergency?

**Answer given by Ms Georgieva on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2014)**

The EC has been following the humanitarian situation in Southern Africa, including the droughts that have plagued Angola since 2012. The EC mobilised Euro 15 million from the EDF, for use by ECHO, to provide emergency nutrition and food and recovery assistance to vulnerable people in Angola, Lesotho, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Euro 4 million were allocated to Angola in 2013 for programmes targeting drought affected areas. Those led to saving over 100 000 lives of children suffering from acute malnutrition and raised the issue in the government response to emergencies and in the programming of the Ministry of Health. The Delegation is committed to ensure sustainability and scaling up of these results.

Early-January rains appear to have slightly alleviated the situation but hardship still remains. The government has revised its food assistance programme and will continue assisting the six worst affected provinces, including Huila, until July 2014.

We have also been monitoring a series of cholera epidemics but the government has not solicited assistance yet. The EU participates in the UN inter-agency Disaster Management Team focusing on helping the government renew and strengthen its automatic response/contingency plan for calamities. It also participates in the nutrition group, led by the Ministry of Health department for nutrition, to improve general policies on the treatment of under nutrition and to reduce vulnerability.

As these issues are likely to become chronic, the EC placed a strong focus on resilience, nutrition and sustainable agriculture in the draft National Indicative Programme for the 11th EDF with an emphasis on water and sanitation.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001085/14
alla Commissione
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(3 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: Accuse all'olio d'oliva italiano e accordi di libero scambio UE-USA

Un articolo apparso domenica sul sito web di un noto quotidiano statunitense ha suscitato una forte ondata di polemiche a causa di numerose informazioni errate in merito alle importazioni di olio d'oliva italiano.

L'articolo faceva riferimento a due pratiche di adulterazione dell'olio che avverrebbero durante la produzione: quella di tagliare l'olio d'oliva con altri oli più a buon mercato come l'olio di soia e, contemporaneamente, quella di aggiungere betacarotene e clorofilla per mascherare colore e sapore dell'olio.

Riferendosi all'etichettatura del prodotto finito, l'articolo sottolineava la stranezza della legislazione europea, che permette che le bottiglie con dicitura «importato dall'Italia» o «imbottigliato in Italia» possano contenere oli provenienti da altri paesi (che devono comunque essere indicati sull'etichetta). Inoltre, l'articolo suggeriva che il 69 % dell'olio extravergine d'oliva venduto negli Stati Uniti sia in realtà contraffatto.

Infine, l'articolo suggeriva la collusione di personaggi politici con i produttori di olio extravergine «contraffatto».

Il quotidiano in questione ha pubblicato nelle scorse ore una rettifica dell'articolo, chiarendo alcuni dei punti sopra elencati, come ad esempio il fatto che in realtà il 69 % delle bottiglie sottoposte a test non sia risultato corrispondente agli standard di gusto e olfattivi per l'olio extravergine d'oliva, ma che questo non significa che l'olio fosse adulterato. Nonostante ciò, l'articolo rappresenta un duro attacco e una mistificazione nei confronti della qualità ed eccellenza del prodotto nostrano.

1. Ciò premesso, può la Commissione far sapere quali iniziative intende assumere contro la campagna diffamatoria in atto negli Stati Uniti, che discredita la politica di sicurezza dei prodotti alimentari in Europa?
2. La Commissione intende sospendere, come sembra lecito, i negoziati sugli accordi di libero scambio con gli Stati Uniti finché non verrà chiarita la questione summenzionata?

**Risposta di Dacian Ciolos a nome della Commissione
(1° aprile 2014)**

La Commissione è a conoscenza dell'articolo cui si riferisce l'Onorevole Parlamentare.

La Commissione è stata in stretto contatto con l'amministrazione statunitense onde garantire la diffusione di una corretta informazione in merito alle disposizioni specifiche, applicabili a livello dell'UE, nel settore dell'olio d'oliva, anche per quanto riguarda le norme, i controlli e le ispezioni.

La Commissione, in coordinamento con gli Stati membri interessati, continuerà a sorvegliare la situazione negli USA e a mantenere stretti contatti sia con l'amministrazione statunitense sia con le principali parti interessate, ovviamente intervenendo, ove necessario, per garantire la comunicazione di una corretta informazione al grande pubblico.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001085/14
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(3 February 2014)

Subject: Damage to the reputation of Italian olive oil and EU-USA free trade agreements

An article that appeared on Sunday on the website of a well-known US newspaper has sparked a wave of controversy as it contained a great deal of incorrect information regarding imports of Italian olive oil.

The article mentioned two adulteration practices allegedly used during olive oil production, namely cutting the olive oil with other, cheaper oils such as soybean oil, and the simultaneous addition of beta-carotene and chlorophyll to mask the colour and flavour of the oil.

Regarding the labelling of the finished product, the article stated that, oddly, under European legislation, bottles labelled 'Imported from Italy' or 'Bottled in Italy' may contain oils from other countries (although they are supposed to be listed on the label). In addition, the article suggested that 69% of the extra virgin olive oil sold in the United States is actually counterfeit.

Lastly, the article suggested collusion between politicians and the producers of 'counterfeit' extra virgin olive oil.

The newspaper in question has now published a corrected version of the article, clarifying some of the above points, such as the fact that in reality 69% of the bottles tested did not meet standards for extra virgin olive oil in terms of taste and smell, but that this does not mean that the oil has been adulterated. Nevertheless, the article represents a severe, defamatory attack on the quality and excellence of our product.

1. What steps does the Commission intend to take against the smear campaign in the United States, which discredits food safety policy in Europe?
2. Does the Commission intend to suspend, as seems reasonable, negotiations on free trade agreements with the United States until the above matter is cleared up?

Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission

(1 April 2014)

The Commission is aware of the newspaper article referred to by the Honourable Member.

The Commission has been in close contact with the U.S. administration in order to provide information on the specific provisions applicable at EU level in the olive oil sector, including in relation to standards, controls and inspections.

The Commission in coordination with the concerned Member States will continue to monitor the situation in the U.S. and maintain close contacts both with the U.S. administration and with the main stakeholders and will of course intervene as appropriate to ensure that correct information is communicated to the general public.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001086/14
alla Commissione**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(3 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Richieste di finanziamento da parte dell'opposizione ucraina

In Ucraina si parla ormai di oltre 50 000 persone scese in piazza per protestare contro le recenti decisioni del governo riguardanti l'accordo di associazione con l'Unione europea e le nuove leggi sulla libertà di manifestazione. Uno dei leader dell'opposizione ha spiegato che l'unico compromesso potrà essere rappresentato dalle dimissioni del presidente e il possibile ritorno alla costituzione del 2004, che prevedeva la divisione dei poteri fra presidente, parlamento e governo.

Un altro esponente di spicco dell'opposizione ha anche annunciato di aver richiesto sostegno finanziario concreto ai «partner occidentali», affermando poi che il presidente e i dirigenti del «regime» risponderanno «di tutti i loro crimini».

Alla luce di questi ultimi eventi, può la Commissione chiarire se:

1. ha ricevuto richieste di sostegno finanziario da parte dell'opposizione ucraina o dai manifestanti;
2. è a conoscenza di richieste simili formalizzate presso uno o più Stati membri dell'UE;
3. intende avviare un dialogo con i leader delle opposizioni per garantire che, in caso di dimissioni, i diritti civili e politici del presidente ucraino in carica siano pienamente rispettati?

Risposta di Štefan Füle a nome della Commissione

(11 aprile 2014)

La situazione in Ucraina si è evoluta significativamente nelle ultime settimane. L'UE sostiene pienamente gli sforzi del nuovo governo ucraino per stabilizzare la situazione e portare avanti le riforme costituzionali e le altre riforme, nonché per tenere elezioni presidenziali libere, eque e trasparenti. È fondamentale che vi sia un governo che coinvolga tutte le regioni e i gruppi di popolazione dell'Ucraina per garantire la piena tutela delle minoranze nazionali. Il governo ha ribadito il proprio impegno per una maggiore associazione politica e integrazione economica dell'Ucraina con l'UE. L'UE ha firmato le parti politiche dell'accordo di associazione con l'Ucraina il 21 marzo. La Commissione ha presentato una proposta tesa all'adozione di misure commerciali autonome per i prodotti ucraini, che permetterebbe al paese di trarre già benefici sostanziali da una futura zona di libero scambio globale e approfondita. Una priorità immediata è quella di ripristinare la stabilità macroeconomica in Ucraina; l'UE sta approntando un pacchetto di assistenza globale⁽¹⁾. Inoltre sta introducendo misure restrittive contro le persone responsabili di violazioni dei diritti umani o di appropriazione indebita di fondi dello Stato, nonché misure tese a incoraggiare l'allentamento della crisi in Crimea.

Dall'inizio della crisi l'UE si è adoperata per facilitare una soluzione negoziata e pacifica in Ucraina.

⁽¹⁾ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-219_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001086/14
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(3 February 2014)

Subject: Requests for funding from the Ukrainian opposition

In Ukraine, we're hearing that more than 50 000 people have now gathered in the square to protest against the government's recent decision concerning the association agreement with the European Union and the new laws on the right to demonstrate. One of the opposition leaders has said that the only possible compromise would involve the president's resignation and a possible return to the 2004 constitution, which provided for the sharing of power by the president, parliament and government.

Another prominent opposition spokesman has also said that practical financial support has been requested from 'western partners', going on to say that the president and leaders of the 'regime' will answer 'for all their crimes'.

In the light of these recent events, could the Commission clarify whether:

1. it has received requests for financial support from the Ukrainian opposition or from the protesters;
2. it is aware of any such requests being officially made to one or more Member States of the EU;
3. it intends to open a dialogue with the opposition leaders in order to ensure that, should the current Ukrainian president resign, his civil and political rights will be fully respected?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission

(11 April 2014)

The situation in Ukraine has evolved significantly in recent weeks. The EU fully supports efforts of the new Ukrainian Government to stabilise the situation and pursue constitutional and other reforms, as well as free, fair and transparent Presidential elections. An inclusive Government that reaches out to all Ukrainian regions and population groups to ensure full protection of national minorities is essential. The Government has reiterated its commitment to closer political association and economic integration with the EU. The EU signed the political parts of the Association Agreement with Ukraine on 21 March. The Commission tabled a proposal for autonomous trade measures for Ukrainian goods, which would allow Ukraine to draw early substantial benefits from a future Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). An immediate priority is to restore macroeconomic stability in Ukraine; the EU is preparing a comprehensive assistance package ⁽¹⁾. The EU is also pursuing restrictive measures for persons identified as responsible for human rights violations or misappropriation of State funds, as well as measures aimed at encouraging de-escalation of the crisis in Crimea.

The EU has been active in facilitating peaceful and negotiated solutions in Ukraine since the beginning of the crisis.

⁽¹⁾ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-219_en.htm

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001098/14
a la Comisión**

Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)

(4 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Amenazas a una persona por denunciar los crímenes del franquismo en Leganés

La situación de inseguridad en determinadas poblaciones de España llega a límites insospechados. La impunidad con la que actúan determinadas Fuerzas de Seguridad del Estado es el reflejo de una sociedad en la que nunca se ha hecho justicia tras la dictadura. El siguiente caso es una de las pruebas más extremas de cómo desprotegen determinadas instituciones públicas a las víctimas de los delitos cometidos durante la dictadura.

La situación de Gema Carretero, ciudadana de Leganés, en la Comunidad de Madrid, es dramática. Hija de un sindicalista fusilado en 1965, Gema se ha adherido a la querrela contra los crímenes del franquismo que instruye la justicia argentina. Desde que se produjo dicha adhesión, esta persona y su familia están siendo amenazadas por grupos de ideología de extrema derecha, que han llegado a escribir amenazas de muerte en su propio domicilio.

Esta persona, ante esta crítica situación, está solicitando que se implementen medidas de protección para proteger su vida y la de su familia. Sin embargo, se produce una situación de objetiva desprotección y desamparo, causada por la impunidad imperante en España. El comisario de la ciudad de Leganés es Jesús González Reglero, miembro destacado de la Brigada Político-Social durante la dictadura y uno de los encausados por la citada causa impulsada por la jueza argentina María Servini. Esta situación provoca la actual desprotección de la familiar de una víctima de la represión franquista, en una localidad donde un criminal de dicha dictadura continúa ejerciendo la autoridad. De la misma manera el alcalde llegó a amenazar a un grupo político con enviar «cabezas rapadas».

¿Conoce el caso de la citada ciudadana?

¿Considera que esta situación permite una adecuada implementación de lo estipulado en la Directiva 2012/29/UE, en especial en lo concerniente a la protección y apoyo a las víctimas?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión

(7 de abril de 2014)

El plazo de incorporación de la Directiva 2012/29/UE al ordenamiento jurídico de los Estados miembros expirará el 16 de noviembre de 2015. Esto significa que, independientemente de la posible aplicación de la Directiva a las circunstancias a que se refiere la pregunta, la misma no será aplicable hasta el 16 de noviembre de 2015.

La Comisión podrá evaluar el cumplimiento por los Estados miembros de las disposiciones de la Directiva únicamente después de expirar su plazo de incorporación al ordenamiento jurídico nacional. En la actualidad, la Comisión está ayudando a los Estados miembros a proceder a una incorporación correcta y oportuna mediante un documento de orientación, talleres y reuniones de expertos.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001098/14
to the Commission
Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)
(4 February 2014)

Subject: Threats received by Leganés resident for denouncing crimes committed during the Franco era

Insecurity among particular sections of the Spanish population has reached unprecedented levels. The impunity with which certain elements of the State Security Forces are acting is a reflection of a society in which the perpetrators of Francoist crimes have never been brought to justice. The case described below is one of the most extreme examples of how certain public institutions are failing to protect the victims of crimes committed during the dictatorship.

Gema Carretero, a resident of Leganés in the administrative Community of Madrid, is in an extremely difficult situation. The daughter of a union member who was murdered in 1965, Gema has lent her support to the case against the crimes of Francoism which is being heard by the Argentinian courts. Since doing so, both Gema and her family have received threats from extreme-right groups, who have even gone as far as to scrawl death threats on the walls of her house.

Faced with this situation, Gema has been requesting that measures be taken to protect her and her family. However, she has effectively been left completely unprotected, and it is the prevailing culture of impunity in Spain which is to blame for this. The Police Superintendent in Leganés is Jesús González Reglero, a prominent member of the Brigada Político-Social (Francoist secret police) during the dictatorship and one of the defendants in the above-mentioned case instigated by the Argentinian judge María Servini. This situation has resulted in the relative of a victim of Francoist repression failing to receive protection in a city where a criminal from that era continues to exercise authority. The Mayor also threatened to send a mob of 'skinheads' to the offices occupied by a political grouping.

Is the Commission aware of Gema Carretero's situation?

Does the Commission think that the provisions of Directive 2012/29/EU, in particular those relating to victim protection and support, apply in this case?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(7 April 2014)

The transposition period for Member States of Directive 2012/29/EU will expire on 16 November 2015. This means that irrespective of whether the directive would apply in the circumstances referred to in the question, the directive is not applicable until 16 November 2015.

The Commission will be able to assess Member States' compliance with the provisions of the directive only after the transposition period expires. Currently, the Commission is actively assisting Member States in correct and timely transposition by issuing a guidance document, organising workshops and expert meetings.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001338/14
an die Kommission
Andreas Mölzer (NI)
(10. Februar 2014)

Betrifft: Massive Internet-Kontrollen in der Türkei

Kürzlich wurde im türkischen Parlament ein umstrittenes Gesetz zur Kontrolle des Internets vorgelegt. Die neuen Regelungen räumen den Behörden die Möglichkeit der Sperrung von Internetseiten ohne Gerichtsbeschluss ein. Zudem darf Surfverhalten aufgezeichnet und zwei Jahre lang gespeichert werden. Dies alles dient angeblich dem besseren Schutz von Persönlichkeitsrechten im Internet und dem Schutz der Jugend vor schädlichen Einflüssen aus dem Internet wie Drogen und Pornografie. De facto gibt das Gesetz der Regierung die Macht, willkürlich über die Sperrung von Inhalten zu entscheiden, was einer Zensur gleichkommt.

Im Zuge der Proteste rund um den Istanbuler Gezi-Park im vergangenen Sommer wurde fast ausschließlich über soziale Medien kommuniziert, da regierungsnahe Medien über die Demonstrationen zeitweise kaum oder nicht berichteten. Daraufhin wurden Hunderte Aktivisten festgenommen, die im Internet zu Demonstrationen aufgerufen hatten.

1. Wie steht die Kommission zu dieser weiteren Einschränkung der persönlichen Freiheiten und Bürgerrechte in der Türkei?
2. Welchen Einfluss hat dieses Vorhaben auf die laufenden Beitrittsverhandlungen?

Gemeinsame Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission
(24. April 2014)

Das geänderte Internetgesetz, mit dem der Begriff der Verhältnismäßigkeit eingeführt wird und die Haftstrafen für Anbieter von Internetdiensten abgeschafft werden, ist am 28. Februar 2014 in Kraft getreten. Allerdings wirft das Gesetz Bedenken wegen der möglichen Willkür der türkischen Behörde „Telecommunication Communications Presidency“ und des Mangels an ausreichendem Schutz und Rechtssicherheit für die Betroffenen auf. Die Kommission hat ihre Besorgnis den türkischen Behörden gegenüber schriftlich und im Rahmen des politischen Dialogs auf Ministerebene in Brüssel am 10. Februar 2014 zum Ausdruck gebracht.

Die von den türkischen Behörden verhängten Zugangssperren für Twitter und YouTube geben Anlass zu ernster Besorgnis. Die jüngste Entscheidung des Verfassungsgerichts hat bestätigt, dass das generelle Twitter-Verbot gegen das verfassungsmäßige Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung verstößt. Die Kommission erwartet daher von den türkischen Behörden, dass sie die YouTube-Sperre aufheben und das rechte Gleichgewicht zwischen nationaler Sicherheit und der freien Meinungsäußerung finden.

Die Kommission weist darauf hin, dass zur freien Meinungsäußerung auch die Freiheit gehört, Informationen und Ideen ohne behördliche Eingriffe zu empfangen und weiterzugeben. Der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte hat klargestellt, dass jeder Eingriff in die Ausübung dieser Freiheiten aufgrund der herausragenden Bedeutung der betreffenden Rechte einer strikten Überwachung durch die Gerichte bedarf. Insbesondere müssen einzelne Eingriffe in die Anwendung des einschlägigen Gesetzes in einem angemessenen Verhältnis zu dem angestrebten Ziel stehen.

Die Kommission wird die Umsetzung des Gesetzes genau beobachten, einschließlich jeglicher Einschränkung der Meinungsfreiheit, die sich aus seiner Anwendung durch die nationalen Behörden ergibt. Sie wird in ihrem nächsten Fortschrittsbericht über dieses Thema berichten.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001692/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)
(14 Φεβρουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Δικτυακή λογοκρισία στην Τουρκία

Με νόμο που υιοθετήθηκε πρόσφατα στην Τουρκία σχετικά με την επιβολή αυστηρότερων ελέγχων στο διαδίκτυο, η Τουρκική κυβέρνηση απειλεί το δικαίωμα ελεύθερης χρήσης του διαδικτύου. Ο εν λόγω νόμος περιορίζει ακόμα περισσότερο την ελευθερία της έκφρασης και επικοινωνίας και το δικαίωμα των πολιτών για ελεύθερη πρόσβαση στην ενημέρωση.

Ο νέος νόμος επιτρέπει στην κυβερνητική αρχή που είναι αρμόδια για τις τηλεπικοινωνίες (ΤΙΒ) να μπλοκάρει, χωρίς την παραμικρή απόφαση της δικαιοσύνης, οποιονδήποτε ιστότοπο κατά βούληση.

Δεδομένου ότι 40 εκατομμύρια τούρκικα νοικοκυριά έχουν πρόσβαση στο διαδίκτυο, καθιστώντας το διαδίκτυο πολύ σημαντική πηγή ενημέρωσης, δημιουργούνται εύλογα ερωτήματα σχετικά με τη διαφύλαξη του δικαιώματος της ελευθερίας της έκφρασης και του Τύπου, που αποτελούν θεμελιώδη δικαιώματα και βάση του κράτους δικαίου.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ποιες ενέργειες προτιμάται να κάνει για να καταδικαστεί αυτή η συμπεριφορά της Τουρκίας και για να συμμορφωθεί η χώρα αυτή στα πρότυπα της ΕΕ, στην οποία επιδιώκει να ενταχθεί;
2. Θα γίνει σαφές ότι τέτοιες αναχρονιστικές κινήσεις λογοκρισίας και καταστρατήγησης της ελευθερίας του Τύπου και της ενημέρωσης θα έχουν επακόλουθες επιπτώσεις στις σχέσεις ΕΕ-Τουρκίας καθώς και στην ευρωπαϊκή πορεία της τελευταίας;

Κοινή απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(24 Απριλίου 2014)

Ο τροποποιημένος νόμος περί Διαδικτύου τέθηκε σε ισχύ στις 28 Φεβρουαρίου 2014. Ο τροποποιημένος νόμος εισάγει την έννοια της αναλογικότητας και καταργεί τις ποινές φυλάκισης για τους παρόχους υπηρεσιών Διαδικτύου. Ωστόσο, εκφράζονται ανησυχίες λόγω του ενδεχομένου αυθαιρεσιών της τουρκικής Αρχής Τηλεπικοινωνιών και της απουσίας επαρκούς προστασίας και νομικών εγγυήσεων για τα θιγόμενα μέρη. Η Επιτροπή εξέφρασε τις ανησυχίες της στις τουρκικές αρχές, αφενός μεν γραπτώς, αφετέρου δε κατά τη διάρκεια του πολιτικού διαλόγου σε υπουργικό επίπεδο που έλαβε χώρα στις Βρυξέλλες στις 10 Φεβρουαρίου 2014.

Οι απαγορεύσεις πρόσβασης στο Twitter και στο YouTube που έχουν επιβληθεί από τις τουρκικές αρχές εγείρουν σοβαρές ανησυχίες. Η πρόσφατη απόφαση του Συνταγματικού Δικαστηρίου επιβεβαιώνει ότι η γενική απαγόρευση του Twitter αποτελούσε παραβίαση του συνταγματικού δικαιώματος περί ελευθερίας της έκφρασης. Ως εκ τούτου, η Επιτροπή αναμένει από τις τουρκικές αρχές να άρουν την απαγόρευση του YouTube και να βρουν την κατάλληλη ισορροπία μεταξύ της εθνικής ασφάλειας και της ελευθερίας της έκφρασης.

Η Επιτροπή υπενθυμίζει ότι η ελευθερία της έκφρασης περιλαμβάνει την ελευθερία της διακίνησης πληροφοριών ή ιδεών χωρίς την ανάμειξη δημοσίων αρχών. Το Ευρωπαϊκό Δικαστήριο των Δικαιωμάτων του Ανθρώπου κατέστησε σαφές ότι κάθε περιορισμός των εν λόγω ελευθεριών προϋποθέτει αυστηρό έλεγχο από τα δικαστήρια, λόγω της κεφαλαιώδους σημασίας των εν λόγω δικαιωμάτων. Ειδικότερα, κάθε περιορισμός όσον αφορά την εφαρμογή της σχετικής νομοθεσίας πρέπει να είναι ανάλογος προς τον επιδιωκόμενο στόχο.

Η Επιτροπή θα παρακολουθεί εκ του σύνεγγυς την εφαρμογή του σχετικού νόμου καθώς και κάθε περιορισμό της ελευθερίας της έκφρασης εκ μέρους των αρμόδιων αρχών και θα αναφερθεί σε αυτό το θέμα ευκαιρία της επόμενης έκθεσης προόδου.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001308/14

alla Commissione
Mario Borghezio (NI)
(10 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Censura di Internet in Turchia

La commissione parlamentare turca ha approvato un progetto di legge con il quale il governo di Erdogan potrà esercitare un controllo fortissimo su tutta la rete Internet, impedendo l'accesso ad alcuni siti web e tutto ciò senza il consenso della magistratura.

Inoltre, le aziende che ospitano siti web dovranno aderire a un programma sotto diretto controllo del ministero, che, attraverso una banca dati, verificherà per due anni le pagine web visitate dagli utenti turchi.

Queste restrizioni sono motivate dal governo turco per controllare i casi di pedofilia e tutelare così i minori. Contro questi provvedimenti si è recentemente svolta a Istanbul una manifestazione pacifica, durante la quale vi sono stati però numerosi arresti.

1. È a conoscenza la Commissione di questo provvedimento che limita ulteriormente la libertà di espressione della popolazione turca?
2. Come intende intervenire?

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001723/14

alla Commissione
Oreste Rossi (PPE)
(17 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Turchia: legge che censura Internet

Ancora una volta, in Turchia, il diritto alla libertà di espressione è sotto attacco. Il Parlamento turco ha di recente approvato un pacchetto di norme le quali rafforzano il controllo dello Stato su Internet, consentendo al governo di monitorare tutte le attività online degli utenti e di tenerne traccia per due anni. Inoltre, il Direttorato delle telecomunicazioni avrà il potere di chiedere ai *provider* il blocco dei siti contenenti violazioni della privacy, senza previa autorizzazione a procedere da parte della magistratura.

La nuova legge «sarebbe necessaria per tutelare i minori, per oscurare pagine che incitano a discriminazioni razziali, religiose o etniche, e che non rispettino la privacy dei cittadini».

Dall'inizio dei negoziati di adesione, la Commissione si è finora limitata a chiedere ad Ankara di modificare le disposizioni giuridiche che limitano la libertà di espressione.

Considerato che tale comportamento viola la Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo e rischia di compromettere il processo di adesione del paese all'Unione europea, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. intende avviare procedure politiche e diplomatiche urgenti e più coercitive con lo scopo principale di sospendere il processo di adesione?
2. Ritiene che il pacchetto di norme approvato sia compatibile con i valori democratici dell'Unione europea e con l'adesione di un paese che ha violato la libertà di espressione e le dichiarazioni d'intenti, precedentemente sottoscritte e ratificate a livello internazionale?

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001749/14

alla Commissione
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(17 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Minacce alla libertà di stampa in Turchia

Lo scorso 11 gennaio il premier turco ha ammesso di aver fatto pressioni su alcuni organi di stampa nazionali affinché alcuni contenuti giornalistici venissero rimossi dalla versione online di un noto quotidiano turco.

Numerosi esponenti della stampa turca hanno accusato le forti pressioni politiche subite da diversi gruppi editoriali da parte di politici o dagli stessi consigli di amministrazione, i cui membri sono spesso vicino a figure politiche rilevanti. In questo modo, a farne le spese sono quei giornalisti che restano fedeli all'indipendenza che dovrebbe caratterizzare gli organi di stampa, puniti spesso anche con il licenziamento. A luglio, la Tgs, l'Unione Giornalisti turchi, ha reso noto che i reporter che hanno perso il loro posto di lavoro per aver coperto le rivolte di Gezi Parki sono stati 22. Altri 37 sono stati spinti alle dimissioni.

A peggiorare ulteriormente la situazione è poi giunta una legge approvata la scorsa settimana, definita liberticida dall'opposizione, dato che renderà più facile la chiusura di siti internet e permetterà all'Authority per le Telecomunicazioni di controllare l'attività degli utenti sulla rete. La legge attende ora la firma del presidente per la ratifica definitiva.

Alla luce di quanto detto, si chiede alla Commissione europea quali misure intenda prendere per favorire il rispetto della libertà di stampa in Turchia e se la libertà di stampa sia presente tra i capitoli aperti dalla Commissione e dal governo di Ankara in relazione al processo di adesione della Turchia all'Unione europea.

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002174/14
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(25 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: Provvedimenti assunti dal governo turco per un maggiore controllo di Internet

Il governo turco ha votato una serie di norme che conferiscono all'Autorità governativa per le telecomunicazioni la possibilità di bloccare contenuti web, chiudere siti internet e richiedere informazioni sui loro utenti, senza provvedimenti autorizzativi da parte della magistratura.

La Commissione è a conoscenza dei fatti sopra descritti?

Ritiene che tali leggi violino i diritti umani?

Poiché la Turchia è uno dei paesi che sta negoziando l'adesione all'UE e in quanto tale sarebbe tenuto al rispetto dei diritti umani e alla giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo, come intende intervenire la Commissione?

**Risposta congiunta di Štefan Füle a nome della Commissione
(24 aprile 2014)**

La legge modificata su internet, che è entrata in vigore il 28 febbraio 2014, introduce il concetto di proporzionalità e abolisce le pene detentive per i fornitori di servizi internet. La legge desta tuttavia preoccupazione per il potere potenzialmente arbitrario della Presidenza delle telecomunicazioni e delle comunicazioni e l'assenza di una protezione e di garanzie giuridiche adeguate per le parti lese. La Commissione ha espresso le proprie preoccupazioni alle autorità turche, sia per iscritto sia durante il dialogo politico a livello ministeriale svoltosi a Bruxelles il 10 febbraio 2014.

I divieti di accesso a Twitter e YouTube imposti dalle autorità turche sono allarmanti. La recente decisione della Corte costituzionale conferma che il divieto generale relativo a Twitter costituisce una violazione del diritto costituzionale alla libertà di espressione. La Commissione si aspetta quindi che le autorità turche revochino il divieto relativo a YouTube e trovino il giusto equilibrio fra sicurezza nazionale e libertà di espressione.

La Commissione ricorda che la libertà di espressione comprende la libertà di ricevere e diffondere informazioni e idee senza ingerenze da parte dell'autorità pubblica. La Corte europea dei diritti umani ha specificato chiaramente che, vista l'importanza capitale di tali diritti, qualsiasi interferenza con l'esercizio di queste libertà deve essere oggetto di una rigorosa vigilanza da parte dei tribunali. In particolare, ogni singola interferenza nell'applicazione della legge in questione deve essere proporzionata allo scopo perseguito.

La Commissione sorveglierà attentamente l'applicazione della legge, comprese tutte le eventuali restrizioni alla libertà di espressione derivanti dalla sua applicazione da parte delle autorità nazionali, e riferirà in merito nella prossima relazione sui progressi compiuti dalla Turchia.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001101/14

aan de Commissie

Marietje Schaake (ALDE)

(4 februari 2014)

Betreft: Wetgeving internetcensuur in Turkije

Deze week zal het Turkse parlement stemmen over een wetsvoorstel tot wijziging van de verordening uit 2007 betreffende internetwebsites en de preventie van misdrijven door middel van die websites (wet nr. 5651). Sinds de invoering van de wet in 2007 zijn duizenden websites geblokkeerd. Het nieuwe voorstel is verontrustend omdat het onduidelijke definities bevat, willekeurige besluiten mogelijk maakt en de controle door de regering van internet en internetproviders vergroot. De vrijheid van meningsuiting, de vrijheid van de media en de rechtsstaat staan reeds onder steeds grotere druk in Turkije, het land dat het grootste aantal journalisten opsluit.

1. Wat is het oordeel van de Commissie over het voorstel tot wijziging van wet nr. 5651?
2. Is de Commissie van mening dat wet nr. 5651 in strijd zou zijn met de criteria van Kopenhagen? Zo nee, waarom niet?
3. Is de Commissie ook van mening dat de vrijheid van meningsuiting in Turkije steeds meer onder druk staat? Zo nee, waarom niet?
4. Heeft de Commissie de onderwerpen vrijheid van meningsuiting, vrijheid van de media in verband met de huidige staatscrisis en de gebrekkige eerbiediging van de rechtsstaat recentelijk aan de orde gebracht bij rechtstreekse gesprekken met de Turkse regering? Zo nee, wanneer gaat zij dit dan doen?

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001326/14

aan de Commissie

Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)

(10 februari 2014)

Betreft: Nieuwe Turkse internetwet: verdere inperking vrijheid van meningsuiting!

Het Turkse parlement is akkoord gegaan met een nieuwe internetwet. Deze wet staat het de autoriteiten toe, naar believen, internetsites uit de lucht te halen — zonder tussenkomst van de rechter⁽¹⁾.

1. Hoe beoordeelt de Commissie de nieuwe Turkse internetwet die het de autoriteiten toestaat, naar believen, het internet te censureren — zonder tussenkomst van de rechter? Deelt de Commissie de mening dat dit een zeer ernstige, verdere inperking van de vrijheid van meningsuiting en expressie betekent?

In antwoord op schriftelijke vraag E-007689/2013, over het aan banden leggen van sociale media door de Turkse autoriteiten, schreef de heer Füle op 5 september 2013: „De Commissie zet zich krachtig in voor de vrijheid van meningsuiting en de bevordering van een vrij en open internet: de universele rechten van de mens moeten zowel online als offline gelden. Daarom heeft de Commissie herhaaldelijk benadrukt dat er eerder minder dan meer beperkingen op de media nodig zijn in Turkije.”

2. Hoe rijmt de Commissie de recente ontwikkelingen (de verregaande inperking van de vrijheid van meningsuiting door de Turkse autoriteiten — in dit geval door middel van een nieuwe internetwet) met haar, in het kader van de toetredingsonderhandelingen, met de Turkse autoriteiten onderhouden contacten (haar herhaaldelijke oproepen dat zij de vrijheid van meningsuiting dienen te waarborgen — bijvoorbeeld blijktens haar antwoord op E-007689/2013)? Deelt de Commissie de mening dat de Turkse autoriteiten aldus geen oren naar de EU hebben, aangezien zij de oproepen van de Commissie stelselmatig negeren en juist almaar in strijd met de door haar gestelde EU-maatstaven handelen? Welke conclusies trekt de Commissie hieruit? Welke gevolgen heeft dit voor de toetredingsonderhandelingen?
3. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat de recente ontwikkelingen aantonen dat Turkije niet Europees is, niet Europees wil zijn, niet Europees wil worden, nooit Europees zal worden, aldus niet tot de EU wil toetreden, nooit tot de EU kan toetreden en nooit ofte nimmer tot de EU zou moeten toetreden? Wanneer brengt de Commissie verlossing door de toetredingsonderhandelingen tussen de EU en Turkije voor eens en voor altijd te beëindigen?

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/turkish-parliament-restricts-free-expression-online>.

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002036/14
aan de Commissie
Philip Claeys (NI)
(20 februari 2014)

Betreft: Verklaringen van president Gül over de persvrijheid in Turkije

De Turkse president Abdullah Gül verklaarde tijdens een bezoek aan Hongarije dat hij bezorgd is om de persvrijheid in zijn land. Hij zei onder meer dat er teveel klachten zijn over ongeoorloofde druk van de Turkse regering op journalisten.

Deze uitspraken werden gedaan na vragen over de Turkse wet die het internetgebruik verder aan banden legt, wat manifest in strijd is met de criteria van Kopenhagen.

Beschouwt de Commissie de verklaringen van president Gül als een bijkomend element dat kan leiden tot het stilleggen van de toetredingsonderhandelingen met Turkije?

Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie
(24 april 2014)

De gewijzigde internetwet is op 28 februari 2014 in werking getreden. De gewijzigde wet voert het evenredigheidsbeginsel in en schaft gevangenisstraffen voor internetaanbieders af. De wet geeft echter aanleiding tot ongerustheid wegens de mogelijk arbitraire bevoegdheid van de Turkse Telecommunicatie-autoriteit en het ontbreken van voldoende bescherming en rechtszekerheid voor de betrokken partijen. De Commissie heeft haar bezorgdheid geuit bij de Turkse autoriteiten, zowel schriftelijk, als tijdens de politieke dialoog op ministerieel niveau op 10 februari 2014 in Brussel.

Het toegangsverbod dat de Turkse autoriteiten aan Twitter en YouTube hebben opgelegd, geeft ook aanleiding tot zware ongerustheid. Het recente besluit van het Constitutioneel Hof bevestigt dat het algehele verbod op Twitter een inbreuk vormde op het grondwettelijke recht op vrijheid van meningsuiting. De Commissie verwacht van de Turkse autoriteiten dat ze een einde maken aan het verbod op YouTube en een goed evenwicht vinden tussen de nationale veiligheid en de vrijheid van meningsuiting.

De Commissie herinnert eraan dat de vrijheid van meningsuiting de vrijheid omvat om informatie en ideeën te ontvangen en te verstrekken, zonder inmenging van de overheid. Het Europees Hof voor de rechten van de mens heeft duidelijk gesteld dat elke inmenging in de uitoefening van deze vrijheden aan een strikt toezicht door de rechter is onderworpen vanwege het kardinale belang van de rechten in kwestie. Met name elke inmenging in de toepassing van deze wet moet in verhouding staan tot het beoogde doel.

De Commissie zal nauw toezien op de tenuitvoerlegging van deze wet, met inbegrip van elke beperking van de vrijheid van meningsuiting die een gevolg kan zijn van de toepassing van de wet door de nationale autoriteiten, en zal hierover verslag uitbrengen in haar volgende voortgangsverslag.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001502/14
do Komisji**

Adam Bielan (ECR)

(12 lutego 2014 r.)

Przedmiot: Cenzura Internetu w Turcji

Jestem wstrząśnięty ostatnimi wydarzeniami w Turcji.

Władze wprowadzają nowe przepisy prawne, które mają w jeszcze większym niż dotychczas stopniu regulować Internet. 5 lutego br. została przyjęta ustawa, która umożliwi władzom blokowanie stron internetowych bez decyzji sądu. Dostawcy internetowi po otrzymaniu informacji od władz dotyczącej blokady strony będą mieli maksymalnie 4 godziny, aby wykonać to postanowienie. Dostawcy zostali również zobowiązani do przechowywania danych dotyczących użytkowników przez okres 2 lat i udostępniania ich władzom na życzenie.

Mieszkańcy Turcji sprzeciwili się tym przepisom i zorganizowali protesty 5 lutego. Manifestacje zostały rozpędzone przez policję przy użyciu armatek wodnych, gazu łzawiącego i broni z gumowymi kulami.

W związku z powyższymi informacjami chciałbym zapytać Komisję:

1. Czy w ramach otwartych rozdziałów akcesyjnych z Turcją są prowadzone rozmowy na temat praw obywateli i użytkowników Internetu?
2. Jak Komisja ocenia działania rządu tureckiego w sprawie kontroli Internetu, szczególnie brutalne tłumienie protestów?

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001817/14
do Komisji**

Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)

(18 lutego 2014 r.)

Przedmiot: Ograniczenie Internetu w Turcji

Parlament Turcji przyjął ustawę zezwalającą władzom państwowym na zaostrzenie kontroli nad Internetem. obrońcy wolności słowa w sieci i opozycja odnoszą się krytycznie do nowego prawa. Deputowani Wielkiego Zgromadzenia Narodowego wyrazili zgodę, by urząd ds. telekomunikacji bez nakazu sądowego mógł blokować strony internetowe, którym zarzuca się naruszenie prywatności. Ustawa przewiduje rejestr aktywności użytkowników, którego będą mogli dokonywać dostawcy usług internetowych. Taki rejestr będzie przechowywany przez dwa lata i udostępniany władzom na żądanie bez zawiadomienia użytkowników.

W związku z powyższym chciałbym zapytać:

1. Czy Komisja monitoruje na bieżąco sytuację przestrzegania wolności słowa w Internecie w Turcji?
2. Według kryteriów kopenhaskich przyjęcie nowego państwa do Wspólnoty wymaga istnienia instytucji gwarantujących stabilną demokrację i rządy prawa. Uważam, że ograniczanie wolności w sieci i kontrola państwa nad internautami są przeciw tym zasadom. Czy Komisja poruszy temat podczas prowadzonych negocjacji w sprawie członkostwa, a jeśli tak, to w jaki sposób będzie próbowała wpłynąć na Turcję, aby zaniechała takich rozwiązań prawnych?

Wspólna odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Štefana Fülego w imieniu Komisji

(24 kwietnia 2014 r.)

Zmieniona ustawa o Internecie weszła w życie w dniu 28 lutego 2014 r. Wprowadzono w niej pojęcie proporcjonalności oraz usunięto kary pozbawienia wolności dla dostawców usług internetowych. Budzi ona jednak obawy z uwagi na potencjalnie arbitralne upoważnienia tureckiego urzędu ds. telekomunikacji i komunikacji, a także brak wystarczającej ochrony i gwarancji prawnych dla dotkniętych stron. Komisja wyraziła swoje obawy przed władzami tureckimi na piśmie oraz w trakcie dialogu politycznego na szczeblu ministerialnym w Brukseli w dniu 10 lutego 2014 r.

Zakaz dostępu do Twittera i YouTube nałożony przez władze tureckie wzbudza poważne zaniepokojenie. Niedawna decyzja Trybunału Konstytucyjnego potwierdza, że ogólny zakaz korzystania z Twittera stanowił naruszenie konstytucyjnego prawa wolności wypowiedzi. Komisja oczekuje zatem, że władze tureckie zniosą zakaz korzystania z YouTube i znajdą odpowiednią równowagę pomiędzy zapewnianiem bezpieczeństwa narodowego a wolnością wypowiedzi.

Komisja przypomina, że wolność wypowiedzi obejmuje swobodę otrzymywania i przekazywania informacji oraz idei bez ingerencji organów publicznych. Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka jasno stwierdził, że jakkolwiek ingerencja w korzystanie z tych swobód wymaga ścisłego nadzoru ze strony sądów ze względu na podstawowe znaczenie przedmiotowych praw. W szczególności każda jednostkowa ingerencja w stosowanie takiej ustawy musi być proporcjonalna do zamierzonego celu.

Komisja będzie uważnie śledzić wdrażanie przedmiotowej ustawy, a także wszelkie ograniczenia wolności wypowiedzi wynikające z jej stosowania przez władze krajowe oraz będzie informować o tych kwestiach w kolejnym sprawozdaniu okresowym.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris P-001688/14
adresată Comisiei (Vicepreședintelui/Înaltului Reprezentant)
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(14 februarie 2014)

Subiect: VP/HR — Încălcarea drepturilor omului prin așa-numita „reformă a internetului” din Turcia

Recentele evoluții din Turcia cu privire la cenzura instaurată asupra internetului se transformă într-o vădită încălcare a drepturilor omului.

Așa-numita „reformă a internetului” aduce grave prejudicii dreptului la liberă exprimare, legea permițând autorităților guvernamentale de telecomunicații să blocheze, în mod discreționar, fără nicio hotărâre judecătorească prealabilă, orice pagină de internet.

Mai mult decât atât, legislația acordă autorităților posibilitatea de a stoca, vreme de doi ani, toate datele de acces referitoare la site-urile web vizitate de internetuți, ceea ce consider că aduce grave prejudicii dreptului la viață privată.

Ce măsuri are în vedere Înaltul Reprezentant pentru a convinge autoritățile din Turcia, care se pare că nu au fost intimidat nici de recentele proteste din țară, să pună capăt acestor încălcări ale drepturilor fundamentale?

Răspuns comun dat de dl Füle în numele Comisiei
(24 aprilie 2014)

Legea modificată privind internetul a intrat în vigoare la data de 28 februarie 2014. Aceasta introduce conceptul de proporționalitate și elimină pedepsele cu închisoarea pentru furnizorii de servicii de internet. Legea în cauză generează însă motive de îngrijorare în ceea ce privește puterea potențial arbitrară a autorității de reglementare din domeniul telecomunicațiilor, precum și în ceea ce privește protecția insuficientă și lipsa garanțiilor juridice pentru părțile afectate. Comisia a făcut cunoscute autorităților turce îngrijorările sale, pe care le-a exprimat în scris și în cadrul dialogului politic la nivel ministerial care a avut loc la Bruxelles, la data de 10 februarie 2014.

Măsura de interzicere a accesului la Twitter și la Youtube impusă de autoritățile turce reprezintă un motiv de îngrijorare profundă. Hotărârea pronunțată recent de Curtea Constituțională confirmă faptul că interzicerea completă a rețelei de socializare Twitter a constituit o încălcare a dreptului constituțional la libertatea de exprimare. În consecință, Comisia așteaptă ca autoritățile turce să ridice interdicția de acces la YouTube și să găsească echilibrul corespunzător între securitatea națională și libertatea de exprimare.

Comisia reamintește faptul că libertatea de exprimare include libertatea de a primi și de a comunica informații și idei fără amestecul autorităților publice. Curtea Europeană a Drepturilor Omului a precizat în mod clar că orice amestec în exercitarea acestor libertăți necesită supravegherea strictă de către instanțe, dată fiind importanța fundamentală a drepturilor în cauză. În special, orice amestec în aplicarea unei astfel de legi trebuie să fie proporțional cu scopul urmărit.

Comisia va monitoriza îndeaproape punerea în aplicare a acestei legi, inclusiv orice limitare impusă libertății de exprimare ca urmare a aplicării sale de către autoritățile naționale, și va aborda acest subiect în cadrul viitorului său raport privind progresele înregistrate.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001101/14
to the Commission**

Marietje Schaake (ALDE)

(4 February 2014)

Subject: Legislation to censor the Internet in Turkey

This week, the Turkish Parliament will vote on proposed legislation to amend the 2007 Regulation of Broadcasts via Internet and Prevention of Crimes Committed through Such Broadcasts (Law No 5651). Since its introduction in 2007, thousands of websites have been blocked. The new proposal is worrying because it contains unclear definitions, allows for arbitrary decisions and would increase government control over the Internet and providers. Freedom of expression, freedom of the media, and the rule of law are already increasingly under threat in Turkey, which remains the biggest jailer of journalists.

1. How does the Commission assess the proposal to amend Law No. 5651?
2. Does the Commission believe that Law No 5651 would violate the Copenhagen criteria? If not, why not?
3. Does the Commission agree that freedom of expression is increasingly under threat in Turkey? If not, why not?
4. Has the Commission addressed the issues of freedom of expression, freedom of the media in relation to the ongoing state crisis, and the lack of respect for the rule of law, in direct talks with the Turkish government recently? If not, when will it do so?

**Question for written answer E-001308/14
to the Commission**

Mario Borghezio (NI)

(10 February 2014)

Subject: Censorship of the Internet in Turkey

The Turkish Parliamentary Commission has approved draft legislation which will enable the Erdoğan government to exercise the strictest control over the whole Internet, preventing access to certain websites, all without the consent of the judiciary.

Furthermore, website hosting companies will have to follow a programme under direct ministerial control. This will use a database to check the web pages visited by Turkish users for two years.

The Turkish Government justifies these restrictions as controlling cases of paedophilia and so protecting children. A peaceful demonstration recently took place against these measures in Istanbul. During it, however, there were many arrests.

1. Is the Commission aware of this measure which further limits the Turkish population's freedom of expression?
2. How does it intend to intervene?

**Question for written answer E-001326/14
to the Commission**

Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)

(10 February 2014)

Subject: New Turkish law on the Internet: further restriction of freedom of expression!

The Turkish Parliament has approved a new law on the Internet. It permits the authorities to take down any website they choose, without applying for a court order ⁽¹⁾.

1. What view does the Commission take of the new Turkish law on the Internet, which permits the authorities to censor the Internet in any way they choose without applying for a court order? Does the Commission agree that this is a very serious further restriction of freedom of expression?

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/turkish-parliament-restricts-free-expression-online>

In answer to Written Question E-007689/2013, concerning the Turkish authorities' measures to control social media, Mr Füle wrote on 5 September 2013: 'The Commission is strongly committed to freedom of expression and promoting a free and open Internet: universal human rights must apply online as they do offline. Therefore, the Commission has consistently emphasised that fewer, rather than more restrictions on media are needed in Turkey.'

2. How does the Commission reconcile recent developments (the far-reaching restriction of freedom of expression by the Turkish authorities — in this case by means of a new law on the Internet) with the contacts which the Commission maintains with the Turkish authorities in connection with the accession negotiations (its reiterated calls for them to respect freedom of expression — for example as indicated by its answer to Question E-007689/2013)? Does the Commission agree that the Turkish authorities clearly pay no attention to the EU, as they systematically ignore the Commission's calls and — far from complying with them — constantly breach the EU criteria which the Commission invokes? What conclusions does the Commission draw from this? What consequences will it have for the accession negotiations?

3. Does the Commission agree that the recent developments show that Turkey is not European, does not wish to become European, never will become European, and thus does not wish to accede to the EU, will never be able to do so, and never ever ought to? When will the Commission have mercy and halt the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey once and for all?

Question for written answer E-001338/14
to the Commission
Andreas Mölzer (NI)
(10 February 2014)

Subject: Extensive Internet controls in Turkey

A controversial law on controls over the Internet was recently proposed in the Turkish parliament. The new regulations provide the authorities with the means to block websites without a court order. Internet activity may also be monitored and the records stored for a period of two years. All this should allegedly serve to better protect personal rights on the Internet and to protect young people from damaging influences on the Internet such as drugs and pornography. In practice, the law gives the government the power to arbitrarily reach decisions regarding the blocking of content, and this equates to censorship.

Communication took place almost exclusively via social media during the protests around Gezi Park in Istanbul last summer, as pro-government media would barely report on the demonstrations at times or would not report on them at all. Hundreds of activists who had called for demonstrations on the Internet were arrested as a result.

1. What view does the Commission take of this further restriction of personal freedoms and civil rights in Turkey?
2. How does this proposal influence the accession negotiations that are currently taking place?

Question for written answer E-001502/14
to the Commission
Adam Bielan (ECR)
(12 February 2014)

Subject: Internet censorship in Turkey

I am appalled by recent events in Turkey.

The authorities are implementing new laws which will regulate the Internet more than ever before. On 5 February a law was adopted which will enable the authorities to block Internet sites without a court order. As soon as the authorities inform them that a site is to be blocked, Internet service providers will have no more than four hours to do so. Service providers are also now obliged to retain data on users for two years and make them available to the authorities on demand.

People in Turkey objected to the laws and staged protests on 5 February. The demonstrations were broken up by the police using water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets.

1. Do the accession chapters which are open with Turkey include talks on the rights of citizens and Internet users?
2. What is the Commission's view of the Turkish government's actions regarding Internet control and in particular the brutal suppression of demonstrations?

**Question for written answer P-001688/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(14 February 2014)**

Subject: VP/HR — Human rights violations resulting from Turkey's so-called Internet reform

Recent developments in Turkey with the newly introduced Internet censorship represent a clear violation of human rights.

The so-called Internet reform seriously damages the right to freedom of expression, since the law allows the government telecommunications authorities to block any webpages at their own discretion, without any prior judicial decision.

Moreover, the law gives the authorities the possibility of storing all access data for the websites visited by users for two years, which seriously compromises the right to privacy.

What steps will the High Representative take to persuade the Turkish authorities, who appear not to have been swayed by the recent protests in the country, to put an end to these violations of fundamental rights?

**Question for written answer E-001692/14
to the Commission
Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)
(14 February 2014)**

Subject: Internet censorship in Turkey

In adopting a law recently imposing stricter controls on the Internet, the Turkish government is undermining the right to unrestricted use of the Internet. This law further restricts freedom of expression and communication and the right of citizens to free access to information.

The new law allows the government authority responsible for telecommunications (TIB) to block any website at will, without the need for any judicial decision.

Given that 40 million Turkish households have access to the Internet, which makes it a key source of information, it is legitimate to ask whether this affects the right to freedom of expression and of the press — fundamental rights which form the basis of the rule of law.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. What steps will it take to ensure that these moves by Turkey are condemned, so that it complies with the standards of the EU, to which it aspires to accede?
2. Will it be made clear that such anachronistic measures to censor and undermine freedom of the press and information will affect EU-Turkey relations and Turkey's application for EU membership?

**Question for written answer E-001723/14
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (PPE)
(17 February 2014)**

Subject: Turkey — law censoring the Internet

Freedom of expression is once again under attack in Turkey. The Turkish Parliament has recently passed a raft of regulations strengthening State control of the Internet and allowing the government to monitor all users' online activities and to hold them on record for two years. The Department of Telecommunications will also have the power to require providers to block sites whose content violates privacy, without the prior authorisation of the courts.

The new law 'is necessary in order to protect minors and remove pages that incite racial, religious or ethnic discrimination and fail to respect people's privacy'.

Since accession talks began, the Commission has so far limited itself to calling on Ankara to amend legal provisions that restrict freedom of expression.

Given that this behaviour is in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights and threatens to compromise the process of Turkey's accession to the European Union, can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. does it intend to take urgent and more forceful political and diplomatic measures, principally to suspend the accession process?
2. Does it consider the raft of regulations passed by the Turkish Parliament to be compatible with the European Union's democratic values and with the accession of a country that has violated both freedom of expression and declarations of intent already signed and ratified at international level?

**Question for written answer E-001749/14
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(17 February 2014)

Subject: Threats to the freedom of the press in Turkey

On 11 January, the Turkish Prime Minister admitted that he had placed pressure on various national press organisations in order to have several articles removed from the website of a well-known Turkish newspaper.

According to a number of representatives of the Turkish press, various editorial teams are being put under intense political pressure by political parties or by their own management boards, whose members are often close to powerful political figureheads. And it is the journalists who remain loyal to the principles of independence — in short, the type of journalist that should be found in all press organisations — who are bearing the brunt of the situation, with punishments, and even sackings, often being metered out. In July 2013, the TGS (Turkish Union of Journalists) announced that 22 reporters had lost their jobs for having covered the protests at Gezi Park, and a further 37 had been forced to resign.

The situation has grown even worse over the last week following the passing of a law, condemned by the opposition as a further nail in the coffin of freedom, that makes it easier for websites to be shut down and gives the Turkish Telecommunications Authority the power to monitor user activity on the Internet. The law now only needs to be signed by the Turkish President in order to be ratified.

In light of the above, what actions does the European Commission intend to take in order to ensure that the freedom of the press is respected in Turkey, and can it specify whether freedom of the press has been discussed in the ongoing negotiations between the Commission and the Turkish Government concerning Turkey's accession to the European Union?

**Question for written answer E-001817/14
to the Commission**

Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)

(18 February 2014)

Subject: Internet restrictions in Turkey

The Turkish parliament has adopted an act permitting the state authorities to increase controls over the Internet. Defenders of online freedom of speech and the opposition are critical of the new law. Deputies of the Grand National Assembly have granted consent for the telecommunications office, without a court order, to block websites which it claims have breached privacy. The Act provides for a register of user activity, which Internet service providers will be able to keep. This register will be kept for two years and made available to the authorities on request without notifying users.

In respect of the above, I wish to ask:

1. Is the Commission monitoring the observance of free speech over the Internet in Turkey on an on-going basis?
2. According to the Copenhagen criteria, before a new Member State can be accepted into the EU, it must have institutions that guarantee a stable democracy and the rule of law. I believe that the restriction of freedom on the Internet and state monitoring of Internet users are contrary to these principles. Will the Commission raise this issue during membership negotiations and if so, how will it attempt to persuade Turkey to cease taking such legal measures?

**Question for written answer E-002036/14
to the Commission
Philip Claeys (NI)
(20 February 2014)**

Subject: Statement by President Gül concerning press freedom in Turkey

During a visit to Hungary, Turkish President Abdullah Gül expressed concern regarding press freedom in Turkey and the excessive number of complaints regarding inadmissible government pressure on journalists.

This was in response to questions regarding Turkish legislation imposing further restrictions on the use of Internet in obvious breach of the Copenhagen criteria.

Does the Commission regard these comments by President Gül as yet another development that could bring accession negotiations with Turkey to a halt?

**Question for written answer E-002174/14
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(25 February 2014)**

Subject: Measures taken by the Turkish Government to tighten control of the Internet

The Turkish Government has voted on a set of regulations making it possible for its Information and Communication Technologies Authority to block web content, shut down websites and request information on their visitors, without the backing of warrants from the judiciary.

Is the Commission aware of the facts outlined above?

Does it consider that these laws violate human rights?

As Turkey is one of the countries negotiating EU accession and ought, as such, to respect human rights and the precedents of the European Court of Human Rights, how does the Commission intend to intervene?

**Joint answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2014)**

The amended Internet law entered into force on 28 February 2014. The amended law introduces the concept of proportionality and eliminates prison sentences for Internet Service Providers. However, it raises concerns related to the potentially arbitrary power of the Telecommunication Communications Presidency and to the absence of sufficient protection and legal safeguards for affected parties. The Commission has expressed its concerns to the Turkish authorities, in writing and during the political dialogue at ministerial level in Brussels on 10 February 2014.

The access bans to Twitter and YouTube imposed by the Turkish authorities raise grave concerns. The recent decision of the Constitutional Court confirms that the blanket ban on Twitter constituted an infringement of the Constitutional right to freedom of expression. Accordingly, the Commission expects the Turkish authorities to lift the ban on YouTube and find the appropriate balance between national security and freedom of expression.

The Commission recalls that freedom of expression includes the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority. The European Court of Human Rights made it clear that any interference with the exercise of such freedoms requires strict supervision by the courts due to the cardinal importance of the rights in question. In particular, any individual interference in the application of such law must be proportionate to the aim pursued.

The Commission will closely monitor the implementation of this law, including any limitation imposed on freedom of expression as a result of its application by the national authorities, and will report on this issue in its forthcoming progress report.

(Hrvatska verzija)

Pitanje za pisani odgovor E-001102/14
upućeno Komisiji
Zdravka Bušić (PPE)
(4. veljače 2014.)

Predmet: Objava zakonodavnih akata Europske unije u službenom listu

U skladu s pravnom stečevinom Europske unije i pristupnim ugovorom koji je Hrvatska potpisala prilikom pristupanja Europskoj uniji, direktive koje se donesu zakonodavnim postupkom Europske unije implementiraju se preko zakonskih i provedbenih akata u nacionalno zakonodavstvo, a dokumenti takva sadržaja potom bivaju objavljeni u *Narodnim novinama*, nacionalnom službenom listu.

Uredbe, koje su izravno i u cijelosti obvezujuće u svim državama članicama Unije, ne objavljuju se u nacionalnom službenom listu nego u *Official Journal of the EU*, europskom službenom listu. Uredbe jesu dostupne i na određenim internetskim stranicama, no mnogi ljudi čijih života se uredbe direktno tiču moraju se sami jako potruditi da dođu do službenih objava. Stoga smatram kako se po ovom pitanju može učiniti još puno više, a sve s ciljem smanjivanja demokratskog deficita i približavanja Europe prosječnim građanima.

S obzirom na navedeno zanima me sljedeće:

Na koji način bi Komisija mogla suplementirati svoje s nacionalnim objavama kako bi ih približila europskim građanima, a u duhu pravne stečevine Europske unije?

Odgovor g. Hahna u ime Komisije
(13. svibnja 2014.)

Pravo EU-a, uključujući direktive i uredbe, objavljuje se u Službenom listu Europske unije. Njegova vjerodostojna internetska inačica može se lako pronaći na *web*-mjestu EUR-Lexa. Ona je besplatna i dostupna na svim službenim jezicima EU-a. EUR-Lex nudi jedinstven pristup pravu EU-a, uključujući zakonodavne akte, pročišćene tekstove zakonodavnih akata, sudsku praksu i zakonodavne postupke.

Kako bi se pojednostavio pristup građanima, valja poduzeti nekoliko mjera da bi se povezao sadržaj *web*-mjestu EUR-Lexa sa zakonodavstvom koje se objavljuje na nacionalnoj razini. Primjerice, EUR-Lex sadrži upućivanja na mjere koje su poduzele države članice kako bi prenijele direktive EU-a u svoje nacionalno pravo. Ona također nudi, putem N-Lexa, pristup nacionalnim zakonodavnim bazama podataka država članica EU-a. Osim toga, radi se na tome da se istraže druge mogućnosti kako poboljšati vezu između prava EU-a i nacionalnog prava, primjerice strukturiranim i stabilnim poveznicama za nacionalno zakonodavstvo i zakonodavstvo EU-a (Europska identifikacijska oznaka zakonodavstva, ELI ⁽¹⁾).

Određene države članice ponovo objavljuju zakonodavstvo EU-a u svojim službenim listovima. Odluka o tome isključivo je njihova odgovornost.

(¹) Zaključci Vijeća kojima se poziva na uvođenje Europske identifikacijske oznake zakonodavstva, SL C 325, 26.10.2012.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001102/14
to the Commission
Zdravka Bušić (PPE)
(4 February 2014)**

Subject: Publication of EU acts in official gazettes

In accordance with the EU *acquis* and with the accession treaty that Croatia signed when it joined the EU, directives adopted by an EU legislative procedure are transposed into national legislation by laws and implementing acts, and the corresponding documents are then published in the national official gazette, in Croatia's case the *Narodne novine*.

Regulations, which are directly binding in their entirety on all Member States, are published not in national official gazettes, but in the *Official Journal of the EU*. They can also be accessed on certain websites, but many people whose lives they directly affect have to go to great lengths by themselves in order to get hold of the official texts. That is why I think that a lot more could be done on this point to reduce the democratic deficit and bring Europe closer to ordinary citizens.

Can the Commission therefore say how it might be able to use documents published at national level to supplement its own publications and thereby make these more accessible to European citizens, observing the spirit of the EU *acquis*?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(13 May 2014)**

EC law, including directives and regulations, is published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*. Its authentic online version is easily accessible on the EUR-Lex website, free of charge and available in all official languages of the EU. EUR-Lex offers a single access point to EC law, including legislation, consolidated versions of legislation, case law and legislative procedures.

Several measures have been taken to link the content on the EUR-Lex website with law published at national level, in order to simplify access for citizens. For example, EUR-Lex contains references to the measures taken by Member States to incorporate EU directives into national law. It also offers, via N-Lex, access to national legislation databases of the EU Member States. Additionally, work is on-going in order to explore other ways to enhance the connection between EU and national law, for example with structured and stable links for national and EU legislation (the European Legislation Identifier, ELI ⁽¹⁾).

Certain Member States re-publish EU legislation in national gazettes. This decision falls under their sole responsibility.

⁽¹⁾ Council conclusions inviting the introduction of the European Legislation Identifier, OJ C 325, 26.10.2012.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001103/14
alla Commissione
Salvatore Iacolino (PPE)
(4 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: Piani di comunicazione per i fondi strutturali — Obblighi delle autorità di gestione

Visto il regolamento (CE) n. 1083/2006 recante disposizioni generali sui Fondi strutturali;

visto il regolamento (CE) n. 1828/2006 che stabilisce modalità di applicazione del richiamato regolamento (CE) n. 1083/2006;

visto, altresì, il nuovo regolamento del 17 dicembre 2013 recante nuove disposizioni comuni in materia di Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale, Fondo sociale europeo, Fondo di coesione, Fondo europeo agricolo per lo sviluppo rurale e Fondo europeo per gli affari marittimi e la pesca e disposizioni generali su Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale, Fondo sociale europeo, Fondo di coesione e Fondo europeo per gli affari marittimi e la pesca, e che abroga il regolamento (CE) n. 1083/2006 del Consiglio;

considerando che i predetti regolamenti prevedono l'obbligo di piani di comunicazione e che le relative risorse — di ogni programma sui fondi strutturali — debbono essere congrue rispetto alla necessità di una adeguata informazione propria di questi programmi;

considerando che a livello di singola autorità di gestione tenuta all'attuazione di ciascun piano di comunicazione — in particolare per le regioni non sviluppate, fra cui la Regione Siciliana — è emerso il mancato rispetto di questo strumento indispensabile per dare compiuta informazione ai territori e alle imprese;

può la Commissione chiarire:

1. se dispone di informazioni in tal senso anche con riferimento ai più recenti programmi operativi;
2. se in sede di obbligo di rendicontazione di spese per i piani di comunicazione sono state accertate violazioni e come le stesse sono state sanzionate a carico delle autorità di gestione;
3. se tali inadempienze — come sembrerebbe anche per la Regione Siciliana — incidono sul corretto e integrale utilizzo dei fondi destinati ai programmi operativi;
4. cosa intende fare per garantire che i piani di comunicazione — come precisato al punto 2 — possano essere rispettati a livello di singola autorità di gestione anche con riferimento al richiamato regolamento del 17 dicembre 2013;
5. se ritiene di prevedere l'obbligo di una percentuale minima per piano di comunicazione relativo ai singoli programmi operativi?

**Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione
(9 aprile 2014)**

La Commissione non è a conoscenza di irregolarità o di violazioni degli obblighi di cui ai regolamenti per quanto concerne le attività di comunicazione nel contesto del programma regionale 2007-2013 per la Regione Sicilia. Se emergessero prove in contrario la Commissione adotterà tutte le misure necessarie per tutelare gli interessi finanziari dell'UE.

Per il periodo 2014-2020 gli obblighi a carico delle autorità di gestione e degli Stati membri in termini di attività di informazione e comunicazione sono stabiliti nel regolamento 1303/2013 del 17/12/2013 (RDC) ⁽¹⁾. L'articolo 115 specifica i tipi di attività di informazione e di comunicazione che gli Stati membri e le autorità di gestione devono espletare. Tra essi rientra una strategia di comunicazione che, conformemente all'articolo 116, deve essere presentata al comitato di sorveglianza per approvazione non più tardi di sei mesi dall'adozione del programma. Almeno una volta all'anno il comitato di sorveglianza deve riesaminare l'implementazione della strategia di comunicazione ⁽²⁾. La Commissione assicurerà che tale disposizione venga rispettata.

⁽¹⁾ Regolamento (UE) n. 1303/2013 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 17 dicembre 2013, recante disposizioni comuni sul Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale, sul Fondo sociale europeo, sul Fondo di coesione, sul Fondo europeo agricolo per lo sviluppo rurale e sul Fondo europeo per gli affari marittimi e la pesca e disposizioni generali sul Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale, sul Fondo sociale europeo, sul Fondo di coesione e sul Fondo europeo per gli affari marittimi e la pesca e che abroga il regolamento (CE) n. 1083/2006 del Consiglio, GU L 347 del 20.12.2013.

⁽²⁾ Sulla base di un'analisi dei risultati e dei piani per l'anno successivo presentati dall'autorità di gestione al comitato di sorveglianza.

Il regolamento RDC non prevede uno stanziamento finanziario minimo per l'attuazione di ciascuna strategia di comunicazione. Mediamente, nel periodo 2007-2013 circa lo 0,15 % del bilancio destinato ai programmi del Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale è stato assegnato alle attività di comunicazione.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001103/14
to the Commission**

Salvatore Iacolino (PPE)

(4 February 2014)

Subject: Communication plans for the Structural Funds — Management authorities' obligations

Considering Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds;

Considering Commission Regulation (EC) No 1828/2006 setting out rules for the implementation of the aforementioned Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006;

Considering also the new regulation of 17 December 2013 laying down new common provisions regarding the European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund, Cohesion Fund, European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and European Maritime and Fisheries Fund, and general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund, Cohesion Fund, and European Maritime and Fisheries Fund, and which repeals Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006;

Considering that the aforementioned regulations make communication plans compulsory and stipulate that the relevant resources — for each programme under the Structural Funds — must be proportionate to the need for adequate information on these programmes;

Considering that it has emerged that some of the individual management authorities responsible for implementing each communication plan — particularly in the case of undeveloped regions such as Sicily — are failing to comply with their obligation as regards communication plans, which are a vital tool for ensuring that regions and businesses are fully informed;

could the Commission clarify:

1. whether it has information on this issue, including as regards the most recent operational programmes;
2. whether any breaches of the obligation to account for expenditure on communication plans have been found, and how management authorities have been sanctioned for any such breaches;
3. whether any such failures to comply — as would seem to be the case for Sicily — are having an impact on the full and correct use of funds intended for operational programmes;
4. what it intends to do to ensure that individual management authorities comply with their obligations regarding communication plans (as specified in point 2), including with reference to the aforementioned Regulation of 17 December 2013;
5. whether it is considering establishing a compulsory minimum percentage for each communication plan with regard to individual operational programmes?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission

(9 April 2014)

The Commission is not aware of any irregularity or breach of the obligations ensuing from the regulations with respect to communication activities in the 2007-2013 regional programme for Sicily. Should any evidence to the contrary emerge, the Commission will take all necessary steps to protect the EU's financial interests.

For the 2014-2020 period, Member States' and managing authorities' obligations in terms of information and communication activities are laid down in Regulation 1303/2013 of 17.12.2013 (CPR) ⁽¹⁾. Article 115 indicates the types of information and communication activities Member States and managing authorities will have to carry out. This will include a communication strategy which, according to Article 116, will need to be submitted to the Monitoring Committee for approval no later than six months after the adoption of the programme. At least once a year, the Monitoring Committee has to review the implementation of the communication strategy ⁽²⁾. The Commission will ensure that this provision will be respected.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013.

⁽²⁾ Based on an analysis of the results and plans for the following year, presented by the Managing Authority to the Monitoring Committee.

The CPR regulation does not provide for any minimum financial allocation for the implementation of each communication strategy. On average, about 0.15% of the budget of European Regional Development Fund programmes was allocated to communication activities during the 2007-2013 period.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001104/14
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(4 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: Monete regionali virtuali

Accanto al Bitcoin, sta aumentando, in molte regioni italiane, ultima la Lombardia, la diffusione di una moneta virtuale regionale, con un rapporto di cambio fisso rispetto all'euro.

La Commissione:

1. poiché l'emissione di moneta convertibile in euro equivale all'aumento della massa monetaria in circolazione nell'Eurozona, non teme un sostanziale aggiramento della BCE e, quindi, l'esautoramento di fatto dell'intero percorso istituzionale di integrazione europea?
2. Ritiene di dover direttamente disciplinare, attraverso accordi con Stati membri o accordi internazionali, l'emissione di tali valute parallele e le garanzie che devono essere sottese a qualsiasi valuta, per la natura di veicolo fiduciario che la valuta stessa riveste?
3. Ha motivo di ritenere che le transazioni effettuate in valute diverse dall'euro possano aggirare le regole di corretta contabilità cui i Paesi dell'Eurozona sono chiamati dai Trattati? In caso affermativo, ha il potere di procedere di conseguenza, e come?
4. Ritiene che l'eventuale insostenibilità di situazioni finanziarie non espresse in euro ma in valute legate ad esso, perché emesse da Paesi dell'Eurozona, debba essere presa in carico dalle autorità competenti, in sede nazionale ed europea?
5. Ritiene viceversa che l'emissione di monete parallele legate all'euro sia un fenomeno tollerabile poiché consente di attenuare le restrizioni alla circolazione di liquidità, o che si tratti addirittura di un fenomeno indotto dalla scarsa disponibilità del circuito del credito a fornire risorse alla cosiddetta economia reale?

**Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione
(7 aprile 2014)**

L'onorevole deputato esprime preoccupazione per la diffusione, in molte regioni italiane, di valute virtuali regionali con un rapporto di cambio fisso rispetto all'euro.

Ad oggi le valute virtuali non sono regolamentate a livello di UE. La Commissione è membro di un'apposita *task force* guidata dall'Autorità bancaria europea (ABE), cui partecipano anche la Banca centrale europea (BCE), l'Autorità europea degli strumenti finanziari e dei mercati (ESMA) e diversi rappresentanti degli Stati membri, con l'obiettivo di definire tali valute virtuali e valutare la necessità di una regolamentazione. Le conclusioni della *task force* sono attese per il mese di maggio 2014.

Tuttavia, stando alle informazioni fornite, la Commissione è del parere che l'iniziativa cui fa riferimento l'onorevole deputato sia diversa da quella relativa alle monete virtuali analoghe al *bitcoin*, poiché sembrerebbe circoscritta a una determinata regione, con una scarsa accettazione, nessuna vocazione di sviluppo a livello globale e un tasso di cambio fisso solo con l'euro. Sulla base delle informazioni disponibili, il caso sembra presentare maggiori analogie con i buoni pasto o con buoni per altri servizi.

Sulla base delle informazioni disponibili sul progetto in Lombardia ed esperienze di progetti simili come la sterlina di Bristol (*Bristol Pound*), la Commissione nelle attuali circostanze non ritiene che questo tipo di progetti rischi di aggirare la BCE o di compromettere il processo istituzionale di integrazione europea. Per quanto riguarda gli aspetti contabili, da quanto si può dedurre dalle informazioni fornite, compete alle autorità nazionali garantire il rispetto della legislazione pertinente, compreso, ad esempio, il corretto versamento dell'IVA.

Ciononostante, la Commissione continuerà a seguire gli sviluppi in questo settore.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001104/14
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(4 February 2014)

Subject: Regional virtual currencies

In addition to Bitcoin, we are seeing the increasing spread of regional virtual currencies with a fixed exchange rate with the euro in many Italian regions, most recently Lombardy.

Does the Commission:

1. Not fear a substantial by-passing of the European Central Bank and, therefore, the effective undermining of the entire institutional process of European integration given that the issuing of currency that can be converted into euros is equivalent to increasing the amount of money in circulation in the Eurozone?
2. Consider it should, via agreements with Member States or international agreements, directly regulate the issuing of these parallel currencies and the guarantees that have to underlie any currency, because it is a fiduciary vehicle?
3. Have reason to think that transactions conducted in currencies other than the euro might by-pass the rules of proper accounting that the Treaties impose on Eurozone countries? If so, does it have the power to proceed accordingly, and how will it do so?
4. Consider that the potential unsustainability of financial situations expressed not in the euro but in currencies linked to it because they are issued by Eurozone countries, should be taken in charge by the competent authorities, at national and European level?
5. Consider on the contrary that the issuing of parallel currencies linked to the euro is a tolerable phenomenon since it allows for an easing of the restrictions on the circulation of liquidity, or that it is in fact a phenomenon caused by the scarce availability of credit for supplying resources to the so-called real economy?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(7 April 2014)

The Honourable Member is concerned by the current development of regional virtual currencies with a fixed exchange rate with the euro in many Italian regions.

Virtual currencies are not subject to regulation at EU level at this stage. The Commission is currently participating in a dedicated task force led by the European Banking Authority including the European Central Bank (ECB), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and various Member States representatives with the aim of defining such currencies and assessing the need for regulation. The conclusions of this task force are expected by May 2014.

However, it would appear to the Commission that the initiative referred to by the Honourable Member is different from the Bitcoin-type of virtual currencies as it would seem limited to a certain region, has low acceptance, no ambition of global development and a fixed exchange rate only with the euro. Based on the information available, a closer comparison would be restaurant or service vouchers.

Based on the information available on the Lombard project and experiences with similar projects as the Bristol Pound, the Commission would not at this stage think that this kind of projects would lead to by-passing of the ECB or undermine the institutional process of European integration. As regards the accounting aspects, it would appear that it is for national authorities to ensure that all relevant legislation is complied with, including the correct payment of VAT for example.

Nevertheless, the Commission will remain attentive to all developments in this area.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001105/14
alla Commissione**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(4 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Energie pulite, «torcia al plasma»

Interessanti ricerche condotte dalla Nasa hanno rilevato le potenzialità di una nuova tecnologia, atta al trattamento dei rifiuti, con positive ricadute sull'ambiente. In sostanza, la tecnologia della torcia al plasma permette di superare i limiti dell'inceneritore tradizionale, senza emissione di sostanze nocive (diossine, furani, SVOC, ceneri volanti contenenti metalli pesanti).

Inoltre, permette di trattare non separatamente diversi tipi di rifiuti — tra cui quelli speciali, ospedalieri, industriali — dimostrandosi altamente competitiva nella gestione di quelli pericolosi.

Ulteriore valore aggiunto della succitata tecnologia risiede nella possibilità di poter modificare in maniera flessibile la produttività degli impianti, in relazione alle variazioni stagionali dei flussi di rifiuti.

Alla luce di quanto esposto, si interroga la Commissione per sapere:

1. qual è il grado di rilevanza che intende dedicare alle tecnologie energetiche pulite, rispetto a quelle tradizionali, nell'ambito delle politiche implementate;
2. quali sono le sue intenzioni riguardo ad un'azione di sensibilizzazione, volta a promuovere ed incentivare l'approfondimento degli studi relativi alle tecnologie pulite e ad un loro effettivo impiego.

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione

(10 aprile 2014)

1. Il 7° programma di azione per l'ambiente ⁽¹⁾ riconosce la necessità, imposta dalle complesse questioni ambientali, di attingere a tutte le potenzialità offerte dalle tecnologie ambientali esistenti, garantendo nel contempo il continuo sviluppo e l'adozione delle migliori tecniche disponibili e delle innovazioni emergenti.

La direttiva 2010/75/UE sulle emissioni industriali ⁽²⁾ prevede l'individuazione delle migliori tecniche disponibili e delle tecniche emergenti per i diversi settori industriali attraverso uno scambio di informazioni con le parti interessate. La sua applicazione nel settore dei rifiuti ha portato all'elaborazione di due documenti, sull'incenerimento e sul trattamento, che contengono informazioni sull'utilizzo delle tecnologie al plasma.

Per dimostrare l'affidabilità delle prestazioni dichiarate delle tecnologie ambientali innovative è stato lanciato il programma pilota dell'UE sul sistema di verifica delle tecnologie ambientali (Environmental Technology Verification — ETV) ⁽³⁾. Programma su base volontaria, consente agli sviluppatori delle soluzioni tecnologiche di distinguersi dalla concorrenza e riduce i rischi per clienti e investitori.

2. Al fine di incoraggiare lo sviluppo e l'utilizzo di tecnologie pulite, l'Eco-innovation Scoreboard della Commissione ⁽⁴⁾ misura le prestazioni dell'innovazione ecologica a livello nazionale e fornisce informazioni sulle questioni relative alla ricerca e all'innovazione.

L'innovazione ecologica è sostenuta anche dalla campagna «Generation Awake», che promuove consumi più intelligenti ⁽⁵⁾, e dal forum europeo sull'ecoinnovazione, iniziativa che consente alle parti interessate di incontrarsi per discutere, scambiarsi migliori prassi e presentare innovazioni nel settore dell'ecologia.

Il programma di lavoro 2014-2015 del programma quadro per la ricerca e l'innovazione «Orizzonte 2020» include uno specifico invito a presentare proposte, dal titolo «Waste: a Resource to Recycle, Reuse and Recover Raw Materials», che valuta le alternative per una gestione dei rifiuti industriali e urbani basata sull'ecoinnovazione.

⁽¹⁾ Decisione 1386/2013/UE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 20 novembre 2013, su un programma generale di azione dell'Unione in materia di ambiente fino al 2020 «Vivere bene entro i limiti del nostro pianeta» (GUL 354 del 28.12.2013).

⁽²⁾ GUL 334 del 17.12.2010.

⁽³⁾ <http://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/etv/>

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.eco-innovation.eu>

⁽⁵⁾ <http://www.generationawake.eu/it/>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001105/14
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(4 February 2014)

Subject: Clean energies — 'plasma torch'

Some interesting research conducted by NASA has revealed the potential of a new technology that could be used for waste treatment, with benefits for the environment. In brief, plasma torch technology makes it possible to exceed the temperature limits of conventional incinerators, without emissions of harmful substances (dioxins, furans, SVOCs, and fly ash containing heavy metals).

It also makes it possible to process various types of waste — including special, hospital and industrial waste — without separating them, which makes it a highly competitive technology for the management of hazardous wastes.

A further added value of the technology is the fact that plant output can be altered flexibly to suit seasonal variations in waste flows.

In the light of the above, I ask the Commission:

1. how much importance does it intend to give to clean energy technologies, by comparison with conventional ones, under existing policies;
2. what are its intentions as regards an awareness campaign to promote and encourage further studies concerning clean technologies and their actual use?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(10 April 2014)

1. The seventh Environment Action Programme ⁽¹⁾ acknowledges that complex environmental issues will require tapping into the full potential of existing environmental technologies, while ensuring the continuous development and uptake of the best available techniques and emerging innovations.

Under Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions ⁽²⁾, best available techniques and emerging techniques are identified for different industrial sectors through an information exchange with stakeholders. The resulting documents for 'Waste Incineration' and 'Waste Treatment' contain information on the use of plasma technologies.

The EU pilot programme on Environmental Technology Verification (ETV) ⁽³⁾ provides verified evidence, on a voluntary basis, that innovative environmental technologies perform as they claim. This helps technology developers to differentiate from their competitors and reduces risks for customers and investors.

2. In order to encourage the development and use of clean technologies, the Commission's Eco-innovation Scoreboard ⁽⁴⁾ measures the performance of eco-innovation at national level and provides insights into research and innovation issues.

Eco-innovation is also supported by the 'Generation Awake' campaign for smarter consumption ⁽⁵⁾ and the 'European Forum on Eco-innovation', which brings together stakeholders to debate, exchange best practices and showcase eco-innovations.

The Work Programme 2014-2015 of the framework Programme for Research & Innovation 'Horizon 2020' includes a specific call for proposals on 'Waste: a Resource to Recycle, Reuse and Recover Raw Materials', addressing eco-innovative waste management options for both industrial and urban waste.

⁽¹⁾ Decision No 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 'Living well, within the limits of our planet', OJ L 354, 28.12.2013.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 334, 17.12.2010.

⁽³⁾ <http://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/etv/>

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.eco-innovation.eu>

⁽⁵⁾ <http://www.generationawake.eu/en/>

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita P-001109/14
a la Comisión**

Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)

(4 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Declaraciones del Relator Especial de las Naciones Unidas sobre la promoción de la verdad, la justicia, la reparación y las garantías de no repetición con respecto al franquismo

El pasado 3 de febrero terminaba la misión especial de las Naciones Unidas para la promoción de la verdad, la justicia, la reparación y las garantías de no repetición del franquismo. Su Relator Especial, Pablo de Greiff declaraba que «es necesaria una política de Estado sobre las víctimas del franquismo».

El informe elaborado por la misión no se verá publicado hasta el mes de septiembre de este año, pero en su último día en España, Pablo de Greiff ha señalado diferentes aspectos donde las instituciones españolas no garantizan los aspectos de verdad, justicia, reparación y no repetición debido a su inacción. El Relator Especial ha señalado su preocupación por la brecha «especialmente profunda» entre las víctimas de los crímenes del franquismo y unas instituciones que no reconocen su responsabilidad para con ellos.

De Greiff continuó señalando numerosos aspectos problemáticos en los que el Gobierno español está incurriendo, observados durante su estancia de diez días en el país. Afirmando que el Gobierno debe hacer una «política de Estado» ha afirmado que en muchos Estados con leyes de amnistía se ha llegado a interpretaciones de la norma «que no han impedido el procesamiento de los presuntos culpables». El Relator ha mostrado su preocupación por el papel ambiguo de las instituciones a la hora de hablar sobre la Guerra Civil. Igualmente, ha solicitado la reforma del Valle de los Caídos, ha criticado las «lagunas» de la Ley de Memoria Histórica, y ha hecho muchas críticas más. Esta investigación mostrará el escaso compromiso de las instituciones españolas con la Memoria Democrática de España y el absoluto desamparo en el que se encuentran muchos familiares de las víctimas de la Guerra Civil y la dictadura.

¿Conoce la Comisión las citadas declaraciones del Relator Especial de la ONU, Pablo de Greiff?

¿Piensa que la inacción de las instituciones españolas se ajusta a lo dispuesto en la Decisión Marco 2008/913/JAI? ¿Piensa abrir un procedimiento de infracción a España por este tema?

¿Piensa que los citados casos de inacción y desamparo jurídico se ajustan a lo establecido en la Directiva 2012/29/UE?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión

(2 de abril de 2014)

La política que aplica el Gobierno de España respecto de las víctimas del régimen franquista no es una cuestión que se inscriba en el ámbito de aplicación de la legislación de la Unión. Así pues, corresponde al Estado miembro en cuestión garantizar el respeto de las obligaciones en materia de derechos fundamentales contraídas en virtud de acuerdos internacionales y de la propia legislación nacional.

Por lo que respecta a la Decisión Marco 2008/913/JAI, la Comisión publicó un informe sobre su aplicación el 27 de enero de 2014 y mantendrá conversaciones bilaterales con los Estados miembros a lo largo del año en curso a fin de garantizar la plena y correcta incorporación de la misma al ordenamiento jurídico nacional. No obstante, la aplicación de la Decisión Marco a escala nacional compete a las autoridades del país.

En cuanto a la Directiva 2012/29/UE, relativa a los derechos de las víctimas, independientemente de que esta sea o no de aplicación en las circunstancias mencionadas en su pregunta, los Estados miembros deberán haberla incorporado el 16 de noviembre de 2015, como muy tarde, lo que supone que no será aplicable hasta esa fecha y que solo a continuación la Comisión podrá llevar a cabo una evaluación de su incorporación.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001109/14
to the Commission
Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)
(4 February 2014)

Subject: Comments by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence in respect of the Franco regime

On 3 February 2014 the UN special mission for the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence in respect of the Franco regime came to an end. Its Special Rapporteur, Pablo de Greiff, said that a state policy was needed as regards the victims of the Franco regime.

Although the report of the mission will not be published until September 2014, on his last day in Spain de Greiff pointed out a number of areas where, as a result of inaction on the part of Spain's institutions, truth, justice, reparation and non-recurrence could not be guaranteed. De Greiff also expressed concern at the particularly deep divide between the victims of the crimes of Francoism and institutions that did not recognise their responsibility for those crimes.

The Special Rapporteur also drew attention to a number of other failings on the part of the government noted during his 10-day visit to the country. He stressed that the government needed to devise a state policy, and underlined the fact that many countries had adopted amnesty laws which did not prevent suspects from being prosecuted. He also expressed concern at the ambiguous role played by Spanish institutions in discussions about the Civil War, called for reform in respect of the Valley of the Fallen (Valle de los Caídos), and criticised, inter alia, shortcomings in the Law on Historical Memory. The investigation will demonstrate the limited commitment of the Spanish institutions to the democratic memory of Spain and the fact that many of the relatives of the victims of the Civil War and the dictatorship have no means of legal redress whatsoever.

Is the Commission aware of the above-mentioned comments by the UN Special Rapporteur, Pablo de Greiff?

Does it think that inaction on the part of the Spanish institutions is in keeping with the provisions of Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA? Does it intend to launch infringement proceedings against Spain in respect of this matter?

Does it think that the above-mentioned examples of inaction and lack of legal protection are in keeping with Directive 2012/29/EU?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2014)

The issue of the state policy as regards the victims of the Franco regime does not fall within the scope of Union law. It is thus for the concerned Member State to ensure that its obligations regarding fundamental rights — as resulting from international agreements and from their internal legislation — are respected.

As regards Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA the Commission published a report on its implementation by the Member States on 27 January 2014. Bilateral discussions will be held with Member States throughout this year with a view to ensuring full and correct transposition of the framework Decision into national law. However, it is for national authorities to apply the framework Decision at national level.

As regards Directive 2012/29/EU on victims' rights, irrespective whether the directive would apply under the circumstances referred to in the question Member States are obliged to transpose the directive by 16 November 2015. This means that the directive will not be applicable until that date and that the Commission will carry out its evaluation of such transposition after that date.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001112/14
a la Comisión**

Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)

(4 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Nuevo vídeo sobre las expulsiones de inmigrantes irregulares en la frontera de Melilla

El pasado 4 de febrero uno de los principales periódicos españoles volvió a publicar material audiovisual sobre cómo la policía española expulsaba a inmigrantes irregulares de manera contraria a Derecho en la valla de la Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla.

En la respuesta a mi pregunta E-013655/2013, ya preguntaba a la Sra. Malmström sobre las fotografías publicadas por el mismo periódico el 18 de noviembre del año pasado. En su respuesta, la Comisaria sostenía: «la Comisión considera que la noticia en cuestión no presenta datos probados sobre el respeto o no de dichas salvaguardias». Sin embargo, el mismo periódico sigue aportando indicios que en cualquier Estado de Derecho deberían justificar al menos una investigación.

En esta ocasión el periódico presenta un vídeo completo realizado por una ONG local llamada Prodein sobre cómo la policía agrupa a los migrantes cerca de la verja para expulsarlos. Esto, como bien indicaba la respuesta de la Sra. Malmström, constituye una clara violación del artículo 4, apartado 4, de la Directiva de Retorno (2008/115/CE). Este vídeo es producto de la preocupación de las ONG y de la sociedad civil melillense por la clara violación de las leyes que se está produciendo en su frontera y que debería justificar una investigación. Incluso el ramo melillense de la Asociación Unificada de Guardias Civiles ha llegado a declarar que no tiene dudas de que se produzcan este tipo de expulsiones y que ya solicitó al Fiscal General del Estado que investigase la legalidad de las mismas.

¿Conoce el vídeo publicado sobre las expulsiones de migrantes en Melilla?

¿Piensa iniciar una investigación que esclarezca la veracidad de estas expulsiones contrarias a Derecho?

¿Qué sanciones puede plantear al Gobierno de España con motivo, en caso de confirmarse, de estas expulsiones irregulares?

Respuesta de la Sra. Malmström en nombre de la Comisión

(2 de abril de 2014)

La Comisión conoce el material audiovisual al que se hace referencia en la pregunta de Su Señoría.

La Comisión pidió explicaciones a las autoridades españolas sobre los acontecimientos aparentemente similares que se produjeron en Ceuta el 6 de febrero de 2014 y, en el contexto de estas comunicaciones bilaterales entre la Comisión y las autoridades españolas, la situación de Melilla también se está abordando. La Comisión examinará la información aportada por España y seguirá de cerca la evolución de la situación.

En su papel de garante de los Tratados, la Comisión se reserva el derecho a adoptar las medidas adecuadas en el caso de que haya pruebas de que un Estado miembro ha infringido el Derecho de la UE.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001112/14
to the Commission**

Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)

(4 February 2014)

Subject: New video concerning expulsions of irregular immigrants at the border in Melilla

On 4 February 2014, a leading Spanish newspaper once again published audiovisual material relating to unlawful expulsions of irregular immigrants by Spanish police at the fences of the Autonomous Community of Melilla.

In her response to my Question E-013655/2013, which I asked Commissioner Malmström in relation to the photographs published by the same newspaper on 18 November 2013, she stated: 'The Commission considers that no substantiated information on the respect or not of these safeguards can be found in the media report'. However, this newspaper is continuing to provide evidence that ought to at least merit an investigation in any constitutional state.

On this occasion, the newspaper presents a complete video, shot by a local NGO called Prodein, which relates to the gathering of migrants near the fencing by police in order to expel them. This, as stated in Commissioner Malmström's answer, is a clear infringement of Article 4(4) of the Return Directive (2008/115/EC). This video has come about due to the concerns held by NGOs and civil society in Melilla owing to the clear infringement of laws which is taking place at their border and should merit an investigation. Even the Melilla branch of the Unified Association of Civil Guard Officers has declared that it does not doubt that these kinds of expulsions are taking place and that it has already asked the Attorney General to investigate the legality of these practices.

Is the Commission aware of the published video concerning the expulsions of migrants in Melilla?

Does the Commission intend to launch an investigation to ascertain the veracity of these unlawful expulsions?

If these irregular expulsions are confirmed to have taken place, what sanctions might the Commission consider imposing on the Spanish Government?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission

(2 April 2014)

The Commission is aware of the media reports referred to in the Honourable Member's question.

The Commission requested explanations from the Spanish authorities on apparently similar events which took place in Ceuta on 6 February 2014. In the context of this bilateral exchange between the Commission and Spanish authorities, the situation in Melilla is also being addressed. The Commission will examine the information received from Spain and closely monitor further developments.

As guardian of the Treaties, the Commission reserves the right to take appropriate steps where there is evidence that a Member State has violated EC law.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001114/14
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(4 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Créditos fiscales Bankia

Bankia es una de las entidades más favorecidas por la nueva legislación de los activos fiscales diferidos (DTAs en inglés) aprobada por el Gobierno español. El saldo actual de los DTAs de Bankia asciende a 7 350 millones, de los que 5 250 millones son monetizables, es decir, se pueden transformar en capital.

Durante el año 2014 se llevará a cabo la revisión minuciosa de la calidad de los activos (asset quality review) de la banca europea con el objetivo de conocer de primera mano cuál es la situación exacta de los bancos europeos supervisados por el BCE.

En su respuesta E-012416/2013 la Comisión afirmaba: «En relación con la fiscalidad, existe ayuda estatal únicamente cuando una medida otorga, de hecho o de derecho, una ventaja selectiva a determinadas empresas o a la producción de ciertos bienes».

A la luz de lo anterior,

¿No cree la Comisión que el Gobierno español ha dado ayudas estatales mediante los DTAs a toda la banca española, de las que se ha beneficiado especialmente Bankia?

¿No cree la Comisión que los bancos europeos no-españoles sufren una distorsión de la competencia causada por los DTAs?

Respuesta del Sr. Almunia en nombre de la Comisión

(10 de abril de 2014)

En la actualidad, y de acuerdo con la información presentada por las autoridades españolas, la Comisión no tiene indicio alguno de que las medidas del Gobierno español sean materialmente selectivas y, por lo tanto, que pueda haber ayuda estatal. Teniendo esto en cuenta, la Comisión no ha iniciado ninguna actuación de oficio. Además, la Comisión no puede realizar ninguna declaración oficial sobre el carácter de ayuda de las medidas concretas, a falta de notificación.

Por lo tanto, la Comisión no está en condiciones de pronunciarse sobre el carácter de estas medidas y tampoco sobre sus posibles efectos en la competencia en el mercado. Por el momento, no parece necesario investigar la cuestión más a fondo.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001114/14
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(4 February 2014)

Subject: Bankia tax credits

Bankia is one of the companies that has benefited the most under the new legislation on deferred tax assets (DTAs) which has been approved by the Spanish Government. The current balance of Bankia's DTAs amounts to EUR 7 350 million, of which EUR 5 250 million is monetisable, i.e. can be converted into cash.

A thorough asset quality review of the European banking industry will be conducted in 2014 in order to gain first-hand information about the exact situation of the European banks that are under the supervision of the European Central Bank.

In its answer E-012416/2013, the Commission made the following statement: 'In taxation cases, there is state aid only where a measure grants, de jure or de facto, a selective advantage to certain undertakings or the production of certain goods'.

In light of the above:

Does the Commission take the view that the Spanish Government has granted state aid to the entire Spanish banking industry by means of DTAs, and that Bankia in particular has benefited from this?

Does the Commission believe that non-Spanish-owned European banks have been subject to distorted competition as a result of DTAs?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission

(10 April 2014)

Currently, and according to the information presented by the Spanish authorities, the Commission has no indication that the Spanish Government's measures are materially selective and, therefore, that state aid may be involved. Given this, the Commission has not started any ex officio action. Moreover, the Commission cannot make any official statement on the aid nature of the measures in the absence of a concrete notification.

Therefore, the Commission is not in a position to give an opinion on the nature of these measures or on their potential impact on market competition, and, for the moment, does not deem it necessary to investigate the matter further.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001115/14
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(4 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Precio de la electricidad en el Estado español

En el Estado español, se ha duplicado en seis meses lo que se paga por la luz antes siquiera de encenderla ⁽¹⁾. Según consta en la última resolución del Ministerio de Industria sobre el coste de producción de energía eléctrica y los precios voluntarios para el pequeño consumidor, el término de potencia —que debe abonar el cliente antes incluso de empezar a consumir— subió hasta los 42,04 euros por kilovatio, un 17,9 % más respecto a los 35,64 euros de la anterior revisión, llevada a cabo en octubre de 2013. La comparación con el mes de julio es todavía más dolorosa, ya que entonces ese coste era de 21,89 euros. Esto es, el fijo que pagan los consumidores por la luz se ha incrementado en un 92 %.

Es la cara oculta del «tarifazo» eléctrico, y lo que más de 25 millones de españoles tienen que pagar con independencia del gasto de luz en sus hogares.

¿No cree la Comisión que esta medida desincentiva al consumidor para tener un consumo energéticamente eficiente?

¿Cree la Comisión que es una buena medida para afrontar el déficit de tarifa que acumula el sector eléctrico español?

¿Cree la Comisión que con esta medida se afronta el problema de la pobreza energética?

Respuesta del Sr. Oettinger en nombre de la Comisión

(23 de abril de 2014)

En estos momentos, la Comisión sigue recabando información para evaluar las reformas realizadas por España en el sector de la electricidad, en particular en lo que respecta a las medidas adoptadas para abordar el déficit tarifario y las repercusiones sobre la eficiencia energética. La Comisión teme, no obstante, que las reformas en el sector de la electricidad, si bien van en la dirección adecuada, podrían no ser suficientes para alcanzar sus objetivos con eficacia. Las reformas deberían promover la evolución del mercado de la electricidad hacia la consecución de los objetivos de la UE en materia de eficiencia energética. Deben evitarse las discrepancias con los requisitos de la Directiva de la UE sobre eficiencia energética, que será aplicable a partir del 5 de junio de 2014.

Los consumidores vulnerables suelen consumir generalmente menos energía que el consumidor medio y, por consiguiente, sus facturas de energía pueden aumentar a raíz del incremento del término de potencia. La Comisión reconoce que la pobreza energética es un serio motivo de preocupación e insiste en que los Estados miembros apliquen con celeridad todas las disposiciones pertinentes de la legislación europea en materia energética ⁽²⁾. Un grupo de expertos, creado por la Comisión en 2012, ha publicado recientemente un documento de orientación ⁽³⁾ con el objetivo de ayudar a los Estados miembros a cumplir sus obligaciones legislativas en relación con los clientes vulnerables y la pobreza energética.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2014-02-04/industria-duplica-en-seis-meses-lo-que-se-paga-por-la-luz-antes-siquiera-de-encenderla_84542/.

⁽²⁾ Artículo 3 de la Directiva 2009/72/CE (DO L 211 de 14.8.2009) y de la Directiva 2009/73/CE (DO L 211 de 14.8.2009).

⁽³⁾ Documento de orientación del Grupo de trabajo sobre consumidores vulnerables, publicado el 6 de enero de 2014: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/forum_citizen_energy/20140106_vulnerable_consumer_report.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001115/14
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(4 February 2014)

Subject: Price of electricity in Spain

The price paid in Spain for electricity, even before it is switched on, has doubled in the last six months ⁽¹⁾. As stated in the last resolution of the Ministry of Industry on the cost of electricity production and voluntary prices for small consumers, the fixed charge — which has to be paid by the customer before they even start to consume power — rose to EUR 42.04 per kilowatt, an increase of 17.9% with respect to EUR 35.64 for the previous review conducted in October 2013. With regard to July 2013, the comparison is even more distressing, as the cost then was EUR 21.89. In short, the fixed charge paid by consumers for electricity has increased by 92%.

This is the hidden face of the electricity 'tariff hike', which more than 25 million Spanish households are having to pay regardless of the amount of electricity they use.

Does the Commission not think that this measure is discouraging consumers from energy-efficient power consumption?

Does the Commission believe that this is a good way of dealing with the tariff deficit that is building up in the Spanish electricity industry?

Does the Commission believe that this measure is tackling the issue of energy poverty?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission

(23 April 2014)

The Commission is at this stage still collecting information to assess Spain's reforms in the electricity sector, in particular concerning the measures taken to deal with the tariff deficit and impacts on energy efficiency. The Commission is however concerned that the reforms in the electricity sector, although going in the right direction, may not be sufficient to reach their objectives effectively. The reforms should stimulate electricity market developments conducive to realising the EU objectives *inter alia* on energy efficiency. Discrepancies with the requirements of the EU Energy Efficiency Directive, which will be applicable as of 5 June 2014, should be avoided.

Vulnerable consumers tend to use, in general, less energy than the average consumer, and their energy bills may consequently rise following the increase in the fixed charge. The Commission recognises energy poverty as a serious concern and stresses that Member States should rapidly implement all the relevant provisions in European energy legislation ⁽²⁾. An expert group, set up by the Commission in 2012, has recently published a guidance document ⁽³⁾ with the aim of assisting Member States to meet their legislative obligations on vulnerable customers and energy poverty.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2014-02-04/industria-duplica-en-seis-meses-lo-que-se-paga-por-la-luz-antes-siquiera-de-encenderla_84542/

⁽²⁾ Article 3 of Directive 2009/72/EC, OJ L 211, 14.8.2009 and of Directive 2009/73/EC, OJ L 211, 14.8.2009.

⁽³⁾ Vulnerable Consumer Working Group Guidance Document, published 6 January 2014:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/forum_citizen_energy/20140106_vulnerable_consumer_report.pdf

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001116/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(4 Φεβρουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Παρενόχληση νορβηγικού σκάφους από τουρκική φρεγάτα

Η κυπριακή κυβέρνηση αναμένεται να συντάξει επίσημη καταγγελία μετά από παρενόχληση που φαίνεται ότι έγινε από τουρκικό πολεμικό πλοίο σε σκάφος που έφερε νορβηγική σημαία και πραγματοποιούσε ελέγχους για υπεράκτια αποθέματα πετρελαίου και φυσικού αερίου εντός της κυπριακής ΑΟΖ, το Σάββατο 1 Φεβρουαρίου 2014. Το βράδυ του Σαββάτου, η τουρκική φρεγάτα φέρεται ότι κάλεσε το σκάφος *Princess*, το οποίο πραγματοποιούσε ελέγχους για λογαριασμό του γαλλικού πετρελαϊκού κολοσσού Total, να «αποχωρήσει από τα τουρκικά ύδατα» και να «αναχωρήσει από το σημείο». Ο υπουργός Εξωτερικών της Κύπρου, Ιωάννης Κασουλίδης, δήλωσε ότι το γεγονός είναι απολύτως απαράδεκτο.

Ποια μέτρα προτίθεται να λάβει η Επιτροπή ώστε να δώσει τέλος σε τέτοιου είδους προκλητικές παρενοχλήσεις σε βάρος της Γαλλίας, της Νορβηγίας, της ΕΕ και των Ηνωμένων Εθνών;

Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(22 Απριλίου 2014)

Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση έχει πάρει ξεκάθαρη θέση όσον αφορά το θέμα της εκμετάλλευσης του πετρελαίου και του φυσικού αερίου που βρίσκεται στην αποκλειστική οικονομική ζώνη της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας. Στα τελευταία της συμπεράσματα του Δεκεμβρίου του 2013, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση υπογράμμισε εκ νέου όλα τα κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ, περιλαμβανομένου και του δικαιώματος σύναψης διμερών συμφωνιών και του δικαιώματος εκμετάλλευσης των φυσικών πόρων, σύμφωνα με το κεκτημένο της ΕΕ και το διεθνές δίκαιο, περιλαμβανομένης της σύμβασης του ΟΗΕ σχετικά με το δικαίο της θάλασσας. Η ΕΕ επεσήμανε επίσης την ανάγκη σεβασμού της κυριαρχίας των κρατών μελών στα χωρικά τους ύδατα.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001116/14
to the Commission
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(4 February 2014)**

Subject: Harassment by Turkish frigate of Norwegian ship

The Government of Cyprus will be lodging a formal complaint after a Turkish warship allegedly harassed a Norwegian-flagged vessel which was surveying for offshore oil and gas reserves inside Cyprus' exclusive economic zone on Saturday, 1 February 2014. The *Princess*, surveying on behalf of French oil giant Total, was allegedly ordered by a Turkish frigate to 'leave Turkish waters' and 'abandon position' on Saturday evening. Cypriot Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ioannis Kasoulides, stated that this was absolutely unacceptable.

What actions does the Commission intend to take to put an end to such provocative harassment against France, Norway, the EU and the UN?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2014)**

The European Union has been very clear on the issue of oil and gas exploration in the Republic of Cyprus's Exclusive Economic Zone. In its last conclusions of December 2013, the European Union stressed again all the sovereign rights of EU Member States, including the right to enter into bilateral agreements and the right to explore and exploit natural resources, in accordance with the EU *acquis* and international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The EU also stressed the need to respect the sovereignty of Member States over their territorial sea.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001117/14
à la Commission
Anne Delvaux (PPE)
(4 février 2014)

Objet: État d'avancement de l'enquête de la Commission sur l'extension du régime belge de garantie des dépôts protégeant les parts détenues par le groupe ARCO

Suite à la mise en liquidation du groupe belge de coopératives financières ARCO en octobre 2011, l'État belge a notifié, dans son arrêté royal du 7 novembre 2011, une extension du régime de garantie des dépôts protégeant, de cette manière, les participations des actionnaires particuliers de coopératives financières.

En avril 2012, la Commission a fait savoir qu'elle ouvrait une enquête sur ce régime de protection des actionnaires de coopératives financières afin de déterminer s'il ne viole pas les règles de l'Union européenne régissant les aides d'État. Le 03 avril 2012, la Commission a d'ailleurs «décidé d'émettre une injonction de suspension afin d'éviter que l'État belge ne procède à des paiements au titre du régime de garantie et n'autorise de nouvelles coopératives à participer au régime» ⁽¹⁾. Elle a également invité «les tiers intéressés à présenter leurs observations».

La Commission peut-elle fournir des informations sur l'état d'avancement du dossier et préciser la date de sa décision?

Réponse donnée par M. Almunia au nom de la Commission
(19 mars 2014)

Le 3 avril 2012, la Commission a décidé d'ouvrir la procédure prévue à l'article 108, paragraphe 2, du TFUE relative à l'extension du régime belge de garantie des dépôts protégeant les parts détenues par le groupe ARCO. Elle a également décidé d'émettre une injonction de suspension en vertu de l'article 11, paragraphe 1, du règlement (CE) n° 659/1999 du Conseil ⁽²⁾ afin d'éviter que l'État belge ne procède à des paiements au titre du régime de garantie et n'autorise de nouvelles coopératives à participer au régime. La décision a été publiée au Journal officiel du 19 juillet 2012 ⁽³⁾ et comportait aussi une invitation adressée aux tiers intéressés à présenter leurs observations sur les conclusions préliminaires de la Commission.

Cette dernière étudie actuellement le dossier et ne peut pas encore préciser la date à laquelle sa décision sera adoptée.

⁽¹⁾ Réponse donnée le 18 janvier 2013 par M. Almunia au nom de la Commission à la question écrite E-010452/2012.

⁽²⁾ JO L 83 du 27.3.1999, p. 1.

⁽³⁾ JO C 213 du 19.7.2012, p. 64.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001117/14
to the Commission
Anne Delvaux (PPE)
(4 February 2014)

Subject: State of progress of Commission investigation into the extension of the Belgian deposit guarantee scheme protecting ARCO group shares

Following the liquidation of ARCO (a Belgian group of financial cooperatives) in October 2011, the Belgian Government notified, by Royal Decree of 7 November 2011, the extension of the deposit guarantee scheme to protect shares held by individual shareholders in financial cooperatives.

In April 2012, the Commission announced that it would launch an investigation into this scheme in order to determine whether it violated EU rules on state aid. On 3 April 2012, the Commission also 'decided to issue a suspension injunction to ensure that the Belgian State does not make pay-outs in relation to the guarantee scheme and to prevent the admission by the Belgian State of new cooperatives to that scheme' ⁽¹⁾. The Commission also asked 'interested third parties to comment'.

Can the Commission provide some information regarding the state of progress of the case and specify the date on which a decision will be reached?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission
(19 March 2014)

On 3 April 2012, the Commission decided to open the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU on the extension of the Belgian deposit guarantee scheme protecting ARCO group shares. The Commission also decided to issue a suspension injunction in accordance with Article 11(1) of Council Regulation 659/1999 ⁽²⁾ to ensure that the Belgian State does not make pay-outs in relation to the guarantee scheme and to prevent the admission by the Belgian State of new cooperatives to that scheme. The decision was published in the Official Journal on 19 July 2012 ⁽³⁾, also asking interested third parties to comment on the preliminary findings of the Commission.

The Commission is currently investigating the matter and cannot indicate an expected decision date.

⁽¹⁾ Answer given on 18 January 2013 by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission in response to Written Question E-010452/2012.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.

⁽³⁾ OJ C 213, 19.7.2012, p. 64.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001118/14
alla Commissione
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(4 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: Emergenze ambientali e salute

Il degrado ambientale, al quale sono sottoposte diverse aree locali, in special modo in paesi come l'Italia, è certamente un fenomeno ben presente agli occhi di cittadini ed Istituzioni di vario livello.

Recentemente, la gravità dello stesso, e soprattutto le pesanti ricadute sulla salute dei cittadini (specie di minori in tenera età), si rivelano in misura maggiore, gettando luce su anni di sfruttamento criminoso del territorio (e delle sue risorse) e andando a inficiare, se non precludere, ulteriori possibilità di sviluppo comunitario.

Relativamente all'Italia, basti menzionare il caso eclatante della Terra dei Fuochi; punta d'iceberg di un fenomeno ben più diffuso.

Alla luce di quanto esposto, si interroga la Commissione per sapere:

1. qual è la posizione della Commissione in merito,
2. quali interventi fattivi considera di porre in essere, relativamente a casi di vera e propria emergenza ambientale e sanitaria,
3. quali sono, ad oggi, le risorse, non solo finanziarie, a disposizione di comunità territoriali interessate da un elevato livello di degrado ambientale?

**Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione
(16 aprile 2014)**

Spetta principalmente alle autorità, amministrative e giudiziarie, degli Stati membri tutelare la salute dei cittadini e l'ambiente e garantire il rispetto della normativa unionale applicabile in materia di ambiente. In presenza di prove che attestino eventuali infrazioni della normativa ambientale, la Commissione prende le misure appropriate.

Per quanto riguarda la *Terra dei Fuochi*, gli altri problemi di gestione dei rifiuti in Campania e in Italia e le azioni intraprese dalla Commissione al riguardo, si invita l'onorevole deputato a fare riferimento alla risposta fornita all'interrogazione scritta E-013777/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

Per quanto riguarda le misure proattive per intervenire sulle emergenze ambientali e sanitarie, la Commissione non intende intraprendere azioni specifiche, dal momento che tali questioni rientrano tra le competenze degli Stati membri.

Il programma 2007-2014 per la Campania prevede la possibilità di finanziare il recupero dei siti inquinati nell'ambito della priorità I, nel quadro del piano regionale che definisce i settori d'intervento prioritari (Piano regionale bonifiche). Tuttavia, in linea con il principio di gestione condivisa dei fondi strutturali, la selezione e la realizzazione dei progetti competono alle autorità nazionali. Di conseguenza, qualora l'onorevole deputato desideri ottenere maggiori informazioni, la Commissione gli suggerisce di contattare direttamente l'autorità responsabile della gestione del programma.

POR Campania 2007/2013
Via S. Lucia 81
80132 NAPOLI
adg.fesr@regione.campania.it

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/it/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001118/14
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(4 February 2014)

Subject: Environmental and health emergencies

The environmental degradation to which a number of local areas are subject, especially in countries such as Italy, is certainly a phenomenon of the utmost concern to citizens and Institutions at various levels.

Recently, the gravity of this phenomenon, and in particular its severe repercussions on the health of citizens (especially young children), have become increasingly evident, revealing years of criminal exploitation of the territory of the Community (and its resources) and jeopardising, if not precluding, future prospects for Community development.

With regard to Italy, it is sufficient to cite the striking example of Terra dei Fuochi, the tip of an iceberg representing a far more widespread phenomenon.

In the light of the above, the Commission is asked:

1. What is the position of the Commission in this regard?
2. What proactive measures are contemplated by the Commission in the face of situations of downright environmental and health emergency?
3. What, currently, are the financial and other resources at the disposal of regional communities affected by high levels of environmental degradation?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(16 April 2014)

It is primarily for the authorities of Member States — administrative and judicial — to safeguard the health of their citizens and environment and to secure compliance with the applicable EU environmental law. Where there is evidence of a possible infringement of this law, the Commission takes the appropriate action.

With regard to the *Terra dei Fuochi*, other waste management issues in Campania and across Italy and the actions taken by the Commission in this respect, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its reply to Written Question E-013777/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission is not planning to take specific actions on proactive measures to intervene on environmental and health emergency issues as these fall under the responsibility of Member States.

The 2007-2014 programme for Campania provides for the possibility to fund the reclamation of contaminated sites under priority I within the framework of the Regional plan establishing the priority areas for reclamation interventions (Piano regionale bonifiche). However, in line with the shared management principle used for the management of Structural funds, project selection and implementation is the responsibility of the national authorities. For more information the Commission therefore suggests that the Honourable Member contact directly the managing authority of programme:

Regional operational programme for Campania for 2007-2013

Via S.Lucia 81

80132 NAPOLI

adg.fesr@regione.campania.it

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Tekstas lietuvių kalba)

Klausimas, į kurį atsakoma raštu, Nr. E-001119/14

Komisijai

Vilija Blinkėvičiūtė (S&D)

(2014 m. vasario 4 d.)

Tema: Neįvertintas Europos viešųjų bibliotekų potencialas siekiant strategijos „Europa 2020“ tikslų

Unikalus, daugiataktantinis Europos Sąjungos viešųjų bibliotekų tinklas padeda aktyviai siekti strategijos „Europa 2020“ tikslų įgyvendinimo, ypač skaitmeninės darbotvarkės, socialinės atskirties, mokymosi visą gyvenimą srityse.

Remiantis 2013 m. paskelbta e. įtraukties apklausa ⁽¹⁾, ES iš viso yra apie 250 000 organizacijų, siekiančių socialiai integruoti bendruomenės narius, skatinant juos naudotis informacinėmis technologijomis. Viešosios bibliotekos sudaro 30 % visų e. įtraukties organizacijų ES, kai tuo tarpu antra pagal dydį organizacijų kategorija siekia 14 %.

2013 m. TNS atlikta 17 Europos šalių sociologinė apklausa ⁽²⁾, tyrusi lankytojų nuomonę apie informacines kompiuterines technologijas viešosiose bibliotekose, atskleidė, kad per pastaruosius 12 mėnesių beveik kas ketvirtas suaugęs gyventojas (97,3 milijonų europiečių) apsilankė viešojoje bibliotekoje ir 13,9 mln. suaugusiųjų bibliotekoje naudojami internetu. 83 % pastarųjų teigia, kad sutaupė laiko ir pinigų, pagerino igūdžius tam tikroje srityje, pasinaudojo e. vyriausybės teikiama paslaugomis, susirado daugiau informacijos įdarbinimo ir sveikatos klausimais. Bibliotekos sudaro sąlygas mokytis kiekvienam priimtiniu tempu ir laiku. Vien praėjusiais metais apie 24 mln. ES suaugusių gyventojų dalyvavo bibliotekose organizuojuose mokymuose, iš jų 2,3 mln. dalyvavo kompiuterinio raštingumo mokymuose.

Įspūdinga tai, kad respondentų (daugiausia romų, neįgaliųjų, vyresnio amžiaus žmonių ir bedarbių), teigiančių, kad viešosios bibliotekos jiems yra vienintelė vieta, kurioje jie gali pasinaudoti internetu, skaičius prilygtų keturių mažiausių ES šalių gyventojų skaičiui. Apklausa taip pat parodė, kad praėjusiais metais net 250 000 europiečių susirado darbą naudodamiesi internetu savo viešojoje bibliotekoje.

Ar Komisija nemano, kad pagal viešųjų bibliotekų institucinę sampratą, kuria šiuo metu yra vadovaujama ES, yra nuvertinamas bibliotekų veiklos poveikis visuomenei ir dėl to yra nepagrįstai ribojamos jų veiklos galimybės? Ar Komisija nemano, kad būtų tikslinga pripažinti viešųjų bibliotekų, kaip neformalaus švietimo įstaigų, statusą ES strateginiuose dokumentuose, kad jos galėtų plačiau naudotis ES struktūrine parama pagal susijusias politikos sritis ir taip prisidėti prie tolesnės visuomenės pažangos bei ES prioritetinių tikslų įgyvendinimo?

Klausimas, į kurį atsakoma raštu, Nr. E-002035/14

Komisijai

Vilija Blinkėvičiūtė (S&D)

(2014 m. vasario 20 d.)

Tema: Dėl neįvertinto Europos viešųjų bibliotekų potencialo, siekiant strategijos „Europa 2020“ tikslų

Unikalus, daugiataktantinis Europos Sąjungos viešųjų bibliotekų tinklas padeda aktyviai siekti strategijos „Europa 2020“ tikslų įgyvendinimo, ypač skaitmeninės darbotvarkės, socialinės atskirties ir mokymosi visą gyvenimą srityse.

Remiantis 2013 m. paskelbta e. įtraukties apklausa, ES iš viso yra apie 250 000 organizacijų, siekiančių socialiai integruoti bendruomenės narius, skatinant juos naudotis informacinėmis technologijomis. Viešosios bibliotekos sudaro 30 % visų e. įtraukties organizacijų ES, o kita po jų einanti didžiausia organizacijų kategorija sudaro 14 %.

2013 m. TNS atlikta 17 Europos šalių sociologinė apklausa, tyrusi lankytojų nuomonę apie informacines kompiuterines technologijas viešosiose bibliotekose, atskleidė, kad per pastaruosius 12 mėnesių beveik kas ketvirtas suaugęs gyventojas (97,3 milijono europiečių) apsilankė viešojoje bibliotekoje ir 13,9 mln. suaugusiųjų bibliotekoje naudojami internetu. 83 % pastarųjų teigia, kad sutaupė laiko ir pinigų, pagerino igūdžius tam tikroje srityje, pasinaudojo e. vyriausybės teikiama paslaugomis, susirado daugiau informacijos įdarbinimo ir sveikatos srityse. Bibliotekos sudaro sąlygas mokytis kiekvienam priimtiniu tempu ir laiku. Vien praėjusiais metais apie 24 mln. ES suaugusių gyventojų dalyvavo bibliotekose organizuojuose mokymuose, iš jų 2,3 mln. dalyvavo kompiuterinio raštingumo mokymuose.

Įspūdinga, kad respondentų (daugiausiai romai, neįgalieji, vyresnio amžiaus žmonės ir bedarbiai), teigiančių, kad viešosios bibliotekos jiems yra vienintelė vieta, kurioje jie gali pasinaudoti internetu, skaičius prilygtų keturių mažiausių ES šalių gyventojų skaičiui. Apklausa taip pat parodė, kad praėjusiais metais net 250 000 europiečių susirado darbą naudodamiesi Internetu savo viešojoje bibliotekoje.

⁽¹⁾ https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1773/24060/EU_survey_report_elInclusion_actors_2013.pdf?sequence=1.

⁽²⁾ http://www.minedu.fi/export/sites/default/OPM/Kirjastot/kansainvaelinen_ja_eu-yhteistyoe/Liitteet/Final_Report_-_Cross-European_Library_Impact.pdf

Ar Komisija nemano, kad pagal viešųjų bibliotekų institucinę sampratą, kuria šiuo metu vadovaujamosi ES, yra nuvertinamas bibliotekų veiklos poveikis visuomenei, ir dėl to nepagrįstai ribojamos jų veiklos galimybės? Ar Komisija nemano, kad būtų tikslinga pripažinti viešųjų bibliotekų, kaip neformalaus švietimo įstaigų, statusą ES strateginiuose dokumentuose, kad jos galėtų plačiau naudotis ES struktūrine parama pagal susijusias politikos sritis ir taip prisidėti prie tolesnės visuomenės pažangos bei ES prioritetinių tikslų įgyvendinimo?

Bendras atsakymas, A. Vassiliou atsakymas Komisijos vardu

(2014 m. kovo 28 d.)

Komisija pripažįsta, kad viešosios bibliotekos, prisidedamos prie to, kad visi ES piliečiai turėtų galimybę naudotis žiniomis ir informacija, atlieka kertinių kultūros institucijų vaidmenį. Galimybė nemokamai bibliotekose ar kitur naudotis kompiuteriais ir internetu, be abejo, yra svarbus socialinės įtraukties veiksnys asmenims, kurie kitais atžvilgiais priklauso atskirtų asmenų grupėms, ypač tiems, kurie ieško darbo. Tad viešosios bibliotekos prisideda prie strategijos „Europa 2020“ tikslų įgyvendinimo, ypač tokiose srityse kaip skaitmeninė dienotvarkė, socialinė įtrauktis ir mokymasis visą gyvenimą.

Viešųjų bibliotekų rėmimas ir kokybiškų paslaugų užtikrinimas visų pirma priklauso nacionalinės ar vietos lygmens kompetencijai, tačiau viešosios bibliotekos gali teikti paraiškas dėl finansavimo pagal naująją programą „Kūrybiška Europa“. Pagal ankstesniąją programą „Kultūra“ (2007-2013 m.) Komisija rėmė skaitymo projektus, pavyzdžiui, „ABC – knygos menas“, taip pat kitus bendradarbiavimo ir tinklų kūrimo projektus, kuriais bibliotekos prisidėjo prie kultūros ir švietimo srities veiklos. Pagal programą „Erasmus+“ bibliotekos taip pat turėtų turėti galimybę dalyvauti tinklų kūrimo ir mainų projektuose.

ES lygmeniu nėra nuostatų, pagal kurias būtų pripažįstamas bibliotekų, kaip neformaliojo švietimo institucijų, statusas.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001119/14
to the Commission
Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D)
(4 February 2014)

Subject: Underestimated potential of public libraries in achieving the targets of Europe 2020

A unique network of many thousands of European public libraries helps to actively pursue the targets of the Europe 2020 strategy, especially in the fields of the digital agenda, social exclusion and lifelong learning.

Based on the survey on e-Inclusion actors published in 2013 ⁽¹⁾, there are approximately 250 000 organisations in the EU seeking to socially integrate members of the community by encouraging them to use information technologies. Public libraries represent 30% of e-Inclusion organisations in the EU, while the second largest category of organisations covers just 14%.

In 2013, TNS conducted a sociological survey of 17 European countries ⁽²⁾ which investigated visitors' opinions on computer and information technologies in public libraries. It revealed that over the previous 12 months nearly a quarter of adult residents (97.3 million Europeans) had visited a public library, 13.9 million of whom had used the Internet there. Furthermore, 83% claimed that they had saved time and money, improved their skills in a particular area, taken advantage of e-Government services and found more information on employment and health issues. Libraries allow people to study at their own pace and in their own time. Last year alone, approximately 24 million adults in the EU participated in training organised by libraries, of whom 2.3 million attended computer literacy courses.

An impressive fact is that the number of respondents (the Romani, disabled, elderly and unemployed people) who claimed that public libraries are the only place they can take advantage of the Internet is equal to the number of residents in the four least densely populated EU Member States. The survey also revealed that in the previous year as many as 250 000 European residents had found a job by using the Internet at a public library.

Does the Commission not believe that the institutional concept of public libraries which is now being employed in the EU underestimates the impact of the activities of libraries and therefore that their activities are unreasonably restricted? Does the Commission not believe that it would be appropriate to recognise the status of a public library as a non-formal educational institution in EU strategic documents so that they could make more extensive use of EU structural support in accordance with related policies, thereby contributing to the further progress of society and EU priority objectives?

Question for written answer E-002035/14
to the Commission
Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D)
(20 February 2014)

Subject: Underestimated potential of public libraries in achieving the targets of the Europe 2020 strategy

A unique multi-thousand network of European public libraries helps to actively pursue the targets of the Europe 2020 strategy, especially in the fields of digital agenda, social exclusion and lifelong learning.

Based on the survey on e-Inclusion published in 2013, there are approximately 250 000 organisations in the EU, seeking to socially integrate members of the community by encouraging them to use information technologies. Public libraries represent 30% of e-Inclusion organisations in the EU, while the second largest category of organisations covers 14%.

In 2013, TNS conducted a sociological survey of 17 European countries, which investigated visitors' opinion on computer and information technologies in public libraries. It revealed that over the last 12 months nearly a quarter of adult residents (97.3 million Europeans) visited a public library, and 13.9 million of them used the Internet there. Furthermore, 83% of the recent respondents claimed that they had saved time and money, improved their skills in a particular area, taken advantage of e-Government services, and found more information on employment and health issues. Libraries allow studying at one's own pace and in one's own good time. Last year alone, approximately 24 million of the EU's adult population participated in trainings organised by libraries, of which 2.3 million attended computer literacy courses.

A very impressive fact is that the number of respondents (the Romani, disabled, elderly and unemployed people) claiming that the public library is the only place where they can take advantage of the Internet would be equal to the number of residents in the four least densely populated EU countries. The survey also revealed that over the last year 250 000 European residents had found a job by using the Internet in their public library.

⁽¹⁾ https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1773/24060/EU_survey_report_eInclusion_actors_2013.pdf?sequence=1

⁽²⁾ http://www.minedu.fi/export/sites/default/OPM/Kirjastot/kansainvaelinen_ja_eu-yhteistyoe/Liitteet/Final_Report_-_Cross-European_Library_Impact.pdf

Does the Commission not believe that the institutional concept of public libraries, which is now being employed in the EU, underestimates the impact of activities of libraries and that therefore their activities are unreasonably restricted? Does the Commission not believe that it would be appropriate to recognise the status of the public library, as a non-formal educational institution, in EU strategic documents, so that they could make more extensive use of EU structural support in accordance with the related policies, thereby contributing to the further progress of society and EU priority objectives?

Joint answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission

(28 March 2014)

The Commission recognises the role of public libraries as key cultural institutions, supporting individuals' access to knowledge and information for all citizens in the EU. Access to free public computers and Internet — in libraries or elsewhere — is clearly important for the social inclusion of otherwise excluded groups, particularly for job-seekers. Public libraries therefore contribute to meeting the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy, especially in the fields of the digital agenda, social inclusion and lifelong learning.

While supporting public libraries and ensuring high-quality services is primarily a matter of national or local competence, public libraries are eligible to apply for funding under the new Creative Europe programme. Under the previous Culture programme (2007-2013) the Commission supported reading projects such as 'ABC — The art of the book' as well as other cooperation and networking projects involving libraries in the cultural and educational fields. There would also be potential for libraries to participate in networks and exchanges under Erasmus+.

There are no provisions at EU level for recognising the status of libraries as non-formal educational institution.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001121/14
προς το Συμβούλιο
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(4 Φεβρουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Εμπορικές συμφωνίες ΕΕ με Καναδά και ΗΠΑ

Όπως είναι γνωστό, τη στιγμή αυτή βρίσκονται σε εξέλιξη δύο μεγάλες εμπορικές συμφωνίες της ΕΕ: Η Συνολική Οικονομική και Εμπορική Συμφωνία με τον Καναδά (CETA) και η Διατλαντική Εταιρική Σχέση Εμπορίου και Επενδύσεων με τις ΗΠΑ (TTIP).

Ερωτάται το Συμβούλιο:

1. Μπορεί να προσδιορίσει περίπου το χρονοδιάγραμμα υιοθέτησης και επικύρωσης για κάθε μία από τις ανωτέρω συμφωνίες;
2. Ποια είναι τα μεγαλύτερα θέματα για τα οποία υπάρχει ακόμη μεγάλη «απόσταση» μεταξύ των μερών και μεταξύ των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ;
3. Τι δυνατότητες υπάρχουν για τα κράτη-μέλη κατά την εξέλιξη της διαδικασίας και σε ποια στάδια μπορούν να υποβάλλουν ενστάσεις για επιμέρους θέματα των συμφωνιών αυτών ή ακόμη και να προβάλλουν βέτο;

Απάντηση
(13 Μαΐου 2014)

Οι διαπραγματεύσεις για τη Διατλαντική εταιρική σχέση συναλλαγών και επενδύσεων (TTIP) με τις ΗΠΑ διεξάγονται από την Επιτροπή βάσει της διαπραγματευτικής εντολής που συμφώνησε το Συμβούλιο στις 14 Ιουνίου 2013. Η Επιτροπή τηρεί ενήμερο το Συμβούλιο για την πορεία των διαπραγματεύσεων. Δεδομένου ότι οι διαπραγματεύσεις συνεχίζονται, το Συμβούλιο δεν είναι σε θέση, σε αυτή την πρόωπη φάση, να δώσει λεπτομερέστερη απάντηση σχετικά με τα προβληματικά σημεία και το πιθανό χρονοδιάγραμμα για τη σύναψη και επικύρωση της συμφωνίας.

Όσον αφορά τη συνολική συμφωνία οικονομικών και εμπορικών συναλλαγών (CETA), στις 18 Οκτωβρίου 2013, ο Πρωθυπουργός κ. Harper και ο Πρόεδρος κ. Barroso ανήγγειλαν την ολοκλήρωση των διαπραγματεύσεων. Κατά τη σύνοδο του Συμβουλίου Εξωτερικών Υποθέσεων (Εμπόριο) την ίδια ημέρα, ο Επίτροπος κ. De Gucht ενημέρωσε τους υπουργούς εμπορίου για τα βασικά στοιχεία της επιτευχθείσας συμφωνίας. Το κείμενο του σχεδίου συμφωνίας δεν έχει μονογραφηθεί ακόμη, ενώ η Επιτροπή δεν έχει υποβάλει ακόμη τυπική πρόταση αποφάσεων του Συμβουλίου για την υπογραφή και σύναψη της συμφωνίας. Επομένως, σε αυτή τη φάση, το Συμβούλιο δεν είναι ακόμη σε θέση να έχει άποψη για το περιεχόμενο της συμφωνίας, καθώς και για το πιθανό χρονοδιάγραμμα της σύναψης και επικύρωσης της συμφωνίας.

Γενικότερα, δυνάμει του άρθρου 207 της Συνθήκης για τη λειτουργία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, η Επιτροπή διεξάγει διαπραγματεύσεις για εμπορικές συμφωνίες με τρίτες χώρες κατόπιν εξουσιοδότησης του Συμβουλίου για την έναρξη διαπραγματεύσεων. Η Επιτροπή διεξάγει αυτές τις διαπραγματεύσεις εντός του πλαισίου των οδηγιών που εκδίδει το Συμβούλιο και σε συνεννόηση με την Επιτροπή Εμπορικής Πολιτικής. Τα κράτη μέλη μπορούν μέσω της Επιτροπής Εμπορικής Πολιτικής να παρακολουθήσουν την πορεία των διαπραγματεύσεων. Η τυπική εξέταση του κειμένου συμφωνίας αρχίζει μόλις η Επιτροπή υποβάλει στο Συμβούλιο πρόταση απόφασης του Συμβουλίου για την υπογραφή της συμφωνίας.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001121/14
to the Council**

Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)

(4 February 2014)

Subject: EU Trade Agreements with Canada and the US

Two major EU trade agreements are currently being drawn up: the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the US.

Will the Council say:

1. Can it determine approximately the timetable for adopting and ratifying each of these agreements?
2. What are the major sticking points between the parties and between the EU Member States?
3. What possibilities are available to Member States during the course of the procedure and at what stage may they submit objections relating to specific issues in such agreements or even veto them?

Reply

(13 May 2014)

The negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the US are being conducted by the Commission on the basis of a negotiating mandate adopted by the Council on 14 June 2013. The Council is kept informed by the Commission on the progress made in these negotiations. Given that the negotiations are still ongoing, the Council is not in a position, at this early stage, to give a more detailed answer regarding any sticking points and the possible timetable for adopting and ratifying this agreement.

As for the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA), on 18 October 2013 Prime Minister Harper and President Barroso announced the conclusion of the negotiations. On the same day, Trade Ministers were informed by Commissioner De Gucht at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council (Trade) of the main elements of the deal reached. The text of the draft agreement has not yet been initialled and the Commission has not yet submitted the formal proposals for the Council decisions to sign and conclude the agreement. Therefore, at this stage, it is also premature for the Council to take a view on the content of the agreement, as well as on the possible timetable for its adoption and ratification.

More generally, pursuant to Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Commission conducts negotiations on trade agreements with third countries on the basis of the Council's authorisation to open negotiations. The Commission conducts these negotiations within the framework of directives issued by the Council and in consultation with the Trade Policy Committee. It is through the Trade Policy Committee that Member States have an opportunity to assess the progress of negotiations. The formal examination of the text of an agreement starts once the Commission submits to the Council a proposal for the Council decision to sign the agreement.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001122/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(4 Φεβρουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Εμπορικές συμφωνίες ΕΕ με Καναδά και ΗΠΑ

Όπως είναι γνωστό, τη στιγμή αυτή βρίσκονται σε εξέλιξη δύο μεγάλες εμπορικές συμφωνίες της ΕΕ: Η Συνολική Οικονομική και Εμπορική Συμφωνία με τον Καναδά (CETA) και η Διατλαντική Εταιρική Σχέση Εμπορίου και Επενδύσεων με τις ΗΠΑ (TTIP).

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Μπορεί να προσδιορίσει περίπου το χρονοδιάγραμμα υιοθέτησης και επικύρωσης για κάθε μία από τις ανωτέρω συμφωνίες;
2. Ποια είναι τα μεγαλύτερα θέματα για τα οποία υπάρχει ακόμη μεγάλη «απόσταση» μεταξύ των μερών και μεταξύ των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ;
3. Τι δυνατότητες υπάρχουν για τα κράτη μέλη κατά την εξέλιξη της διαδικασίας και σε ποια στάδια μπορούν να υποβάλλουν ενστάσεις για επιμέρους θέματα των συμφωνιών αυτών ή ακόμη και να προβάλλουν βέτο;

Απάντηση του κ. De Gucht εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(2 Απριλίου 2014)

Οι διαπραγματεύσεις για μια διατλαντική εταιρική σχέση εμπορίου και επενδύσεων (TTIP) άρχισαν τον Ιούλιο του 2013 και έχουν σημειώσει ικανοποιητική πρόοδο. Είναι πρόωρο, στο παρόν στάδιο των διαπραγματεύσεων, να διατυπωθούν εικασίες σχετικά με την ακριβή διάρκεια των διαπραγματεύσεων. Και οι δύο πλευρές δεσμεύτηκαν να τηρήσουν ένα σθεναρό ρυθμό διαπραγματεύσεων, διασφαλίζοντας παράλληλα ότι η ουσία υπερισχύει της ταχύτητας. Περισσότερες πληροφορίες σχετικά με την τρέχουσα κατάσταση και τα βασικά θέματα των διαπραγματεύσεων, παρέχονται στη διεύθυνση: <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/>.

Όσον αφορά τη συνολική οικονομική και εμπορική συμφωνία με τον Καναδά (CETA), τα βασικά στοιχεία της συμφωνίας έχουν ήδη συμφωνηθεί. Απομένει η διευθέτηση των εκκρεμών τεχνικών και νομικών θεμάτων. Αφού ολοκληρωθούν η νομική εξέταση και η μετάφραση του κειμένου σε όλες τις επίσημες γλώσσες της ΕΕ, το κείμενο θα διαβιβασθεί στο Συμβούλιο, το οποίο είναι υπεύθυνο για τις αποφάσεις σχετικά με την υπογραφή (και την προσωρινή εφαρμογή κατά περίπτωση), καθώς και για τη σύναψη της συμφωνίας. Το Συμβούλιο θα ζητήσει από το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο να εγκρίνει τη συμφωνία, καθώς η σύναψη μιας εμπορικής συμφωνίας απαιτεί προηγούμενη έγκριση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου. Η διαδικασία αυτή, από πλευράς ΕΕ, αναμένεται να διαρκέσει περίπου δεκαοκτώ μήνες.

Ρόλος της Επιτροπής είναι να διαπραγματεύεται με τους εμπορικούς εταίρους εξ ονόματος της ΕΕ και για τον σκοπό αυτό συνεργάζεται στενά με τα κράτη μέλη στο Συμβούλιο και το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο, το οποίο τηρείται πλήρως ενήμερο καθ' όλη τη διάρκεια της διαδικασίας, ιδίως μέσω της επιτροπής INTA (επιτροπή διεθνούς εμπορίου). Μετά την ολοκλήρωση των διαπραγματεύσεων, το Συμβούλιο και το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο είναι τα όργανα που πρέπει να συμφωνήσουν επίσημα σχετικά με το αποτέλεσμα.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001122/14
to the Commission**

Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)

(4 February 2014)

Subject: EU Trade Agreements with Canada and the US

Two major EU trade agreements are currently being drawn up: the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the US.

Will the Commission say:

1. Can it determine approximately the timetable for adopting and ratifying each of these agreements?
2. What are the major sticking points between the parties and between the EU Member States?
3. What possibilities are available to Member States during the course of the procedure and at what stage may they submit objections relating to specific issues in such agreements or even veto them?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission

(2 April 2014)

The negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) started in July 2013 and have been making good progress. It is premature, at this stage of negotiations, to speculate about the exact duration of negotiations. Both sides are committed to a vigorous pace of negotiations, all while ensuring that substance will prevail over speed. For more information on the state of play and the key issues in the negotiations, see: <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/>

As regards the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA), the key elements of the deal have already been agreed. What remains to be done is to finalise the remaining technical and legal issues. Once the legal review and the translation of the text into all EU official languages have been completed, the text will be sent to the Council, which is responsible for the decisions on its signature (and provisional application if that is the case) and on the conclusion of the agreement. The Council will ask the European Parliament for its approval as the conclusion of a trade agreement requires prior consent of the European Parliament. This process is, on the EU side, expected to take approximately one year and a half.

It is the Commission's role to negotiate with the trading partners on behalf of the EU and it does this working closely with the Member States in the Council and the European Parliament, which is kept fully informed throughout the process, notably through the INTA Committee. Once negotiations are completed, Council and the European Parliament are the ones to formally agree on the outcome.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001123/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(4 Φεβρουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Πορεία ψυχιατρικής μεταρρύθμισης στην Ελλάδα

Στην ερώτησή μου E-012782/2013, η Επιτροπή, μεταξύ άλλων, απάντησε ότι, «ο προβλεπόμενος προϋπολογισμός για τον άξονα προτεραιότητας 5 ήταν 354 787 429 ευρώ έως τον Σεπτέμβριο του 2012, όταν μειώθηκε στα 268 148 385 ευρώ», καθώς και ότι «μέρος των έργων που έχουν εγκριθεί στο πλαίσιο του άξονα προτεραιότητας 5 υλοποιείται από μη κερδοσκοπικές κοινοτικές μονάδες ψυχικής υγείας. Τον Δεκέμβριο του 2013, ο συνολικός προϋπολογισμός για τα έργα αυτά ήταν 214,6 εκατ. ευρώ». Το 80% δηλαδή των προϋπολογιζόμενων κονδυλίων για την ψυχιατρική μεταρρύθμιση, κατευθύνεται στις μη κερδοσκοπικές κοινοτικές μονάδες ψυχικής υγείας. Επίσης, παρέλειψε να μου απαντήσει σε 2 κρίσιμα κατά τη γνώμη μου ερωτήματα, τα οποία και επαναλαμβάνω στη συνέχεια.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ποιοι ήταν οι λόγοι της τεράστιας μείωσης του προϋπολογισμού του Άξονα Προτεραιότητας 5 για την ψυχική υγεία; Πώς αξιοποιήθηκαν τα κονδύλια που περικόπηκαν;
2. Με το 80% των κονδυλίων να κατευθύνεται σε μη κερδοσκοπικές κοινοτικές μονάδες ψυχικής υγείας, θεωρεί ότι γίνεται σωστή και σύμφωνη με το Σχέδιο Δράσης που επισυνάπτεται στο Μνημόνιο Συνεργασίας της 23/4/2013, κατανομή των κονδυλίων, ώστε να προχωρήσει και να ολοκληρωθεί η ψυχιατρική μεταρρύθμιση στην Ελλάδα;
3. Εκτιμά ότι υπάρχουν οι κατάλληλες προϋποθέσεις ώστε να κλείσουν τα Τμήματα Χρόνιας Νοσηλείας;
4. Μπορεί να διαβεβαιώσει ότι θα ζητήσει από το Υπουργείο Υγείας να προβεί «στις απαραίτητες διαδικασίες στελέχωσης των μονάδων ψυχικής υγείας που λειτουργούν τα ΝΠΔΔ (ψυχιατρικά τμήματα των γενικών νοσοκομείων, κοινοτικές δομές, κ.λπ.), αξιοποιώντας πλήρως το σύνολο του προσωπικού» από τα Ψυχιατρικά Νοσοκομεία που θα καταργηθούν, όπως σαφώς ορίζεται στο σημείο VI του Μνημονίου Συνεργασίας και στο επισυναπτόμενο Σχέδιο Δράσης;
5. Πώς κρίνει συνολικά την πορεία της ψυχιατρικής μεταρρύθμισης στην Ελλάδα;

Απάντηση του κ. Andor εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(4 Απριλίου 2014)

1. Η μείωση του προϋπολογισμού για τον άξονα προτεραιότητας 5 του επιχειρησιακού προγράμματος «Ανάπτυξη των ανθρώπινων πόρων», δικαιολογείται από τις δυσχέρειες εφαρμογής του άξονα (δαπάνες 5,5%). Ο προϋπολογισμός που διατέθηκε από την εν λόγω μεταφορά προορίζεται για την αντιμετώπιση του προβλήματος της ανεργίας των νέων, μέσω του άξονα προτεραιότητας 3.
2. Η ευθύνη για την κατανομή των κεφαλαίων εναπόκειται στο κράτος μέλος ⁽¹⁾.
3. Σύμφωνα με τις ελληνικές αρχές και σε συμμόρφωση με το μνημόνιο συνεννόησης, αναμένεται στο εγγύς μέλλον μια εκτίμηση της αναγκαιότητας δημιουργίας νέων μονάδων ή συμπληρωματικών προγραμμάτων ψυχοκοινωνικής αποκατάστασης. Εν τω μεταξύ, ένας σημαντικός αριθμός χρόνιων ασθενών μεταφέρθηκαν στις υφιστάμενες δομές ψυχικής υγείας.
4. Με την υπογραφή του μνημονίου συνεννόησης, το Υπουργείο Υγείας δεσμεύεται να μεταφέρει το ειδικευμένο ιατρικό προσωπικό από τα καταργηθέντα ψυχιατρικά νοσοκομεία σε ψυχιατρικές μονάδες γενικών νοσοκομείων ή σε δομές ψυχικής υγείας, όπως αναφέρεται με σαφήνεια στο τμήμα VI. Η Επιτροπή θα παρακολουθεί στενά την υλοποίηση αυτού του στόχου.
5. Η μεταρρύθμιση του τομέα της ψυχικής υγείας στην Ελλάδα κινείται αργά προς τον κύριο στόχο της οικονομικά βιώσιμης αποϊδρυματοποίησης ασθενών με προβλήματα ψυχικής υγείας.

⁽¹⁾ Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1083/2006 του Συμβουλίου, της 11ης Ιουλίου 2006, περί καθορισμού γενικών διατάξεων για το Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο Περιφερειακής Ανάπτυξης, το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινωνικό Ταμείο και το Ταμείο Συνόχης και την κατάργηση του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1260/1999, ΕΕ L 210 της 31.7.2006, σ. 58.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001123/14
to the Commission
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(4 February 2014)**

Subject: Psychiatric reform in Greece

In its answer to my Question E-012782/2013, the Commission stated, *inter alia*, that 'the budget allocated to priority axis 5 was EUR 354 787 429 until September 2012 when it was reduced to EUR 268 148 385...' and that 'a part of the approved projects under priority axis 5 is being implemented by non-profit community mental health units. In December 2013, the total budget of these projects stands at EUR 214.6 million' i.e. 80% of the budgeted funds for psychiatric reform is channelled to non-profit community mental health units. However, it failed to answer two critical questions, which I repeat below.

Will the Commission say:

1. What were the reasons for the huge reduction in the budget of priority axis 5 for mental health? How have the resources saved in this way been utilised?
2. With 80% of the funds being channelled to non-profit community mental health units, does it consider that this represents a proper allocation of the funds, in line with the action plan attached to the memorandum of understanding of 23.4.2013, so as to enable the process of psychiatric reform in Greece to proceed and be completed?
3. Does it believe that the appropriate conditions exist for the closure of the long-term care departments?
4. Can it provide assurances that it will ask the Ministry of Health to undertake the necessary procedures to staff the mental health units operated by legal persons governed by public law (psychiatric departments in general hospitals, community structures, etc.), fully utilising all the staff from the psychiatric hospitals that are earmarked for closure, as clearly stated in section VI of the memorandum of understanding and the attached Action Plan?
5. How does it judge the overall process of psychiatric reform in Greece?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2014)**

1. The decrease of the budget of priority axis 5 of the Operational Programme 'Human Resources Development' was justified by the axis' implementation difficulties (5,5% expenditure). The budget made available from this transfer was earmarked for tackling the problem of youth unemployment through priority axis 3.
2. The responsibility for the allocation of funds falls with the Member State ⁽¹⁾.
3. According to the Greek authorities and in line with the MoU, an assessment of the necessity to create new units or additional psycho-social rehabilitation programmes is expected in the near future. In the meantime a significant number of chronic patients were transferred to existing mental health structures.
4. By signing the memorandum of understanding (MoU) the Ministry of Health committed itself to transferring specialized medical personnel from the abolished Psychiatric Hospitals to psychiatric units of General Hospitals or mental health structures as clearly stated in section VI. The Commission will monitor closely the achievement of this milestone.
5. Mental health reform in Greece moves slowly towards the main goal of the financially sustainable de-institutionalization of the mental health patients.

⁽¹⁾ Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, of 11 July 2006, laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, OJ L 210 of 31 July 2006, § 58.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001128/14
a la Comisión**

Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE)

(4 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Recomendaciones de la Comisión al Reino de España (2)

Recientemente, la Comisión Europea y el Banco Central Europeo han impuesto al Reino de España una nueva agenda de reformas financieras. Las dos instituciones han pedido, entre otras cosas, al Gobierno de España que vigile que las diferentes medidas para limitar los desahucios a nivel estatal y regional no pongan en riesgo la estabilidad financiera y que preserve la unidad del mercado de servicios financieros en España frente a las diferentes leyes autonómicas.

En muchas ocasiones, la Comisión suele responder a preguntas realizadas por diputados al Parlamento Europeo que la materia consultada no corresponde al ámbito de competencia de la Unión, sino de cada uno de los Estados miembros, y que la Comisión no puede actuar. Además, un número importante de preguntas no suele ser ni admitida a trámite utilizando un argumento similar. La temática de dichas preguntas puede variar desde temas de derechos humanos (política penitenciaria, por ejemplo) a temas de organización administrativa interna de los Estados, pasando por temas de derechos lingüísticos y culturales de las minorías.

Evidentemente, las medidas y la legislación para tratar el impago de los créditos por compra de vivienda, que en el caso del Reino de España llevan al desahucio, son competencia clara de los Estados miembros.

¿Qué razones han impulsado a la Comisión a efectuar recomendaciones al Reino de España en este caso?

¿Por qué no puede la Comisión, en otros casos de competencia de los Estados miembros, realizar recomendaciones, como en el caso de la política penitenciaria recomendando al Reino de España que cumpla su propia ley y los diferentes convenios internacionales al respecto que ha firmado?

Respuesta del Sr. Rehn en nombre de la Comisión

(3 de abril de 2014)

Como consecuencia de la solicitud de asistencia financiera por España, las autoridades españolas y la Comisión firmaron un Memorándum de Acuerdo en nombre del FEEF/MEDE en julio de 2012. En el Memorándum se establecieron algunas condiciones que deben cumplir las autoridades a lo largo de la duración del programa, tanto en lo que respecta a los distintos bancos como al marco regulador y de supervisión. El Memorándum también estableció que las autoridades españolas deberían consultar de antemano con la Comisión Europea y el Banco Central Europeo (BCE) sobre la adopción de políticas del sector financiero no incluidas en el ME, pero que podrían tener un impacto importante en la consecución de los objetivos del programa.

En este contexto, las autoridades españolas informaron a la Comisión sobre todas las iniciativas legislativas en materia de ejecuciones hipotecarias y desahucios a nivel nacional y autonómico, y la Comisión examinó estas iniciativas con las autoridades y dio su opinión, en su caso, en lo que respecta a su posible impacto en la consecución de los objetivos del programa.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001128/14
to the Commission**
Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE)
(4 February 2014)

Subject: The Commission's recommendations to Spain (2)

Recently, the European Commission and the European Central Bank set out a new financial reform agenda for Spain. The two institutions have asked the Spanish Government, *inter alia*, to ensure that the various measures at state and regional levels to limit evictions do not put financial stability at risk, and also to keep the Spanish financial services market united in the face of the various autonomous laws.

The Commission frequently answers MEPs' questions by stating that the issue in question does not fall within the field of competence of the European Union, but of each of the Member States, and that the Commission cannot take action. Moreover, through a similar line of reasoning, a considerable number of questions are not even declared admissible. These questions can cover a whole range of topics, from human rights issues (e.g. prison policy), to Member State internal administration organisation, to minority group linguistic and cultural rights.

The measures and legislation for dealing with the non-payment of credit for purchasing housing — which in Spain results in eviction — clearly fall within the remit of the Member States.

For what reasons has the Commission decided to make recommendations to Spain in this case?

Why is the Commission unable to make recommendations in other cases that fall within the remit of the Member States, for example a recommendation that Spain comply with its own law and the various international agreements it has signed on prison policy?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2014)

As a result of the request for financial assistance by Spain, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed by the Spanish authorities and the Commission on behalf of the EFSF/ESM in July 2012. This MoU set out some conditions to be met by the authorities throughout the programme duration both as regards individual banks and the regulatory and supervisory framework. The MoU also established that the Spanish authorities should 'consult ex-ante with the European Commission, and the European Central Bank (ECB) on the adoption of financial-sector policies that are not included in this MoU but that could have a material impact on the achievement of programme objectives'.

Against this background, the Spanish authorities informed the Commission on all legislative initiatives on foreclosures and evictions at national and regional level, and the Commission discussed these initiatives with the authorities, and shared its view where indicated, regarding their possible impact on the achievement of the programme objectives.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001134/14
an die Kommission
Thomas Ulmer (PPE)
(5. Februar 2014)

Betrifft: Ausschreibungspflicht bei Bereitschaftsdienst in Deutschland

Bei dem von der Kassenärztlichen Vereinigung organisierten ärztlichen Notfall-/Bereitschaftsdienst in Deutschland bedarf es einer europaweiten Ausschreibung. Kann die Kommission dazu folgende Fragen beantworten:

1. Auf welcher europäischen Vorgabe basiert diese Regelung?
2. Inwieweit besteht hier eine Pflicht zur Ausschreibung in Deutschland?
3. Existiert im gesamten EU-Raum ein mit Deutschland vergleichbarer ärztlicher Notfall-/Bereitschaftsdienst?
4. Falls ja, bedarf es überall einer europaweiten Ausschreibung, oder basiert dies in Deutschland auf der nationalen Umsetzung einer Richtlinie?
5. Wie beurteilt die Kommission die Ausschreibungspflicht in Anbetracht des Subsidiaritätsprinzips gemäß Artikel 5 Absatz 3 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union (EUV)?
6. Ist hier derzeit durch die Kommission eine Anpassung/Veränderung der Rechtsgrundlage geplant?

Antwort von Herrn Barnier im Namen der Kommission
(9. April 2014)

Der Herr Abgeordnete bezieht sich in seiner Anfrage auf ärztliche Notfall-/Bereitschaftsdienste, für die in Deutschland europaweite Ausschreibungen verlangt werden.

Leider enthält die Anfrage keine Angaben zu den konkreten Dienstleistungen, die hier gemeint sind (Krankentransporte, medizinische Notdienste, Organisation von Bereitschaftsdiensten für Allgemeinmediziner oder andere, ähnliche Dienste). Da je nach Art der betreffenden Dienstleistung jeweils andere europäische Vorschriften gelten, ist die Kommission deshalb nicht in der Lage, die Anfrage zu beantworten, und wäre dem Herrn Abgeordneten für die Übermittlung detaillierterer Informationen dankbar.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001134/14
to the Commission
Thomas Ulmer (PPE)
(5 February 2014)**

Subject: Tendering obligation for on-call service in Germany

Medical emergency/on-call service in Germany, which is organised by the German Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians, is subject to Europe-wide tendering. Can the Commission answer the following questions in this regard:

1. On what European requirement is this regulation based?
2. To what extent does this constitute an obligation to tender in Germany?
3. Is there a medical emergency/on-call service comparable to that of Germany within the entire EU area?
4. If so, is Europe-wide tendering a requirement everywhere, or is it based on the national transposition of a directive in Germany?
5. What view does the Commission take of the tendering obligation in light of the principle of subsidiarity pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)?
6. Does the Commission currently intend to adapt/change the legal basis in this regard?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2014)**

The Honourable Member refers to medical emergency/on-call services and the fact that those services are subject to European-wide tendering in Germany.

However, the question does not specify which specific services are referred to. Health transport services, medical emergency services, the organisation of on-call services for general practitioners, or other similar services. As the European rules differ according to the specific nature of the service in question, the Commission is not in a position to answer the question at the moment and would be grateful if the Honourable Member could provide more detailed information.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001135/14
alla Commissione**

Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)

(5 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: La bolla dei derivati

Nella sua risposta all'interrogazione n. E-005297/2013 relativa alla questione in oggetto, la Commissione ha affermato che «sta realizzando una valutazione d'impatto delle conseguenze della riforma della struttura delle banche troppo grandi e troppo importanti per fallire. Tale valutazione» — continua la Commissione — «copre tre settori principali: attività da separare, tipo di separazione, campo d'applicazione e introduzione dei cambiamenti. I risultati dovrebbero essere disponibili a inizio autunno ed ora è troppo presto per formulare previsioni». Poiché l'autunno è ormai trascorso, può indicarci la Commissione quali siano stati i risultati della valutazione d'impatto effettuata, con specifico riferimento ai tre principali settori indicati nella risposta?

Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione

(10 aprile 2014)

Il 29 gennaio 2014 la Commissione ha adottato una proposta di regolamento relativa alle misure strutturali volte a rafforzare la resilienza degli enti creditizi dell'Unione europea.

La proposta riguarda l'esiguo numero di banche di grandissime dimensioni dell'UE che, malgrado l'introduzione di nuove norme in materia di aumento del capitale, risoluzione delle crisi e vigilanza rafforzata, potrebbero risultare ancora troppo grandi per fallire, troppo costose da salvare e troppo complesse per risolverne le crisi. Con la proposta si intende impedire a queste banche di dedicarsi all'attività di negoziazione per conto proprio. La proposta conferirebbe inoltre alle autorità di vigilanza il potere — e addirittura l'obbligo in determinate circostanze — di imporre a tali banche la separazione dalle attività di raccolta dei depositi dalle altre attività di negoziazione (compresi i derivati complessi), se l'esercizio di queste ultime compromette la stabilità finanziaria, a meno che le istituzioni interessate non riescano a dimostrare l'assenza di tali rischi.

Le misure proposte contribuirebbero a rafforzare ulteriormente la stabilità finanziaria e ridurre le probabilità che le banche debbano essere salvate. Essa fornirebbe inoltre un quadro comune a livello dell'UE. La proposta è calibrata attentamente in modo da assicurare il delicato equilibrio tra stabilità finanziaria e creazione delle condizioni che permettono l'erogazione di prestiti all'economia reale.

Nel formulare la sua proposta, la Commissione ha tenuto conto della relazione del gruppo di alto livello presieduto dal governatore della Banca di Finlandia Erkki Liikanen, delle norme nazionali vigenti o in corso di elaborazione in alcuni Stati membri e degli sviluppi in altre giurisdizioni.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001135/14
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(5 February 2014)**

Subject: The derivatives bubble

In its response to Question E-005297/2013 on the above matter, the Commission stated that 'it is undertaking an impact assessment on the consequences of reform of the structure of the banks which are too big and too important to fail. The assessment' — continues the Commission — 'covers three key aspects: the activities to be separated, the type of separation, and the scope and introduction of changes. The findings are expected to be available in the early autumn and it is therefore too soon to make predictions'. Given that the autumn has now passed, can the Commission disclose the findings of the impact assessment, with specific reference to the three key aspects referred to in the answer?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2014)**

On 29 January 2014, the Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation on structural measures to improve the resilience of EU credit institutions.

The proposal deals with the small number of very large EU banks which, despite the new rules introduced in terms of increased capital, resolution and better supervision, might still be too-big-to-fail, too-costly-to save and too-complex-to-resolve. These banks would be prohibited from engaging in proprietary trading. Moreover, the proposal would also give supervisors the power, and in certain instances the obligation, to require those banks to separate other trading activities (incl. complex derivatives) from their deposit-taking business if the pursuit of such activities compromises financial stability and unless the institutions concerned can demonstrate that no such risks occur.

The proposed measures would further strengthen financial stability and reduce the likelihood that banks have to be bailed out. It would provide a common framework at EU level. The proposal is carefully calibrated to strike a delicate balance between financial stability and creating the right conditions for lending to the real economy.

In its proposal the Commission has taken into account the report by the High Level Group chaired by the Governor of the Bank of Finland, Erkki Liikanen, as well as existing national rules already in place or being developed by Member States and developments in other jurisdictions.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001136/14
a la Comisión**

**Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D), Eider Gardiazábal Rubial (S&D), Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto (S&D), Alejandro Cercas (S&D)
y Ricardo Cortés Lastra (S&D)**
(5 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Establecimiento de un sistema de impuestos sobre las transacciones financieras

Entre los meses de septiembre y octubre de 2012, once Estados miembros solicitaron avanzar mediante cooperación reforzada en el ámbito de la tasación de las transacciones financieras, partiendo de la propuesta de Directiva presentada por la Comisión Europea el 28 de septiembre de 2011. Dicha solicitud, respaldada por la Comisión y el Parlamento Europeo, fue aprobada por el Consejo mediante su Decisión de 22 de enero de 2013.

En abril de 2012, la Comisión estimó que el establecimiento de un impuesto sobre las transacciones financieras como el propuesto podría generar una recaudación anual de 57 000 millones de euros. ¿No considera la Comisión que la puesta en marcha de este impuesto facilitaría el proceso de consolidación fiscal, permitiendo al mismo tiempo aliviar la presión sobre los recortes en el gasto público? ¿Ha realizado la Comisión Europea una estimación previa de las políticas a las que sería más conveniente destinar los ingresos obtenidos con este impuesto?

¿Puede confirmar la Comisión si el establecimiento de un impuesto sobre las transacciones financieras figura en los planes nacionales de reforma remitidos por los Estados miembros participantes? ¿Puede confirmar asimismo si las previsiones de recaudación correspondientes se encuentran en los borradores de proyectos presupuestarios enviados respectivamente para el próximo año fiscal? Y, si no es así, ¿qué medidas va a adoptar para corregir esta situación y de cara a la pronta puesta en marcha del impuesto sobre las transacciones financieras?

Respuesta del Sr. Šemeta en nombre de la Comisión
(4 de abril de 2014)

La propuesta de la Comisión de una Directiva del Consejo por la que se establece una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito del impuesto sobre las transacciones financieras (ITF) no incluye normas sobre la utilización de los ingresos generados por el ITF. Además, solo los 11 Estados miembros autorizados a establecer un sistema común del ITF pueden decidir en última instancia la adopción de la propuesta.

La evaluación de impacto adjunta a la propuesta de la Comisión prevé que el sistema de los ITF nacionales, tal y como se propone en el marco de la cooperación reforzada, permitiría obtener entre 30 000 y 35 000 millones EUR, es decir, entre el 0,4 y el 0,5 % del PIB de los 11 Estados miembros. Dichos Estados miembros podrán decidir sobre los usos de estos ingresos adicionales, por ejemplo para la reducción de los déficits y la deuda públicos o para medidas de fomento del crecimiento que contribuyan al saneamiento presupuestario a medio plazo.

El Consejo Europeo de febrero de 2013 invitó a los Estados miembros participantes a examinar si el ITF podría servir de base para un recurso propio del presupuesto de la UE, reduciendo sus correspondientes contribuciones basadas en la RNB.

En el contexto del proceso de evaluación de los proyectos de planes presupuestarios, los Estados miembros no proporcionan sistemáticamente información sobre los ingresos previstos de impuestos individuales, sino agrupados por categorías de ingresos. Sin embargo, se espera que los Estados miembros presenten información detallada sobre las medidas presupuestarias que tienen previsto introducir. La introducción del ITF constituiría una medida por el lado de los ingresos y como tal debería ser notificada en el proyecto de plan presupuestario.

Por lo que se refiere a los programas nacionales de reforma, la Comisión remite a Su Señoría al sitio wWeb del Semestre Europeo donde se enumeran todos los programas ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/index_es.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001136/14
to the Commission**

**Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D), Eider Gardiazábal Rubial (S&D), Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto (S&D), Alejandro Cercas (S&D)
and Ricardo Cortés Lastra (S&D)**

(5 February 2014)

Subject: Establishment of a system of taxes on financial transactions

Between September and October 2012 eleven Member States asked to go ahead with the projected financial transaction tax by way of enhanced cooperation, on the basis of the proposal for a directive presented by the European Commission on 28 September 2011. This request, which was backed by the Commission and the European Parliament, was approved by the Council in its Decision of 22 January 2013.

In April 2012 the European Commission estimated that the creation of a tax on financial transactions such as the one proposed might generate annual revenues of EUR 57 000 million. Does the Commission not consider that the implementation of such a tax would facilitate the process of fiscal consolidation, while at the same time relieving the pressure for cuts in public spending? Has the Commission carried out a prior assessment of the policies to which the revenues obtained from this tax might best be allocated?

Can the Commission confirm whether the imposition of a financial transaction tax is included in the national reform plans submitted by the participating Member States? Can it also confirm whether the corresponding revenue forecasts are included in the respective draft budgetary projects presented for the next financial year? If that is not the case, what measures does it intend to adopt in order to rectify this situation and with a view to early implementation of the financial transaction tax?

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission

(4 April 2014)

The Commission Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax (FTT) does not include rules on the use of the revenue generated by such FTT. Moreover, only the 11 Member States authorised to establish a common FTT system can ultimately decide on the adoption of this proposal.

The impact assessment annexed to this Commission proposal estimated that the system of national FTT's as proposed under enhanced cooperation could yield around EUR 30 to 35 billion, or 0.4 to 0.5% of the GDP of these 11 Member States. These Member States can decide on the use of extra revenue, such as for the direct reduction of public deficits and debt or for growth enhancing measures contributing to fiscal consolidation in the medium term.

The European Council of February 2013 invited the participating Member States to examine whether the FTT could become the basis for an own resource of the EU budget, reducing their GNI contributions respectively.

In the context of the process of the assessment draft budgetary plans, Member States do not provide systematically information about revenues envisaged from individual taxes, but rather grouped by the revenue categories. However, Member States are expected to present detailed information about the budgetary measures they plan to introduce. Introduction of the FTT would constitute a revenue measure and as such should be reported in the draft budgetary plan.

Regarding the National Reform Programmes, the Commission would refer the Honourable Members to the European Semester website where all programmes are listed ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/index_en.htm

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001137/14
do Komisji**

Tadeusz Ross (PPE)

(5 lutego 2014 r.)

Przedmiot: Głosowanie online, szczególnie dla obywateli seniorów

Wiele państw europejskich z powodzeniem wdrożyło inicjatywę głosowania online. Jako przykład wyjątkowo dobrze przyjętego wdrożenia takiej inicjatywy można podać Estonię, pierwszy kraj, w którym przeprowadzono prawnie wiążące wybory powszechne online, a także Belgię, Finlandię, Francję, Niemcy, Irlandię, Niderlandy, Norwegię, Rumunię, Szwajcarię i Zjednoczone Królestwo. Podobną inicjatywę, zwaną e-głosowaniem, zaplanowano na przyszłe wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego.

Czy w trakcie wyborów do Parlamentu Europejskiego w 2019 r. będzie można zorganizować e-głosowania w każdym państwie członkowskim? Mogłoby to zachęcić obywateli do głosowania, zwłaszcza osoby starsze.

Co robi Komisja w państwach, w których e-głosowanie jest już możliwe, aby zapewnić organizację wyborów do PE w sposób przyjazny osobom w starszym wieku? Jakie środki są wprowadzane, aby ułatwić głosowanie osobom starszym z upośledzeniem wzroku? Co jest robione z myślą o tych, którzy nie mają dostępu do Internetu, np. aby zagwarantować głosującym dostęp do alternatywnych procedur głosowania?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Viviane Reding w imieniu Komisji

(7 kwietnia 2014 r.)

Komisja przywiązuje dużą wagę do zachęcania obywateli UE do uczestnictwa w życiu demokratycznym oraz do ułatwiania im tego. Zaproponowała więc niedawno środki, które ułatwią obywatelom głosowanie w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego i wzmocnią europejski wymiar tych wyborów. Inicjatywa ta obejmuje *komunikat* ⁽¹⁾ oraz *zalecenie* ⁽²⁾ w sprawie *dalszego usprawnienia demokratycznego i skutecznego sposobu przeprowadzania wyborów europejskich*.

Komisja uważa również, że państwa członkowskie muszą szanować ogólne zasady prawa unijnego, a jednocześnie do ich kompetencji należy uregulowanie tych aspektów procedur wyborczych do Parlamentu Europejskiego, które nie są zharmonizowane na poziomie UE, takich jak przyjęcie środków mających na celu wprowadzenie głosowania elektronicznego.

3 grudnia 2012 r. Komisja przyjęła również wniosek dotyczący dyrektywy w sprawie dostępności stron internetowych instytucji sektora publicznego, której celem jest ustanowienie zharmonizowanych wymogów dostępności stron internetowych instytucji sektora publicznego oferujących dwanaście rodzajów usług publicznych. Dyrektywa jest obecnie przedmiotem procedury ustawodawczej.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2013) 126.

⁽²⁾ Dz.U. L 79 z 21.3.2013, s. 29.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001137/14
to the Commission
Tadeusz Ross (PPE)
(5 February 2014)**

Subject: Online voting especially for senior citizens

Many European countries have successfully implemented online voting initiatives. Examples include the remarkably well-received implementation in Estonia, which was the first country to hold legally binding general elections online, as well as Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. A similar online initiative called e-Vote is planned for future elections to the European Parliament.

Will it be possible to organise an e-Vote in each Member State for the European Parliament elections in 2019? It could encourage citizens to vote, especially elderly people.

In Member States where e-Voting is already possible, what is the Commission doing to ensure that it is organised in an age-friendly manner for the EP elections? What measures are being put in place in order to facilitate voting for older people with visual impairments? What is being done about those who have no access to the Internet, for example to guarantee that voters have access to alternative voting procedures?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(7 April 2014)**

Encouraging and facilitating the participation of EU citizens in the democratic life is a high priority for the Commission. This is why the Commission recently proposed measures to facilitate citizens' participation in the European Parliament elections and to strengthen the European dimension of these elections. Initiatives include a communication ⁽¹⁾ and a recommendation ⁽²⁾ for further enhancing the democratic and efficient conduct of the European elections.

The Commission also notes that while Member States must respect general principles of EC law it falls within their competences to regulate aspects of European Parliament electoral procedures not harmonised at EU level, such as adopting measures in view of introducing electronic voting.

Furthermore on 3 December 2012 the Commission adopted a proposal for a directive on the accessibility of public sector bodies' websites which aims at establishing harmonised accessibility requirements for a set of public sector bodies' websites offering twelve types of public services. The directive is currently going through the legislative procedure.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2013) 126.

⁽²⁾ OJ L79, 21.3.2013, p. 29.

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001139/14
à la Commission**

Sandrine Bélier (Verts/ALE)

(5 février 2014)

Objet: Bien-être animal et pratiques de chasse

La pratique de la chasse à courre nuit fortement au bien-être des animaux sauvages de par le stress et la souffrance qu'elle engendre pour l'animal chassé. D'un point de vue écologique, la chasse à courre ne comporte pas d'avantages particuliers au regard des objectifs de conservation d'une espèce. D'un point de vue juridique, si la quasi-totalité des pays européens l'ont déjà proscrite, cette pratique fait encore l'objet de conditions particulièrement favorables dans certains États-membres.

La Commission a entamé une réflexion européenne sur le principe du bien-être animal, illustrée par la stratégie de l'Union européenne pour la protection et le bien-être des animaux au cours de la période 2012-2015 (COM(2012)6 final/2).

La Commission peut-elle préciser comment elle entend assurer le respect du principe du bien-être animal?

La Commission prévoit-elle de réglementer la chasse à courre ou de proposer aux États membres de bannir cette pratique au regard de sa contradiction évidente avec le respect du bien-être animal?

Réponse donnée par M. Borg au nom de la Commission

(31 mars 2014)

Les institutions de l'Union européenne doivent rester dans les limites des compétences que leur confèrent les traités. Leur pouvoir d'améliorer le bien-être animal en légiférant et en faisant appliquer la législation existante se limite donc aux politiques mentionnées à l'article 13 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne, c'est-à-dire aux domaines de l'agriculture, de la pêche, des transports, du marché intérieur, de la recherche et du développement technologique et de l'espace.

Par conséquent, la Commission ne dispose pas de mandat pour proposer des politiques spécifiques réglementant le bien-être des animaux sauvages en liaison avec la chasse à courre.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001139/14
to the Commission**

Sandrine Bélier (Verts/ALE)

(5 February 2014)

Subject: Animal welfare and hunting practices

The practice of hunting with hounds or dogs is extremely detrimental to the welfare of wild animals due to the stress and suffering that it causes the hunted animal. From an ecological point of view, hunting with hounds or dogs does not offer any particular advantages with regard to species conservation objectives. From a legal point of view, although practically every European country has already prohibited it, this practice is still subject to particularly favourable conditions in certain Member States.

The Commission initiated debate on the principle of animal welfare at a European level, which is illustrated by the European Union Strategy for the Protection and Welfare of Animals 2012-2015 (COM(2012)6 final/2).

Can the Commission explain how it intends to ensure that the principle of animal welfare is observed?

Does the Commission intend to regulate hunting with hounds or dogs, or propose that the Member States ban this practice in light of how it is clearly inconsistent with respecting animal welfare?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(31 March 2014)

European Union institutions must stay within the competences conferred on them by the Treaties. Their power to improve animal welfare by law making and enforcement is limited to the policies mentioned in Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, i.e. agriculture, fisheries, transport, internal market, research and technological development and space.

As a result, the Commission has no mandate to put forward specific policies for regulating the welfare of wild animals in relation to the hunting with hounds or dogs.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001140/14
alla Commissione**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(5 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Disponibilità di farmaci oncologici innovativi

L'approvazione di nuovi farmaci oncologici salvavita nei prontuari nazionali, da parte delle agenzie preposte, afferisce sicuramente a un tema particolarmente importante e delicato.

In particolar modo — qualora la procedura di approvazione si caratterizzi per dilazioni, lungaggini e mancato rispetto dei termini espressi dalla normativa vigente — si presentano per il paziente gravi limitazioni in merito alla selezione di prodotti innovativi.

Quanto esposto si profila in alcune realtà nazionali, non ultima quella italiana, con gravi ritardi e divari anche tra le regioni.

Relativamente al caso italiano, le associazioni mediche oncologiche hanno più volte lamentato i gravi ritardi che da diversi anni si registrano in ordine a tale questione.

Alla luce di quanto sopra, può la Commissione precisare quanto segue:

1. Quale posizione assume in merito?
2. Quali sono le misure e gli eventuali interventi da essa posti in essere e finalizzati al superamento della situazione sopra esposta?

Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione

(8 aprile 2014)

La normativa UE sui farmaci dispone di un solido quadro per garantire medicinali sicuri ed efficaci ai cittadini europei. A norma dell'articolo 168, paragrafo 7, del trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea (TFUE) l'Unione deve rispettare la competenza degli Stati membri a definire la propria politica sanitaria nonché organizzare e prestare servizi sanitari e assistenza medica.

L'inserimento di prodotti farmaceutici nei regimi di assicurazione o rimborso degli Stati membri è una decisione presa esclusivamente a livello nazionale.

1. La Commissione ha sempre incoraggiato la cooperazione e la condivisione delle pratiche ottimali, mirando a facilitare un accesso equo e tempestivo ai medicinali. In particolare il processo sulla responsabilità delle imprese nel settore farmaceutico ⁽¹⁾ ha favorito la collaborazione tra Stati membri e parti interessate, finalizzata a trovare impostazioni comuni al di fuori dell'ambito normativo per garantire un accesso equo e tempestivo ai medicinali una volta che ne sia stata autorizzata la commercializzazione.
2. Attualmente si sta inoltre riesaminando, con una procedura di codecisione, la direttiva 89/105/CEE riguardante la trasparenza delle misure che disciplinano la fissazione dei prezzi delle specialità per uso umano e la loro inclusione nei regimi nazionali di assicurazione sanitaria. La proposta modificata intende favorire un accesso più rapido ai medicinali e garantire la chiarezza della normativa per pazienti, industria e autorità competenti. Attualmente sono in corso negoziati sulla proposta modificata.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=7870

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001140/14
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(5 February 2014)

Subject: Availability of innovative cancer drugs

Approval by the competent agencies of lifesaving new cancer drugs for inclusion on national lists is of course an especially important and delicate subject.

In particular — when the approval process is marked by postponements, delays and failure to comply with the periods laid down by the current regulations — patients are faced with serious restrictions on the choice of innovative products.

This situation is arising in various countries, including Italy, with serious delays and variations, including from one region to another.

In the case of Italy, oncologists and their associations have made numerous complaints about the serious delays in approvals over the past few years.

In the light of the above, could the Commission tell me:

1. What is its position on this issue?
2. What measures and possible interventions has it introduced with a view to resolving the situation described above?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission

(8 April 2014)

The EU pharmaceutical legislation provides a solid framework guaranteeing that EU citizens are provided with safe and efficacious medicines. According to Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Union must respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of their health policy and for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care.

Inclusion of pharmaceuticals in the national reimbursement or insurance schemes of Member States is a decision taken exclusively at national level.

1. The Commission has always fostered the cooperation and exchange of best practice aiming at facilitating timely and equitable access to medicines. Notably the Process on corporate responsibility in the field of pharmaceuticals ⁽¹⁾ fostered collaboration among Member States and relevant stakeholders in order to find common, non-regulatory approaches to timely and equitable access to medicines after their marketing authorisation.

2. In addition, Directive 89/105/EEC relating to the transparency of measures regulating the pricing of medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the scope of national health insurance systems is currently under review through the co-decision procedure. The amended proposal aims at facilitating faster access to medicines and ensuring legal clarity for patients, industry and competent authorities. The negotiations on the amended proposal are currently on-going.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=7870

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001141/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Catherine Stihler (S&D)

(5 February 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Christians in Iran

At least 300 Christians have been arrested in Iran in the past 3 years, the most common charges being action against public security and propaganda against the regime.

Does the Vice-President/High Representative have a position on what seems to be a targeting of the Christian community?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(2 April 2014)

The EU is well aware of the situation regarding religious minorities in Iran.

In this regard, the EU has, on several occasions, called on Iran to live up to international legal obligations on human rights, which Iran has itself signed up to, also with particular regard to the rights of peoples belonging to religious minorities such as Christians.

The EU will continue to emphasise, in its contacts with Iranian authorities and decision makers, the need for Iran to respect religious freedom and will make full use of the EU Guidelines on Freedom of Religion or Belief, adopted by the Council last year.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001146/14
do Komisji**

Tadeusz Ross (PPE)

(5 lutego 2014 r.)

Przedmiot: Utworzenie stanowiska komisarza UE i unijnej intergrupy ds. obywateli seniorów

Unia Europejska ma wielu komisarzy, którzy zajmują się sprawami postrzeganymi jako kluczowe dla przyszłości Unii. Czy istnieją plany utworzenia stanowiska komisarza ds. obywateli seniorów?

Starzenie się społeczeństwa jest kluczową sprawą, która dotyczy całej Unii Europejskiej. Uważam, że starzenie się społeczeństwa i solidarność międzypokoleniowa powinny być uwzględnione we wszystkich istotnych strategiach politycznych UE.

Czy istnieją plany powołania międzyinstytucjonalnej grupy lub forum gromadzącego różnorakie zainteresowane strony (takie jak odpowiednie DG, komisje Parlamentu Europejskiego, Rada i społeczeństwo obywatelskie), które omawiałyby kwestie lepszego koordynowania działań zmierzających do zapewnienia bardziej kompleksowej i skutecznej unijnej odpowiedzi na wyzwania demograficzne?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza László Andora w imieniu Komisji

(2 kwietnia 2014 r.)

Jak wyjaśniono w broszurze opublikowanej w 2012 r., Komisja wspiera państwa członkowskie w ich wysiłkach zmierzających do poprawy warunków dla osób starszych w wielu obszarach polityki ⁽¹⁾. Aktywne starzenie się jest istotnym elementem strategii „Europa 2020”, której powodzenie zależy w dużej mierze od umożliwienia osobom starszym wniesienia pełnego wkładu w rozwój społeczeństwa oraz rynku pracy. W białej księdze z 2012 r. przedstawiono środki zmierzające do zapewnienia adekwatnych, stabilnych i bezpiecznych systemów emerytalnych ⁽²⁾. W pakiecie dotyczącym inwestycji społecznych z 2013 r. przedstawiono wytyczne na temat dostosowania polityki społecznej do wyzwań związanych ze starzeniem się społeczeństwa ⁽³⁾. Powstało Europejskie partnerstwo na rzecz innowacji sprzyjającej aktywnemu starzeniu się w dobrym zdrowiu, które ma na celu promowanie poprawy zdrowia i jakości życia osób starszych oraz prezentację przykładów innowacyjnych dobrych praktyk ⁽⁴⁾. Ponadto zachęca się państwa członkowskie do wykorzystania europejskich funduszy strukturalnych i inwestycyjnych w celu rozwiązywania problemów demograficznych w latach 2014-2020.

Wszystkie te inicjatywy są owocem ścisłej współpracy wielu służb Komisji oraz odzwierciedlają transformację naszych społeczeństw, która jest wynikiem starzenia się społeczeństwa. Są one dowodem na to, że Komisja w swojej obecnej postaci jest w stanie rozwiązywać różne problemy związane ze starzeniem się społeczeństwa. Decyzję o utworzeniu nowego portfolio dotyczącego zagadnień związanych ze starzeniem się społeczeństwa może podjąć jedynie nowy przewodniczący Komisji.

W związku z tym nie planuje się obecnie utworzenia międzyinstytucjonalnej grupy lub odpowiedniego forum.

⁽¹⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=6920&type=2&furtherPubs=yes>

⁽²⁾ COM(2012) 55 wersja ostateczna z dnia 16 lutego 2012 r. at

<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=752&langId=en>

⁽³⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1044&langId=en>

⁽⁴⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/index_en.cfm?section=active-healthy-ageing&pg=home

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001146/14
to the Commission
Tadeusz Ross (PPE)
(5 February 2014)**

Subject: Creation of an EU Commissioner and an EU intergroup for senior citizens

The EU has numerous Commissioners working on issues perceived to be crucial to the future of the Community. Are there any plans in place to create and appoint a post of Commissioner for senior citizens?

The ageing of societies is a key issue facing the European Union as a whole. I feel that demographic ageing and solidarity between generations should be mainstreamed in all relevant EU policies.

Are there any plans in place to found an interinstitutional group or a forum of multiple stakeholders (such as relevant DGs, Committees of the European Parliament, the Council and civil society) which would discuss how to better coordinate action aimed at ensuring a more comprehensive and effective response to the EU's demographic challenge?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2014)**

The Commission supports the Member States in their efforts to improve conditions for older people in many policy areas, as explained in a brochure published in 2012 ⁽¹⁾. Active ageing is an essential part of the Europe 2020 strategy, the success of which depends to a large extent on enabling older people to contribute fully to society and the labour market. A 2012 White Paper presented measures to ensure that pensions are adequate, safe and sustainable ⁽²⁾. The 2013 Social Investment Package provided guidance on adapting social policies to the challenges of ageing ⁽³⁾. The European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing aims to promote better health and quality of life for older people and showcases innovative good practices ⁽⁴⁾. Moreover, Member States are invited to use the European Structural and Investment Funds for tackling demographic challenges in the 2014-2020 period.

All these initiatives have been the fruit of close cooperation of a wide range of Commission services and reflect the transformation of our societies that comes with population ageing. They show that the Commission is capable of dealing with the wide range of ageing issues within its current organisation. With respect to the idea of a new portfolio dedicated to ageing, that is a decision that can only be taken by the next President of the Commission.

In this respect, there are no plans at the moment for setting-up an interinstitutional group or a specific forum.

⁽¹⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=6920&type=2&furtherPubs=yes>
⁽²⁾ COM(2012) 55 final of 16 February 2012; at <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=752&langId=en>
⁽³⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1044&langId=en>
⁽⁴⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/index_en.cfm?section=active-healthy-ageing&pg=home

(Hrvatska verzija)

Pitanje za pisani odgovor E-001147/14
upućeno Komisiji
Dubravka Šuica (PPE)
(5. veljače 2014.)

Predmet: Problem kvota za male elektrane u RH

Projekti malih solarnih elektrana (od 10 i 30 kilovata) u RH trenutno stoje i ne mogu se realizirati zbog zastoja u HROTE d.o.o. (Hrvatski operator tržišta energijom), koji je pod direktnom nadležnošću Ministarstva gospodarstva RH i Vlade RH. Od početka 2013. g. pa sve do 15. 12. 2013., uredno su predavani zahtjevi na HROTE za projekte koji su dobili prethodnu elektroenergetsku suglasnost i ugovor o priključenju od HEP-a. Svaki predani zahtjev u HROTE u 2013. g. dobio je svoj redni broj, da bi u prosincu HROTE svima poslao odbijenicu te tražio da se za sve zahtjeve koji su predani u 2013. g. pošalju novi zahtjevi za kvotu 2014. g. — na način da se svi zahtjevi moraju slati isključivo poštom te isključivo dana 1. 1. 2014. te da će jedini kriterij biti vrijeme slanja na pošti. Tim postupkom HROTE je anulirao sve redne brojeve iz 2013. g., što je izravno pogodovanje nekima i kršenje Zakona o javnoj nabavi! Za 2014. godinu za male integrirane elektrane odobrena je kvota od samo 5 megavata.

Nigdje u Europi nema kvota ili ograničenja kvota za male solarne elektrane od 10 i 30 kilovata, osim u Hrvatskoj. Kvote postoje samo za velike vjetroelektrane, elektrane na biomasu itd.

Koje je stajalište Komisije o prethodno opisanom ograničavanju kvota za male elektrane u Republici Hrvatskoj i postoje li konkretne obveze Republike Hrvatske u odnosu na ovu problematiku?

Odgovor g. Oettingera u ime Komisije
(1. travnja 2014.)

U skladu s Direktivom o energiji iz obnovljivih izvora 2009/28/EZ, hrvatski nacionalni cilj od 20,00 % energije dobivene iz obnovljivih izvora treba ostvariti do 2020. Prema preliminarnim brojkama Eurostata, postotak energije iz obnovljivih izvora 2012. iznosio je 16,85 %. To je iznad okvirnih smjernica određenih Direktivom o energiji iz obnovljivih izvora.

Prema hrvatskom Nacionalnom akcijskom planu za obnovljive izvore energije (NREAP), do 2020. sunčeve bi elektrane trebale proizvoditi ukupno 52 MW. Prema NREAP-u, ne postoje tehničke zapreke za priključivanje tih novih kapaciteta na mrežu. NREAP dalje navodi da je do 30. rujna 2013. HROTE već sklopio ugovore za 720 projekata sunčevih elektrana (ukupne snage od 37,42 MW) koje još nisu priključene na elektroenergetsku mrežu. Riječ je o pretežno malim sunčevim elektranama do 30 kW.

Komisija ne zna za nikakva ograničenja povezana s vrstom elektrana na sunčevu energiju koje se mogu instalirati do 2014. Kako bi se iskoristile poticajne cijene, hrvatskim zakonom za integrirane sunčeve elektrane određuje se gornja granica od 15 MW ukupne instalirane snage svih elektrana u tekućoj godini. Gornja granica za sunčeve elektrane koje nisu integrirane je 10 MW. To nije u suprotnosti s obvezama Hrvatske u okviru Direktive o energiji iz obnovljivih izvora jer države članice imaju veliko diskrecijsko pravo u pogledu programâ potpore za obnovljive izvore energije, uzimajući pritom u obzir posebne nacionalne okolnosti, osobito klimatske i gospodarske uvjete.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001147/14
to the Commission
Dubravka Šuica (PPE)
(5 February 2014)

Subject: Quota problem for small power plants in Croatia

Projects in Croatia involving small (10 kW to 30 kW) solar power plants are currently stalled and cannot be implemented, because of the impasse at HROTE d.o.o. (Hrvatski operator tržišta energijom), the Croatian energy market operator, which lies directly within the province of the Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Government. From the beginning of 2013 until 15 December 2013 applications were duly submitted to HROTE, and the projects concerned obtained prior approval for electric power purposes and a connection agreement from HEP, the Croatian electricity company. Each application submitted to HROTE in 2013 was given its own serial number, enabling HROTE to send notices of rejection to all of the 2013 applicants, who were asked to reapply for a quota for 2014; this was done in such a way that those applications all had to be sent by post only and only on 1 January 2014, the sole criterion being the time of posting. By that procedure HROTE has done away with all the 2013 serial numbers: this amounts to downright favouritism towards some parties as well as to a breach of the Public Procurement Act! In 2014 a quota will be granted only for small integrated power plants of 5 MW and above.

No European country apart from Croatia applies quotas or quota restrictions to small solar power plants from 10 kW to 30 kW. Quotas exist only for large wind farms, biomass power plants, and so on.

How does the Commission view the fact that the quota for small power plants in Croatia is being limited in the manner described above? Does Croatia have any specific obligations regarding this matter?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(1 April 2014)

Under the Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC, Croatia's national renewable energy target is 20.0% to be achieved by 2020. The percentage of renewable energy was 16.85% in 2012 according to preliminary figures from Eurostat. This is above the indicative trajectory specified by the Renewable Energy Directive.

According to the Croatian National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP) a total contribution of 52 MW by 2020 is expected from solar plants. There are, according to the NREAP, no technical barriers for connection of these new capacities to the grid. The NREAP furthermore stipulates that, as of 30 September 2013, HROTE had already concluded contracts with 720 solar plant projects (with a total capacity of 37.42 MW), which have not yet been connected to the electricity network. These are primarily small solar plants of up to 30 kW.

The Commission has not been made aware of any limitations concerning the type of solar power plants that can be installed in 2014. In order to benefit from incentive prices, Croatian law stipulates a cap of 15 MW of the total installed capacity of all electric plants in the current year for integrated solar plants. The cap for solar plants that are not integrated is 10 MW. This is not in contradiction with Croatia's obligations under the Renewable Energy Directive as Member States retain a broad margin of discretion with regard to support schemes for renewable energy, taking into account the specific national circumstances, especially concerning climatic and economic conditions.

(Hrvatska verzija)

Pitanje za pisani odgovor E-001149/14
upućeno Komisiji
Dubravka Šuica (PPE)
(5. veljače 2014.)

Predmet: Povrat otuđenoga kulturnog blaga iz Hrvatske

Prema podacima Ministarstva kulture od 46 191 otuđenog (nestalog, ukradenog) muzejskog predmeta iz 45 hrvatskih muzeja tijekom Domovinskog rata, sukcesijom su od 2001. do lipnja 2011. godine vraćena u muzeje, galerije i crkve samo 25 252 pokretna kulturna dobra i to većinom iz Srbije i manjim dijelom iz Crne Gore.

Među nestalim su umjetninama čija se sudbina ne zna i brojni predmeti iz Gradskog muzeja u Vukovaru, kulturna dobra iz muzeja Ivana Meštrovića, muzeja u Kninu i drugih muzeja, samostana, crkava te privatnih zbirki diljem Hrvatske.

Direktiva o vraćanju kulturnih predmeta bespravno otuđenih s teritorija države članice EU-a regulira povrat predmeta otuđenih od 1993. godine, no postoji potreba ažuriranja podataka zbog činjenice da je Hrvatska pristupila EU-u naknadno, a također bi bilo potrebno Direktivom obuhvatiti i povrat umjetnina otuđenih tijekom Domovinskog rata i do 1993. godine.

Možemo li očekivati da Komisija pomogne ubrzati proces povrata kulturnih dobara otuđenih tijekom agresije na Hrvatsku koja je danas članica EU-a, a sve u duhu dobrosusjedskih odnosa i građenja povjerenja na prostorima jugoistočne Europe?

Odgovor g. Barniera u ime Komisije
(30. travnja 2014.)

Direktiva Vijeća 93/7/EEZ o povratu kulturnih predmeta nezakonito iznesenih iz državnog područja države članice ⁽¹⁾ mjera je kojom se podupire unutarnje tržište čiji je cilj uskladiti temeljno načelo slobodnog kretanja robe, kako je navedeno u člancima 34. i 35. UFEU-a, sa zaštitom nacionalnog blaga, kako je utvrđeno člankom 36. UFEU-a.

Ta se Direktiva primjenjuje na kulturne predmete zaštićene kao „nacionalno blago koje ima umjetničku, povijesnu ili arheološku vrijednost”, koji pripadaju kategoriji kulturnih predmeta iz njezina Priloga ili su dio javnih zbirki ili inventara crkvenih institucija, nezakonito iznesenih iz državnog područja države članice 1. siječnja 1993. ili poslije.

Obvezom povrata sadržanom u Direktivi obuhvaćene su države članice Europske unije te se ona primjenjuje na kulturne predmete nezakonito iznesene iz državnog područja države članice koji se nalaze na državnom području druge države članice. Od 1. srpnja 2013. navedeno se primjenjuje i na Hrvatsku. Međutim tim zakonodavstvom nije obuhvaćen povrat nezakonito iznesenih kulturnih predmeta koji se nalaze u trećim zemljama ⁽²⁾.

U tim slučajevima Komisija skreće pozornost na međunarodne konvencije, osobito Konvenciju iz 1954. o zaštiti kulturnih dobara u slučaju oružanog sukoba i Konvenciju iz 1970. o mjerama zabrane i sprečavanja nezakonitog uvoza i izvoza kulturnih dobara i prijenosa vlasništva nad njima.

⁽¹⁾ Direktiva Vijeća 93/7/EEZ od 15. ožujka 1993. o povratu kulturnih predmeta nezakonito iznesenih iz državnog područja države članice, SL L 74, 27.3.1993., str. 74., izmijenjena Direktivom 96/100/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 17. veljače 1997., SL L 60, 1.3.1997., str. 59. i Direktivom 2001/38/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 5. lipnja 2001., SL L 187, 10.7.2001., str. 43.

⁽²⁾ Prijedlog Komisije kojom se preinačuje Direktiva Direktiva 93/7/EEZ [COM (2013) 311 završna verzija — 2013/0162/COD], koji će vjerojatno biti donesen u ovom parlamentarnom sazivu, ne mijenja Direktivu u tom smislu.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001149/14
to the Commission**

Dubravka Šuica (PPE)

(5 February 2014)

Subject: Return of cultural goods removed from Croatia

According to figures from the Croatian Ministry of Culture, out of the 46 191 exhibits removed (that is to say, which disappeared or were stolen) from 45 Croatian museums during the Croatian War of Independence, only 25 252 cultural goods were returned by succession between 2001 and June 2011 to museums, galleries, and churches; these came mostly from Serbia and to a lesser extent from Montenegro.

The works of art whose fate is unknown include numerous exhibits from the Vukovar City Museum and cultural goods from the Ivan Meštrović Museum, the Knin museum, and other museums, monasteries and convents, churches, and private collections in all parts of Croatia.

The directive on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State regulates the return of objects removed from 1993 on, but the figures need to be updated in the light of the fact that Croatia has since joined the EU; furthermore, the return of works of art removed during the Croatian War of Independence and up to 1993 should also be covered by the directive.

Will the Commission help to speed up the process of returning cultural goods removed at the time of the aggression against Croatia — now an EU Member State — while invariably seeking to foster the spirit of good-neighbourly relations and confidence building in South-East Europe?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2014)

Council Directive 93/7/EEC on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State ⁽¹⁾ is a measure supporting the internal market which aims to reconcile the fundamental principle of the free movement of goods, as laid down by Articles 34 and 35 of the TFEU, with the protection of national treasures, as set out in Article 36 of the TFEU.

This directive applies to cultural objects classified as 'national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value', which fall under the categories of cultural objects referred to in its Annex or form part of public collections or inventories of ecclesiastical institutions, unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State on or after 1 January 1993.

The return obligation enshrined in the directive involves Member States of the European Union and applies to cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State that are located in the territory of another Member State. Since 1st July 2013 it thus applies also to Croatia. However, this legislation does not cover the return of unlawfully removed cultural objects located in third countries ⁽²⁾.

For those cases, the Commission highlights the role of the international conventions, in particular the Convention of 1954 for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict and the Convention of 1970 on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1970.

⁽¹⁾ Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State, OJ L 74, 27.3.1993, p. 74, amended by Directive 96/100/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 February 1997, OJ L 60, 1.3.1997, p. 59, and by Directive 2001/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001, OJ L 187, 10.7.2001, p. 43.

⁽²⁾ The Commission's proposal recasting Directive 93/7/EEC [COM(2013) 311 final — 2013/0162/COD], which will probably be adopted in this parliamentary term, does not modify the directive in this respect.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001152/14
a la Comisión
Guido Milana (S&D) y Dolores García-Hierro Caraballo (S&D)
(5 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Ayudas a las almadrabas del Fondo Europeo Marítimo y de Pesca

El pasado 23 de octubre de 2013 el Pleno del Parlamento Europeo aprobó la definición de almadraba («arte de pesca extractiva tradicional de red fija anclada al fondo durante varios meses, constituido por un conjunto de buques, redes, cables y anclas que se sitúa cercano a la costa para interceptar el paso de las pesquerías migratorias —túnidos y especies afines— y conducirlos hasta un recinto de donde se extraen») en el Fondo Europeo Marítimo y de Pesca (FEMP).

Tras la última reunión técnica del Trío los Servicios Jurídicos han estimado que esta definición no es necesaria, puesto que ya se encuentra incluida en el artículo 4 de la Reforma de la política pesquera común.

En este sentido, estos diputados quisieran preguntar a la Comisión si garantiza que, aun en el caso de que no figure explícitamente la definición de almadraba en el FEMP, este arte de pesca podrá optar a todas las posibles subvenciones que regula el FEMP en las mismas condiciones que el resto de pescadores.

Respuesta de la Sra. Damanaki en nombre de la Comisión
(2 de abril de 2014)

Tras la votación de la sesión plenaria del Parlamento Europeo sobre una serie de modificaciones del Reglamento relativo al Fondo Europeo Marítimo y de Pesca (FEMP), los legisladores consideraron innecesario incluir una definición de almadraba en el FEMP, ya que las definiciones adoptadas para los fines del Reglamento sobre la Política Pesquera Común ⁽¹⁾, en particular la que define almadraba como un buque pesquero, se aplicarán igualmente a los efectos del FEMP ⁽²⁾.

De ello se deduce que las operaciones que implican la utilización de almadrabas, los propietarios de las mismas y los pescadores empleados podrían beneficiarse de la ayuda pública prevista en el FEMP para medidas relativas a los buques pesqueros y con arreglo a las condiciones de las disposiciones aplicables en el FEMP y en cualquier otra legislación pertinente.

⁽¹⁾ Artículo 4, apartado 1, punto 4), del Reglamento (UE) n° 1380/2013 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 11 de diciembre de 2013, sobre la Política Pesquera Común, por el que se modifican los Reglamentos (CE) n° 1954/2003 y (CE) n° 1224/2009 del Consejo, y se derogan los Reglamentos (CE) n° 2371/2002 y (CE) n° 639/2004 del Consejo y la Decisión 2004/585/CE del Consejo (DO L 354 de 28.12.2013).

⁽²⁾ Véase el artículo 3, apartado 1, del expediente interinstitucional 2011/0380(COD), disponible en:
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%208883%202013%20INI>

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001152/14
alla Commissione
Guido Milana (S&D) e Dolores García-Hierro Caraballo (S&D)
(5 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: Aiuti alle tonnare del Fondo europeo per gli affari marittimi e la pesca

Il 23 ottobre 2013 il Parlamento europeo ha approvato in Aula la definizione di tonnara («tecnica tradizionale di pesca estrattiva basata su reti fisse ancorate al fondo per diversi mesi, che consiste in un gruppo di navi, reti, fili da pesca e ancore situati vicino alla costa per intercettare pesci migratori — tonno e specie simili — e condurli in uno spazio chiuso in cui vengono estratti») nel quadro del Fondo europeo per gli affari marittimi e la pesca (FEAMP).

A seguito dell'ultima riunione tecnica del trilatero, i servizi giuridici hanno ritenuto tale definizione non necessaria dal momento che è già compresa nell'articolo 4 della riforma della politica comune della pesca.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione indicare se garantisce che, anche nel caso in cui nel FEAMP non figurino esplicitamente la definizione di tonnara, questa tecnica di pesca possa aver accesso a tutti i possibili sussidi previsti dal FEAMP alle stesse condizioni delle altre tecniche di pesca?

**Risposta di Maria Damanaki a nome della Commissione
(2 aprile 2014)**

Vista la serie di emendamenti al regolamento sul Fondo europeo per gli affari marittimi e la pesca (FEAMP) votati in plenaria dal Parlamento europeo, i colegislatori hanno ritenuto superfluo inserire in tale regolamento la definizione di «tonnara», in quanto per il FEAMP varranno le stesse definizioni adottate ai fini del regolamento relativo alla politica comune della pesca ⁽¹⁾, in particolare l'inclusione della tonnara nella definizione di «peschereccio» ⁽²⁾.

Ne consegue che le operazioni che implicano l'uso di una tonnara, i proprietari delle tonnare e i tonnarotti possono essere ammissibili al sostegno pubblico che il FEAMP prevede per le misure inerenti ai pescherecci, purché siano soddisfatte le condizioni stabilite dalle norme applicabili del FEAMP e degli altri atti normativi pertinenti.

⁽¹⁾ Articolo 4, paragrafo 1, punto 4, del regolamento (UE) n. 1380/2013 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, dell'11 dicembre 2013, relativo alla politica comune della pesca, che modifica i regolamenti (CE) n. 1954/2003 e (CE) n. 1224/2009 del Consiglio e che abroga i regolamenti (CE) n. 2371/2002 e (CE) n. 639/2004 del Consiglio, nonché la decisione 2004/585/CE del Consiglio — GU L 354 del 28.12.2013, pag. 22.

⁽²⁾ Cfr. articolo 3, paragrafo 1, del fascicolo interistituzionale 2011/0380 (COD), consultabile all'indirizzo:
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=it&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%208883%202013%20INI>

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001152/14
to the Commission
Guido Milana (S&D) and Dolores García-Hierro Carballo (S&D)
(5 February 2014)

Subject: Support for tuna traps from the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund

At its plenary sitting on 23 October 2013, Parliament approved the definition of a tuna trap as a 'traditional extractive fishing technique based on fixed nets anchored to the bottom for several months, which consists of a group of vessels, nets, fishing wires and anchors located near the coastline to intercept migratory fisheries (tuna and tunalike species) and lead them to an enclosed area where they are extracted' in the proposal for a regulation on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF).

After the last technical meeting of the trialogue, the Legal Services decided that this definition was unnecessary since it is already included in Article 4 of the Reform of the common fisheries policy.

That being the case, we would like to ask the Commission for an assurance that even if the definition of tuna trap is not specifically included in the EMFF regulation, this fishing technique will be eligible for all possible EMFF subsidies under the same conditions as other fishing techniques.

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2014)

Following the European Parliament plenary vote on a series of amendments to the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund Regulation (EMFF), the co-legislators have considered that there was no need to include a definition of blue fin tuna trap in the EMFF, since the definitions adopted for the purposes of the common fisheries policy Regulation ⁽¹⁾, in particular the one defining a blue fin tuna trap as a fishing vessel, will also apply for the purposes of the EMFF ⁽²⁾.

It follows that operations involving blue fin tuna traps, the owners of these traps and the fishermen employed, could be eligible for public support provided for in the EMFF for measures relating to fishing vessels and under the conditions of the applicable provisions in the EMFF and in any other relevant legislation.

⁽¹⁾ Article 4(1)(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the common fisheries policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC; OJ L 354, 28.12.2013.

⁽²⁾ See Article 3(1) of the Interinstitutional file 2011/0380 (COD) available at:
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%208883%202013%20INI>

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001154/14
alla Commissione**

Giommaria Uggias (ALDE)

(5 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Attivazione del Fondo di solidarietà per l'alluvione in Sardegna

Facendo seguito alla risposta interlocutoria del commissario Hahn del 3 febbraio 2014 all'interrogazione E-013482/2013,

vista la situazione drammatica in cui versa ancora la regione Sardegna dopo la terribile alluvione del 18 novembre 2013,

vista la scadenza del 27 gennaio scorso quale termine ultimo consentito alle autorità italiane per fare richiesta di attivazione del Fondo di solidarietà dell'UE di cui al regolamento (CE) n. 2012/2002,

può la Commissione fornire aggiornamenti in merito al contenuto della domanda presentata dalle autorità italiane e informazioni relativamente all'ammontare della somma da erogare, alla tempistica e alle modalità?

Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione

(2 aprile 2014)

La Commissione ha ricevuto la domanda dell'Italia relativa alle alluvioni in Sardegna, cui ha fatto riferimento l'on. parlamentare il 24 gennaio 2014. In base alla domanda, il danno totale diretto è pari a EUR 652 milioni; la soglia che normalmente consente di classificare una catastrofe come grave e determina l'intervento del fondo per l'Italia è attualmente di EUR 3,7 miliardi (corrispondenti a EUR 3 miliardi ai prezzi 2002). La Commissione sta pertanto attualmente esaminando se il Fondo di solidarietà può essere attivato eccezionalmente sulla base del criterio delle cosiddette catastrofi regionali straordinarie, secondo il quale occorre dimostrare che sia stata colpita la maggior parte della popolazione della regione con profonde e durevoli ripercussioni sulle condizioni di vita dei cittadini e sulla stabilità economica della regione.

Se la Commissione valuterà che sussistono le condizioni per mobilitare il fondo in questo contesto, determinerà l'importo dell'assistenza finanziaria considerata necessaria, entro i limiti delle risorse finanziarie disponibili, e proporrà alle autorità di bilancio di rendere tale importo disponibile quanto prima possibile.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001154/14
to the Commission**

Giommaria Uggias (ALDE)

(5 February 2014)

Subject: Mobilisation of the Solidarity Fund to address the devastation caused by the flooding in Sardinia

In view of the provisional answer given by Commissioner Hahn on 3 February 2014 to Question E-013482/2013, the dramatic situation still prevailing in the region of Sardinia after the terrible flooding of 18 November 2013 and the expiry of the 27 January deadline for the Italian authorities to request the mobilisation of the EU Solidarity Fund established by Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002:

Can the Commission provide updates about the content of the application submitted by the Italian authorities and say what level of funding is to be granted and when and how the funds will be disbursed?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission

(2 April 2014)

The Commission received the application from Italy for the flooding disaster in Sardinia referred to by the Honourable Member on 24 January 2014. According to the application, the total direct damage amounts to EUR 652 million, whereas the major disaster threshold for activating the Fund for Italy is currently set at EUR 3.7 billion (i.e. EUR 3 billion in 2002 prices). The Commission is therefore currently examining whether the Solidarity Fund could be activated exceptionally on the basis of the criteria for so-called extraordinary regional disasters, whereby a major part of the population living in the disaster-stricken area must be affected and serious and lasting repercussions on living conditions and the economic stability of the region must be demonstrated.

If the Commission assesses that the conditions for mobilising the Fund in this way are met, it will determine the amount of financial assistance deemed necessary, within the limits of the financial resources available and will propose to the Budgetary Authority to make this amount available as quickly as possible.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001158/14
aan de Raad**

Charles Tannock (ECR) en Peter van Dalen (ECR)

(5 februari 2014)

Betreft: Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis op de Europese terreurlijst

De naam Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis wordt in verband gebracht met bijna elke terreuraanslag die Egypte heeft getroffen na de verdrijving van de Moslimbroederschap. De groep heeft een groot aantal aanslagen opgeëist, onder meer de bomaanslag op het hoofdkwartier van de nationale veiligheidsdiensten in Caïro en Mansoura, de aanslag op de minister van Binnenlandse Zaken, diverse aanslagen en gevechten op het schiereiland Sinaï en raketaanvallen op Israël. Het recente neerhalen van een militaire helikopter in de Sinaï toont dat de groep in staat is tot steeds meer geavanceerde aanvallen.

Er is sprake van banden tussen de groep en de Moslimbroederschap, Gaza-militanten en -terroristen en Al Qaeda.

Wil de Raad overwegen Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis op zijn lijst van terreurorganisaties te zetten?

Antwoord

(13 mei 2014)

De Raad kan van iedere lidstaat een voorstel om een persoon, groep of entiteit op te nemen in de lijst van personen, groepen en entiteiten die bij terroristische daden betrokken zijn, in overweging nemen, indien een bevoegde instantie heeft besloten de persoon, groep of entiteit op te sporen of te vervolgen wegens een terroristische daad, poging tot het plegen van een dergelijke daad, of de deelname aan of het vergemakkelijken van een dergelijke daad, dan wel heeft besloten dergelijke feiten te veroordelen ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Gemeenschappelijk standpunt van de Raad van 27 december 2001 betreffende de toepassing van specifieke maatregelen ter bestrijding van het terrorisme (2001/931/GBVB), PB L 344 van 28.12.2001, blz. 93.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001158/14
to the Council
Charles Tannock (ECR) and Peter van Dalen (ECR)
(5 February 2014)**

Subject: Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis on EU terror list

The name of the group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis has been associated with almost every terrorist attack committed in Egypt since the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood. The group has claimed many attacks, including the bombing of national security headquarters in Cairo and Mansoura, the attempt on the life of the Interior Minister, various attacks and battles in the Sinai peninsula, and rocket attacks on Israel. The recent shooting down of a military helicopter in Sinai shows that the group is capable of increasingly sophisticated attacks.

There are allegations of links between the group and the Muslim Brotherhood, Gaza militants and terrorists, and Al Qaeda.

Is the Council willing to consider placing Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis on its list of designated terrorist organisations?

**Reply
(13 May 2014)**

The Council may consider a proposal by any Member State to include a person, group or entity in the list of persons, groups or entities involved in terrorist acts where a competent authority has taken a decision to investigate or prosecute the person, group or entity for a terrorist act, an attempt to perpetrate, participate in or facilitate such an act, or has taken a decision to condemn such deeds ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Council common position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP), OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001159/14
alla Commissione
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(5 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: Carta di Lampedusa e migrazione nell'UE

La scorsa settimana, dal 31 gennaio al 2 febbraio, l'isola di Lampedusa è stata teatro di una manifestazione di circa trecento persone provenienti da diversi paesi e realtà dell'associazionismo nazionale e internazionale che si battono per i diritti dei migranti. In tale occasione è stata redatta la Carta di Lampedusa, un documento condiviso di riaffermazione dei principi della Carta mondiale del migrante redatta a Gorée, in Senegal, nel 2011.

La Carta vuole essere uno spartiacque nato dalla necessità di confronto e produzione dal basso di alternative al modello della militarizzazione delle frontiere e della gestione dei flussi migratori. Il progetto è stato lanciato da una ONG europea che, all'indomani delle stragi del 3 e 11 ottobre scorso in cui diverse centinaia di persone annegarono a pochi metri dalle coste isolate, ha organizzato due assemblee online e ha redatto in modalità *open source* una bozza della Carta, che tutti gli interessati possono consultare e correggere.

La manifestazione ha anche dato spazio alle proposte di possibili applicazioni pratiche di questo documento di principi e alle testimonianze dirette dei diversi attori coinvolti nella stesura della Carta, australiani, ciadiani, tunisini, israeliani, turchi, nigeriani, senegalesi, tedeschi, austriaci, che hanno condiviso le proprie esperienze di attivismo e associazionismo.

Alla luce di questi fatti, si chiede alla Commissione:

1. se è a conoscenza della manifestazione in oggetto;
2. come intende intervenire per sostenere il governo italiano e l'isola di Lampedusa nella gestione dei forti flussi migratori indirizzati verso di essa;
3. se intende promuovere una revisione dell'attuale sistema di coordinamento della gestione delle frontiere esterne dell'UE.

**Risposta di Cecilia Malmström a nome della Commissione
(22 aprile 2014)**

La Commissione è a conoscenza della manifestazione cui fa riferimento l'onorevole parlamentare.

In seguito alla tragedia di Lampedusa, la Commissione ha inviato all'Italia un importo supplementare pari a 30 milioni di euro per rafforzare il sistema di asilo e potenziare i pattugliamenti nel Mediterraneo. Per ulteriori dettagli si vedano le risposte della Commissione alle interrogazioni scritte n. 11984/2013 ⁽¹⁾ e 11596/2013 ⁽²⁾.

La Commissione rinvia inoltre l'onorevole parlamentare alla comunicazione sull'attività della Task Force «Mediterraneo» ⁽³⁾, che stabilisce la necessità di ricorrere a una vasta gamma di misure, seguendo un approccio integrato per l'intera area mediterranea, intese, fra l'altro, a:

- intensificare l'assistenza ai paesi di origine e di transito e il dialogo con questi ultimi, compresi gli sforzi per migliorare la tutela dei diritti dei migranti, conformemente all'approccio globale in materia di migrazione e mobilità;
- rinnovare l'attenzione agli sforzi di reinsediamento e di protezione regionale;
- esplorare canali legali che permettano di accedere in sicurezza all'Unione europea, e in generale aumentare l'impegno per il reinsediamento;
- lottare contro la tratta e il traffico di esseri umani e le reti criminali;
- garantire che i migranti siano rimpatriati in modo veloce e sostenibile, ma umano e dignitoso; rafforzare la gestione delle frontiere esterne dell'UE;
- attuare il regolamento Eurosur, recentemente adottato; e sostenere gli Stati membri i cui sistemi di migrazione e di asilo sono sottoposti a pressioni.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-011984&language=IT>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-011596&language=IT>

⁽³⁾ COM(2013) 869 del 4.12.2013.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001159/14
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(5 February 2014)

Subject: Lampedusa Charter and migration into the EU

Last week, from 31 January to 2 February, the island of Lampedusa was the scene of a demonstration by around 300 people originating from various countries and national and international associations who are campaigning for the rights of migrants. On this occasion, the Lampedusa Charter was drawn up. This joint document reaffirms the principles of the World Charter of Migrants drawn up on Gorée, Senegal, in 2011.

The Charter sets out to be a watershed. It derives from the need to challenge the model of militarization of frontiers and management of migrant flows, and to devise grassroots alternatives. The project was launched by a European NGO which organised two online conferences in the wake of the loss of life of 3 and 11 October 2013, when several hundred people drowned, a few metres off shore from the island. This NGO has drawn up an open-source draft of the Charter, which anyone interested can read and correct.

The demonstration also provided a platform for proposals for possible practical applications of this charter of principles, and direct testimonies from people involved in drafting it. Australians, Chadians, Tunisians, Israelis, Turks, Nigerians, Senegalese, Germans and Austrians shared their experiences of activism and organised lobbying.

In the light of these facts, the Commission is asked:

1. Is it aware of this demonstration?
2. How does it plan to intervene in support of the Italian Government and island of Lampedusa in the management of the large flows of migrants bound for the island?
3. Does it intend to promote a revision of the current system of coordination of the management of the EU's external frontiers?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission

(22 April 2014)

The Commission is aware of the demonstration to which the Honourable Member refers.

Following the tragedy at Lampedusa, the Commission provided Italy with an additional EUR 30 million to strengthen the asylum system and to reinforce patrolling of the Mediterranean. Further detail was provided in the answers to Parliamentary Questions 11984/2013 ⁽¹⁾ and 11596/2013 ⁽²⁾.

The Commission also refers the Honourable Member to its communication on the work of the Task Force Mediterranean ⁽³⁾, which sets out a comprehensive range of measures to be used following an integrated approach for the whole Mediterranean area, including, among other areas:

- assistance and strengthened dialogue with countries of origin and transit, including efforts to enhance the protection of migrants' rights, in line with the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility;
- a renewed focus on resettlement and regional protection efforts;
- exploring legal channels to safely access the European Union, as well as a general focus on increased resettlement efforts;
- the fight against trafficking and smuggling of human beings and criminal networks;
- ensuring a speedy and sustainable return of migrants in a humane and dignified manner; strengthening the management of the EU's external borders;
- implementation of the recently adopted Eurosur Regulation; and the support to Member States facing pressure on their migration and asylum systems.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-011984&language=EN>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-011596&language=EN>

⁽³⁾ COM(2013) 869 of 4.12.2013.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001160/14
alla Commissione**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(5 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Lavori alta-capacità ferroviaria sulla Bari-Napoli

Il primo tratto pugliese dell'alta capacità ferroviaria Bari-Napoli (il raddoppio dei binari da Cervaro a Bovino, in provincia di Foggia) deve essere riappaltato. La società appaltante, infatti, ha rescisso il contratto con l'azienda esecutrice dei lavori, che non può più ottemperare agli impegni presi a causa della crisi che la attanaglia. Dallo scorso luglio si è cercato di trovare una soluzione alternativa alla rescissione del contratto ma evidentemente non è stato possibile. Cresce a questo punto la probabilità che la minaccia avanzata nei giorni scorsi dagli operai di occupare i binari della linea Bari-Roma in caso di esito negativo della trattativa possa tramutarsi in realtà. Perché al di là dell'ennesima opera italiana che vede allungarsi i tempi di realizzazione il problema più immediato è quello degli operai. Il rischio è infatti che vengano licenziati oltre 250 lavoratori.

Alla luce di ciò, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. è informata sulla vicenda?
2. I lavori per l'alta capacità sulla Bari-Napoli sono finanziati con fondi europei?
3. Nel caso si tratti di fondi europei, cosa intende fare la Commissione?

Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione

(4 aprile 2014)

1. La Commissione è a conoscenza della fattispecie menzionata dall'Onorevole deputato.
2. Il progetto di ferrovia Cervara-Bovino ha ricevuto un cofinanziamento dal Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale nell'ambito del programma «Trasporti» nel periodo 2000-2006 nonché nell'ambito del programma «Reti e Mobilità» nel periodo 2007-2013.
3. Secondo le informazioni fornite dalle autorità italiane, dopo la rescissione del contratto tra RFI e il primo contraente sono state avviate procedure per la ripresa dei lavori e RFI ritiene di essere in grado di completare il progetto entro il periodo di ammissibilità per i programmi 2007-2013, segnatamente il 31 dicembre 2015. Se il progetto non fosse completato e la struttura non fosse operativa entro tale data, la Commissione dovrebbe procedere al recupero degli stanziamenti relativi ai periodi 2000-2006 e 2007-2013.

La linea ferroviaria Napoli-Bari riveste un'importanza strategica per l'UE poiché è parte centrale delle reti TEN-T rivedute. Le autorità italiane sono tenute ad adottare le misure appropriate per sviluppare l'intera linea ferroviaria Napoli-Bari entro la fine del 2030 conformemente agli standard definiti per le reti centrali.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001160/14
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(5 February 2014)

Subject: Work on the Bari-Naples high-capacity rail link

The first stretch in Apulia of the Bari-Naples high-capacity rail link involves doubling the track from Cervaro to Bovino, in the Province of Foggia. The contract for this stretch now has to be reallocated. In fact the awarding company has cancelled the contract with the works contractor which, due to the impact of the recession, is no longer able to meet its commitments. Since last July, efforts have been made to find an alternative solution to cancelling the contract, but apparently this has not been possible. At this point there is a growing probability that the workers will act on their recent threat to block the Bari-Rome line if the negotiations fail. This is not only one of many Italian construction projects for which the completion times are being extended: the more immediate problem is that of the workers, over 250 of whom are at risk of dismissal.

In the light of this, can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Is it aware of the matter?
2. Is the work on the Bari-Naples high-capacity rail link financed with European funds?
3. If European funds are involved, what does the Commission plan to do?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission

(4 April 2014)

1. The Commission is aware of the matter raised by the Honourable Member.
2. The Cervara — Bovino railway project has received co-financing from the European Regional Development Fund under the 'Trasporti' programme during the 2000-2006 period and under the 'Reti e Mobilità' programme during the 2007-2013 period.
3. According to the information provided by the Italian authorities, after the cancellation of the contract between RFI and the first contractor, procedures for the resumption of the works have been started and RFI considers that it will be able to complete the project within the eligibility period for 2007-2013 programmes, namely 31 December 2015. Should the project not be completed and rendered operational by that date, the Commission would have to proceed to the recovery of both the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 allocations.

The Napoli — Bari rail line is of strategic importance for the EU as it is part of the core-network of the revised TEN-T networks. The Italian authorities are obliged to take appropriate measures to develop the entire Napoli — Bari rail line by the end of 2030 in compliance with the standards defined for core networks.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001161/14
alla Commissione**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(5 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: La Corte dei conti italiana contro le agenzie di rating

La Corte dei conti italiana ha citato in giudizio per la cifra di 234 miliardi EUR l'agenzia di rating Standard & Poor's, che nel 2011 aveva dato un giudizio di rating in ribasso dell'Italia (BBB). L'accusa della Corte è che l'agenzia, nel fornire il proprio giudizio, non ha tenuto conto dell'immenso patrimonio artistico e letterario italiano, che aggiunge al bilancio del paese un valore inestimabile.

Secondo una fonte americana, sarebbero state citate dalla Corte dei conti anche altre agenzie di rating che non avrebbero nemmeno considerato il patrimonio immateriale di cui dispone l'Italia. Le agenzie incriminate hanno definito l'accusa «non seria e senza merito» e hanno difeso la correttezza del proprio operato.

Si tratta della seconda azione giudiziaria dello Stato italiano contro le agenzie di rating, dopo che l'anno scorso un pubblico ministero aveva chiesto il rinvio a giudizio di nove tra dirigenti e funzionari di due agenzie di rating per aver manipolato il mercato in maniera continuata e pluriaggravata.

Alla luce di questi fatti, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. È a conoscenza dell'azione mossa dalla Corte dei conti italiana?
2. È a conoscenza di azioni simili avvenute in altri Stati membri o in paesi extra-europei?
3. Ritiene che la condotta delle agenzie di rating sia stata corretta o che abbia alterato in maniera volontaria la percezione dei mercati finanziari?

Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione

(14 aprile 2014)

La Commissione ritiene che sia importante disporre di rating del debito sovrano accurati e trasparenti in modo che gli investitori possano comprendere pienamente i meccanismi di rating del credito concernenti le entità sovrane e le loro implicazioni generali.

La Commissione segue con grande attenzione gli attuali sviluppi delle agenzie di rating del credito negli Stati membri e al di fuori dell'UE, soprattutto negli Stati Uniti.

L'Autorità europea dei mercati e valori mobiliari (ESMA) è l'autorità competente per la vigilanza delle agenzie di rating del credito. Nel dicembre 2013 l'ESMA ha pubblicato una relazione sulle procedure di rating del debito sovrano ⁽¹⁾. L'indagine dell'ESMA ha rilevato alcune carenze nelle procedure di rating del debito sovrano che potrebbero comportare rischi per la qualità, l'indipendenza e l'integrità dei giudizi e delle procedure di rating. Secondo l'ESMA tali carenze non sembrano tuttavia costituire violazioni del regolamento sulle agenzie di rating del credito.

Le nuove norme in materia di rating ⁽²⁾ contribuiranno in misura considerevole a rafforzare la governance e le procedure di rating del debito sovrano. Come previsto dal nuovo regolamento, entro il 31 dicembre 2014 la Commissione presenterà una relazione al Parlamento europeo e al Consiglio in merito all'opportunità di sviluppare una valutazione europea del merito creditizio per il debito sovrano. Le constatazioni e le osservazioni dell'ESMA sulle procedure giuridiche ⁽³⁾ delle agenzie di rating del credito costituiranno un contributo importante per la suddetta relazione in merito all'opportunità di prevedere ulteriori misure.

⁽¹⁾ ESMA, Credit Rating Agencies, Sovereign ratings investigations, ESMA's assessment of governance, conflicts of interest, resourcing adequacy and confidentiality controls (Agenzie di rating del credito, indagini sul rating del debito sovrano, valutazione della governance da parte dell'ESMA, conflitti di interesse, adeguatezza del finanziamento e riservatezza dei controlli), 2 dicembre 2013, ESMA/2013/1775.

⁽²⁾ GU L 146 del 31.5.2013, pag. 1.

⁽³⁾ In conformità degli articoli 21 e 22 bis (GU L 145 del 31.5.2011, pagg. 38-39).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001161/14
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(5 February 2014)

Subject: The Italian Court of Auditors against the credit rating agencies

The Italian Court of Auditors is suing the credit rating agency Standard and Poor's for EUR 234 billion for having downgraded Italy to a BBB rating in 2011. The Court is accusing the agency of not having taken account in its decision of Italy's immense artistic and literary heritage, which adds inestimable value to the country's balance sheet.

According to a US source, the Court of Auditors has also accused other credit rating agencies of not taking Italy's intangible heritage into consideration. The agencies concerned have rejected the allegations as 'not serious and groundless' and claim they have acted perfectly correctly.

This is the second time the Italian authorities have taken legal action against the credit rating agencies. Last year a public prosecutor called for nine executives and employees from two credit rating agencies to be tried for repeated and aggravated manipulation of the market.

1. Is the Commission aware of the legal action being taken by the Italian Court of Auditors?
2. Is it aware of similar legal action in other Member States or outside the European Union?
3. Does it believe that the credit rating agencies have behaved correctly or have their actions deliberately altered perceptions on the financial markets?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(14 April 2014)

The Commission believes that it is important that sovereign ratings are accurate and transparent so that investors can fully understand credit rating actions regarding sovereigns and their wider implications.

The Commission is following with great attention ongoing developments around credit rating agencies (CRA) in Member States and outside of the EU, notably in the US.

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is the authority competent for the supervision of CRAs. In December 2013, ESMA published a report on sovereign ratings processes.⁽¹⁾ ESMA's investigation revealed certain shortcomings in the sovereign ratings process which could pose risks to the quality, independence and integrity of the ratings and of the rating process. However, ESMA considered that these findings did not appear to constitute infringements of the CRA Regulation.

The new rules on credit rating⁽²⁾, will considerably contribute to enhancing the governance and processes of sovereign debt ratings. As foreseen by the new Regulation, the Commission will submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the appropriateness of the development of a European creditworthiness assessment for sovereign debt by 31 December 2014. ESMA's findings and observations on legal procedures⁽³⁾ concerning CRAs will provide important input for that report and as regards the question whether additional measures would be appropriate.

⁽¹⁾ ESMA, Credit Rating Agencies, Sovereign ratings investigations, ESMA's assessment of governance, conflicts of interest, resourcing adequacy and confidentiality controls, 02 December 2013, ESMA/2013/1775.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 146, 31.5.2013, p. 1-33.

⁽³⁾ In line with Article 21 and 22a, OJ L 145, 31.5.2011, p. 38-39.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001162/14
a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(5 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: VP/HR — El acceso de los niños a la educación en Pakistán

Según el Informe de Seguimiento Educación para Todos en el Mundo (EPT), publicado por la Unesco el 29 de enero de 2014, en Pakistán, la imponente cifra de 5,4 millones de niños no va al colegio, de manera que es muy probable que Pakistán no alcance el objetivo de la EPT para 2015. A pesar de que ha disminuido el total de niños no escolarizados en el mundo, principalmente gracias a las iniciativas de India y Etiopía en este campo, Pakistán, por el contrario, ha reducido su contribución nacional a la educación de 2,6 % del PIB en 1999 a 2,3 % en 2010, según este informe, y es la cuna del 10 % de los niños sin escolarizar de todo el mundo.

¿Supervisa la UE la política del Gobierno de Pakistán relativa al acceso de los niños a la educación en Pakistán, en especial, con vistas a la concesión a Pakistán de la categoría SPG+?

¿Destina la UE fondos a Pakistán para facilitar el acceso de los niños a la educación? ¿Qué medidas toma para garantizar que dichos fondos se utilizan para ese fin?

Dada la creciente influencia de los talibanes y los clérigos islamistas, contrarios a que en Pakistán niños y niñas vayan al colegio, ¿cómo actúa la UE para ejercer presión internacional en apoyo del derecho de los niños a la educación?

Respuesta del Sr. Piebalgs en nombre de la Comisión

(7 de abril de 2014)

La Comisión conoce y se preocupa por la situación del sector de la educación en Pakistán y, en particular, el elevado número de niños sin escolarizar. Es por ello que la UE ha definido la educación como uno de los ámbitos de interés. Presta apoyo a programas de reforma de la enseñanza en las provincias de Khyber Pakhtunkhwa y Sindh, con una asignación actual de 75 millones EUR y 30 millones EUR respectivamente. El acceso a la educación es uno de los indicadores que la UE evalúa para cada uno de los tramos de desembolso. Para más información, la Comisión remite a Su Señoría a las respuestas a las preguntas escritas E-000160/2013, E-000312/2013 y E-004224/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

En todos sus trabajos en Pakistán, la Comisión presta particular atención al acceso a la educación, que es un componente importante de la ayuda al desarrollo de la UE a Pakistán. La cuestión del derecho a una educación libre e igual para todos los niños pakistaníes ya forma parte del diálogo político y estratégico regular y permanente UE-Pakistán.

Como todo beneficiario del SPG+, Pakistán está sujeto al mecanismo de control establecido por la Comisión para garantizar el cumplimiento de los requisitos de la legislación de la UE. Pakistán tiene la obligación de dar aplicación efectiva a un total de 27 convenciones, algunas de las cuales cubren los derechos de los niños, como la *Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño*. En el marco del SGP+, los resultados de Pakistán se controlan en la medida en que son pertinentes para la aplicación efectiva de dichas convenciones.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/es/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001162/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(5 February 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Access of children to education in Pakistan

According to the Education for All (EFA) Global Monitoring Report released by Unesco on 29 January 2014, a staggering 5.4 million children in Pakistan do not attend school, meaning that Pakistan is very likely failing to meet the EFA target for 2015. Despite the global reduction in the number of out-of-school children, primarily thanks to India's and Ethiopia's initiatives in the field, Pakistan, on the contrary, has reduced its national contribution to education from 2.6% of GNP in 1999 to 2.3% in 2010, according to the report, and is home to 10% of all out-of-school children worldwide.

Is the EU monitoring the policy pursued by the Government of Pakistan with regard to access for children to education in Pakistan, especially in view of Pakistan's upgrade to GSP+ status?

Is the EU directing funds in Pakistan towards facilitating children's access to education? What steps is it taking to ensure that the funds provided are being used for that cause?

With the rising influence of the Taliban and Islamic mullahs in preventing both girls and boys from attending school in Pakistan, what is the EU doing to apply international pressure to support the right of the child to education?

Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission

(7 April 2014)

The Commission is aware and concerned about the state of the education sector in Pakistan, in particular about the high number of out of school children. Therefore, the EU defined education as one of the focal areas. It is supporting education reform programmes in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh, with current allocation of EUR 75 million and EUR 30 million respectively. Access to education is among the range of indicators that the EU assesses for each tranche disbursement. For further details the Commission refers the Honourable Member to the answers to written questions E-000160/2013, E-000312/2013 and E-004224/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

In all its work in Pakistan the Commission pays particular attention to access to education. Indeed, it is a major component of the EU's development assistance to Pakistan. The issue of the right to free and equal education for all Pakistani children is already part of the regular and ongoing EU-Pakistan political and policy dialogues.

As any GSP+ beneficiary, Pakistan is subject to the monitoring mechanism established by the Commission to ensure compliance with the requirements of the EC law. Pakistan is required to give effective implementation to a set of 27 conventions, amongst which some cover the rights of children such as the *Convention on the Right of the Child*. Within the context of GSP+, Pakistan's performance is monitored as long as it is relevant for the effective implementation of those conventions.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001163/14

a la Comisión

Josefa Andrés Barea (S&D)

(5 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Violación de la normativa europea en materia de competencia

El modelo de gestión del Hospital Universitario de La Ribera (Alzira, Valencia) ha sido vendido en los medios de comunicación por el Partido Popular y por el Gobierno valenciano como un ejemplo de buena gestión en la privatización de la sanidad pública valenciana. Pero, como tantas otras cosas del Gobierno valenciano, ha resultado que estaban enmascarando una realidad: la apertura irregular del mercado de la sanidad de un modo no acorde con la normativa en materia de competencia.

La Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (CNC) destaca en un informe que, según se recoge en toda la prensa nacional, el acceso a la licitación no sigue las recomendaciones de este órgano, ya que a cinco de las seis licitaciones concurrió solo una agrupación de empresas (en Manises concurrieron 2), y las seis licitaciones han sido adjudicadas a agrupaciones de empresas participadas todas ellas por la empresa Ribera Salud, favoreciéndola claramente.

El plazo de las licitaciones de los hospitales de La Ribera de Alzira y de Torreveja fue apenas de mes y medio, exigiéndose en dicho periodo la presentación de un plan de gestión de calidad, anteproyectos técnicos, plan de inversiones e información sobre el equipo técnico del proyecto, que son documentos de gran complejidad, por lo que es posible que, como han señalado algunos sindicatos, «el corto plazo de tiempo para su preparación y el hecho de que solo un grupo de empresas concurriera al concurso indica que quizás tuvieran con carácter previo una información privilegiada dirigida a adjudicar el proyecto a dicho grupo empresarial».

El informe de la CNC también señala que, en la adjudicación de los contratos, se valoran criterios económicos de escasa relevancia en la facturación, no valorándose la facturación intercentros ni el ahorro por la prestación farmacéutica.

- ¿Considera la Comisión que estas prácticas vulneran la normativa europea en materia de contratación pública?
- ¿Tiene la Comisión conocimiento de este informe por parte de la Comisión Nacional de la Competencia?
- ¿Qué controles ejerce la Comisión sobre las adjudicaciones de contratos en el caso de que no haya una denuncia por parte de otras empresas competidoras, como es este caso?

Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión

(1 de abril de 2014)

La Comisión, basándose en la información que proporciona Su Señoría, no está en condiciones de ofrecer un análisis jurídico formal sobre la compatibilidad de los procedimientos de adjudicación en cuestión con las normas de contratación pública de la UE, ya que no dispone de elementos fácticos esenciales para valorarlo (por ejemplo, en lo relativo a la naturaleza y a las condiciones de los contratos).

El régimen jurídico aplicable depende de la naturaleza del procedimiento de adjudicación de contratos y, aunque los procedimientos de adjudicación de contratos públicos se rigen por las disposiciones de la Directiva 2004/18/CE ⁽¹⁾ (la Directiva), la adjudicación de concesiones de servicios sigue sujeta a los principios del Tratado de la UE, es decir, no discriminación, igualdad de trato y transparencia. Además, las únicas disposiciones de la Directiva que se aplican a los contratos públicos relativos a los servicios indicados en su anexo II B, entre los que se encuentran los servicios sociales y de salud, son las relativas a las especificaciones técnicas y a la transparencia *ex post*.

En lo referente a los plazos de presentación, la Directiva establece que, en los procedimientos abiertos, el plazo mínimo para la recepción de ofertas es de 52 días a partir de la fecha de envío para publicación del anuncio de licitación. Este plazo puede acortarse en ciertas circunstancias, así como en el contexto de los demás tipos de procedimientos de contratación pública ⁽²⁾.

Toda persona interesada que desee presentar una denuncia sobre un procedimiento de licitación específico puede hacerlo cumplimentando el impreso oficial ⁽³⁾ o mediante una carta dirigida a los servicios de la Comisión. Los servicios de la Comisión evalúan los argumentos presentados en virtud de las normas de contratación pública de la UE. En caso de que las labores de verificación de la Comisión determinen que existe una infracción de las normas de contratación pública de la UE, puede decidir incoar un procedimiento formal de infracción.

⁽¹⁾ Directiva 2004/18/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 31 de marzo de 2004, sobre coordinación de los procedimientos de adjudicación de los contratos públicos de obras, de suministro y de servicios. DO L 134 de 30.4.2004.

⁽²⁾ Por ejemplo: procedimientos restringidos, procedimientos negociados con publicación de anuncio y diálogo competitivo.

⁽³⁾ Disponible en: http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/your_rights/your_rights_forms_es.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001163/14
to the Commission
Josefa Andrés Barea (S&D)
(5 February 2014)**

Subject: Infringement of European competition law

The management model of the La Ribera hospital (Alzira, Valencia) has been marketed by the media, the People's Party and the Valencian regional government as an example of good management resulting from the privatisation of the Valencian Community's public health system. However, just as it has done in so many other cases, the Valencian government turns out to have been covering up the truth, which is that the health market has been opened up in an irregular manner which breaches competition law.

As has been pointed out in a report by the National Competition Authority (CNC) and taken up in all the national press, the tendering process did not follow the Authority's recommendations, as in five of the six procedures, bids were only submitted by one group of companies (in Manises there were two bids) and all six contracts were awarded to companies partly belonging to the Ribera Salud group, which clearly received preferential treatment.

Tenders for La Ribera hospital in Alzira and for Torrevieja hospital had to be submitted within a one-and-a-half month time limit and required the inclusion of a high-quality management plan, technical plans, an investment plan and information about the project's technical team, all of which are highly complex documents. It is therefore possible, as some unions have suggested, that the short deadline for preparing the bid and the fact that only one group of companies took part in the procedure are an indication that these companies received privileged information beforehand so that the contract would be awarded to their group.

The CNC report also points out that economic factors largely irrelevant to revenue were taken into account when awarding the contracts, whereas inter-centre billing and savings related to pharmaceutical services were not considered.

Does the Commission see these practices as infringing European public procurement law?

Is the Commission aware of the report by the Spanish National Competition Authority?

What checks does the Commission carry out on contract awards when another competing company complains, as is the case here?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(1 April 2014)**

On the basis of the information provided by the Honourable Member, the Commission is not in a position to provide a formal legal analysis concerning the compatibility of the award procedures at stake with EU public procurement rules, as essential factual elements for this assessment are lacking (e.g. concerning the nature and conditions of the contracts).

The applicable legal regime depends on the nature of the procurement procedure. While the procedures for the award of public contracts are regulated by the provisions of Directive 2004/18/EC ⁽¹⁾ (the directive), the award of services concessions is still subject to the general EU Treaty principles, i.e. non-discrimination, equal treatment and transparency. Furthermore, only the provisions of the directive related to technical specifications and *ex-post* transparency apply to public contracts concerning the services listed in its Annex II B, among which health and social services.

Concerning the deadlines for submission, the directive rules that in open procedures, the minimum time limit for the receipt of tenders is 52 days from the date in which the contract notice was sent for publication. This time limit may be shortened under some conditions, and also in the context of other types of procurement procedures ⁽²⁾.

When an interested person wishes to file a complaint concerning a specific tender procedure, they may fill in the official forms ⁽³⁾ or alternatively, by means of a letter addressed to the Commission's departments. The Commission's departments assess the merits of the case in the light of EU public procurement rules. Should the Commission investigations lead to conclude on the existence of a breach of EU public procurement rules, it may decide to open a formal infringement case.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts. OJ L 134 of 30 April 2004.

⁽²⁾ e.g. restricted procedures, negotiated procedures with publication for a contract notice and competitive dialogue.

⁽³⁾ Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/your_rights/your_rights_forms_en.htm

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001166/14
an die Kommission
Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(5. Februar 2014)

Betrifft: Missbrauch der Gelder für Jugendgarantie

Laut Vorsitz des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes werden die verfügbaren EU-Mittel zur Bekämpfung der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit von Unternehmen dazu missbraucht, junge Menschen in unbezahlten Praktika zu beschäftigen.

Die Jugendbeschäftigungsinitiative ist dazu gedacht, Mitgliedstaaten mit einer besonders hohen Jugendarbeitslosenquote bei der Umsetzung der Jugendgarantie zu unterstützen. Ziel ist es dabei, jungen Menschen innerhalb von vier Monaten eine qualitativ hochwertige Beschäftigung in Form einer Arbeitsstelle, einen Praktikums- oder einen Weiterbildungsplatz beschaffen.

Laut Vorwürfen des DGB nutzen Unternehmen unbezahlte Praktikanten dazu, Zuschüsse aus der Jugendbeschäftigungsinitiative einzustreichen, statt Ausbildungsplätze mit fairen Arbeitsbedingungen zu schaffen.

1. Ist sich die Kommission dieser Vorwürfe bewusst?
2. Sind die Unternehmen bekannt, die mit Geldern der Jugendbeschäftigungsinitiative zur prekären Beschäftigung Jugendlicher beitragen? Haben diese Unternehmen mit Folgemaßnahmen zu rechnen?
3. Wie gedenkt die Kommission, zukünftig die Verteilung der Mittel besser zu überwachen und dem Missbrauch der Gelder vorzubeugen?
4. Plant die Kommission eine Erhöhung der bisherigen 6 Milliarden, falls diese schon vor Ablauf der ersten beiden Finanzierungsjahre des MFR aufgebraucht werden?

Antwort von Herrn Andor im Namen der Kommission
(2. April 2014)

Deutschland hat die niedrigste Jugendarbeitslosenquote der Union und kommt daher nicht für eine finanzielle Förderung im Rahmen der Beschäftigungsinitiative für junge Menschen in Betracht. Die Aussagen, auf die sich die Frau Abgeordnete bezieht, scheinen vielmehr die nationale Initiative MobiPro-EU des Bundesministeriums für Arbeit und Soziales (BMAS) und der Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA) zu betreffen⁽¹⁾. Die Kommission wurde darüber unterrichtet, dass der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) diese Aussagen in der Zwischenzeit korrigiert und die Angaben auf seiner Website entsprechend berichtigt hat.

Darüber hinaus müssen die in Betracht kommenden Mitgliedstaaten, um Zuschüsse im Rahmen der Beschäftigungsinitiative für junge Menschen zu erhalten, zunächst ihre operationellen Programme für den Zeitraum 2014-2020 ausarbeiten — und dieser Prozess ist noch nicht abgeschlossen — und diese der Kommission zur Annahme vorlegen.

Abschließend ist anzumerken, dass 2016 die Halbzeitüberprüfung des EU-Haushaltsplans stattfinden wird und den Ergebnissen dieser Überprüfung in Bezug auf einzelne Haushaltsposten nicht vorgegriffen werden kann.

⁽¹⁾ Siehe Seite 16 des Kanzlerinnen-Handouts:
<http://jugend.dgb.de/meldungen/dgb-jugend/++co++a23a1574-8da9-11e3-9c72-525400808b5c>

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001166/14
to the Commission
Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(5 February 2014)

Subject: Misuse of Youth Guarantee funds

According to the Chair of the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB), the EU funds available to combat youth unemployment have been misused by undertakings to employ young people as unpaid interns.

The Youth Employment Initiative is intended to help Member States with particularly high unemployment rates to implement the Youth Guarantee. The aim is to ensure that young people obtain, within four months, high-quality employment in the form of a job, apprenticeship or traineeship.

The DGB alleges that undertakings are using unpaid interns to rake in subsidies from the Youth Employment Initiative instead of creating traineeships with fair conditions of employment.

1. Is the Commission aware of these allegations?
2. Is it known which firms are using funds from the Youth Employment Initiative to contribute to the precarious employment of young people? Will these undertakings suffer any consequences?
3. What does the Commission propose to do in future to monitor the distribution of these funds more effectively and prevent their misuse?
4. Does the Commission plan to increase the existing budget of EUR 6 billion if this is used up before the end of the first two funding years of the MFF?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2014)

Germany has the Union's lowest youth unemployment rate and is not eligible for funding from the YEI. The statement referred to by the Honourable Member appear to concern rather the national programme MobiPro-EU managed by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS) and the Public Employment Service (Bundesagentur für Arbeit — BA) ⁽¹⁾. The Commission has been informed that the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB) has revised these statements in the meantime and corrected its website accordingly.

Furthermore, to receive payments for the YEI, eligible Member States first need to prepare their 2014-2020 Operational Programmes, a process which is currently ongoing, and they need to submit their programmes to the Commission for adoption.

Finally, the mid-term review of the EU budget will take place in 2016 and it is not possible to prejudge the orientation of this review concerning individual budget items.

⁽¹⁾ See page 16 of Kanzlerinnen-Handout: <http://jugend.dgb.de/meldungen/dgb-jugend/++co++a23a1574-8da9-11e3-9c72-525400808b5c>

(Hrvatska verzija)

Pitanje za pisani odgovor E-001167/14
upućeno Komisiji
Dubravka Šuica (PPE)
(5. veljače 2014.)

Predmet: Utjecaj brodova na kulturno-povijesnu baštinu

Cilj Europske unije je smanjenje emisija ugljičnog dioksida iz sektora prometa za 40 posto u budućnosti. Međunarodni pomorski promet jedini je oblik transporta koji nije uključen u obaveze smanjenja emisija, samim time i onečišćenja. RH dijeli stajalište Europske unije da je to potrebno promijeniti što prije. Pravedno je da i taj sektor dijeli teret obaveza smanjenja emisija ugljičnog dioksida, što je nužno i smanjenje onečišćenja. Također treba paziti i na ekonomski predznak da pomorski promet ostane konkurentan u globalnim razmjerima.

Dubrovnik, kao mjesto svjetske kulturne baštine UNESCO-a, privlači mnogo turista sa svih kontinenata i samo je prošle godine prihvatio skoro milijun putnika s brodova za kružna putovanja. Svakako se treba pronaći održiva i dugotrajna strategija razvoja industrije kružnih putovanja tako da se masovnim iskorištavanjem ne ugroze naše kulturno-povijesne znamenitosti, a i kako bi se zaštitio okoliš.

1. S obzirom na to da su veliki brodovi također i veliki zagađivači, istražuje li Komisija njihov utjecaj na kulturno-povijesnu baštinu nekih europskih gradova na moru, primjerice Dubrovnika?
2. Planira li Komisija poduzeti nešto po tom pitanju kako bi se zaštitilo kulturno-povijesno nasljeđe Europe?

Odgovor g. Potočnika u ime Komisije
(10. travnja 2014.)

Komisija smatra da je zaštita kulturne baštine, spomenika i znamenitosti od najveće važnosti. U skladu s člankom 167. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije, zaštita kulturne i povijesne baštine ostaje u primarnoj nadležnosti država članica.

Dodatno, smanjenje emisija u međunarodnom pomorskom prometu predstavlja znatan problem koji EU rješava u okviru politika o klimatskim promjenama i okolišu. One će vjerojatno imati pozitivan utjecaj na očuvanje baštine.

Također, direktivama o okolišu i novim tematskim strategijama o onečišćenju zraka i poboljšanju europskog urbanog okoliša rješavaju se pitanja emisija pomorskog prometa poput, na primjer, nedavno izmijenjene Direktive o sadržaju sumpora u brodskim gorivima. ⁽¹⁾ Revizijom Direktive osigurava se da brodovi na vezu u lukama Unije ne koriste goriva sa sadržajem sumpora većim od 0,1 %. Od 2020. nadalje, norma od 0,5 % sadržaja sumpora primjenjuje se u svim teritorijalnim morima, isključivim gospodarskim pojasevima i područjima kontroliranog onečišćenja država članica.

Uvaženu zastupnicu možda zanima i da je, u predmetu protiv luke Genove, Europski sud nedavno presudio ⁽²⁾ da su brodovi za kružna putovanja koji pristaju u lukama EU-a obuhvaćeni odredbama Direktive o sumporu koje se odnose na putničke brodove na redovnim linijama i stoga sadržaj sumpora u korištenom gorivu moraju ograničiti na 1,5 % u svim teritorijalnim morima, isključivim gospodarskim pojasevima i područjima kontroliranog onečišćenja država članica.

⁽¹⁾ Direktiva 2012/33/EU o izmjeni Direktive 1999/32/EZ.

⁽²⁾ Predmet C-537/11.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001167/14
to the Commission
Dubravka Šuica (PPE)
(5 February 2014)

Subject: Influence of ships on historic and cultural heritage

The EU is aiming to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the transport sector by 40% in the future. International carriage by sea is the only form of transport not covered by the obligations to reduce emissions and hence pollution. Croatia shares the EU's view that this needs to change as quickly as possible. It is right that this sector should share the burden of lowering carbon dioxide emissions, as is essential in order to reduce pollution. It is also necessary to pay heed to the economic outlook, to ensure that sea transport remains competitive on a global scale.

Dubrovnik, a Unesco world cultural heritage city, attracts many tourists from all continents; last year alone it was visited by almost a million cruise ship passengers. A sustainable long-term development strategy needs in any event to be worked out for the cruising industry, so as to prevent our sights of cultural and historic interest from being endangered through mass exploitation and ensure that the environment is protected.

1. Given that large ships are also large polluters, is the Commission examining their influence on the cultural and historic heritage of particular European coastal cities, for example Dubrovnik?
2. Will it take any steps in this matter with a view to protecting Europe's cultural and historic heritage?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2014)

The Commission regards the safeguarding of cultural heritage, monuments and sites as being of the highest importance. In accordance with Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Member States retain the primary responsibility for the protection of cultural and historic heritage.

Additionally, reduction of emissions from international shipping is a substantial concern addressed by the EU under its climate change and environmental policies. They are likely to positively impact heritage conservation.

Also, environment Directives and new thematic strategies on air pollution and improving the European urban environment address shipping emissions, as for example, the recently amended Directive on the sulphur content of marine fuels. ⁽¹⁾ This revision of the directive ensures that ships at berth in Union ports do not use fuels with a sulphur content exceeding 0.1%. From 2020 onwards, a standard of 0.5% sulphur content applies in all Member States' territorial seas, exclusive economic zones and pollution controlled zones.

The Honourable Member may also be interested to know that the European Court of Justice recently ruled, ⁽²⁾ in a case brought against the port of Genoa, that cruise ships calling at EU ports fall under the provisions of the Sulphur Directive regarding passenger ships on regular service, and so must limit the sulphur content of fuel used to 1.5% in all Member States' territorial seas, exclusive economic zones and pollution control zones.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2012/33/EU modifying Directive 1999/32/EC.

⁽²⁾ Case C-537/11.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001168/14
alla Commissione**

Mario Borghezio (NI)

(5 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Premio «Museo dell'anno» al museo Baski

Il museo turco Baksi di Bayburt è stato nominato «Museo dell'anno 2014», premio assegnato dalla commissione cultura dell'Assemblea parlamentare del Consiglio d'Europa.

Può la Commissione far sapere se il museo ha ricevuto e/o riceve fondi europei?

Risposta di Štefan Füle a nome della Commissione

(9 aprile 2014)

La Commissione si congratula con il museo Baksi di Bayburt, in Turchia, per essere stato insignito del Premio del Museo 2014 attribuito dal Consiglio d'Europa.

Il museo non riceve né ha ricevuto finanziamenti dell'UE.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001168/14
to the Commission
Mario Borghezio (NI)
(5 February 2014)**

Subject: 'Museum of the year' award for the Baksi Museum

The Baksi Museum in Bayburt, Turkey, has been named 'Museum of the year 2014', an award made by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Can the Commission say whether the Museum has received and/or receives EU funding?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2014)**

The Commission congratulates the Baksi Museum in Bayburt, Turkey, for having recently been awarded the 2014 Council of Europe Museum Prize.

The museum does not receive nor has it received any EU funding.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001169/14
alla Commissione**

Mario Borghezio (NI)

(5 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Sanzioni contro giocatori di calcio in Turchia

I giocatori del Fethiyespor, un club della serie B turca che giocava in Coppa di Turchia sul terreno del Fenerbahce a Istanbul, sono scesi in campo con scritta sulle maglie ciascuno una lettera che, nell'allineamento della squadra durante l'esecuzione dell'inno nazionale, formavano le due parole «Yuce Atatürk», «Grande Atatürk».

Questi giocatori ora rischiano pesanti sanzioni per avere violato il veto alle attività politiche nel calcio imposto dal governo del premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan dopo la grande rivolta di Gezi Park.

Non ritiene la Commissione che il veto imposto dal governo Erdogan sia un'ulteriore limitazione alla libertà di espressione?

Risposta di Štefan Füle a nome della Commissione

(4 aprile 2014)

La Commissione segnala all'onorevole deputato che il 10 dicembre 2013 la Commissione disciplinare dalla Federcalcio turca ha deciso di non infliggere sanzioni al Fethiyespor per insussistenza dell'infrazione.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001169/14
to the Commission
Mario Borghezio (NI)
(5 February 2014)**

Subject: Sanctions against footballers in Turkey

Footballers at Fethiyespor , a Series B [First Division] Turkish football club playing for the Turkish Cup on the Fenerbahce pitch in Istanbul, went onto the field wearing shirts each containing a letter which, when the team lined up during the singing of the national anthem, formed the two phrases 'Yuce Atatürk', 'Grande Atatürk'.

The players now risk heavy sanctions for breaching the veto on political activity in football imposed by the government of Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan after the major riots at Gezi Park.

Does the Commission not consider that the veto imposed by the Erdogan Government represents a further limitation on freedom of expression?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2014)**

The Commission would like to draw the attention of the Honourable Member to the decision issued on 10 December 2013 by the Professional Football Disciplinary Board of non-imposition of penalties on Fethiyespor due to the absence of breach of discipline.

(Slovenska različica)

Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-001175/14
za Komisijo
Jelko Kacin (ALDE)
(5. februar 2014)

Zadeva: Srbski kazenski zakonik, člen 234

Upati je, da bo začetek pristopnih pogajanj s Srbijo sedanjo srbsko vlado spodbudil k nadaljnjemu izvajanju reform, povezanih z EU, da bi pravna država v Srbiji dobila trdne temelje. Eno od najpomembnejših nerešenih vprašanj, ki vzbujajo pomisleke o neodvisnosti srbskega pravosodja, je člen 359 srbskega kazenskega zakonika o zlorabi položaja, ki se je pogosto zlorabljal za neupravičeno preganjanje lastnikov podjetij in menedžerjev v zasebnem sektorju.

Dolgo pričakovana revizija srbskega kazenskega zakonika iz leta 2013 vlagateljem ni zagotovila pravne varnosti in ni onemogočila nepravičnih postopkov proti akterjem iz zasebnega sektorja. Še vedno slišimo za zadeve, ki so bile enostavno prekvalificirane skladu z novimi določbami kazenskega zakonika (člen 234 o zlorabi odgovornega položaja), ne da bi se primerno preučile, razložile ali se omogočila pritožba proti prekvalifikaciji.

Menimo, da je treba to novo kaznivo dejanje zlorabe odgovornega položaja toliko zožiti, da ne bo prihajalo do zlorab.

Ali lahko Komisija razloži, katere vrste kaznivih ravnanj niso vključene v pojem „drug korporacijski kriminal“, za katerega je možen pregon v skladu s členom 234?

Ali lahko Komisija pojasni, kako se je vodil postopek odločanja o prekvalifikaciji zadev iz člena 359?

Ali bo Komisija vztrajala, da se bodo zadeve, ki so bile prekvalificirane iz člena 359 v člen 234, ustrezno preučile in bodo vsi neupravičeni pregoni končani?

Odgovor g. Füle v imenu Komisije
(1. april 2014)

Začetek pristopnih pogajanj je velika priložnost za spodbuditev Srbije, naj okrepi svoja prizadevanja na področju pravne države, pravosodja in temeljnih pravic, pravičnosti, svobode in varnosti, z namenom uskladitve zakonodaje s pravnim redom EU ter vzpostavitve ali krepitve institucionalnih zmogljivosti za njeno učinkovito izvajanje.

Komisija pripisuje velik pomen uvedbi predvidljivega pravnega in poslovnega okolja. V zvezi s tem je bila kritična do zlorab pri uporabi prejšnjega člena 359 kazenskega zakonika in je pozvala srbsko vlado, naj ga spremeni. Spremembe iz decembra 2012, s katerimi sta bila uvedena nova člena 234 in 234a, so prvi korak v tej smeri, dokler se ne izvede celoviti pregled dela kazenskega zakonika, ki ureja področje gospodarske kriminalitete. Ta pregled je kot srednjeročni ukrep določen v državnem akcijskem načrtu za izvajanje nacionalne protikorupcijske strategije za obdobje od 2013–2018. Eden od njegovih ciljev je proučiti trajne, dosledne in sorazmerne alternativne rešitve za preiskave in pregone sedanjega kaznivega dejanja „zlorabe odgovornega položaja“, kar bi postopoma vodilo do zoženja ali celo razveljavitve členov 234 in 234a.

Komisija bo še naprej podpirala Srbijo v teh prizadevanjih z zagotavljanjem namenskega strokovnega znanja. Prav tako bo še naprej pozorno spremljala položaj na področju pravne države v Srbiji, zlasti v svojem poročilu o napredku, ki bo izšlo oktobra 2014 ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Dodatne informacije so Vam na voljo v Poročilu o napredku Srbije za leto 2013:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/brochures/serbia_2013.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001175/14
to the Commission
Jelko Kacin (ALDE)
(5 February 2014)**

Subject: Serbian Criminal Code, Article 234

It is to be hoped that the opening of accession talks with Serbia will encourage the current Serbian Government to continue implementing EU-related reforms with the aim of firmly establishing the rule of law in the country. One of the most important outstanding issues, which has raised doubts as to the independence of the Serbian judiciary, has been Article 359 of the Serbian Criminal Code on 'abuse of office', which has been widely misused to unjustly prosecute company owners and managers operating in the private sector.

The much-awaited 2013 revisions of Serbia's Criminal Code have failed to ensure legal certainty for investors or end unjust proceedings against private-sector operators. We continue to hear of cases which have simply been reclassified under a new provision of the Criminal Code (Article 234 on 'abuse of responsible position') without due analysis, explanation, or right of appeal against the reclassification decision.

Our opinion is that the new offence of 'abuse of responsible position' needs to be narrowed down enough to prevent misuse.

Can the Commission explain what types of criminal conduct which are not covered by other corporate crimes are liable to prosecution under Article 234?

Can the Commission clarify how the decision-making process on the reclassification of Article 359 cases was conducted in Serbia?

Will the Commission insist that cases which were reclassified from Article 359 to Article 234 are properly analysed and that all unjust prosecutions are terminated?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(1 April 2014)**

The opening of the accession negotiations creates a major opportunity to encourage Serbia to intensify its efforts on rule of law, judiciary, fundamental rights, justice, freedom and security, with a view to ensuring legal alignment with the *acquis* as well as establishing or enhancing the institutional capacity to effectively implement it.

The Commission attaches great importance to the implementation of a predictable legal and business environment. It has in this respect criticised the abusive implementation of former Article 359 of the Criminal Code and encouraged the Serbian government to amend it. The amendments of December 2012 leading to two new Articles 234 and 234a are a first step in that direction, pending a comprehensive review of the economic crime section of the criminal code. This review is scheduled as a medium term measure under the country's action plan for the implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy for 2013-2018. One of the aims of this review is to explore sustainable, consistent and proportionate alternatives to investigations and prosecutions under the current 'abuse of office' offence and eventually lead to narrowing down, if not repealing, Articles 234 and 234a.

The Commission will continue to support Serbia in this exercise by providing targeted expertise. It will also continue to closely monitor the situation of the rule of law in Serbia in particular in its October 2014 Progress Report ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ For further information, please see the 2013 Progress Report on Serbia:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/brochures/serbia_2013.pdf

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001177/14
alla Commissione
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(5 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: RIgeneriAmo e stile di vita sostenibile

A Milano apre oggi, 5 febbraio, l'atelier RIgeneriAmo, un'officina di quartiere dove è possibile dare nuova vita agli oggetti. Lo spazio si trova nel quartiere Lambrate e chi vuole dare nuova vita a oggetti usati può recarvisi ogni mercoledì, dalle 15 alle 22, e usufruire di spazi, strumenti e consigli di designer lì presenti. Grazie all'aiuto di diversi professionisti è possibile riparare oggetti di uso comune oppure creare nuovi oggetti da vecchi scarti. L'obiettivo dell'iniziativa è ridurre gli sprechi, prevenendo la produzione di rifiuti e promuovendo uno stile di vita più sostenibile, attento all'ambiente anche attraverso il riciclo. Attraverso il recupero è possibile infatti prolungare il ciclo di vita di oggetti o materiali che spesso vengono considerati, a torto, scarti e che verrebbero dismessi, mentre invece esistono più modi per sfruttarli e restituirli a nuova vita, sottraendo importanti quantitativi allo smaltimento.

Ogni mese l'officina organizzerà anche dei workshop gratuiti per diverse fasce d'età: laboratori di riuso creativo per i più piccoli e incontri a tema per gli adulti, volti a insegnare a tutti strategie divertenti per allungare il ciclo di vita degli oggetti.

Alla luce del progetto esposto, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. È a conoscenza del progetto?
2. Esistono progetti simili in altri Stati membri?
3. Intende promuovere progetti simili a RIgeneriAmo in tema di riciclo e promozione di uno stile di vita sostenibile?

**Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione
(28 aprile 2014)**

La Commissione è a conoscenza del progetto «RIgeneriAmo». Tali iniziative sono buoni esempi di prevenzione e riutilizzo creativi dei rifiuti.

La Commissione è a conoscenza di numerose iniziative portate avanti in tutta l'UE per dare nuova vita a prodotti e materiali usati, anche attraverso centri di riutilizzo e riparazione. Il sito web della Commissione dedicato all'argomento elenca una serie di migliori prassi relative alla prevenzione dei rifiuti: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/prevention/index.htm>.

L'articolo 4 della direttiva 2008/98/CE⁽¹⁾ definisce la gerarchia dei rifiuti, in base alla quale gli Stati membri adottano misure intese a promuovere la prevenzione e il riutilizzo dei rifiuti come soluzione prioritaria. Inoltre, nell'ambito della politica di coesione (2014-2020), gli Stati membri dovrebbero prevedere il finanziamento di progetti di gestione dei rifiuti volti a prevenire i rifiuti, prepararli per il riutilizzo e riciclarli. Infine, nel quadro del partenariato europeo per l'innovazione (PEI) sulle materie prime, la Commissione sta pubblicando inviti a manifestare impegni per la realizzazione delle azioni previste dal piano strategico di attuazione del PEI, tra cui un'azione per la ricerca a livello UE sulle strategie di prolungamento del ciclo di vita dei prodotti e sullo sviluppo di modelli di business circolari sostenibili. La Commissione valuterà inoltre la possibilità di pubblicare un invito a presentare proposte su questo tema nell'ambito del programma di ricerca e innovazione Orizzonte 2020.

⁽¹⁾ GUL 312 del 22.11.2008.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001177/14
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(5 February 2014)

Subject: RIgeneriAmo and sustainable lifestyle

Today, 5 February, sees the opening in Milan of the RIgeneriAmo studio, a neighbourhood workshop where it is possible to give objects a new life. The space is to be found in the Lambrate neighbourhood, and anyone who wants to give new life to used objects can go there any Wednesday, between 3.00 and 10.00 p.m., and make use of spaces, tools and advice from in-house designers. With the assistance of various professionals everyday objects can be repaired and new ones created from discarded items. The aim of the initiative is to reduce waste, prevent the production of refuse and promote a more sustainable lifestyle, taking care of the environment by recycling. Indeed, by means of recovery it is possible to extend the lifecycle of objects or materials which are often wrongly considered waste, and thrown away, whereas in reality there are many ways of making use of them and bringing them back to life, diverting significant quantities from disposal.

The studio also intends to arrange free monthly workshops for various age groups: creative reuse laboratories for young children and themed meetings for adults, with a view to teaching everyone enjoyable strategies for extending the lifecycle of objects.

In view of this project, can the Commission respond to the following enquiries:

1. is it aware of the project?
2. Do similar projects exist in other Member States?
3. Does it intend to promote projects similar to RIgeneriAmo to deal with recycling and promote a sustainable lifestyle?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(28 April 2014)

The Commission is aware of the 'RIgeneriAmo' project. Such initiatives are good examples of creative waste prevention and reuse.

The Commission is aware of a large number of initiatives throughout the EU aimed at giving used products and materials a new life including through reuse and repair centres. The Commission's dedicated website includes a selection of best practices in relation to waste prevention: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/prevention/index.htm>

Article 4 of Directive 2008/98/EC⁽¹⁾ establishes the waste hierarchy, according to which Member States shall take measures to promote waste prevention and reuse as a priority. Moreover, under the Cohesion Policy (2014-2020), Member States should envisage financing waste management projects aiming at waste prevention, preparing for re-use and recycling. Finally, in the framework of the European Innovation Partnership (EIP) on Raw Materials, the Commission is launching calls for commitments to implement actions included in the strategic implementation plan of the EIP, including one action on EU-wide research on product life extension strategies and development of sustainable circular business models. The Commission will also explore the possibility to make a call for proposals on this theme within the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme.

⁽¹⁾ OJL 312, 22.11.2008.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001179/14
do Komisji
Piotr Borys (PPE) oraz Joanna Katarzyna Skrzydlewska (PPE)
(5 lutego 2014 r.)**

Przedmiot: Brak tłumaczeń programu Erasmus+ na oficjalne języki Unii Europejskiej

Program Erasmus+ stanowi jeden z najważniejszych sukcesów kończącej się kadencji Parlamentu Europejskiego. Ten bardzo ważny i szeroki program, finansujący między innymi projekty organizacji młodzieżowych, międzynarodowe szkolenia i wymiany studenckie, jak również promujący mobilność, różnorodność kulturową oraz wielojęzyczność, powinien być dumą i priorytetem Unii Europejskiej.

Tymczasem przewodnik i regulamin programu Erasmus+ opublikowany przez Komisję Europejską jest dostępny wyłącznie w języku angielskim, marginalizując przy tym idee równorzędnego traktowania wszystkich języków państw członkowskich i wielokulturowości. Brak oficjalnych tłumaczeń dyskryminuje obywateli oraz stowarzyszenia z państw nieanglojęzycznych, ubiegających się o dofinansowanie z programu Erasmus+.

W związku z powyższym:

1. Kiedy Komisja opublikuje tłumaczenia przewodnika i regulaminu Erasmus+ w pozostałych 23 oficjalnych językach Unii Europejskiej?
2. Jak Komisja zamierza rozwiązać problem preferencji języka angielskiego jako głównego i najważniejszego języka komunikacji w Unii Europejskiej, w kontekście marginalizacji wielojęzyczności i wielokulturowości europejskiej?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Androurę Vassiliou w imieniu Komisji
(4 kwietnia 2014 r.)**

Parlament Europejski i Rada przyjęły w dniu 11 grudnia 2013 r. rozporządzenie (UE) nr 1288/2013 ustanawiające „Erasmus+”: unijny program na rzecz kształcenia, szkolenia, młodzieży i sportu ⁽¹⁾. Następnego dnia Komisja opublikowała pierwsze zaproszenie do składania wniosków dotyczących programu Erasmus+ w 23 językach urzędowych UE ⁽²⁾. Strona internetowa dotycząca Erasmus+ jest również dostępna w internecie we wszystkich językach urzędowych UE.

Komisja poinstruowała wszystkie agencje krajowe, które w jej imieniu wdrażają program Erasmus+ na szczeblu krajowym, aby przekazały potencjalnym wnioskodawcom wszelkie konieczne i użyteczne informacje na temat zaproszenia, sporządzone w ich języku. Wnioski można składać we wszystkich językach urzędowych UE.

W związku z tym Komisja nie uważa, że językiem preferowanym jest język angielski.

Przewodnik na temat programu Erasmus+, w którym zawarto szczegółowe informacje na temat wszystkich działań w ramach programu, jest jak dotąd dostępny jedynie w języku angielskim. Przewodnik ten jest obecnie tłumaczony i powinien być dostępny w językach urzędowych UE na początku czerwca.

Komisja przywiązuje dużą wagę do zasady wielojęzyczności, która pozostaje jednym z fundamentów projektu europejskiego. Obejmuje to również używanie języków urzędowych Unii Europejskiej na równych zasadach.

Ponadto promowanie nauki języków obcych i różnorodności językowej jest jednym ze szczegółowych celów programu Erasmus+. Program sfinansuje także wsparcie językowe dla studentów oraz osób odbywających praktyki lub wolontariat za granicą w ramach programu wsparcia dla mobilności edukacyjnej. Będzie wspierać także strategiczne partnerstwa pomiędzy zainteresowanymi stronami z różnych krajów biorących udział w programie na rzecz innowacyjnego podejścia do nauczania i uczenia się języków obcych.

⁽¹⁾ Dz.U. L 347 z 20.12.2013, s. 50.

⁽²⁾ Dz.U. C 362 z 12.12.2013, s. 62.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001179/14
to the Commission
Piotr Borys (PPE) and Joanna Katarzyna Skrzydlewska (PPE)
(5 February 2014)**

Subject: Erasmus+ programme information not translated into official EU languages

The Erasmus+ programme has been one of the most significant successes of this parliamentary term. This very important, wide-ranging programme, which funds, among other things, youth organisation projects, international training and student exchanges, as well as promoting mobility, cultural diversity and multilingualism, should be a source of pride for the European Union and one of its priorities.

However, the Erasmus+ Programme Guide published by the Commission is only available in English, which is hardly in keeping with the idea of equal treatment of all Member State languages and of multiculturalism. The lack of official translations discriminates against individuals and associations from non-English-speaking countries seeking funding under the Erasmus+ programme.

In view of the above:

1. When will the Commission publish translations of the Erasmus+ Programme Guide into the other 23 official languages of the European Union?
2. How does the Commission intend to address the problem of the preference for English as the principal and most important language of communication in the European Union, in the context of the marginalisation of multilingualism and multiculturalism in Europe?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2014)**

The European Parliament and the Council adopted on 11 December 2013 Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013 establishing 'Erasmus +': the Union programme for education, training, youth and sport ⁽¹⁾. The Commission published the next day the first call for proposals for Erasmus+ in 23 official EU languages ⁽²⁾. The Erasmus+ website is also online in all official EU languages.

The Commission has instructed all National Agencies, which implement Erasmus+ on behalf of the Commission at national level, to provide potential applicants with all necessary supporting information on the call in their own language. Applications can be submitted in any official EU language.

Thus the Commission does not consider that preference is given to English.

The Erasmus+ Programme Guide, which provides detailed information about all actions under the Programme, is as yet only available in English. The Guide is currently being translated and should be available in the official EU languages, at the beginning of June.

The Commission is strongly attached to the principle of multilingualism, which remains one of the cornerstones of the European project. This also includes the use of the official languages of the European Union on an equal footing.

Moreover, the promotion of language learning and linguistic diversity is one of the specific objectives of the Erasmus + Programme. It will fund linguistic support to participants for studying, carrying out a traineeship or volunteering abroad in the framework of the Programme's support for learning mobility. And it will support strategic partnerships between stakeholders in different programme countries for innovative approaches to language teaching and learning.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 50.

⁽²⁾ OJ C 362, 12.12.2013, p. 62.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001180/14

al Consejo

Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)

(6 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Acciones para completar el Espacio Europeo de Investigación

De acuerdo con las Conclusiones del Consejo Europeo, el Espacio Europeo de Investigación (EEI) debería estar completado para 2014, creando en Europa un verdadero mercado común del conocimiento, la investigación y la innovación. Específicamente, en su programa, la Presidencia griega del Consejo señala que «una mayor interacción entre los Estados miembros y la Comisión, por una parte, y con las diferentes partes interesadas, por otra, es un elemento necesario para fortalecer el EEI».

¿Podría concretar el Consejo la naturaleza de esta mayor interacción que persigue la Presidencia griega? Es decir, ¿cuáles son los ámbitos y alcance de esta interacción que se señala como necesaria para fortalecer el EEI?

Además, dado que completar el EEI en 2014 es un objetivo muy ambicioso, ¿qué acciones se barajan para cumplir el programa de la Presidencia y avanzar hacia la consecución definitiva del EEI?

Respuesta

(14 de abril de 2014)

El Espacio Europeo de Investigación (EEI) es el concepto fundamental que sustenta las políticas de investigación y desarrollo de la Unión Europea, con fuertes vínculos con la política de innovación y la política educativa. Desde 2000, el concepto se ha situado en el centro de los debates del Consejo y ulteriormente tanto el Consejo Europeo como el Consejo han ido dando forma concreta a este proceso señalando las acciones necesarias para la exitosa realización del EEI.

Más recientemente, el Consejo, en sus Conclusiones del 21 de febrero de 2014 sobre los avances del Espacio Europeo de Investigación, declaró que se ha construido un sólido cimiento del EEI y que Horizonte 2020, como elemento central del EEI, ofrece un nuevo impulso para redoblar esfuerzos para fomentar el desarrollo ulterior del EEI, el cual, en el contexto de la Unión por la Innovación, es un componente necesario de la Estrategia Europa 2020 para generar crecimiento y empleo.

El Consejo puso de relieve el papel que corresponde a los Estados miembros a la hora de seguir fortaleciendo el EEI y los animó a responsabilizarse de manera aún más decidida en la construcción del EEI, basándose en sus sistemas nacionales y definiendo las acciones que han de llevarse a cabo, en particular en cooperación con las organizaciones de partes interesadas. Además, el Consejo invitó a los Estados miembros a que, en estrecha cooperación con la Comisión, elaboren de aquí a mediados de 2015 una hoja de ruta del EEI a nivel europeo, que tenga como finalidad facilitar y reforzar las iniciativas emprendidas por los Estados miembros proporcionando una interpretación común de los objetivos estratégicos durante los próximos años y un conjunto de herramientas y mejores prácticas. En sus Conclusiones, el Consejo también enumeró una serie de aspectos específicos que considera que deben tenerse en cuenta a la hora de elaborar la hoja de ruta del EEI.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001180/14
to the Council**

Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Actions to complete the European Research Area

In line with the conclusions of the European Council, the European Research Area (ERA) should be completed in 2014, creating a genuine single market in Europe for knowledge, research and innovation. More specifically, the Greek Council Presidency points out in its programme that 'closer interaction between member states and the European Commission, on the one part, and the various scientific stakeholders, on the other part, is a necessary tool towards the enhancement of the ERA'.

Could the Council be more specific as to what the closer interaction sought by the Greek Presidency entails? What is the scope of that interaction, in other words, which is described as necessary for enhancing the ERA?

Given, furthermore, that completing the ERA in 2014 is a most ambitious objective, what actions are being considered in order to carry out the Presidency programme and make progress on definitively establishing the ERA?

Reply

(14 April 2014)

The European Research Area (ERA) is the fundamental concept underpinning the research and development policies of the European Union, with strong links to innovation and education policy. Since 2000, the concept has been at the heart of the Council's debates, and both the European Council and the Council have subsequently shaped the process by indicating the actions that are required for the successful completion of the ERA.

Most recently, the Council in its conclusions of 21 February 2014 on European Research Area Progress stated that a solid ERA foundation had been built and that Horizon 2020, as a central element of the ERA, provided fresh momentum to step up efforts to promote the further development of the ERA, which, in the context of the Innovation Union, is a necessary component of the Europe 2020 strategy to create growth and jobs.

The Council emphasised the role of Member States in further strengthening the ERA and encouraged them to take an even stronger ownership of building ERA through taking stock of their national systems and identifying actions, including in cooperation with stakeholder organisations. Furthermore, the Council invited the Member States in close cooperation with the Commission, to develop by mid-2015 an ERA roadmap at European level, which should serve the purpose of facilitating and reinforcing the efforts undertaken by the Member States by providing a shared understanding of the strategic objectives over the next few years and a set of tools and best practices. In its conclusions the Council also listed a number of specific issues which it considered should be taken into account in developing the ERA roadmap.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001183/14
à la Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 février 2014)

Objet: Accord de libre-échange UE-Japon

Les négociations relatives à un accord de libre-échange entre l'Union européenne et le Japon ont débuté en mars 2013. À cette occasion, la Commission a reçu un mandat de négociation d'une durée d'un an, à la fin duquel celle-ci devra rendre compte au Conseil de l'évolution des négociations. En avril de cette année, le Conseil sera amené à décider si, oui ou non, l'Union désire continuer de négocier avec le Japon en vue de la conclusion d'un accord de libre-échange. À ce jour, le bilan reste très mitigé. En effet, même si certains progrès ont pu être constatés, de nombreuses réticences perdurent du côté du Japon quant à l'ouverture de son marché. Les problèmes relatifs aux barrières non-tarifaires et à l'ouverture du marché japonais aux investisseurs étrangers ne sont toujours pas résolus. L'accord de libre-échange entre l'Union et le Japon doit être conclu de manière à garantir un intérêt optimal aux consommateurs mais également à protéger les entreprises européennes.

1. Quelle est la stratégie de la Commission pour les prochaines négociations avec le Japon?
2. Est-il possible d'en arriver à un arrêt des négociations suite à l'avis que la Commission adressera au Conseil en avril 2014?
3. Si les négociations se terminent, qu'advient-il du souhait de partenariat stratégique avec le Japon?

Réponse donnée par M. De Gucht au nom de la Commission
(31 mars 2014)

1. Le cinquième cycle de négociations sur l'accord de libre-échange entre l'Union européenne et le Japon se tiendra à Tokyo du 31 mars au 4 avril 2014. La stratégie de la Commission ne sera pas différente de celle qu'elle a adoptée au cours des cycles précédents: travailler à la conclusion rapide d'un accord ambitieux, complet et équilibré. Lors de ce cycle de négociations, la Commission mettra plus particulièrement l'accent sur les questions qui formeront probablement la partie essentielle de son évaluation de l'état d'avancement des négociations, telle que prévue par l'article 46 des directives de négociation d'un accord de libre-échange avec le Japon, elles-mêmes adoptées par le Conseil des affaires étrangères (questions commerciales) le 29 novembre 2012. Ces questions concerneront surtout les obstacles non tarifaires, les marchés publics ferroviaires et l'accès au marché des biens et services.
2. La Commission ne peut aujourd'hui conjecturer les résultats de cette évaluation; en effet, ceux obtenus lors de ce cinquième cycle occuperont une place importante dans l'évaluation générale de la situation et des perspectives de négociations. Toutefois, de grands progrès ont été constatés lors des quatre cycles de négociations précédents et devraient se poursuivre, voire s'accélérer.
3. Le Japon a été reconnu pour la première fois comme un des partenaires stratégiques de l'Union européenne dans le cadre de la stratégie européenne de sécurité de 2003. Il conservera ce statut quelle que soit l'issue des négociations en cours sur un accord de libre-échange. L'UE, en cherchant à renforcer ses relations avec le Japon, a toujours souhaité aller plus loin, de manière équilibrée et globale, en intégrant les dimensions politique, économique/sectorielle et mondiale. Ces points sont actuellement discutés dans le cadre de négociations parallèles sur un accord-cadre, intitulé provisoirement «accord de partenariat stratégique».

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001183/14
to the Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 February 2014)

Subject: EU-Japan free trade agreement

Negotiations on a free trade agreement between the European Union and Japan began in March 2013. The Commission had a negotiating mandate for a year, at the end of which time it was to report back to the Council. In April 2014 the Council will have to decide whether or not the Union wishes to press ahead with the negotiations with a view to concluding the free trade agreement. It is not currently clear whether that will be worthwhile. Progress has been made on certain fronts but Japan still has many reservations about opening its market. Problems in relation to non-tariff barriers and the opening of the Japanese market to foreign investors remain unresolved. A free trade agreement between the EU and Japan would not only have to be in the best interests of consumers but would also have to protect European companies.

1. What is the Commission's strategy for the next round of negotiations with Japan?
2. Could the negotiations be terminated in the light of the opinion that Commission submits to the Council in April 2014?
3. If that happens, what will become of the aspiration for a strategic partnership with Japan?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(31 March 2014)

1. The fifth round of EU-Japan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations will be held in Tokyo from 31 March to 4 April 2014. The Commission's strategy will remain the same as it has been for the previous rounds: To work towards the rapid conclusion of an ambitious, comprehensive and balanced agreement. Specifically during that round, the Commission will concentrate on the issues that are likely to form the core of its assessment of progress as set out in Article 46 of the directives for the negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement with Japan, as adopted at the Foreign Affairs Council (Trade) on 29 November 2012. These will include in particular non-tariff barriers, railways procurement and market access for goods and services.
 2. At this stage the Commission cannot speculate on the result of this assessment as the results of the fifth round will be very important for the overall assessment of the situation and of the perspectives of the negotiations. So far, it can be noted, however, that significant progress has been made during the four previous rounds of these negotiations and it is expected that this progress will continue and hopefully accelerate.
 3. Japan was first designated as one of the EU's strategic partners in the 2003 EU Security Strategy. This status will remain, irrespective of the outcome of the current negotiations for a free trade agreement. In seeking to upgrade its relations with Japan the EU has consistently called for a balanced and comprehensive deepening that includes also the political, economic/sectoral and global dimensions. These issues are being currently addressed through a parallel negotiation for a Framework Agreement, which currently has the working title Strategic Partnership Agreement.
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(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001190/14
à la Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 février 2014)

Objet: Réforme de la PAC et paiements directs

En décembre 2013, nous avons formellement adopté la réforme de la politique agricole commune (PAC). Quatre règlements ont été adoptés afin de constituer la base de cette PAC réformée. L'agriculture est un secteur très important en France. La réforme de la PAC concerne donc directement ce pays.

Dans un souci de protection de nos agriculteurs, la Commission européenne pourrait-elle nous donner de plus amples informations concernant la mise en pratique du règlement relatif aux paiements directs aux agriculteurs, et notamment les conditions qu'un agriculteur français doit remplir pour bénéficier de ces paiements directs?

Réponse donnée par M. Ciolos au nom de la Commission
(23 avril 2014)

Le règlement (UE) n° 1307/2013 ⁽¹⁾ établit le nouveau cadre juridique pour le soutien direct aux agriculteurs, dont un paiement de base, ainsi que pour d'autres régimes de soutien (comme un soutien couplé facultatif ou un paiement aux jeunes agriculteurs qui commencent à exercer une activité agricole) dans le cadre de la réforme de la PAC. Conformément aux pouvoirs que lui confère cet acte de base, la Commission définira dans un règlement délégué et un règlement d'exécution des règles supplémentaires destinées à assurer le bon fonctionnement de ces régimes.

Les conditions que les agriculteurs français devront remplir pour bénéficier du paiement de base et d'autres régimes de soutien sont définies dans le règlement (UE) n° 1307/2013. Le règlement délégué de la Commission définira des conditions supplémentaires d'admissibilité à ces paiements.

En vertu de ce cadre réglementaire, chaque État membre doit prendre une série de décisions concernant la façon dont il mettra en œuvre la réforme. Par conséquent, les conditions que les agriculteurs français devront remplir pour bénéficier d'un soutien dépendront aussi des choix que la France fera.

⁽¹⁾ Règlement (UE) n° 1307/2013 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 17 décembre 2013 établissant les règles relatives aux paiements directs en faveur des agriculteurs au titre des régimes de soutien relevant de la politique agricole commune et abrogeant le règlement (CE) n° 637/2008 du Conseil et le règlement (CE) n° 73/2009 du Conseil (JO L 347 du 20.12.2013).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001190/14
to the Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 February 2014)**

Subject: CAP reform and direct payments

The reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP) was formally approved in December 2013. Four regulations were adopted to serve as the basis for the reformed CAP. The size of France's farming industry means that the CAP reform has major implications for that country.

Given the importance of protecting French farmers, can the Commission provide more detailed information concerning the way in which the regulation on direct payments to farmers will be implemented and, more particularly, the conditions which French farmers will have to meet in order to be eligible for such payments?

**Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission
(23 April 2014)**

Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 ⁽¹⁾ lays down the new legal framework for direct support, including a basic payment for farmers and further support schemes (e.g. voluntary coupled support, a payment for young farmers commencing their agricultural activity) as part of the reform package of the CAP. In conformity with the empowerments contained in this basic act, further rules to ensure the smooth functioning of the schemes will be set out in a Commission Delegated Regulation and a Commission Implementing Regulation.

The conditions that French farmers will have to meet in order to be eligible for the basic payment and the other support schemes are laid down in that basic Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013. Additional conditions for receiving those payments will be provided for in the Commission Delegated Regulation.

Within this legal framework, Member States have to take a series of decisions regarding the way they will implement the reform. Therefore, the conditions under which the French farmers will be eligible to receive direct support also depend on the choices France will make.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001191/14
à la Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 février 2014)

Objet: Les mesures anti-dumping et anti-subsidies relatives aux panneaux solaires chinois

Les deux enquêtes relatives aux mesures anti-dumping et anti-subsidies dans le contexte de l'importation de panneaux solaires chinois sur le territoire de l'Union européenne ont débuté, respectivement, en septembre et novembre 2012. En juin 2013, après de tumultueuses négociations, des mesures anti-dumping provisoires ont été prises à l'encontre des entreprises chinoises du secteur photovoltaïque. Cependant, environ un tiers des exportateurs de panneaux solaires chinois restent campés sur leur position et refusent de remonter leurs prix à un seuil représentatif. Des mesures définitives ont donc été adoptées afin d'imposer pendant deux ans, à compter du 6 décembre 2013, des mesures anti-dumping s'élevant à 47,7 %. Toutefois, force est de constater que le secteur européen du photovoltaïque souffre de la concurrence déloyale grandissante provenant des pays-tiers et en particulier de la Chine.

1. Dans un souci de transparence, la Commission peut-elle nous éclairer sur la manière dont se sont déroulées les enquêtes susmentionnées, et plus particulièrement les négociations avec les entreprises chinoises de l'industrie des panneaux solaires?
2. Les mesures anti-dumping prises par la Commission et approuvées par le Conseil sont-elles les plus adaptées afin d'assurer la protection des entreprises européennes du secteur photovoltaïque?

Réponse donnée par M. De Gucht au nom de la Commission
(24 mars 2014)

L'industrie européenne des panneaux solaires a subi un préjudice du fait des importations massives réalisées à des prix de dumping et ayant bénéficié de subventions; il a été considéré qu'il était préférable pour les intérêts de l'Union d'opter pour une perspective à long terme et de corriger les déséquilibres dus aux pratiques commerciales déloyales tout en garantissant un approvisionnement constant. Des mesures ont été prises en août, à savoir des droits provisoires, assortis d'un engagement temporaire en matière de prix. Elles ont été confirmées en décembre 2013 par l'institution de mesures antidumping et compensatoires définitives et par l'adoption définitive d'un engagement permettant à la fois aux producteurs de l'Union de ce produit innovant essentiel de redresser leur situation dégradée en raison du dumping et des subventions, et aux producteurs-exportateurs chinois de continuer à exporter des panneaux solaires vers l'Union dans des conditions équitables.

Un engagement constitue un seuil minimum en dessous duquel les prix ne doivent pas tomber. Les exportateurs chinois ont aussi proposé de faire en sorte que le volume des importations effectuées dans le cadre de l'engagement soit fixé à un niveau annuel correspondant approximativement à leur performance actuelle sur le marché.

La plupart des exportations de panneaux solaires chinois vers l'UE sont désormais couvertes par l'engagement. Pour autant que toutes les conditions soient remplies, elles ne sont pas soumises à des droits antidumping ou compensatoires. Les exportateurs chinois participants sont coordonnés par la division «Électronique» de la chambre de commerce chinoise, qui a déployé des efforts importants pour informer les exportateurs chinois intéressés.

Les premiers mois d'application de l'engagement ont été positifs. La chute des prix, qui portait préjudice à l'industrie de l'Union des panneaux solaires, a été stoppée. Les deux parties sont résolues à respecter l'engagement et à garantir son efficacité.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001191/14
to the Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 February 2014)

Subject: Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures vis-à-vis Chinese solar panels

The two investigations to consider anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures in regard to Chinese solar panels being imported into the European Union began in September and November 2012 respectively. In June 2013, following stormy negotiations, provisional anti-dumping measures were imposed on Chinese businesses in the photovoltaic sector but around one third of Chinese solar panel exporters stuck to their guns and refused to raise their prices to a representative threshold. Definitive measures were therefore adopted in order to impose anti-dumping duties of up to 47.7% for two years with effect from 6 December 2013. It is however true to say that growing unfair competition from non-EU countries, and China in particular, is making life difficult for the EU photovoltaic sector.

1. For the sake of transparency, could the Commission say how the aforesaid investigations were conducted, particularly the negotiations with businesses in the Chinese solar panel industry?
2. Are the anti-dumping measures introduced by the Commission and approved by the Council the ones most suited to protecting EU businesses in the photovoltaic sector?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(24 March 2014)

The EU solar industry had been injured by massive dumped and subsidised imports, and the Union interest was best served by taking a longer term perspective and redressing imbalances arising from unfair trade practices while ensuring a steady inflow of supplies. Action was taken in August; provisional duties were combined with a provisional undertaking. This package was confirmed in December 2013 with the imposition of definitive anti-dumping and countervailing measures and the definitive adoption of an undertaking that allow the Union producers of this key innovative product to recover from dumping and subsidisation, while the Chinese exporting producers can continue exports of solar panels to the Union on fair terms.

An undertaking sets a benchmark below which prices should not fall. The Chinese exporters also offered to ensure that the volume of imports made under the undertaking would be at annual levels corresponding roughly to their current market performance.

The vast majority of Chinese solar panel exports to the EU are now covered by the undertaking. Provided that all conditions are fulfilled, they are not subject to anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties. Participating Chinese exporters are coordinated by the Electronics Division of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce that outreached significantly to Chinese exporters that wanted to join.

The first months of undertaking have been positive. The downward spiral of prices that was damaging the solar industry in the Union has been stopped. Both sides are committed to making the undertaking work and ensuring its effectiveness.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001192/14
à la Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 février 2014)

Objet: Les jeunes agriculteurs

La transmission du métier d'agriculteur est un élément essentiel pour pérenniser l'activité et préserver ainsi l'activité dans nos campagnes.

Dans cette optique, comment la Commission pense-t-elle mener des actions pour promouvoir le métier d'agriculteur chez les jeunes?

Réponse donnée par M. Ciolos au nom de la Commission
(21 mars 2014)

La Commission est consciente de l'importance de promouvoir l'agriculture auprès de la jeune génération, en particulier compte tenu du vieillissement rapide de la population agricole ainsi que de la pénurie de jeunes arrivants dans ce secteur.

Dans le cadre de la PAC, l'accent est particulièrement mis sur le renouvellement des générations dans l'agriculture. Dans le cadre de la politique de développement rural, cet aspect est clairement présent dans la priorité 2 (b) «se concentrer sur la facilitation de l'entrée d'exploitants agricoles suffisamment qualifiés dans le secteur de l'agriculture et sur le renouvellement des générations», en plus de la priorité 1 (c) «favoriser l'apprentissage tout au long de la vie et la formation professionnelle».

À la suite de la récente réforme de la PAC, un régime de soutien obligatoire en faveur des jeunes agriculteurs a été instauré dans le cadre du régime de paiements directs. Les jeunes agriculteurs qui s'établissent pour la première fois en qualité de chefs d'exploitation et qui sont âgés de 40 ans au maximum lorsqu'ils introduisent une première demande pour le régime de paiement de base peuvent, en plus de leur paiement de base, recevoir un paiement en faveur des jeunes agriculteurs. Cette aide est accordée pour une période maximale de cinq ans.

En outre, dans le cadre de la politique de développement rural, l'aide est fournie sous la forme d'un large éventail de mesures qui se concentrent davantage sur les besoins spécifiques des jeunes, en envisageant également la possibilité d'un montant d'aide plus élevé dans les cas de soutien à l'investissement. Outre l'aide en faveur de la création d'entreprises destinée aux jeunes, un ensemble de mesures fournissent un soutien supplémentaire, par exemple des services de conseil, un transfert de connaissances, une formation, des actions d'information et de démonstration ainsi qu'une coopération dans le but d'améliorer le niveau global des résultats de l'exploitation agricole.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001192/14
to the Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 February 2014)**

Subject: Young farmers

To ensure that farming has a future and that economic activity is maintained in our countryside it is essential for farming skills to be passed on to younger generations.

In view of this, what does the Commission intend to do to promote farming as a profession among young people?

**Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission
(21 March 2014)**

The Commission is aware of the importance of promoting the farming to the young generation, especially taking into account the rapid ageing of the farming community and the shortage of young entrants.

Within the framework of the CAP special emphasis is put on generation renewal in agriculture. Under the Rural Development Policy, this aspect is clearly reflected in Priority 2(b) 'focusing on the facilitation of the entry of adequately skilled farmers into the agricultural sector and generational renewal', besides Priority 1(c) 'fosters lifelong learning and vocational training'.

As a result of the recent CAP reform a mandatory young farmer's support scheme is introduced under the direct payments system. Young farmers initially setting up as a head of the holding and who are no more than 40 years of age when first applying for the basic payment scheme may in addition to their basic payment receive payment for young farmers. This is granted for a maximum period of five years.

In addition, under Rural Development Policy support is provided in the form of a wide range of measures focusing more on the specific needs of young persons including also the possibility of a higher support rates in case of the investment support. Apart from the business start-up support targeting the young persons, there is a set of measures which provide for a supplementary support e.g. advisory services, knowledge transfer, training, information and demonstration actions and cooperation with the aim to improve the overall performance of the agricultural holding.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001193/14
à la Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 février 2014)

Objet: Réindustrialisation

Lors de la session plénière de janvier 2014, les députés européens ont adopté le rapport relatif à la réindustrialisation de l'Union européenne afin de promouvoir la compétitivité et la durabilité. Ce rapport d'initiative montre la volonté du Parlement européen d'élaborer une stratégie unique pour répondre aux défis lancés par la crise. La mise en valeur de nos industries sera certainement source de croissance et de création d'emplois. C'est également dans un milieu international propice à l'amélioration de la compétitivité des entreprises européennes que l'Union pourra se redresser économiquement.

1. Dans cette perspective, j'adresse la question suivante à la Commission: quelle est sa stratégie pour promouvoir la réindustrialisation au sein de l'Union?
2. Va-t-elle user de la marge de manœuvre que lui offrent les traités pour amener certains États membres à coopérer plus étroitement?

Réponse donnée par M. Tajani au nom de la Commission
(26 mars 2014)

1. La Commission a adopté le 22 janvier une communication⁽¹⁾ présentant ses grandes priorités en matière de politique industrielle. Cette communication donne un aperçu des actions déjà entreprises et propose de nouvelles actions pour accélérer la réalisation des objectifs de l'UE dans ce domaine. Le document de travail des services de la Commission qui l'accompagne traite de la mise en œuvre de la politique industrielle, de la contribution d'autres politiques de l'UE à la compétitivité de l'industrie ainsi que des défis qui se posent et de la situation dans un certain nombre de secteurs industriels.

Ce paquet «Politique industrielle» fournit une description actualisée de la stratégie de réindustrialisation de la Commission et fait le point sur la politique industrielle de l'UE.

2. L'approche qu'a la Commission de la politique industrielle couvre les mesures à prendre par l'UE ainsi que celles qui doivent être adoptées à l'échelon national et régional. La coordination des actions menées au titre des diverses politiques de l'UE et l'articulation des efforts du niveau régional jusqu'à celui de l'UE sont des aspects essentiels de la politique industrielle de l'UE.

La Commission continue de mettre en œuvre et de développer cette politique industrielle pour répondre aux grands défis auxquels notre industrie et l'économie de l'UE, en général, se trouvent actuellement confrontées. La Commission utilisera tous les instruments fournis par le traité pour apporter la meilleure réponse possible à ces défis tout en respectant pleinement le principe de subsidiarité.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2014) 14 final «Pour une renaissance industrielle européenne».

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001193/14
to the Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 February 2014)

Subject: Reindustrialisation

During the January 2014 part-session, MEPs adopted the report on reindustrialising Europe to promote competitiveness and sustainability. This own-initiative report demonstrates that Parliament would be prepared to have just one strategy to meet the challenges thrown up by the crisis. Developing our industries will undoubtedly create growth and jobs. Equally, for the EU to be able to recover, EU businesses need an international setting conducive to their becoming more competitive

1. With this in mind, could the Commission explain its strategy for promoting reindustrialisation within the European Union?
2. Will it use the margin for manoeuvre granted it by the Treaties to prevail upon some Member States to cooperate more closely?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(26 March 2014)

1. The Commission adopted on 22 January a communication ⁽¹⁾ setting out the Commission's key priorities for industrial policy. This communication provides an overview of actions already undertaken and puts forward new actions to speed up the attainment of EU objectives in this area. The accompanying staff working document reports on the implementation of industrial policy, contributions of other EU policies to industrial competitiveness and the challenges and situation of a selected number of industrial sectors.

This industrial policy package provides an up-to-date description of the Commission's strategy for reindustrialisation and the state of play of EU industrial policy.

2. The Commission's approach to industrial policy encompasses actions to be taken at EU as well as those to be adopted at national and regional levels. The coordination of policy actions across EU policies and the articulation of efforts from the regional to the EU policy levels are key aspects of EU industrial policy.

The Commission continues rolling out and developing this industrial policy to respond to the major challenges that our industry and the EU economy in general, are currently facing. The Commission will use all the instruments made available by the Treaty to give the best response possible to those challenges in full respect of the subsidiarity principle.

⁽¹⁾ COM/2014/014 final 'For a European Industrial Renaissance'.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001194/14
à la Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 février 2014)

Objet: Principe de réciprocité dans les relations commerciales avec les pays tiers

En janvier 2014, les députés au Parlement européen ont adopté plusieurs rapports relatifs aux marchés publics européens. L'esprit est donc à l'ouverture des marchés publics à la fois au sein de l'Union européenne et aux pays tiers. Ces rapports sont des exemples parmi tant d'autres de la volonté de l'Union de s'ouvrir de plus en plus au reste du monde afin de correspondre parfaitement aux normes émises par l'OMC et d'aller de l'avant dans les négociations de Doha entamées en 1995. Cependant, il est primordial de protéger nos industries face à la possible concurrence déloyale des pays tiers. Nous voyons, à travers le travail du Parlement européen et de la Commission européenne, une réelle volonté de garantir le principe de réciprocité dans les relations commerciales de l'Union avec le reste du monde. Néanmoins:

1. La Commission peut-elle apporter des éclaircissements sur la façon dont elle compte faire appliquer le principe de réciprocité dans ses relations avec les pays tiers?
2. Quelle est sa stratégie pour faire respecter ce principe aux pays avec lesquels l'Union est en négociation pour un accord de libre-échange?

Réponse donnée par M. De Gucht au nom de la Commission
(24 mars 2014)

La promotion de la réciprocité dans les relations commerciales de l'UE avec ses partenaires est étroitement liée au calendrier des accords de libre-échange (ALE) de l'UE. Étant donné que l'objectif des ALE est d'éliminer tous les obstacles tarifaires et non tarifaires aux échanges et que l'UE, comme d'autres économies avancées, est plus ouverte aux échanges que ses partenaires émergents, cette stratégie aboutira nécessairement à un rééquilibrage de l'asymétrie actuelle entre les niveaux d'ouverture et à l'établissement de règles du jeu plus équitables. Cette politique est réciproque par nature.

L'objectif final est d'amener les économies émergentes à un plus haut niveau d'ouverture plutôt que de fermer le marché de l'UE et d'entraver son économie pour la simple raison que d'autres le font.

Cette approche donne des résultats: l'ALE UE-Corée élimine 99 % des droits de douane sur les échanges avec la Corée ainsi que de nombreux obstacles non tarifaires au commerce, alors que les droits appliqués par la Corée étaient deux fois plus élevés que ceux pratiqués par l'UE avant le début des négociations.

La Commission a proposé un instrument pour ouvrir l'accès aux marchés publics, ce qui peut contribuer à renforcer l'effet de levier permettant à l'UE de promouvoir la poursuite de l'ouverture. En même temps, l'UE encourage ses partenaires commerciaux à négocier des accords avec elle. Les ALE conclus par l'UE avec la Corée et Singapour garantissent l'accès à un large éventail de marchés publics; l'accord avec le Canada, qui couvre pour la première fois les entités sous-fédérales, peut quant à lui donner de très bons résultats.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001194/14
to the Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 February 2014)

Subject: Reciprocity principle in trade relations with third countries

In January 2014 the Members of the European Parliament adopted several reports on European public contracts in a spirit of opening up procurement procedures both within the EU and to third countries. These reports are yet further examples of the EU's willingness to open up increasingly to the rest of the world in line with WTO standards and to make progress in the Doha negotiations which began in 1995. However, it is essential that we protect our industries against possible unfair competition from third countries. In the work of Parliament and the Commission we see a genuine desire to guarantee the principle of reciprocity in the EU's trade relations with the rest of the world. Nevertheless:

1. Can the Commission explain how it intends to apply the principle of reciprocity in its relations with third countries?
2. What strategy is it pursuing to ensure that this principle is respected by countries with which the EU is negotiating free-trade agreements?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(24 March 2014)

The promotion of reciprocity in EU's trade relations with its partners is closely linked to the EU's Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) agenda. As the objective of FTAs is to remove all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and the EU is, like other advanced economies, more open to trade than its emerging partners, this agenda will necessarily rebalance the current asymmetry in levels of openness and promote a more level playing field. This policy is reciprocal in nature.

The ultimate objective is to bring emerging economies to a higher level of openness rather than to close the EU market and hamper the EU's economy simply because others do.

This approach provides results: the EU-Korea FTA removes 99% of tariffs with Korea, besides many non-tariff barriers to trade, while Korea's tariffs were twice as high as in the EU before the start of negotiations.

The Commission has tabled an instrument to open up procurement markets, which can help improve the EU's leverage to promote further opening. At the same time, the EU encourages its trading partners to negotiate agreements with the EU. The EU's FTAs with Korea and Singapore secured a broad coverage of public procurement markets and the agreement with Canada can deliver very good results, covering Canada's sub-federal entities for the first time ever.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001195/14
à la Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 février 2014)

Objet: Relations UE-Taïwan

Le 9 octobre 2013, le Parlement européen a adopté une résolution proposant d'entamer des relations commerciales institutionnalisées entre l'Union européenne et Taïwan, notamment en ce qui concerne la protection des investissements. Le 21 janvier, l'Union européenne a lancé la première phase des négociations en vue d'un accord avec la Chine en matière de protection des investissements. Étant donné l'état des relations entre ces deux entités, je souhaite savoir:

1. Si la Commission européenne est déterminée à entamer des relations commerciales avec Taïwan en matière de protection des investissements et d'accès au marché comme stipulé dans la résolution, certes non contraignante, du Parlement européen?
2. Si Taïwan pàtira des nouvelles négociations entre l'Union européenne et la Chine relatives à la protection des investissements?
3. Si les relations entre ces deux entités seront menacées par le lancement de cette première phase de négociation?

Réponse donnée par M. De Gucht au nom de la Commission
(4 avril 2014)

À l'occasion de l'adoption de la résolution du 9 octobre 2013 sur les relations commerciales entre l'Union européenne et Taïwan, la Commission a confirmé au Parlement qu'elle partage son engagement à l'égard de ces relations.

La Commission concentre actuellement son action sur un ambitieux programme de négociations commerciales avec l'Asie, qui comprend notamment les importantes négociations sur les investissements entamées récemment avec la République populaire de Chine.

Un accord entre l'Union européenne et la Chine qui prévoirait un traitement non discriminatoire et un meilleur accès au marché pourrait non seulement profiter aux investisseurs européens et à leurs investissements mais aussi avoir un effet positif sur d'autres partenaires régionaux.

L'UE continuera à étudier les moyens de développer davantage encore ses relations commerciales avec Taïwan, en prenant en considération l'état d'avancement de son programme de négociations dans la région, y compris celles sur les investissements menées avec la République populaire de Chine.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001195/14
to the Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 February 2014)**

Subject: EU-Taiwan Relations

On 9 October 2013, the European Parliament adopted a resolution proposing to open institutionalised trade relations between the EU and Taiwan, in particular as regards the protection of investments. On 21 January, the European Union launched the first phase of negotiations for an agreement with China on the protection of investments. Given the state of relations between these two entities, will the Commission say:

1. Is it committed to opening trade relations with Taiwan on investment protection and market access, as specified in the European Parliament resolution, which was admittedly non-binding?
2. Will Taiwan suffer because of new negotiations taking place between the European Union and China on the protection of investments?
3. Will the relationship between these two entities be threatened by the launch of this first phase of the negotiations?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2014)**

On the occasion of the adoption of the Resolution of 9 October 2013 on EU-Taiwan trade relations, the Commission confirmed to the Parliament that it shares its commitment to EU-Taiwan trade relations.

The Commission is currently focused on an ambitious agenda of trade negotiations with Asia, including the important investment negotiations that started recently with the People's Republic of China.

An EU Agreement with China which would include non-discriminatory treatment and improved market access might not only benefit European investors and their investments but also positively impact other regional partners.

The EU will continue to explore how to further develop our trade relations with Taiwan, taking into account the progress in our negotiating agenda in the region, including in the investment negotiations with the mainland.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001196/14
à la Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 février 2014)

Objet: Relations UE-ANASE

Depuis quelques années, nous constatons que l'ANASE devient une structure de plus en plus organisée et institutionnalisée. Celle-ci vise à mettre en place pour 2015 un marché intérieur pour 600 millions de personnes. L'Union européenne, pionnière en cette matière, se doit de partager son expérience afin que ces pays puissent réellement former une puissance régionale partageant les mêmes valeurs que celles de l'Union. Le rapport relatif à l'avenir des relations entre l'Union européenne et l'ANASE a été adopté en janvier 2014. Ce rapport évoquait la possibilité de faire évoluer ces relations vers un partenariat stratégique.

1. Je souhaite demander à la Commission européenne s'il y a une réelle volonté de sa part de créer avec l'ANASE un partenariat stratégique?
2. Si tel est le cas, de quelle manière la Commission compte-t-elle s'y prendre afin de s'assurer que des valeurs telles que la démocratie, l'état de droit et les droits fondamentaux soient respectées dans ces pays?

Réponse donnée par M^{me} Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission
(24 avril 2014)

1. La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante et la Commission reconnaissent l'importance stratégique de l'Association des nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est (ANASE). L'UE a tout à gagner du succès de l'intégration de l'association: une ANASE unie et confiante en elle est une bonne chose pour la stabilité, la sécurité et la prospérité de la région. L'UE se réjouit de débattre de l'avenir de ses relations avec l'ANASE lors de la prochaine réunion des ministres des affaires étrangères des deux entités, qui se tiendra le (date à ajouter).
 2. L'UE soutient la démocratie, la primauté du droit et le respect des droits fondamentaux en Asie du Sud-Est de différentes manières:
 - des clauses spécifiques concernant ces points ont été incluses dans les accords de partenariat et de coopération qui ont été signés ou sont en cours de négociation avec des pays de la région;
 - l'UE a mis en place des dialogues spécifiques sur les Droits de l'homme avec pratiquement tous les pays de la région, et la démocratie, la primauté du droit et le respect des droits fondamentaux sont aussi abordés dans le cadre du dialogue politique;
 - l'UE est en train de renforcer ses liens avec les organes de l'ANASE compétents. M. Lambrinidis, représentant spécial de l'Union européenne pour les Droits de l'homme, a rendu visite à la commission intergouvernementale des Droits de l'homme de l'ANASE à Jakarta en mai 2013. Cette commission devrait venir à Bruxelles dans le courant de l'année. Un plan de travail UE-ANASE spécifique, financé par l'UE, est en cours de discussion.
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(English version)

Question for written answer E-001196/14
to the Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 February 2014)

Subject: EU-ASEAN Relations

In recent years, ASEAN has become increasingly organised and institutionalised. By 2015 it seeks to establish an internal market of over 600 million people. The European Union, which is a pioneer in this field, should share its experience so that the ASEAN countries manage to form a regional power with the same values as the Union. The report on the future of relations between the EU and ASEAN was adopted in January 2014. It mentioned the possibility of upgrading these relations to become a strategic partnership.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it have a genuine desire to create a strategic partnership with ASEAN?
2. If so, how does it intend to ensure that values, such as democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, are respected in these countries?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2014)

1. The HR/VP and the Commission recognise the strategic importance of ASEAN. The EU has strong stakes in the success of ASEAN's integration: a united and self-confident ASEAN is good for regional stability, security and prosperity. The EU looks forward to discussing the future of the EU-ASEAN relations at the next EU-ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (date tbc).
 2. The EU supports democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in South East Asia in various ways:
 - Specific clauses on the abovementioned matters have been included in the partnership and cooperation agreements which have been signed with South East Asian countries, or are under negotiation;
 - The EU has dedicated human rights dialogues with almost all South East Asian countries and democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are also raised in political dialogues;
 - The EU is reinforcing its links with relevant ASEAN bodies. EU Special Representative for Human Rights Lambrinidis met in Jakarta in May 2013 with ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). AICHR is expected to visit Brussels later this year. A specific EU-funded EU-ASEAN Work Plan is being discussed.
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(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001197/14
à la Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 février 2014)

Objet: Travailleurs détachés

La question des travailleurs détachés fait actuellement partie intégrante du débat public en France. Beaucoup de nos concitoyens sont concernés par ce phénomène. Le manque criant de transparence de l'information envenime le débat et donne souvent lieu à une appropriation abusive, mais bien réelle, par l'extrême droite.

1. Afin de rétablir la vérité et dans le souci d'avancer vers une législation européenne plus adaptée à ce phénomène, je demande à la Commission de bien vouloir préciser la législation en vigueur régissant les travailleurs détachés?
2. Plus particulièrement, quelles sont les dépenses relatives aux travailleurs détachés qui doivent être payées par le pays d'origine et quelles sont celles qui doivent être financées par le pays d'accueil?

Réponse donnée par M. Andor au nom de la Commission
(2 avril 2014)

1. En ce qui concerne la législation relative aux travailleurs détachés, la Commission voudrait appeler l'attention sur la directive 96/71/CE ⁽¹⁾, laquelle définit un ensemble de conditions d'emploi fondamentales qui doivent s'appliquer aux travailleurs détachés dans le pays d'accueil. Ces conditions comprennent, *inter alia*, les périodes de travail maximales, les périodes de repos minimales, la durée minimale des congés payés annuels, les barèmes minimaux, y compris pour les heures supplémentaires, et les dispositions concernant la santé et la sécurité au travail. En mars 2012, la Commission a aussi adopté une proposition ⁽²⁾ de directive d'exécution qui vise à améliorer l'application et le respect de la directive 96/71/CE par les États membres et dont on a bon espoir qu'elle sera adoptée à la fin de la législature en cours, après la conclusion d'un accord provisoire entre les colégislateurs.

Le règlement (CE) n° 883/2004 ⁽³⁾ portant sur la coordination des systèmes de sécurité sociale comporte également des dispositions sur les travailleurs détachés.

2. Pour ce qui est des dépenses inhérentes aux prestations de sécurité sociale, il convient de préciser ceci: conformément au règlement mentionné ci-dessus, lorsqu'un travailleur est détaché sur le territoire d'un autre État membre (État d'accueil) pour une période limitée d'emblée (à 24 mois au plus) par l'entreprise qui l'emploie, et pour autant que certaines conditions restent d'application, il demeure assujéti au système de sécurité sociale de l'État membre où l'entreprise exerce habituellement son activité (État d'envoi). Dans ces conditions, et puisque le travailleur ne perçoit aucune prestation de la part de l'État d'accueil, c'est, d'une façon générale, l'État d'envoi qui prend à sa charge les dépenses relatives aux prestations de sécurité sociale des travailleurs détachés.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 96/71/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 16 décembre 1996 concernant le détachement de travailleurs effectué dans le cadre d'une prestation de services, JO L 18 du 21.1.1997, p. 1.

⁽²⁾ Proposition de directive du Parlement européen et du Conseil relative à l'exécution de la directive 96/71/CE concernant le détachement des travailleurs effectué dans le cadre d'une prestation de services (COM(2012) 131 final du 21 mars 2012).

⁽³⁾ Règlement (CE) n° 883/2004 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 29 avril 2004 portant sur la coordination des systèmes de sécurité sociale (JO L 166 du 30.4.2004, p. 1).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001197/14
to the Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(6 February 2014)

Subject: Posted workers

The issue of posted workers is currently being hotly debated in France. It is a phenomenon that affects many of our fellow citizens. The serious failure to disclose information on the subject is poisoning the debate, often enabling the extreme right to misappropriate the issue for its own ends.

1. In order to re-establish the truth and to move towards adjusting European legislation to take fuller account of this phenomenon, will the Commission indicate what legislation is in force concerning posted workers?
2. More particularly, what expenses relating to posted workers have to be paid by the country of origin and what expenses have to be financed by the host country?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2014)

1. As regards legislation concerning posted workers, the Commission would highlight Directive 96/71/EC⁽¹⁾, which identifies a core of employment conditions that must be applied to posted workers in the host country. It includes, *inter alia*, maximum work periods and minimum rest periods, minimum paid annual holidays, minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates and provisions regarding health and safety at work. In March 2012 the Commission also adopted a proposal⁽²⁾ for an enforcement directive to improve the way Directive 96/71/EC is implemented, applied and enforced in practice by the Member States. Following the provisional agreement reached between the co-legislators, it will hopefully be adopted by the end of this parliamentary term.

Regulation (EC) No 883/2004⁽³⁾ on the coordination of social security systems also contains provisions that concern posted workers.

2. As regards expenses relating to social security benefits, under the abovementioned Regulation, where a worker is posted for a period limited from the outset (to a maximum of 24 months) to another Member State (the host State) by the undertaking which employs him/her, and provided that certain conditions continue to apply, he/she remains attached to the social security scheme of the Member State in which the undertaking normally operates (the posting State). As the posted person remains attached to the system of the posting State throughout the period of posting and does not receive any benefits from the host State, it is, generally speaking, the posting State which bears the costs relating to social security benefits for posted workers.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ L 18, 21.1.1997, p. 1.

⁽²⁾ Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (COM(2012) 131 final of 21 March 2012).

⁽³⁾ Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, OJ L 166, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001200/14
a la Comisión**

Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)

(6 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Implementación de la Garantía Juvenil

El paro juvenil es uno de los mayores problemas actuales de la Unión. En algunos países el problema se agrava. Es el caso de España donde la tasa de paro entre los menores de 25 años supera el 50 %.

El 28 de febrero de 2013 se aprobó la Garantía Juvenil Europea que pretende asegurar el derecho a un empleo, prácticas, más formación o un empleo formativo a los jóvenes de la UE en situación de desempleo por más de cuatro meses.

La financiación de las medidas a nivel nacional proviene de los fondos estructurales y de inversión de la UE, en concreto del Fondo Social Europeo, así como de una nueva partida presupuestaria de la Unión de 6 000 millones de euros proveniente de la Iniciativa sobre Empleo Juvenil.

¿Cómo se está traduciendo en medidas prácticas esta garantía? ¿Cuál es el estado de implementación y las expectativas de cumplimiento de sus objetivos?

Respuesta del Sr. Andor en nombre de la Comisión

(2 de abril de 2014)

Los 20 Estados miembros que pueden acogerse a la Iniciativa sobre Empleo Juvenil han presentado un plan de aplicación de la Garantía Juvenil que establece el marco estratégico nacional en virtud del cual se aplicarán las medidas de lucha contra el desempleo juvenil. Estas medidas serán evaluadas en el marco del Semestre Europeo.

Los Estados miembros están preparando actualmente los programas operativos del Fondo Social Europeo o de la Iniciativa sobre Empleo Juvenil específicos con arreglo a los cuales se apoyarán las medidas encaminadas a aplicar la Garantía Juvenil. Se han tomado medidas para garantizar una rápida aplicación de la Garantía Juvenil sobre el terreno, y, en particular, de la parte que puede ser financiada por la Iniciativa sobre Empleo Juvenil.

En efecto, las actividades de ejecución de la Iniciativa sobre Empleo Juvenil son subvencionables a partir del 1 de septiembre de 2013, y los Estados miembros pueden presentar un programa operativo nacional específicamente dedicado a la Iniciativa sobre Empleo Juvenil antes de que presenten su Acuerdo de Asociación.

Por último, la Comisión está siguiendo de cerca las disposiciones de los Estados miembros para preparar la Iniciativa sobre Empleo Juvenil y les está alentando para que aprovechen todas las opciones disponibles, en función de sus necesidades específicas, con el fin de garantizar una aplicación rápida y eficaz sobre el terreno.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001200/14
to the Commission
Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)
(6 February 2014)**

Subject: Implementation of the Youth Guarantee

Youth unemployment is one of the major problems currently facing the EU. In some countries the problem is getting worse. That is the case in Spain, where the rate of unemployment among people under the age of 25 is over 50%.

On 28 February 2013, the European Youth Guarantee was approved, the goal of which is to ensure that every young person in the EU who is out of work for over four months is offered a job, a placement, further education or work-focused training.

Funding for the measures at national level comes from EU structural and investment funds, namely the European Social Fund, in addition to a new EU budget share of 6 billion euros from the Youth Employment Initiative.

How is this guarantee being translated into practical measures? To what extent has it been implemented, and to what extent are the goals expected to be achieved?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2014)**

The 20 Member States eligible for the Youth Employment Initiative have submitted a Youth Guarantee Implementation Plan that sets out the national strategic framework under which measures to combat youth unemployment will be implemented. These measures will be assessed in the frame of the European Semester.

Member States are currently preparing the European Social Fund or the dedicated Youth Employment Initiative Operational Programmes under which measures to implement the Youth Guarantee will be supported. Arrangements have been made to ensure a swift implementation of the Youth Guarantee on the ground, and in particular, of the part that may be funded by the YEI.

Indeed, activities implementing the YEI are eligible as from 1 September 2013, and Member States may submit a national Operational Programme specifically dedicated to the YEI before they submit their Partnership Agreement.

Finally, the Commission is following closely Member States' arrangements to prepare the YEI and is encouraging them to use all options available, according to their specific needs, in order to ensure a swift and efficient implementation on the ground.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001203/14
to the Commission**

Liam Aylward (ALDE)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Human rights commitments in trade agreements with third countries

While human rights clauses are now a common feature of trade agreements between the EU and third countries, it is important that these clauses be respected.

A trade agreement between the EU, Peru and Colombia, which includes clauses on human rights, entered into force in August 2013. Yet the human rights situation in Colombia remains a serious concern. According to human rights organisations, specific instances of human rights violations include the murder of human rights defenders (52 instances between January and September 2013) and trade unionists (27 instances during 2013), the displacement of people and the breach of freedom of expression by criminalising social protests and facilitating violence against protestors (including 15 murders in the most recent social mobilisation).

1. Could the Commission comment on the human rights situation in Colombia and its compatibility with the terms of the trade agreement? Could it outline the measures it intends to take to deal with any breaches of the human rights clauses in this instance?
2. The EU holds a human rights dialogue with Colombia twice a year. Was there proper consultation with Colombian civil society before the most recent meeting? Can the Commission ensure that civil society will be part of the process?
3. Could the Commission advise on how it monitors the human rights situation in third countries with which the EU has trade agreements? Does it intend to develop a transparent assessment procedure for finding breaches of human rights in such countries?
4. Could the Commission outline the measures it takes when it finds breaches of human rights in a third country with which it has a trade agreement, and give examples of when it has taken such measures?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission

(16 April 2014)

The Honourable Member is referred to the Commission's replies to written questions E-005156/2012 and E-012830/2013. Furthermore, the Commission wishes to provide reassurances that it monitors the human rights situation in Colombia on a continuous basis. As per normal practice, the EU will consult civil society before the next human rights dialogue with Colombia later this year.

EU Free Trade Agreements are linked to political Framework or Association Agreements which include human rights clauses. If there is no Association or Framework Agreement in force, a separate human rights clause is inserted in Free Trade Agreements, as is the case with the EU-Colombia/Peru Trade Agreement. Now that the Agreement is being implemented, EU and Colombia have a new basis to work on further human rights improvements in the country.

The main value of a human rights clause is to demonstrate shared commitment to human rights by means of a legal basis for appropriate measures, including suspension of the relevant agreement in the event of grave human rights violations. Negative measures and sanctions have been implemented under the human rights clause in a number of framework agreements on 22 occasions.

The Commission is informed that the Colombian government is undertaking efforts to improve respect for human rights by means of measures such as training of security forces on human rights and humanitarian law, protection programmes for human rights defenders and reintegration in civil life of former fighters.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001204/14
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Fiorello Provera (EFD)

(6 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Violazioni dei diritti umani in Vietnam

Il 31 gennaio 2014 Human Rights Watch ha riportato che il Vietnam non ha rispettato i suoi impegni per quanto riguarda il miglioramento della situazione dei diritti umani. L'organizzazione segnala che negli ultimi anni il governo vietnamita ha continuato a violare sistematicamente i diritti in ambiti come la libertà di espressione, di associazione, di riunione e di religione, nonché i diritti dei lavoratori. Hanoi ha chiesto la carcerazione di numerosi attivisti per i diritti umani e militanti per il diritto alla terra. I cittadini vietnamiti che hanno chiesto riforme sono stati oggetto di ritorsioni. I gruppi della società civile, come il partito socialdemocratico e la rete di blogger vietnamiti, sono stati presi di mira a seguito del loro impegno nel contribuire a monitorare la domanda di adesione del Vietnam al Consiglio dei diritti dell'uomo delle Nazioni Unite.

All'inizio di dicembre 2013 è stato predisposto l'intervento delle forze di sicurezza del governo per sciogliere con la violenza le riunioni pacifiche di Hanoi e Ho Chi Minh, che erano state organizzate per celebrare la giornata dei diritti umani. Tale fatto è stato seguito da una serie di attacchi ai danni di blogger, attivisti per la democrazia e manifestanti per il diritto alla terra, e in alcuni casi le persone sono state attaccate all'interno delle loro abitazioni. Contemporaneamente il governo ha impedito agli attivisti della società civile di lasciare il paese. Nel periodo precedente il riesame periodico universale del paese diversi blogger vietnamiti si sono recati negli Stati Uniti, in Europa e in Australia allo scopo di esercitare maggiori pressioni sul governo di Hanoi ai fini di un miglioramento della situazione dei diritti umani nel paese.

Nel complesso, stando a Human Rights Watch, il 2013 ha visto un peggioramento della situazione dei diritti umani in Vietnam ed è stato caratterizzato da gravi e crescenti repressioni degli oppositori del governo e di altri attivisti della società civile.

1. Alla luce del riesame periodico universale del Vietnam, quali provvedimenti sta adottando il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per esercitare pressioni sul governo vietnamita di Hanoi affinché adempia ai suoi obblighi in materia di diritti umani?
2. Quali misure sta adottando l'Unione per sostenere gli attivisti per i diritti umani in Vietnam che sono esposti alle persecuzioni da parte delle autorità?
3. Sta il Vietnam attualmente beneficiando di aiuti dall'Unione europea soggetti a condizioni in funzione del suo impegno ad attuare le riforme in materia di diritti umani?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(7 aprile 2014)

1. Il riesame periodico universale (UPR) ha confermato l'esistenza di gravi carenze nel settore dei diritti umani in Vietnam, segnatamente per quanto riguarda la libertà di espressione, pur evidenziando progressi in materia di diritti sociali ed economici. La necessità di colmare tali lacune e di rispettare gli impegni internazionali è stata e sarà il cuore del nostro messaggio alle controparti vietnamite in occasione di visite, missioni e incontri a tutti i livelli. Non appena, in giugno, sarà resa nota la reazione del Governo alle raccomandazioni formulate nell'UPR, la delegazione dell'UE a Hanoi potrà discutere dei risultati dell'UPR con il governo e la società civile e seguire da vicino l'attuazione delle raccomandazioni. Il seguito dato all'UPR sarà presumibilmente uno dei temi chiave dell'agenda del prossimo Dialogo sui diritti umani tra l'UE e il Vietnam. Se del caso, saranno intraprese mosse diplomatiche, diffusi messaggi pubblici e dichiarazioni ufficiali in merito a specifici sviluppi.

2. La delegazione dell'UE a Hanoi incontra frequentemente gli attivisti per i diritti umani (bilateralmente o in occasione di inviti a conferenze) e così anche le ambasciate degli Stati membri. Ciò dimostra l'attenzione dell'UE nei confronti dei difensori dei diritti umani e fornisce agli attivisti, qualora lo desiderino, visibilità e un certo livello di protezione. Inoltre, la UE ha stilato un elenco di persone a rischio che viene regolarmente aggiornato. Vengono chieste al Governo informazioni sulla situazione degli attivisti per i diritti umani inseriti nell'elenco e specifici casi vengono affrontati con il Governo nell'ambito del nuovo dialogo potenziato in materia di diritti umani.

3. L'assistenza allo sviluppo fornita al Vietnam non è subordinata a specifici impegni in materia di diritti umani, ma mira a promuovere e salvaguardare i diritti fondamentali delle categorie vulnerabili (come le minoranze etniche), a migliorare l'accesso alla giustizia e a rafforzare e conferire poteri alle organizzazioni della società civile.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001204/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(6 February 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Human Rights Violations in Vietnam

On 31 January 2014 Human Rights Watch reported that Vietnam has failed to adhere to its commitments to improve its human rights record. The organisation reports that in the last few years the Vietnamese government has continued to systematically violate rights in areas such as freedom of expression, association, assembly and religion, as well as labour rights. Hanoi has called for the imprisonment of numerous human rights activists and land rights activists. Vietnamese citizens who have called for reforms have faced retaliation. Civil society groups such as the Social Democratic party and the Network of Vietnamese Bloggers have been targeted following their actions helping to monitor Vietnam's bid for membership of the UN Human Rights Council.

In early December 2013, government security forces were sent to violently break up peaceful gatherings in Hanoi and Saigon, which had been organised to mark Human Rights Day. This was followed up by a series of assaults on bloggers, democracy activists and land rights protesters, and in some cases people were attacked in their homes. At the same time, the government has prevented civil society activists from leaving the country. In the run-up to the country's Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a number of Vietnamese bloggers travelled to the US, Europe and Australia in order to put additional pressure on the government in Hanoi to improve its human rights record.

Overall, according to Human Rights Watch, 2013 saw a deterioration in regard to Vietnam's human rights situation and was marked by a severe and intensifying crackdown on critics of the government and other civil society activists.

1. In light of Vietnam's UPR, what steps is the High Representative/Vice-President taking in order to put pressure on the Vietnamese Government in Hanoi to adhere to its human rights obligations?
2. What steps is the EU taking to support human rights activists in Vietnam who are vulnerable to persecution by the authorities?
3. At present, is aid provided to Vietnam by the EU subject to conditions vis-à-vis its commitment to human rights reform?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(7 April 2014)

1. The UPR confirmed major shortcomings in the field of human rights in Vietnam, notably in the field of freedom of expression, while also giving evidence of progress in social and economic rights. The need to address these shortcomings and to meet international commitments has been and will continue to be our consistent message to Vietnamese counterparts in visits, missions and meetings at all levels. While the Government's reaction to the recommendations made in the UPR will only be available in June, the EU Delegation in Hanoi will discuss the UPR outcome with the government and civil society and closely monitor the implementation of the recommendations. The UPR follow-up is also expected to be a key item on the agenda of the next EU-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue. If and when required, demarches, public messages and statements will be issued on specific developments.
 2. The EU Delegation in Hanoi frequently meets with human rights defenders (bilaterally or in form of invitation to conferences), so do embassies from Member States. This demonstrates EU attention to the situation of human rights defenders and, if so desired by the activists, provides them with visibility and a certain degree of protection. Furthermore the EU has established a list of Persons of Concern, which is regularly updated. Information on the situation of the human rights activists on the list is sought from the government and specific cases are raised with the Government in the enhanced Human Rights Dialogue.
 3. Development assistance provided to Vietnam is not conditional to specific human rights commitments. It aims to promote and protect fundamental rights of vulnerable groups (e.g. ethnic minorities), to increase access to justice as well as to strengthen and empower civil society organisations.
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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001208/14
alla Commissione
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(6 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: Richiesta di informazioni circa la concessione all'Albania dello status di paese candidato all'adesione all'Unione europea

I processi di allargamento sono sempre problematici e caratterizzati da numerose implicazioni politiche, economiche e socio-culturali.

La strategia di allargamento adottata dall'Unione europea sancisce la centralità di alcuni criteri fondamentali di adesione, quali lo Stato di diritto, le questioni relative alle riforme giudiziarie, alla lotta contro la criminalità organizzata e la corruzione e al rispetto dei diritti umani. L'Albania ha presentato la sua domanda di adesione all'Unione europea nell'aprile 2009. Solo nel 2013, la Commissione, dopo aver verificato la realizzazione da parte del governo albanese di importanti riforme, ha proposto che all'Albania venisse conferito lo status di paese candidato. Nonostante la valutazione positiva di Commissione e Parlamento europeo, l'Albania non è riuscita a convincere diversi Stati membri e il Consiglio UE. Si consideri che, pur avendo l'Albania adottato importanti riforme strutturali per soddisfare i requisiti minimi richiesti e pur considerando l'impegno svolto nel proseguimento della lotta contro la criminalità organizzata e la corruzione, è necessaria un'intensificazione delle riforme, soprattutto per l'affermazione dello Stato di diritto. Si sottolinea, inoltre, la presenza sul territorio albanese di oltre 400 tra aziende italiane e joint-venture italo-albanesi.

Alla luce di quanto premesso, può dire la Commissione:

1. quali saranno i successivi sviluppi relativi alla possibile futura concessione all'Albania dello status di paese candidato all'adesione all'UE?
2. Quali raccomandazioni sono state formulate dalla Commissione all'Albania per potenziare la lotta contro la criminalità organizzata e la corruzione?

**Risposta di Štefan Füle a nome della Commissione
(2 aprile 2014)**

Nel dicembre 2013 il Consiglio ha definito le varie fasi che porteranno a una decisione sulla concessione dello status di paese candidato all'Albania nel giugno 2014. A tal fine il Consiglio valuterà, in base a una relazione della Commissione, se il paese continui ad attuare le strategie di lotta alla corruzione e riforma giudiziaria e ad applicare le leggi pertinenti di recente adozione e se proseguano le indagini e le azioni giudiziarie proattive, anche nel settore della criminalità organizzata.

Per quanto riguarda la lotta alla criminalità organizzata e alla corruzione, la Commissione ha raccomandato all'Albania di intensificare il ricorso alla valutazione delle minacce, lo scambio di informazioni e le indagini proattive, di rafforzare la capacità degli organi di contrasto e di migliorare la cooperazione con i partner internazionali come Europol, con cui l'Albania ha recentemente concluso un accordo operativo. La riforma giudiziaria è indispensabile per migliorare l'efficienza delle indagini, delle azioni giudiziarie e delle condanne. Occorre un approccio più proattivo per quanto riguarda i patrimoni inspiegabili e i sospetti di riciclaggio. La Commissione ha inoltre raccomandato alle autorità di adottare un approccio olistico nella lotta contro la corruzione e la criminalità organizzata. Questo presuppone l'esistenza di un quadro istituzionale solido che impedisca la corruzione, in particolare attraverso il rafforzamento dei controlli interni, la verifica delle dichiarazioni patrimoniali dei funzionari e una maggiore protezione di chi denuncia irregolarità.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001208/14
to the Commission
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(6 February 2014)

Subject: Request for information concerning the concession to Albania of candidate country status for accession to the European Union

Enlargement processes are always problematic and characterised by multiple political, economic and socio-cultural implications.

The enlargement strategy adopted by the European Union sanctions the centrality of certain fundamental accession criteria, such as the rule of law, matters associated with judicial reform, the fight against organised crime and corruption and respect for human rights. Albania filed its application for accession to the European Union in April 2009. Not until 2013 did the Commission, having verified the implementation of major reforms by the Albanian Government, propose that Albania be granted candidate country status. Despite the endorsement of the Commission and European Parliament, Albania has failed to convince a number of Member States and the EU Council. Although Albania has implemented major structural reforms to satisfy the minimum requirements and shown commitment in pursuit of the fight against organised crime and corruption, it is considered necessary to intensify the reforms, in particular with a view to affirmation of the rule of law. Attention is also drawn to the presence on Albanian territory of over 400 Italian companies and Italian/Albanian joint ventures.

In the light of the above, can the Commission tell us:

1. What will be the next steps in the possible future concession to Albania of candidate country status for accession to the EU?
2. What recommendations has the Commission put forward to Albania to strengthen the fight against organised crime and corruption?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2014)

In December 2013 the Council has set out the steps to be followed in view of a decision on granting candidate status to Albania in June 2014. To this effect the Council will examine, on the basis of a report to be presented by the Commission, continued implementation of anti-corruption and judicial reform strategies and of recently adopted relevant legislation as well as a continued trend of pro-active investigations and prosecutions, including in the area of organised crime.

For the fight against organised crime and corruption, the Commission has recommended to Albania to step up the use of threat assessment, intelligence sharing and proactive investigations, to enhance the capacity of law enforcement bodies and to improve cooperation with international partners, including Europol, with which Albania recently signed an operational agreement. Judicial reform is key to enhance the efficiency of investigations, prosecutions and convictions. A more proactive approach is needed as regards investigating inexplicable wealth and suspicions of money laundering. The Commission has also recommended that the authorities adopt a holistic approach in fighting corruption and organised crime. This requires establishing a robust institutional framework that prevents corruption, notably by strengthening internal controls, auditing asset declarations of officials and enhancing whistleblowing protection.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001212/14
alla Commissione
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(6 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: Violazione della normativa relativa all'etichettatura dei prodotti di abbigliamento «made in China»

La Guardia di finanza di Livorno e di Roma ha, in una recente operazione, sequestrato oltre un milione di capi di abbigliamento. L'operazione è terminata con la denuncia per frode in commercio di 14 persone. Le indagini si sono chiuse nei giorni scorsi con perquisizioni in diverse aziende e nelle abitazioni dei relativi amministratori, tutti di origine cinese. I prodotti erano venduti come cachemire, ma in realtà l'analisi del tessuto, effettuata dal laboratorio chimico dell'Agenzia delle Dogane, ha evidenziato che la reale composizione consisteva in un misto di acrilico, viscosa e poliestere, nonché peli di topo e di altri animali. Insieme ai falsi cachemire, sono stati rinvenuti anche capi con etichetta «lana merinos», «seta» o «pashmina», che sono poi risultati falsi.

Esistono sostanziali differenze tra la normativa europea e quella cinese relativamente alla conformità dell'etichettatura di composizione fibrosa dei capi all'effettiva realtà dei capi e i risultati evidenziati dalle indagini sono allarmanti.

1. Ciò considerato, può la Commissione indicare quali misure e azioni intende intraprendere per garantire una maggiore vigilanza sui prodotti che provengono da paesi terzi?
2. Può inoltre fornire un quadro generale circa la situazione dei controlli sui prodotti importati e commercializzati all'interno del mercato unico europeo?

**Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione
(8 aprile 2014)**

In linea con il regolamento (UE) n. 1007/2011⁽¹⁾ le autorità preposte alla sorveglianza del mercato effettueranno controlli per verificare che la composizione in fibre dei prodotti tessili sia conforme alle informazioni contenute nel presente regolamento. Gli Stati membri hanno la responsabilità di organizzare e svolgere attività di vigilanza del mercato a norma della direttiva 2001/95/CE relativa alla sicurezza generale dei prodotti nonché del regolamento (CE) n. 765/2008 che stabilisce prescrizioni in materia di accreditamento e vigilanza del mercato. Questi atti normativi sono attualmente oggetto di riesame e in fase di negoziato interistituzionale.

Gli Stati membri stanno al momento applicando orientamenti per i controlli all'importazione riguardanti la sicurezza e la conformità dei prodotti⁽²⁾ elaborati dalla Commissione al fine di aiutare le autorità competenti a svolgere i propri compiti.

I controlli sui prodotti importati e commercializzati nel mercato unico europeo vengono effettuati in conformità dei programmi di vigilanza del mercato, si basano principalmente sul rischio e sono pensati per categorie di prodotti nonché di rotte di approvvigionamento individuate come prioritarie in generale o in un determinato anno. Nel 2012 e nel 2013 ad esempio sono state ricevute più di 40 notifiche RAPEX⁽³⁾ relative a calzature, guanti e altri indumenti in materia di rischi chimici.

⁽¹⁾ Regolamento (UE) n. 1007/2011 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio del 27 settembre 2011 alle denominazioni delle fibre tessili e all'etichettatura e al contrassegno della composizione fibrosa dei prodotti tessili — GU L 272 del 18.10.2011.

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/publications/info_docs/customs/product_safety/guidelines_it.pdf

⁽³⁾ RAPEX è il sistema di allarme rapido UE che favorisce un rapido scambio di informazioni tra gli Stati membri e la Commissione in merito a provvedimenti adottati per prevenire o limitare la commercializzazione e l'utilizzo di prodotti che comportano un grave rischio per la salute e la sicurezza dei consumatori.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001212/14
to the Commission**

Roberta Angelilli (PPE)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Breach of regulations on the labelling of 'made in China' clothing products

In a recent operation, the Financial Police in Rome and Livorno seized over a million items of clothing. The operation culminated with the bringing of charges against 14 persons for trade fraud. The investigations recently ended with searches of a number of commercial premises and the homes of the company directors, all of Chinese origin. The products were being sold as cashmere, but in fact an analysis of the fabric by the Customs Agency's chemical laboratory revealed the true composition to be a blend of acrylic, viscose and polyester together with the fur of mice and other animals. In addition to fake cashmere, items of clothing labelled 'merino wool', 'silk' and 'pashmina' were also found, which later also proved to be fakes.

There are fundamental differences between European and Chinese regulations on the compliance of labelling showing the fibrous composition of items of clothing with the true composition of those items. The findings of the investigations described above are alarming.

1. In consideration of the above, can the Commission identify the measures and actions it intends to take to ensure heightened vigilance with regard to products originating from third countries?
2. Can it also provide an overview of the status of controls over products imported to and marketed in the European single market?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission

(8 April 2014)

In line with Regulation (EU) 1007/2011 ⁽¹⁾, market surveillance authorities shall carry out checks on the conformity of the fibre composition of textile products with the information supplied in accordance with this regulation. Member States are responsible for the organisation and carrying out of market surveillance activities in accordance with Directive 2001/95/EC on general product safety and Regulation (EC) 765/2008 setting out requirements for accreditation and market surveillance. These legislative instruments are currently being reviewed and are in the interinstitutional negotiation process.

To help competent authorities to perform their tasks, Guidelines for import controls in the area of product safety and compliance ⁽²⁾ have been drawn up by the Commission and are now being implemented by Member States.

Controls of products imported to and marketed in the European single market are done in accordance with the Member States' market surveillance programmes, and they are largely risk based and targeted to product categories and supply routes identified as priorities in a given year or in general. For example, in 2012 and 2013 over 40 RAPEX notifications ⁽³⁾ concerning chemical risks in shoes, gloves and other items of clothing were received.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EU) No 1007/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 September 2011 on textile fibre names and related labelling and marking of the fibre composition of textile products — OJ L 272, 18.10.2011.

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/publications/info_docs/customs/product_safety/guidelines_en.pdf

⁽³⁾ RAPEX is the EU rapid alert system that facilitates the rapid exchange of information between Member States and the Commission on measures taken to prevent or restrict the marketing or use of products posing a serious risk to the health and safety of consumers.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001213/14
alla Commissione**

Roberta Angelilli (PPE)

(6 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Richiesta di informazioni sull'impatto sulla sicurezza degli alimenti dell'accordo di libero scambio tra l'Unione europea e gli Stati Uniti

L'Unione europea e gli Stati Uniti stanno portando avanti il progetto di realizzare un accordo bilaterale di libero scambio. Il prossimo vertice sul tema si terrà il 26 marzo a Bruxelles. È necessario riflettere sulle implicazioni che questo accordo comporterà in termini di benefici per i cittadini europei. Uno dei punti più controversi è quello concernente l'impatto del partenariato transatlantico UE-USA sulla sicurezza sanitaria degli alimenti. Le normative sulla sicurezza alimentare in Europa e negli Stati Uniti sono diverse e l'analisi dei due sistemi mostra come il sistema europeo assicuri una migliore tutela e maggiori garanzie per i consumatori. Si segnalano anche divergenze nell'approccio relativo ai controlli sugli alimenti: mentre in Europa la normativa comporta l'esame e la tracciabilità di ogni tappa del processo, il sistema americano si limita a verificarne la sicurezza a prodotto finito. Inoltre, le criticità che richiedono un'attenzione eccezionale sono quelle sorte con riferimento all'etichettatura degli OGM.

La legislazione UE, prevedendo l'obbligo di un'etichettatura degli alimenti geneticamente modificati, è sostanzialmente opposta alla normativa statunitense che adotta un sistema inverso di etichettatura sull'assenza di OGM. Un'ulteriore preoccupazione è dovuta alla difformità tra le normative relativamente all'utilizzo di pesticidi, all'utilizzo di prodotti chimici che entrano nella composizione degli alimenti modificati e all'inquinamento degli alimenti causato dai materiali da imballaggio.

1. Alla luce di quanto premesso, può la Commissione fornire un quadro generale sullo stato dell'accordo di libero scambio UE-USA?
2. Può chiarire la sua posizione in merito ai problemi che tale accordo può comportare in materia di sicurezza alimentare, in particolare con riferimento all'etichettatura degli OGM?
3. Può inoltre chiarire come intende tutelare la sicurezza sugli alimenti nell'interesse generale dei consumatori?
4. Può infine illustrare i maggiori benefici che la stipulazione di tale accordo comporterà per i cittadini e le imprese dell'Unione europea?

Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione

(3 aprile 2014)

La Commissione rinvia l'Onorevole deputata alla propria risposta all'interrogazione E-002504/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

I negoziati per una partnership transatlantica per il commercio e gli investimenti (TTIP) sono ancora all'inizio. La quarta tornata di colloqui si è tenuta a Bruxelles a metà marzo 2014. Le questioni sanitarie e fitosanitarie, comprese quelle relative alla sicurezza alimentare, sono state discusse dai rappresentanti della Commissione e degli USA come nelle tornate precedenti.

I negoziati relativi ad accordi di libero scambio non pregiudicano il livello elevato di protezione che è assicurato dalle norme sanitarie dell'UE che devono essere rispettate in relazione a tutti gli alimenti offerti ai consumatori dell'UE. La Commissione è consapevole che vi sono punti sensibili nel settore della sicurezza alimentare e assicurerà che gli standard unionali di sicurezza alimentare non subiscano pregiudizio nel corso dei negoziati.

La TTIP è stata avviata per creare posti di lavoro e crescita nell'interesse sia dell'Europa che dell'America nonché nuove opportunità per le piccole e grandi imprese, al fine di mantenere la competitività dell'Europa su un mercato mondiale in evoluzione, senza pregiudicare i nostri standard elevati e le regole a protezione dei consumatori. I nostri standard in materia di protezione dei consumatori, dell'ambiente o dei dati nonché quelli relativi alla sicurezza alimentare, non sono negoziabili.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001213/14
to the Commission**

Roberta Angelilli (PPE)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Request for information on the impact on food safety arising from the free trade agreement between the European Union and the United States

The European Union and the United States are currently working towards establishing a bilateral free trade agreement, with the next round of talks scheduled to take place in Brussels on 26 March. Careful consideration now needs to be taken of the implications that this agreement will have in terms of benefits to European citizens. One of the most controversial aspects of the transatlantic partnership between the EU and the USA is the impact that it could have on food safety. The regulations governing food safety in Europe are very different from those in force in the United States, with studies showing that the European system provides better protection and more assurances to consumers. Further discrepancies have also been found in relation to food checks: while European regulations call for monitoring and traceability at every step of the process, the American system only requires the safety of the finished product to be checked. In addition, the labelling of GMOs is another area that requires extra special attention.

EU legislation stipulates that all genetically modified food must be labelled as such, but in the United States the situation is the complete opposite, with 'non-GMO' labels appearing on foods with no GM ingredients. There are also further concerns stemming from the differences in the respective laws governing the use of pesticides, the use of chemical ingredients in modified food, and food contamination caused by packaging materials.

1. In light of the above, can the Commission provide an overview of the present state of the free trade agreement between the EU and the USA?
2. Can it clarify its position regarding the problems that this agreement could pose in terms of food safety, with particular reference to GMO labelling?
3. Can it also clarify how it intends to act in the general interests of consumers and protect food safety?
4. Lastly, if this agreement were to come into force, can the Commission indicate the main benefits that it would bring to consumers and companies in the European Union?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(3 April 2014)

The Commission would refer to its answers to Question E-002504/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

The talks for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are at the beginning. The fourth round was held in Brussels mid March 2014. Sanitary and phytosanitary issues, including food safety, were discussed by Commission and US representatives as in previous rounds.

The Free Trade agreement negotiations will not undermine the high level of protection that is ensured by the EU sanitary rules and that must be respected by all food offered to the EU consumers. The Commission is aware of sensitivities in the food safety sector and will ensure that EU food safety standards will not be diminished during the negotiation.

The TTIP was initiated to create jobs and growth for Europeans and Americans and new opportunities for small and large companies, keeping Europe competitive in a changing world market place while maintaining our high level of standards and protection for our consumers. Our standards on consumer protection, on the environment, on data protection and on food safety are not up for negotiation.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001214/14
alla Commissione**

Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)

(6 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Olio d'oliva vero

È del 24 gennaio scorso uno strip di Nicholas Blechman apparso sul New York Times riguardante l'olio d'oliva italiano, nel quale di italiano non c'è niente in quell'olio di cui si parla. Si tratta in realtà di 350 000 tonnellate di olio provenienti da Spagna, Nord Africa, Grecia e Medio Oriente prodotto in prevalenza da olive estere che con l'Italia non hanno niente a che fare. Queste piante, infatti, non crescono in Italia, ma sono allevate all'estero in coltivazioni dette «superintensive» a 2 000 piante per ettaro che producono oli con al massimo 70-100 mg/kg di polifenoli totali. In Italia le «superintensive» non esistono poiché gli oliveti hanno 200 piante per ettaro, cioè 10 volte di meno, producendo oli che hanno anche 1 000 mg/kg di polifenoli. I marchi che imbottigliano gli oli di cui parla il NYT non sono nemmeno italiani. Tra i marchi più importanti presenti sul mercato, la Carapelli e la Bertolli sono di proprietà del gruppo spagnolo Deoleo S.A., che è il numero uno mondiale nella commercializzazione dell'olio d'oliva confezionato (300 mila ton. solo nel 2006, mentre la produzione italiana è di 450 mila ton). Deoleo domina il mercato (quota del 50 %) in Spagna, Portogallo, Italia e Paesi Bassi. Tra il 2005 e il 2006 ha acquisito in Italia marchi storici come Olio Sasso e Carapelli, già in mano straniera da 20 anni. Nel 2008 ha acquisito da Unilever i marchi Bertolli, Maya e San Giorgio. Sono suoi anche i marchi Carbonell, Koipe e Friol. Notizie importanti sull'olio sono contenute nel volume «Monocultivar Olive Oil, l'olio perfetto», che presenta tante verità mai dette sull'olio delle olive.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. Ha la Commissione qualcosa da eccepire sulla predominanza nel mercato dell'olio d'oliva di questo gruppo spagnolo?
2. Come fa il consumatore a distinguere l'olio extra vergine di qualità da quello che viene ricavato da olive coltivate in «superintensive»?
3. Conviene che la denominazione d'origine delle olive dia maggiori garanzie ai consumatori sulla qualità del prodotto?
4. Può essa comunicare se esiste una direttiva per il mercato europeo sull'imbottigliamento dell'olio d'oliva?
5. Chi controlla la percentuale di polifenoli nell'olio per verificare la compatibilità con le norme del CE 432/2012?

Risposta di Dacian Cioloș a nome della Commissione

(4 aprile 2014)

1. Il fatto che un'impresa goda di una posizione dominante in un determinato mercato deve essere accertato ufficialmente ⁽¹⁾. Le quote di mercato delle imprese forniscono una prima indicazione utile di una possibile posizione dominante, ma sono determinanti anche altri elementi tra cui le condizioni e la dinamica del mercato. Una posizione dominante in alcuni mercati di per sé non costituisce una violazione delle regole di concorrenza, a differenza di un abuso comprovato di situazione dominante.
2. Le caratteristiche fisico-chimiche e organolettiche degli oli possono essere condizionate dal clima, dal suolo, dalla varietà, dalle tecniche di coltivazione e raccolta, dall'estrazione e dallo stoccaggio. Non è pertanto possibile distinguere la qualità unicamente in base alle tecniche di coltivazione.
3. I parametri delle varie denominazioni degli oli di oliva sono definiti dalla regolamentazione specifica in materia. Gli oli di oliva possono inoltre beneficiare, se del caso, di una denominazione di origine protetta o di un'indicazione geografica protetta nel rispetto delle prescrizioni del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 ⁽²⁾.
4. La commercializzazione dell'olio di oliva nell'UE è disciplinata tra l'altro dal regolamento (UE) n. 29/2012 ⁽³⁾ relativo alle norme di commercializzazione, in particolare dalle disposizioni relative all'etichettatura, e dal regolamento (CEE) n. 2568/91 ⁽⁴⁾ relativo alle caratteristiche degli oli.

⁽¹⁾ Posizione di potenza economica detenuta da un'impresa, che conferisca a quest'ultima il potere di impedire la sussistenza di una concorrenza effettiva sul mercato in questione, fornendole la possibilità di comportamenti notevolmente indipendenti nei confronti dei propri concorrenti, dei clienti e, da ultimo, dei consumatori (causa 27/76 United Brands).

⁽²⁾ GUL 343 del 14.12.2012.

⁽³⁾ GUL 12 del 14.1.2012.

⁽⁴⁾ GUL 248 del 5.9.1991.

5. L'utilizzazione delle indicazioni sanitarie è facoltativa. Ne consegue che le condizioni dell'utilizzo dell'indicazione relativa ai polifenoli devono essere rispettate unicamente se l'operatore del settore alimentare vi fa riferimento. Il regolamento (CE) n. 178/2002 ⁽⁵⁾ prevede che gli Stati membri verifichino la corretta applicazione delle prescrizioni relative alla sicurezza dei prodotti alimentari.

⁽⁵⁾ G.U.L. 31 dell'1.2.2002.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001214/14
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(6 February 2014)

Subject: Real olive oil

On 24 January a strip cartoon by Nicholas Blechman appeared in the New York Times on the subject of Italian olive oil which in fact contains nothing Italian. This in fact refers to 350 000 tonnes of oil originating from Spain, North Africa, Greece and the Middle East, produced predominantly from foreign olives with no connection with Italy. The olive-trees do not in fact grow in Italy, but are cultivated abroad in super-intensive plantations with a density of 2 000 trees per hectare, producing oils with a maximum total polyphenol content of 70-100 mg/kg. Super-intensive plantations do not exist in Italy, where olive groves have a density of 200 trees per hectare, i.e. 10 times less than the above figure, and produce oils which also have a polyphenol content of 1000 mg/kg. The brands which bottle the oils referred to in the NYT are not even Italian. Of the leading brands on the market, Carapelli and Bertolli are owned by the Spanish Group Deoleo SA, the world leader in the marketing of bottled olive oil (300 thousand tons in 2006 alone, whereas Italian production totals 450 thousand tons). Deoleo dominates the market (with a 50% share) in Spain, Portugal, Italy and the Netherlands. In 2005 and 2006 the Group acquired historic brands in Italy, such as Olio Sasso and Carapelli, which had already been in foreign hands for 20 years. In 2008 the Group acquired the Bertolli, Maya and San Giorgio brands from Unilever and also holds the Carbonell, Koipe and Friol brands. Key information on olive oil is contained in the volume 'Monocultivar Olive Oil, the perfect oil', which expresses many unspoken truths about olive oil.

In the light of the above, can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Has the Commission any objection to the dominance of the olive oil market by this Spanish Group?
2. How can the consumer distinguish quality extra-virgin oil from oil obtained from super-intensively cultivated olives?
3. Should the designation of origin of olives provide consumers with better guarantees as to the quality of the product?
4. Can the Commission disclose whether there is a directive for the European market on the bottling of olive oil?
5. Who controls the percentage polyphenol content of olive oil to verify its compliance with the standards laid down in EC 432/2012?

(Version française)

Réponse donnée par M. Ciołoș au nom de la Commission
(4 avril 2014)

1. Le fait qu'une entreprise occupe une position dominante sur un certain marché doit être établi formellement ⁽¹⁾. Les parts de marché détenues par les entreprises sont une première indication utile de l'existence possible d'une position dominante, mais d'autres éléments tels que les conditions prévalant sur le marché et l'évolution de celui-ci sont également pertinents. Une position dominante sur certains marchés ne constitue pas nécessairement une infraction aux règles de concurrence; seul l'abus avéré de cette position dominante constitue une violation de ces règles.
2. Les caractéristiques physicochimiques et organoleptiques des huiles peuvent être influencées par le climat, le sol, la variété, les techniques culturales et de récolte, l'extraction et le stockage. Dès lors, il n'est pas possible de distinguer la qualité sur base des seules techniques de cultures.
3. Les paramètres des différentes dénominations des huiles d'olive sont définis par la réglementation spécifique en la matière. Les huiles d'olive peuvent de surcroît bénéficier, le cas échéant, d'une appellation d'origine protégée ou d'une indication géographique protégée, dans le respect des prescriptions du règlement (UE) n° 1151/2012 ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Une position de puissance économique détenue par une entreprise qui lui donne le pouvoir de faire obstacle au maintien d'une concurrence effective sur le marché en cause en lui fournissant la possibilité de comportements indépendants dans une mesure appréciable vis-à-vis de ses concurrents, de ses clients, et, en fin de compte, des consommateurs (Affaire 27/76, United Brands).

⁽²⁾ JO L 343 du 14.12.2012.

4. La commercialisation de l'huile d'olive dans l'UE est régie notamment par le règlement (UE) n° 29/2012 ⁽³⁾ relatif aux normes de commercialisation, en particulier les dispositions sur l'étiquetage, et par le règlement (CEE) n° 2568/91 ⁽⁴⁾ sur les caractéristiques des huiles.
5. L'utilisation des allégations de santé est volontaire. Il s'ensuit que les conditions d'utilisation de l'allégation relative aux polyphénols ne doivent être respectées que si l'opérateur du secteur alimentaire y fait référence. Le règlement (CE) n° 178/2002 ⁽⁵⁾ prévoit que les États membres vérifient une bonne application des prescriptions relatives à la sécurité des denrées alimentaires.
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⁽³⁾ JO L 12 du 14.1.2012.

⁽⁴⁾ JO L 248 du 5.9.1991.

⁽⁵⁾ JO L 31 du 1.2.2002.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001215/14

à Comissão

Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)

(6 de fevereiro de 2014)

Assunto: Erosão da orla costeira do concelho Ovar

No passado dia 31 de janeiro fiz uma visita às praias da Cortegaça e do Furadouro, no concelho de Ovar, para observar as destruições provocadas pela recente tempestade Hércules. Apenas um dia depois, mais uma agitação marítima com ondas de 5 e 6 metros, provocou enormes estragos nas casas e comércio local da Praia do Furadouro. O mar entrou pelas ruas da povoação, tendo subido até ao primeiro andar de algumas casas. Esta situação não é nova e é, aliás, bastante conhecida. A zona litoral do concelho de Ovar (Esmoriz, Cortegaça, Furadouro, Maceda) é das mais afetadas pela erosão da zona costeira, tendo o mar já avançado cerca de 100 metros em 50 anos, na Praia do Furadouro. Para além dos danos materiais causados, são também os impactos ao nível da destruição de habitats naturais de enorme valor ambiental que estão em causa. As intervenções que têm sido feitas para pôr cobro à situação têm-se caracterizado pelo imediatismo, minimizando alguns estragos no momento em que ocorrem os acidentes, pautando-se sobretudo pela construção de esporões, molhes, paredões e enrocamentos, o que se revelou ineficaz. O que esta zona litoral necessita é de uma resposta integrada, ou seja, uma intervenção que impeça ou diminua os riscos para a população, que não se limite a arranjar o que foi destruído, mas que impeça a repetição dos danos, ano após ano. No relatório do deputado João Ferreira, aprovado pelo PE em Julho de 2010 (A7-0227/2010), considera-se que «deverão ser objeto de apoio privilegiado da UE aos Estados-Membros, entre outras, as [...] medidas de prevenção [...] e intervenções de proteção e defesa da orla costeira».

Pergunto à Comissão:

- Que apoios estão disponíveis para investigação e estudos sobre as soluções técnicas e científicas a aplicar no caso em apreço? E para a realização de obras e intervenções concretas?
- Sabe se já foram mobilizados fundos comunitários para intervenções na zona litoral do concelho de Ovar? Para que fim?

Resposta dada por Johannes Hahn em nome da Comissão

(4 de abril de 2014)

A proteção das orlas costeiras é, desde há muito tempo, uma prioridade para a UE e recebeu financiamento proveniente dos fundos estruturais já em períodos anteriores. Em 12 de março de 2013, a Comissão lançou uma nova iniciativa para a Gestão Integrada das Zonas Costeiras (GIZC) e para o ordenamento do espaço marítimo, que assume a forma de uma proposta de diretiva, cujo objetivo é criar um quadro para o ordenamento do espaço marítimo e para a GIZC nos Estados-Membros, com vista a promover o crescimento sustentável das atividades marítimas e costeiras e a utilização sustentável dos recursos marinhos e costeiros.

No que diz respeito a Portugal, o financiamento da proteção da orla costeira é, desde há muito tempo, uma prioridade do Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento Regional e do Fundo de Coesão. Para o período de 2007-2013, o Fundo de Coesão financiou estudos, planos e ações para fazer face a esta questão, designadamente, ao garantir a sustentabilidade e a manutenção equilibrada das faixas costeiras e evitar a erosão, a médio e longo prazo, prevenir os riscos e promover um planeamento sustentável da proteção das zonas costeiras, por forma a minimizar os riscos. O financiamento proveniente do Fundo de Coesão aprovado para Portugal até ao final de 2013 eleva-se a cerca de 170 milhões de euros. Quatro projetos aprovados são da competência do município de Ovar, com 10,6 milhões de euros de financiamento da UE. Um montante adicional de 1,3 milhões de euros deverá ser aprovado em breve. Estes projetos destinam-se à reabilitação de esporões e defesas em Esmoriz, Cortegaça e Furadouro, à proteção da avenida principal e à reconstrução da praia do Furadouro, à proteção e defesa da costa e Ria de Aveiro, bem como ao Plano de Ação de Proteção e Valorização do Litoral 2012-2015, na região Centro.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001215/14
to the Commission**

Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Coastal erosion in Ovar (Portugal)

On 31 January 2013 I visited the beaches of Cortegaça and Furadouro, in the administrative district of Ovar, to see the destruction caused there by the recent storm 'Hercules'. Just one day after the storm, high seas with five and six-metre waves again wrought tremendous damage to houses and local businesses in Praia do Furadouro. The sea flooded in through the streets, reaching the first floor of some houses.

This is not a new situation, and has become all too familiar. The coastal part of the administrative district of Ovar (Esmoriz, Cortegaça, Furadouro and Maceda) is one of the areas most affected by coastal erosion. In the last 50 years, the sea has encroached by almost 100 metres at Praia do Furadouro. Apart from the material damage, natural habitats of great environmental value are also being destroyed.

Action taken so far to control the situation has involved short-term damage-control responses, with the main focus on building spurs, wharfs, containing walls and rip rap, which has failed to have the desired effect. What this coastal area needs is a comprehensive response, in other words, action to prevent or reduce the threat to the population and which goes beyond damage repair, to prevent the same destruction taking place year after year.

The report by João Ferreira on the Commission communication 'A Community approach on the prevention of natural and man-made disasters' (A7-0227/2010), which was adopted by Parliament in July 2010, concluded that '*inter alia*, the following prevention measures should be the subject of priority support from the EU to the Member States: [...] protecting and defending the coastline'.

Can the Commission therefore say:

- What support is available for studies and research into technical and scientific solutions which can be applied in this case and for carrying out specific works and actions?
- Whether any Community funding has already been mobilised to address the situation of the coastal area of the Ovar administrative district, and for what purposes?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission

(4 April 2014)

The protection of coastlines has long been a priority for the EU and has received funding from the Structural Funds already in previous periods. On 12 March 2013, the Commission launched a new initiative on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) and maritime spatial planning, which takes the form of a draft directive, aiming to establish a framework for maritime spatial planning and ICZM in the Member States with a view to promote the sustainable growth of maritime and coastal activities and the sustainable use of coastal and marine resources.

For Portugal, the financing of coastal zone protection has long been a priority for the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund. For the 2007-2013 period, the Cohesion Fund has been financing studies, plans and actions to address this issue, namely by ensuring the sustainability and balanced maintenance of the shorelines and prevent erosion, on the medium and long term, preventing risks and promoting a sustainable planning of the protection of coastal areas to minimise risks. Funding from the Cohesion Fund approved for Portugal until the end of 2013 totalled approximately EUR 170 million. Four approved projects concern the municipality of Ovar, with EUR 10.6 million of EU funding. A further EUR 1.3 million should be approved soon. These projects concern the rehabilitation of spurs and defences in Esmoriz, Cortegaça and Furadouro, the protection of the main avenue and the beach replenishment in Furadouro, the protection and defence of the coast and lagoon of Aveiro, and the action plan for the protection and enhancement of the Coast 2012-2015, in the Centro region.

3. Από το 2010, η πρωτοβουλία P&S ⁽¹⁾ της ΕΕ έχει επιτύχει ουσιαστική πρόοδο, ιδίως με τη βελτιστοποίηση της χρήσης των υφιστάμενων ικανοτήτων, τη δρομολόγηση προγραμμάτων συνεργασίας, τη μεγαλύτερη διαφάνεια σε επίπεδο ΕΕ, και την έγκριση του κώδικα συμπεριφοράς για τη συνένωση και την κοινή χρήση.

Το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο για θέματα ασφάλειας και άμυνας του Δεκεμβρίου 2013, τόνισε την προσήλωση των κρατών μελών στην επίτευξη βασικών ικανοτήτων και στην κάλυψη κρίσιμων ελλείψεων, μέσω τεσσάρων σχεδίων (για τον εν πτήση εφοδιασμό, για τα εξ αποστάσεως πλοηγούμενα εναέρια συστήματα, για τις δορυφορικές επικοινωνίες, για τον κυβερνοχώρο). Επιπλέον, βρίσκονται σε εξέλιξη εργασίες για την ανάπτυξη της κατάλληλης πολιτικής πλαίσιο για την προώθηση μιας πιο συστηματικής και μακροπρόθεσμης συνεργασίας στον τομέα της άμυνας, με στόχο την παροχή ικανοτήτων με μεγαλύτερη αποτελεσματικότητα.

4. Η Επιτροπή παρακολουθεί την εφαρμογή των πολιτικών κατά της διαφθοράς στην Ελλάδα στην έκθεση για την καταπολέμηση της διαφθοράς στην ΕΕ, που δημοσιεύθηκε στις 3 Φεβρουαρίου 2014. Οι διαπραγματεύσεις για την προσχώρηση στη GRECO δεν έχουν ακόμη αρχίσει, αλλά οι σχετικές λεπτομέρειες είναι υπό συζήτηση.

5. Η σύμβαση του ΟΟΣΑ απευθύνεται στα κράτη μέλη.

⁽¹⁾ Συνένωση και κοινή χρήση.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001216/14
to the Commission**

Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Failure by European Commission to monitor cases of corruption and bribery which have exacerbated Greece's debt

During its investigation of the corruption scandal surrounding Greek armaments programmes, the Greek judicial system uncovered serious evidence that Greek officers had received large bribes from German companies ⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾ via offshore companies. According to a report by the SIPRI, ⁽³⁾ Greece bought more German armaments than any other country over the five years from 2007 to 2011 (13% of German exports of large conventional weapons). The Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance complained in the European Parliament that German and French arms were being sold to Greece in breach of the European Code of Conduct on arms exports. ⁽⁴⁾⁽⁵⁾ According to articles in the press, the defence filed by the former Deputy Director General for Armaments implicates officers of Dresdner Bank who helped him launder the bribes. ⁽⁶⁾ These bank officers have been implicated in other cases of money laundering, such as the Siemens case. ⁽⁷⁾ Corruption in connection with armaments programmes has seriously exacerbated Greece's debt; over EUR 218 billion have been spent on armaments since 1974. In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it intend to investigate cases of bribery via offshore companies and whether they have contributed to the rise in Greece's public debt?
2. Does it consider that the European framework governing the operation of European banks in Greece is adequate, especially with regard to tax evasion and money laundering?
3. How is the 'pooling and sharing' of defence systems progressing within the framework of the European Defence and Security Policy? Are those who say that progress is extremely slow right?
4. Has the Commission prepared an anti-corruption report in order to periodically assess efforts by Member States? ⁽⁸⁾ Has the Commission negotiated its participation in the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)?
5. Has it adopted the measures proposed in the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery? ⁽⁹⁾

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission

(15 May 2014)

1. The Commission has no competence to investigate individual cases.
2. Yes.

In 2012 the TF ⁽¹⁰⁾ for Greece developed and agreed with the Greek authorities a Road Map on Anti Money Laundering and Tax Evasion. A coordination committee has been working to implement it which seeks to strengthen the fight against tax evasion by developing and enhancing Anti-Money Laundering tools.

At European level, the revised Directive on taxation of savings adopted on 24 March and the forthcoming adoption by the Council of the proposal to revise Directive 2011/16/EU will enhance automatic exchange of information between Member States' tax authorities, including on beneficial owners of accounts held through offshore investment structures

3. Since 2010, the EU P&S ⁽¹¹⁾ initiative achieved substantive progress, especially by optimising the use of existing capabilities, launching cooperative programmes, greater transparency at EU level, and the adoption of the Code of Conduct on P&S.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=556040>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.protothema.gr/politics/article/345749/multi-marturas-denei-tis-mizes-sta-exoplastika/>

⁽³⁾ <http://www.sipri.org/>

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bWQ%2bE-2010-2286%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEL&language=EL>

⁽⁵⁾ <http://tvxs.gr/news/egrapsan-eipan/afopliste-toys-mizadoroys-eksopliste-ti-logiki-toy-mixali-tremopoyloy>

⁽⁶⁾ <http://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/340538/panikos-sti-misi-diaploki-tis-horas/>

⁽⁷⁾ <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=172306>

⁽⁸⁾ <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EL&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%2011237%202011%20INIT&r=http%3A%2F%2Fregister.consilium.europa.eu%2Fpd%2Fel%2F11%2Fst11%2Fst11237.el11.pdf>

⁽⁹⁾ <http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm>

⁽¹⁰⁾ Task Force.

⁽¹¹⁾ Pooling & Sharing.

The December 2013 European Council on security and defence emphasised Member States' commitment to delivering key capabilities and addressing critical shortfalls, through four projects (Air to Air Refuelling, Remotely Piloted Aerial Systems, Satellite Communications, Cyber). Moreover, work is under way to develop the appropriate Policy Framework to foster more systematic and longer term defence cooperation, with a view to delivering capabilities with greater efficiency.

4. The Commission follows the implementation of anti-corruption policies in Greece in the EU Anti-Corruption Report, published on 3 February 2014. The negotiation on the accession to GRECO has not yet started, but its modalities are under discussion.

5. The OECD Convention is addressed to the Member States.

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-001219/14
till kommissionen
Olle Ludvigsson (S&D) och Marita Ulvskog (S&D)
(6 februari 2014)**

Angående: Överträdelse av visstidsdirektivet

Fackliga centralorganisationen TCO anmälde 2007 Sverige till EU-kommissionen för brott mot visstidsdirektivet. Sverige uppmanades i ett motiverat yttrande den 21 februari 2013 att vidta nödvändiga åtgärder för att uppfylla kraven i direktiv 99/70/EC. Tidsfristen som utsattes var två månader.

Det har nu gått ett år och den svenska regeringen har inte visat någon ambition att komma tillrätta med staplade visstidsanställningar. Däremot har regeringen uttalat i media att man inte avser agera. I december 2013 meddelade regeringen att man avsåg tillsätta en statistisk undersökning men att denna inte skulle ligga till grund för en lagändring och därmed inte heller var avsedd att åtgärda överträdelsen.

Min fråga till kommissionen är därför: Varför har inte kommissionen ett år senare inlett ett överträdelseförfarande mot Sverige, i synnerhet då den svenska regeringen tydligt markerat att man inte tänker agera?

**Svar från László Andor på kommissionens vägnar
(1 april 2014)**

Sedan det motiverade yttrandet sändes, har kommissionen tagit emot detaljerade uppgifter från ett antal berörda parter.

Kommissionen håller för närvarande på att analysera denna ytterligare information och kommer inom kort att besluta om vilka åtgärder som ska vidtas härnäst.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001219/14
to the Commission
Olle Ludvigsson (S&D) and Marita Ulvskog (S&D)
(6 February 2014)**

Subject: Breach of the directive on fixed-term work

In 2007, the trade union federation TCO reported Sweden to the Commission for breaching the directive on fixed-term work. In a reasoned opinion of 21 February 2013, Sweden was called upon to take the necessary measures to comply with Directive 99/70/EC. It was given two months to do so.

A year has now passed, and the Swedish Government has not displayed any ambition to tackle successions of fixed-term contracts. Indeed, the government has told the media that it has no intention of taking any action. In December 2013, the government stated that it intended to initiate a statistical survey, but that this would not lead to any amendments to legislation, and that it therefore had no intention of taking measures to remedy the breach, either.

Why — one year later — has the Commission still not brought infringement proceedings against Sweden, particularly as the Swedish Government has clearly stated that it has no intention of taking any action?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(1 April 2014)**

Since the reasoned opinion was sent, the Commission has received detailed input from a number of stakeholders.

The Commission is currently analysing this additional information, and will decide soon on the steps to be taken next.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001220/14
alla Commissione
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(6 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: Possibili finanziamenti per un progetto nel settore enogastronomico

Una società italiana di recente costituzione, che si occupa di formazione professionale nei vari settori enogastronomici e di internalizzazione attraverso una solida rete commerciale e scambio culturale (in particolare in Giappone), intende attuare un progetto che oltre ad ospitare ed organizzare corsi per italiani e stranieri, promuova i prodotti locali più rappresentativi e il turismo locale.

In particolare, le attività della società mirano a:

- scambio culturale, promuovendo la mobilità giovanile e l'apprendimento interculturale;
- creazione di nuovi marchi commerciali enogastronomici, finalizzati all'internazionalizzazione dei prodotti enogastronomici locali di PMI;
- commercializzazione di prodotti agroalimentari di eccellenza attraverso la creazione di eventi in Italia e all'estero;

Ulteriori attività vengono svolte per favorire la valorizzazione del turismo locale e lo sviluppo dei trasporti locali.

La società mette a disposizione la propria professionalità a favore di famiglie disagiate, offrendo la propria collaborazione ad associazioni di volontariato.

Il progetto descritto mira altresì ad incrementare l'occupazione diretta e indiretta, a rilanciare piani integrati a sostegno del turismo e, in tal modo, a contribuire allo sviluppo economico territoriale.

In un mercato globale che soffoca e sacrifica i prodotti locali di piccole e medie imprese, può aumentarne la visibilità, rilanciare marchi e prodotti locali.

Alla luce di quanto premesso, può la Commissione chiarire:

1. se vi sono finanziamenti comunitari, diretti e indiretti, che possono contribuire alla realizzazione del progetto suesposto;
2. quali sono le azioni dell'UE a sostegno delle iniziative legate alla promozione della cultura gastronomica;
3. se è a conoscenza di analoghe iniziative e buone prassi in tale ambito a livello europeo;
4. il quadro generale della situazione.

**Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione
(1° aprile 2014)**

La Commissione sostiene diverse iniziative a promozione della tradizione gastronomica europea e del turismo gastronomico tramite finanziamenti unionali diretti e indiretti.

La Commissione cofinanzia direttamente progetti soltanto a seguito di inviti a presentare proposte. Pertanto, un progetto può essere valutato soltanto una volta che sia stato presentato nel contesto di una procedura aperta.

La Commissione indice annualmente inviti a presentare proposte ⁽¹⁾ per sostenere lo sviluppo di iniziative turistiche transnazionali in Europa, come ad esempio percorsi, sentieri, itinerari basati, tra l'altro, sul patrimonio culturale, industriale o naturale ⁽²⁾. Alcuni progetti legati al turismo gastronomico ed enologico hanno già ricevuto sovvenzioni unionali, ad esempio il progetto «Secret Wine Tours» ⁽³⁾.

Per quanto concerne le opportunità di finanziamento indirette (vale a dire, sostenute dai Fondi strutturali e di investimento europei), l'azienda interessata dovrebbe mettersi in contatto con l'autorità di gestione regionale e/o nazionale del proprio paese.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/contracts-grants/calls-for-proposals/index_it.htm

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/sustainable-tourism/index_it.htm; http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/cultural-routes/index_en.htm

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/sustainable-tourism/documents/secretwine_en.pdf

La Commissione coopera anche con il Consiglio d'Europa per sostenere gli itinerari culturali europei. Tra essi, l'itinerario «Iter Vitis» è concepito quale nuova esperienza turistica attraverso le campagne europee imperniata sulla produzione vinicola.

Infine, nel 2014, la Commissione assieme alla Commissione europea del turismo (ETC) ha inaugurato un portale dedicato ⁽⁴⁾ per promuovere la gastronomia quale parte del patrimonio culturale immateriale europeo. Si tratta di un nuovo strumento di comunicazione che aiuta i turisti a meglio pianificare le loro escursioni. Gli uffici turistici nazionali, regionali e locali possono caricarvi informazioni sui loro festival e fiere gastronomici per dare loro una maggiore visibilità.

⁽⁴⁾ www.tastingeurope.com

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001220/14
to the Commission
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(6 February 2014)

Subject: Possible funding for a project in the enogastronomic sector

A recently formed Italian company which engages in vocational training in the various enogastronomic sectors and insourcing through a solid sales network and cultural exchange (in particular in Japan) intends to launch a project which, in addition to hosting and organising courses for Italian nationals and others, will promote typical local products and local tourism.

The company's activities are specifically geared to:

- cultural exchange through the promotion of youth mobility and cross-cultural learning;
- the creation of new enogastronomic trade marks with a view to internationalisation of the enogastronomic products of local SMEs;
- the marketing of top-quality agri-foodstuffs through the organisation of events in Italy and abroad.

The company will also promote local tourism and develop local transport networks.

The company will place its professional expertise at the disposal of disadvantaged families and offer to work alongside voluntary organisations.

The project described above also aims to increase direct and indirect employment and reintroduce integrated plans to support tourism, thereby contributing to regional economic development.

In a global market which stifles and sacrifices the local products of small and medium enterprises, the company is able to enhance product visibility and revive interest in local products and brands.

In the light of the above, can the Commission:

1. clarify whether direct or indirect Community funding exists to assist in the implementation of the project described above;
2. identify measures taken by the EU in support of initiatives designed to promote the gastronomic culture;
3. tell us whether the Commission is aware of comparable initiatives and good practice in this sector at a European level;
4. provide an overview of the situation.

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(1 April 2014)

The Commission supports a number of initiatives to promote European gastronomic tradition and food tourism through direct and indirect EU funding.

The Commission co-finances projects directly only through calls for proposals. Therefore a project can be assessed only once it is submitted through an open procedure.

The Commission launches annual calls for proposals ⁽¹⁾ to support the development of transnational tourism initiatives in Europe such as routes, trails, itineraries based, amongst others, on cultural, industrial or natural heritage ⁽²⁾. Some projects related to food and wine tourism have been already awarded with the EU grants, e.g. the project 'Secret Wine Tours' ⁽³⁾.

For indirect funding opportunities (e.g. supported by the European Structural and Investment Funds), the interested company is advised to contact the regional and/or national managing authority in their country.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/contracts-grants/calls-for-proposals/index_en.htm

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/sustainable-tourism/index_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/cultural-routes/index_en.htm

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/sustainable-tourism/documents/secretwine_en.pdf

The Commission also cooperates with the Council of Europe to support the European Cultural Routes. Amongst them, the 'Iter Vitis' route is conceived as a new tourism experience through the European countryside linked to the production of wine.

Finally, in 2014, the Commission together with the European Travel Commission (ETC) has launched a dedicated portal ⁽⁴⁾ to promote gastronomy as part of the European intangible cultural heritage. It is a new communication tool to help tourists to better plan their trips. National, regional and local tourism offices can upload information on their food fairs and festivals to achieve better visibility.

⁽⁴⁾ www.tastingeurope.com

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001228/14
a la Comisión**

María Irigoyen Pérez (S&D)

(6 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Ayudas europeas para zonas despobladas en España

El artículo 174 del Tratado establece que, a fin de reforzar su cohesión económica, social y territorial, la Unión se propondrá reducir el retraso de las regiones que padecen desventajas demográficas graves y permanentes.

En España, en varias comunidades autónomas (Asturias, Galicia, Aragón, Castilla-La Mancha y Castilla y León) se registra un descenso de la población y el despoblamiento de amplias zonas de sus territorios. Esta crisis demográfica está afectando especialmente a ciudades (como, por ejemplo, Teruel, Cuenca y Soria, ciudad esta última en la que la densidad de población es inferior a los ocho habitantes por kilómetro cuadrado) y comarcas (como las de Tierras Altas, que ostenta el título de ser una de las más despobladas de toda Europa con 0,9 habitantes por kilómetro cuadrado).

Este desafío territorial requiere una acción conjunta por parte de todas las partes implicadas: las autoridades regionales, las autoridades estatales y la Unión Europea.

La Unión Europea ha previsto en el próximo marco financiero 2014-2020 una partida destinada a estas regiones desfavorecidas cuyo reparto queda en manos de los distintos Estados miembros. Sin embargo, hay que lamentar que en el pasado estos fondos no llegaron a las zonas más desfavorecidas.

¿Puede indicar la Comisión qué cantidad corresponde a España del importe previsto por el FEDER para las regiones despobladas y cómo está previsto repartir este importe entre sus distintas regiones? ¿Cómo puede velar la Comisión por que el dinero que el Estado reparte entre las regiones se destine a los territorios más necesitados?

Respuesta del Sr. Hahn en nombre de la Comisión

(9 de abril de 2014)

La utilización por los Estados miembros del Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER) debe atender a las dificultades específicas de zonas escasamente pobladas cuyo desarrollo se ve frenado por su situación geográfica, con objeto de apoyar su desarrollo sostenible. Se apunta asimismo que los Estados miembros deben utilizar este Fondo con el fin de afrontar los problemas demográficos y generar crecimiento en una sociedad que envejece.

La Comisión negocia actualmente con las autoridades españolas un acuerdo de asociación, así como los diversos programas regionales y multirregionales. Corresponde a cada Estado miembro fijar los importes que destina a las zonas despobladas.

La Comisión, en el ejercicio de sus competencias, vela por que los Estados miembros respeten las disposiciones reglamentarias.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001228/14
to the Commission
María Irigoyen Pérez (S&D)
(6 February 2014)**

Subject: European aid for under-populated areas in Spain

Article 174 of the Treaty establishes that, in order to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion, the Union shall make proposals to restrict regression in regions suffering from serious, permanent under-population.

A number of Autonomous Communities in Spain (Asturias, Galicia, Aragon, Castile-La Mancha and Castile-Leon) have recorded a decrease in population and under-population in a large number of areas within their territories. This demographic crisis is being felt most keenly in cities (e.g. Teruel, Cuenca and Soria, the latter of which having a population density of less than eight inhabitants per square kilometre) and municipal districts (e.g. those in the Tierras Altas, which has the distinction of being one of the most under-populated in all of Europe, with 0.9 inhabitants per square kilometre).

This territorial challenge requires joint action from all parties concerned: the regional authorities, the national authorities and the European Union.

The European Union has set aside a portion of the budget for the upcoming 2014-2020 financial period for underprivileged regions, and it is up to the various Member States to decide how it will be distributed. However, in the past, these funds have unfortunately not reached the most underprivileged areas.

Could the Commission tell us how much of the amount set aside by the ERDF for under-populated regions Spain is set to receive, and how this amount is planned to be distributed among its various regions? How can the Commission ensure that the money that Spain distributes among its regions is given to the territories with the most pressing need?

(Version française)

**Réponse donnée par M. Hahn au nom de la Commission
(9 avril 2014)**

L'utilisation par les États membres du Fonds européen de développement régional (FEDER) devrait prendre en compte les difficultés spécifiques rencontrées dans des zones peu peuplées dont la situation géographique ralentit leur développement, afin de soutenir leur développement durable. Il est également signalé que les États membres doivent utiliser ces fonds, afin de faire face aux problèmes démographiques et de créer de la croissance dans une société confrontée au vieillissement de la population.

La Commission négocie actuellement avec les autorités espagnoles un accord d'association ainsi que les différents programmes régionaux et plurirégionaux. La fixation des montants destinés aux zones dépeuplées relève de l'État membre.

La Commission, dans l'exercice de ses compétences, veille à ce que les exigences des règlements soient respectées par les États membres.

(Verżjoni Maltija)

Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-001229/14
lill-Kummissjoni
Roberta Metsola (PPE)
(6 ta' Frar 2014)

Suġġett: Drittijiet tal-vot għaċ-ċittadini tal-UE li jghixu barra minn pajjiżhom

Il-Kummissjoni talbet lil Malta u lil erba' pajjiżi oħra biex jieqfu milli jneħhu d-drittijiet taċ-ċittadini billi ma jhalluhomx jivvutaw sakemm ma jkunux residenti b'mod permanenti f'pajjiżhom.

Il-Kummissjoni għandha xi informazzjoni dwar is-sistemi disponibbli fl-Istati Membri l-oħra għaċ-ċittadini li mhumiex residenti b'mod permanenti f'pajjiżhom?

Tweġiba mogħtija mis-Sinjura Reding f'isem il-Kummissjoni
(3 ta' April 2014)

Ir-Rakkomandazzjoni "Nindirizzaw il-konsegwenzi tat-tneħħija tad-dritt tal-vot taċ-ċittadini tal-Unjoni li jeżerċitaw id-dritt tagħhom tal-moviment liberu" ⁽¹⁾ hija indirizzata lil hames Stati Membri ⁽²⁾ li r-regoli preżenti tagħhom dwar it-tneħħija tad-dritt tal-vot awtomatikament iċaħhdu d-dritt tal-vot fl-elezzjonijiet parlamentari nazzjonali lil dawk min-nazzjonali tagħhom li jirrisjedu fi Stat Membru iehor għal ċertu perjodu, minghajr ma jagħtuhom l-ebda għażla biex jibqgħu fuq ir-registru elettorali.

Fir-rakkomandazzjoni tagħha l-Kummissjoni pprezentat soluzzjonijiet kostruttivi, u stiednet lill-Istati Membri kkonċernati biex jippermettu liċ-ċittadini tagħhom li jagħmlu użu mid-dritt tagħhom ta' moviment liberu li jzommu d-dritt tagħhom li jivvutaw fl-elezzjonijiet nazzjonali, jekk huma juru interess kontinwu fil-hajja politika tal-pajjiż.

Skont l-informazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni, ċittadini ta' Stati Membri oħra li jghixu barra minn pajjiżhom mhumiex imcaħhda mid-dritt li jivvutaw fl-elezzjonijiet parlamentari nazzjonali ta' pajjiżhom stess. Għandu jiġi nnutat li ċittadini tal-Awstrija u tal-Ġermanja li jghixu barra mill-pajjiż jistgħu jiġu mcaħhda mid-dritt li jivvutaw f'dawn l-elezzjonijiet iżda għandhom l-għażla li jibqgħu fir-registru elettorali ⁽³⁾. Il-liġi Awstrijaka tirrikjedi liċ-ċittadini kkonċernati biex japplikaw qabel ma jtilqu mill-pajjiż biex jibqgħu registrati fir-registru elettorali u li jggeddu din l-applikazzjoni kull 10 snin. Iċ-ċittadini Ġermaniżi li jirrisjedu barra l-pajjiż huma eligibbli li jivvutaw fl-elezzjonijiet nazzjonali sakemm jissodisfaw waħda mill-kundizzjonijiet li ġejjin: jew: i) li jkunu għexu l-Ġermanja għal perjodu mhux interrott ta' mill-anqas tliet xhur wara li jagħlqu l-14-il sena u dan il-perjodu jmur lura mhux aktar minn 25 sena. jew ii) li jkunu saru familjari, personalment u direttament, mas-sitwazzjoni politika fil-Ġermanja u jkunu affettwati minnha.

⁽¹⁾ C(2014) 391 final.

⁽²⁾ Ċipru, id-Danimarka, l-Irlanda, Malta u r-Renju Unit.

⁽³⁾ COM(2014) 33 final.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001229/14
to the Commission
Roberta Metsola (PPE)
(6 February 2014)

Subject: Voting rights of EU citizens living abroad

The Commission has called on Malta and four other countries to stop disenfranchising citizens by not allowing them to vote unless they reside permanently in their home countries.

Does the Commission have information on the systems available in the other Member States for citizens who do not reside permanently in their home countries?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2014)

The recommendation 'Addressing the consequences of disenfranchisement of Union citizens exercising their rights to free movement' ⁽¹⁾ is addressed to the five Member States ⁽²⁾ whose current disenfranchisement rules automatically deny the right to vote in national parliamentary elections to those of their nationals who reside in another Member State for a certain period, without giving them any option to remain on the electoral rolls.

In its Recommendation the Commission put forward constructive solutions, inviting the concerned Member States to enable their nationals who make use of their free movement rights to retain their right to vote in national elections, if they demonstrate a continuing interest in the political life of their country.

According to the information of the Commission, nationals of the other Member States who reside abroad are not denied the right to vote in the national parliamentary elections of their own country. It is to be noted that nationals of Austria and of Germany residing abroad may be denied the right to vote in these elections but they have the option to remain on the electoral rolls ⁽³⁾. The Austrian law requires the nationals concerned to apply before leaving the country to remain registered on the electoral roll and to renew this application every 10 years. German citizens residing abroad are eligible to vote in national elections provided they fulfil one of the following conditions: either: i) that they had resided in Germany for an uninterrupted period of at least three months after reaching the age of fourteen years and this period dates back not more than 25 years; or ii) that they have become familiar, personally and directly, with the political situation in Germany and are affected by it.

⁽¹⁾ C(2014) 391 final.

⁽²⁾ Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Malta and the United Kingdom.

⁽³⁾ COM(2014) 33 final.

(Verżjoni Maltija)

Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-001231/14
lill-Kummissjoni
Roberta Metsola (PPE)
(6 ta' Frar 2014)

Suġġett: Riforma strutturali tas-settur bankarju tal-UE

Il-Kummissjoni reċentement ipproponiet regoli ġodda biex twaqqaf l-akbar u l-aktar banek kumplessi milli jinvolvu ruħhom fl-attività riskjuża ta' kummerċ proprjetarju. Adottat ukoll miżuri ta' akkumpanjament mmirati sabiex tiżdied it-trasparenza ta' ċerti transazzjonijiet fis-settur bankarju parallel.

Il-Kummissjoni tista' tiċċara r-raġunijiet għala l-abbozz ta' liġi resaq 'il bogħod milli jeżiġi separazzjoni vera tas-servizzi bbażati fuq depożitu standard u l-fergħat ta' investimenti aktar riskjużi tal-banek, kif irrakkomandat frapport konsultattiv għall-Kummissjoni ppubblikat fl-2012 ⁽¹⁾?

Tweġiba mogħtija mis-Sur Barnier f'isem il-Kummissjoni
(9 ta' April 2014)

Ir-rapport tal-Grupp ta' Esperti ta' Livell Għoli ("l-HLEG") dwar riforma strutturali għall-banek tal-UE kien ta' valur kbir għall-Kummissjoni waqt il-preparazzjoni tal-proposta adottata reċentement għal Regolament dwar il-miżuri strutturali li jtejbu r-reżiljenza tal-istituzzjonijiet ta' kreditu tal-UE. Il-proposta timmira li twaqqaf l-ikbar banek milli jimpenjaw ruħhom f'attività riskjuża ta' kummerċ proprjetarju u tagħti wkoll lis-superviżuri s-setgħa li jeħtieġu l-banek biex jisseparaw ċerti attivitajiet ta' kummerċ riskjużi potenzjalment min-negozju ta' depożitu tagħhom.

Fost affarijiet oħra, l-HLEG irrakkomanda s-separazzjoni obbligatorja ta' ċerti attivitajiet ta' kummerċ riskjużi potenzjalment minn attivitajiet bankarji oħra. Il-Kummissjoni sussegwentement ikkonsidrat il-każ għal riforma strutturali fid-dawl ta' riformi oħrajn diġà mehuda, notevolment fil-valutazzjoni tal-impatt li takkumpanja ir-Regolament imsemmi hawn fuq.

Il-Kummissjoni tikkonsidra li l-proposta tagħha toqot l-aħjar bilanċ bejn it-tnaqqis tar-riskji sistemici u ż-żamma ta' finanzjament sostenibbli ta' tkabbir sistemiku, waqt li tinkorpora l-oġettivi espressi fir-rapport tal-HLEG.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report_en.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001231/14
to the Commission**

Roberta Metsola (PPE)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Structural reform of the EU banking sector

The Commission has recently proposed new rules to stop the largest and most complex banks from engaging in the risky activity of proprietary trading. It has also adopted accompanying measures aimed at increasing the transparency of certain transactions in the shadow banking sector.

Could the Commission clarify the reasons why the draft law steers away from requiring a true separation of the standard deposit-based services and the riskier investment arms of banks, as recommended in an advisory report for the Commission published in 2012 ⁽¹⁾?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(9 April 2014)

The report of the High-Level Expert Group (the 'HLEG') on a structural reform for EU banks has been very valuable to the Commission when preparing the recently adopted proposal for a regulation on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions. The proposal aims at stopping the largest banks from engaging in the risky activity of proprietary trading and would also give supervisors the power to require banks to separate certain potentially risky trading activities from their deposit-taking business.

Among other things, the HLEG recommended the mandatory separation of certain high-risk trading activities from other banking activities. The Commission has subsequently considered the case for structural reform in the light of other reforms already undertaken, most notably in its impact assessment accompanying the abovementioned Regulation.

The Commission considers that its proposal strikes the best balance between reducing systemic risks and maintaining sustainable financing of economic growth, while incorporating the objectives expressed in the HLEG report.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report_en.pdf

(Verżjoni Maltija)

Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-001233/14
lill-Kummissjoni
Roberta Metsola (PPE)
(6 ta' Frar 2014)

Suġġett: Tariffi postali fi hdan l-Unjoni Ewropea

L-għan tal-politika tal-UE fis-settur tal-posta huwa li jiffinalizza s-suq intern għas-servizzi postali u jiżgura, permezz ta' qafas regolatorju adegwat, li servizzi postali effikaċi, affidabbli u ta' kwalità tajba jkunu disponibbli liċ-cittadini kollha tal-UE fl-Unjoni kollha, bi prezzijiet aċċessibbli għal kulhadd. L-importanza tas-servizzi postali kemm għall-prosperità ekonomika kif ukoll għall-benesseri soċjali u l-koeżjoni tal-UE hija qasam ta' priorità għal azzjoni tal-Unjoni.

Madankollu, il-konsumaturi tal-UE huma tal-fehma li tariffi eżorbitanti tal-posta bl-ajru għal materjal stampat qed ikollhom jithallsu għal servizzi postali bejn l-Istati Membri tal-UE.

Il-Kummissjoni qed tippjana li tohroġ leġiżlazzjoni biex jitnaqqsu l-ispejjeż tal-posta intrakomunitarji għal oġġetti bħal kotba, rivisti u gazzetti, meta wiehed iżomm f'moħħu li dawn huma prinċipalment għal skopijiet edukattivi/ta' rikreazzjoni?

Il-Kummissjoni għandha informazzjoni dwar it-tariffi postali mitluba mill-Istati Membri l-oħra tal-UE għas-servizzi postali intrakomunitarji għall-materjal stampat?

Tweġiba mogħtija mis-Sur Barnier f'isem il-Kummissjoni
(1 ta' April 2014)

Li jiġu żgurati servizzi ta' konsenja ta' kwalità għolja u għall-but ta' kulhadd fir-rigward ta' provvedimenti ta' servizzi postali transfruntieri huwa wiehed mill-pilastru ewlenin tar-riforma postali tal-UE u huwa fiċ-ċentru ta' hidma tal-politiki u l-infurzar tal-Kummissjoni.

Il-Kummissjoni tixtieq tfakkar li Artikolu 12 tad-Direttiva 97/67/KE⁽¹⁾ jehtieg li t-tariffi ta' servizzi universali jkunu għall-but ta' kulhadd u orjentati lejn l-ispejjeż. Dawn ir-rekwiżiti jistgħu japplikaw ukoll għall-konsenja ta' kotba, gazzetti u perjodiċi hekk kif jikkonstitwixxu oġġetti postali fis-sens tal-Artikolu 2 punt 12 tad-Direttiva msemmija hawn fuq li jistgħu jagħmlu parti mis-servizz universali. Studju riċenti⁽²⁾ fih ċifri dettaljati fir-rigward ta' tariffi pubbliċi għall-iktar kategoriji importanti ta' oġġetti postali (għalkemm m'hemm ebda ċifri speċifiċi dwar il-prezzijiet tal-konsenja ta' gazzetti u perjodiċi transfruntiera).

Il-Kummissjoni hija konxja li hemm potenzjal sabiex jittejjeb il-funzjonament tas-suq intern għall-konsenji transfruntieri.

Għalhekk, il-Kummissjoni adottat fis-16 ta' Diċembru 2013 "Pjan direzzjonali dwar l-ikkompletar tas-suq uniku għall-konsenja tal-pakketti"⁽³⁾, li jipprevedi numru ta' azzjonijiet mhux leġiżlattivi mmirati biex jiżguraw li titjib ta' għall-konsenja tal-pakketti transfruntiera jkun imwettaq. Dawn l-azzjonijiet ta' politika jikkonċernaw fost affarijiet oħra t-titjib tal-informazzjoni għall-konsumaturi dwar il-karatteristiċi u l-prezzijiet ta' soluzzjonijiet differenti ta' konsenja u redditi u jsaħhu it-trasparenza tal-prezzijiet ta' oġġetti transfruntieri, b'mod partikolari permezz tal-implimentazzjoni tal-Artikolu 22a tad-Direttiva 97/67/KE.

⁽¹⁾ Id-Direttiva 97/67/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-15 ta' Diċembru 1997 dwar regoli komuni għall-iżvilupp tas-suq intern tas-servizzi postali tal-Komunità u t-titjib fil-kwalità tas-servizz (kif emendata mid-Direttiva 2002/39/KE u d-Direttiva 2008/6/KE).

⁽²⁾ WIK. Żviluppi Ewlenin fis-Settur Postali (2010-2013), 2013.

⁽³⁾ COM(2013) 886 finali.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001233/14
to the Commission
Roberta Metsola (PPE)
(6 February 2014)**

Subject: Postal tariffs within the European Union

The purpose of EU policy in the postal sector is to complete the internal market for postal services and to ensure, through an appropriate regulatory framework, that efficient, reliable and good-quality postal services are available at affordable prices to all EU citizens throughout the Union. The importance of postal services for both the economic prosperity and the social well-being and cohesion of the EU makes this a priority area for Union action.

However, EU consumers are of the opinion that exorbitant airmail postal tariffs for printed matter are being charged for postal services among the EU Member States.

Does the Commission plan to issue legislation to reduce the intra-community postal charges for articles such as books, magazines and newspapers, bearing in mind that these are mainly for educational/recreational purposes?

Does the Commission have information on the postal tariffs being charged by the other EU Member States on intra-community postal services for printed matter?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(1 April 2014)**

Ensuring high quality and affordable delivery services regarding the cross-border provision of postal services is one of the main pillars of the EU postal reform and is at the centre of the Commission's policy and enforcement work.

The Commission would like to recall that Article 12 of Directive 97/67/EC ⁽¹⁾ requires universal services tariffs to be affordable and cost-oriented. These requirements may also apply to the delivery of books, newspapers and periodicals as they constitute postal items in the sense of Article 2 point 12 of the above Directive that can be part of the universal service. A recent study ⁽²⁾ contains detailed figures as for the public tariffs for the most important categories of postal items (albeit there are no specific figures on the prices for the delivery of cross-border newspapers or periodicals).

The Commission is aware that there is potential to improve the functioning of the internal market for cross-border delivery.

Therefore, the Commission adopted on 16 December 2013 a 'Roadmap for completing the single market for parcel delivery' ⁽³⁾, which foresees a number of non-legislative actions aimed at ensuring that tangible improvements in the field of cross-border parcel delivery are carried out. These policy actions concern *inter alia* the improvement of information for consumers on the characteristics and costs of different delivery and returns solutions and enhancing the transparency of prices of cross-border items, in particular through the implementation of Article 22a of Directive 97/67/EC.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service (as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC and Directive 2008/6/EC).

⁽²⁾ WIK, Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2010-2013), 2013.

⁽³⁾ COM(2013) 886 final.

(Verżjoni Maltija)

Mistoqsija għal twegħiba bil-miktub E-001234/14
lill-Kummissjoni
Roberta Metsola (PPE)
(6 ta' Frar 2014)

Suġġett: Rapport dwar il-korruzzjoni madwar l-UE

Fl-2011 il-Kummissjoni ddecidiet li tikkompila rapport biex tivvaluta l-korruzzjoni fl-Istati Membri u fi hdan l-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE. Madankollu, minn dak inhar gie deciz li ma jigix inkluz kapitolu dwar l-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE.

Għal dan il-ghan, x'qiegħda tagħmel il-Kummissjoni biex tiżgura li l-korruzzjoni fi hdan l-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE tiġi vvalutata b'mod xieraq u li jsir eżercizzju biex tiġi indirizzata tali korruzzjoni?

Twegħiba mogħtija mis-Sinjura Malmström f'isem il-Kummissjoni
(24 ta' April 2014)

Il-Kummissjoni ddecidied li ma tinkludix sezzjoni li tivvaluta sforzi għal kontra l-korruzzjoni tal-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE stess fir-Rapport tal-UE għal Kontra l-Korruzzjoni ghax f'dan l-istadju ma kienx possibbli li tapplika l-istess metodologija — inkluz analizi ta' rapporti indipendenti eżistenti u ricerka akkademika — lill-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE b'tali mod li jkunu jistghu jipprovdu valutazzjoni sufficjement solida u objettiva. Il-Kummissjoni se tikkunsidra din il-kwistjoni f'Rapporti futuri tal-UE għal Kontra l-Korruzzjoni.

Attwalment, għall-kuntrarju tal-Istati Membri, m'hemm ebda analizi esterni indipendenti fuq xiex il-Kummissjoni tkun tista' tibbenifika biex tevalwa l-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE stess, lanqas hemm evidenza sostanzjali ta' ricerka akkademika dwar miżuri għal kontra l-korruzzjoni fl-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE. Il-Kummissjoni, f'konsultazzjoni ma' istituzzjonijiet ohra tal-UE, issa qed tivvaluta l-implikazzjonijiet tekniċi u legali tal-adeżjoni tal-UE mal-GRECO (Grupp ta' Stati kontra l-korruzzjoni, Kunsill tal-Ewropa), li jkunu jinvolvu analizi tal-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE mill-GRECO.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001234/14
to the Commission**

Roberta Metsola (PPE)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: EU-wide corruption report

In 2011 the Commission decided to compile a report to assess corruption in the Member States and within the EU institutions. However, it has since been decided not to include a chapter on the EU institutions.

To this end, what is the Commission doing in order to ensure that corruption within the EU institutions is properly assessed and that an exercise is undertaken to tackle such corruption?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission

(24 April 2014)

The Commission decided not to include a section assessing anti-corruption efforts of the EU's own institutions in the EU Anti-Corruption Report as it was not possible at this stage to apply the same methodology — including an analysis of existing independent reports and academic research — to the EU institutions in a way which would provide a sufficiently solid and objective assessment. The Commission will consider this question in future EU Anti-Corruption Reports.

At present, unlike for the Member States, there are no independent external reviews on which the Commission could draw to evaluate the EU's own institutions, nor is there a substantial body of academic research on anti-corruption measures within the EU institutions. The Commission, in consultation with other EU institutions, is now assessing the technical and legal implications of EU accession to GRECO (Group of States against corruption, Council of Europe), which would entail review by GRECO of EU institutions.

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001238/14
à la Commission (Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante)**

Marc Tarabella (S&D)

(6 février 2014)

Objet: VP/HR — Violences en Birmanie

J'exprime de vives préoccupations quant à la situation en Birmanie. On ne peut rester de marbre face aux dernières violences dont a été victime la communauté Rohingya. Selon les Nations unies, 48 Rohingyas, dont des femmes et des enfants, ont été tués lors d'attaques survenues à partir du 13 janvier 2014. La police a également été impliquée dans ces meurtres.

1. Convenez-vous qu'il est nécessaire de mettre en place une enquête internationale et indépendante sur les violations des Droits de l'homme perpétrées depuis 2012 dans l'État d'Arakan, dans l'ouest de la Birmanie?
2. Quelles sont les actions que vous comptez entreprendre?

Réponse donnée par M^{me} Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission

(7 mai 2014)

La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante suit de près les événements survenus récemment dans l'État d'Arakan. Au niveau local, la délégation de l'UE a été en contact avec le gouvernement, les autorités publiques et les organismes d'aide internationale présents dans cet État ainsi qu'avec les communautés bouddhistes et Rohingyas.

Les chefs de mission de l'UE à Yangon se sont rendu dans l'État d'Arakan du 29 janvier au 1^{er} février dans le but de faire le point de la situation générale, de prendre la mesure de ses conséquences sur les plans politiques et humanitaires et en matière de développement et d'obtenir des informations de première main auprès des deux communautés. La délégation a visité de nombreux sites, notamment des camps de personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays, et a rencontré des dignitaires religieux.

La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante et le commissaire chargé de la coopération internationale, de l'aide humanitaire et de la réaction aux crises, ont fait part de leur vive préoccupation au sujet de la situation des Rohingyas à M. U Soe Thane, ministre de la présidence du Myanmar, lors de sa visite à Bruxelles en mars 2014.

La tragédie que vous mentionnez a suscité un vif émoi au sein de la communauté internationale. Dans sa résolution sur la situation des Droits de l'homme au Myanmar adoptée en mars 2014 et soutenue par l'UE, le Conseil des Droits de l'homme des Nations unies a de nouveau fait part de sa profonde inquiétude quant à la situation des Rohingyas dans l'État d'Arakan, et a demandé qu'une enquête indépendante soit menée sur les violences intercommunautaires et que les personnes coupables d'incitation à la haine soient tenues responsables de leurs actes.

Entre 2013 et 2014, la Commission européenne a engagé 13,5 millions d'euros d'aide humanitaire en faveur des personnes les plus nécessiteuses dans l'État d'Arakan, tandis que l'enveloppe affectée à l'aide au développement de cet État s'élève actuellement à 17 millions d'euros.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001238/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Marc Tarabella (S&D)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Violence in Burma

The situation in Burma is a cause for great concern. We cannot remain unmoved by the latest violence suffered by the Rohingya community. According to the UN, 48 Rohingyas, including women and children, have been killed in attacks since 13 January 2014. The police are also implicated in these murders.

1. Do you agree that it is necessary to establish an independent international investigation into human rights violations committed since 2012 in Rakhine State, in western Burma?
2. What actions will you take in this connection?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(7 May 2014)

The HR/VP has been closely following the recent events in Rakhine State. Locally, the EU Delegation has been in contact with government, state authorities and international aid agencies operating in Rakhine state as well as with Rakhine Buddhist and Rohingya communities.

EU Heads of Mission in Yangon visited Rakhine state from 29 January — 1 February with the objective of assessing the overall situation, its political, humanitarian and development dimensions and obtaining first-hand information from both communities. The delegation visited a wide range of locations, including IDP camps and met with religious leaders.

The HR/VP and the Commissioner responsible for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response raised their serious concerns about the situation of the Rohingya with President's Office Minister U Soe Thane, when he visited Brussels in March 2014.

The incident you referred to has received high international attention. The UN Human Rights Council resolution on the situation of human rights in Myanmar of March 2014, which was sponsored by the EU, reiterated serious concerns about the situation of the Rohingya in Rakhine State and requested an independent investigation into inter-communal violence and that those who incite hatred are held accountable.

For the period 2013/2014 the European Commission has committed EUR 13.5 million in humanitarian assistance for those most in need in Rakhine state is, while ongoing development assistance currently stands at EUR 17 million in the State.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001239/14
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(6 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: Alluvione in Veneto e Friuli Venezia Giulia

Il Veneto e il Friuli Venezia Giulia sono da giorni alle prese con il maltempo: le incessanti precipitazioni hanno determinato per i cittadini di queste regioni una situazione difficilissima, destinata, secondo le previsioni degli esperti, a peggiorare.

In Veneto l'eccezionale incremento dei livelli idrometrici interessa le province di Vicenza, Padova, Venezia e Verona.

Vicenza città e i comuni limitrofi sono in allerta a causa del livello raggiunto dal fiume Bacchiglione che minaccia di esondare. A Bovolenta e Battaglia Terme, in provincia di Padova, è iniziata l'evacuazione di almeno 600 persone. C'è forte apprensione anche a Legnago, in provincia di Verona, per il livello del Bussè, mentre a Portogruaro, in provincia di Venezia, l'esondazione del fiume Reghena ha causato l'allagamento delle abitazioni e l'interruzione di un'intera linea ferroviaria. In provincia di Belluno a causa delle precipitazioni nevose molti comuni sono rimasti isolati e senza corrente elettrica. Molti comuni di tutta la regione hanno chiuso le scuole.

I terreni non sono più in grado di assorbire l'acqua.

Il Veneto è già stato colpito nel 2010 da una tragica alluvione e il Presidente della Regione Luca Zaia ha dichiarato che i danni economici sono enormi e probabilmente supereranno quelli del 2010.

In Friuli la situazione è altrettanto critica: la Regione ha dichiarato lo «stato di emergenza» a causa delle forti piogge e delle intense nevicate che mettono in situazione di allerta molti comuni montani.

La Commissione:

1. è al corrente della situazione?
2. prevede di stanziare finanziamenti ad hoc per la prevenzione del rischio idrogeologico di questi territori?
3. intende attivare provvedimenti straordinari quali la deroga del Patto di Stabilità per gli enti locali che governano questi territori?
4. intende attivare il Fondo di Solidarietà?

**Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione
(7 aprile 2014)**

1. La Commissione è a conoscenza degli eventi verificatisi in Veneto e in Friuli-Venezia Giulia.
2. Il Fondo europeo per lo sviluppo regionale prevede la possibilità di finanziare gli interventi di prevenzione dei rischi nell'ambito dei programmi 2007-13 per le regioni Veneto e Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Anche se il Fondo europeo agricolo per lo sviluppo rurale (FEASR) prevede a sua volta questa possibilità per il periodo 2007-13, sino ad oggi queste regioni non hanno inserito questo strumento nei loro programmi 2007-13 di sviluppo rurale. Interventi analoghi saranno anche possibili nel periodo 2014-20.
3. Il Patto di stabilità e crescita comprende una clausola che consente la presa in considerazione di eventi imprevisti con un impatto notevole sulle finanze pubbliche, anche se è dubbio che un evento ricorrente e i relativi costi siano conformi ai requisiti stabiliti per l'applicazione di tale clausola. Ciò significa che le spese pubbliche destinate a rimediare alle conseguenze permanenti del maltempo, diverse da quelle relative ai costi dei soccorsi d'emergenza, devono essere finanziate dallo Stato membro entro i limiti pertinenti.
4. Il Fondo di solidarietà può essere mobilitato solo su richiesta di uno Stato membro entro dieci settimane dal primo danno. Fino ad oggi, non è stata presentata o annunciata alcuna richiesta. Il fatto che una catastrofe abbia i requisiti necessari può essere valutato solo in base a una solida valutazione del danno e delle sue conseguenze sulle condizioni di vita e sull'economia. Gli aiuti del fondo possono essere utilizzati per gli aiuti di urgenza alla popolazione colpita, gli alloggi temporanei, la riparazione delle infrastrutture danneggiate, la tutela del patrimonio culturale e le operazioni di pulizia. I danni privati non possono usufruire di aiuti.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001239/14
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(6 February 2014)

Subject: Flooding in Veneto and Friuli Venezia Giulia

Veneto and Friuli Venezia Giulia have for days been struggling with bad weather: the unceasing rainfall has created a very difficult situation for the inhabitants of these regions, and experts are predicting that it will get worse.

In Veneto the provinces of Vicenza, Padova, Venice, and Verona are being affected by the unusual rise in water levels.

The city of Vicenza and neighbouring municipalities are on alert because the river Bacchiglione has risen so high that it is in danger of overflowing. In Bovolenta and Battaglia Terme, in the province of Padova, at least 600 people are being evacuated. In Legnago, in the province of Verona, the level of the Busse' is causing serious anxiety; in Portogruaro, in the province of Venice, the river Reghena has burst its banks, with the result that homes have been flooded and an entire railway line rendered impassable. Because of the snowfall in Belluno province, many municipalities have been cut off and left without electricity. Schools have been closed in many municipalities throughout the region.

The ground cannot absorb any more water.

Veneto was previously hit by severe flooding in 2010; the President of the Region, Luca Zaia, has spoken of immense economic damage likely to exceed the harm done in 2010.

A similarly critical situation exists in Friuli: the regional authorities have declared a state of emergency on account of the violent downpours and heavy snowfall that are putting many mountain municipalities on alert.

1. Is the Commission aware of the situation described above?
2. Will it allocate funding specifically for hydrogeological risk prevention in the affected areas?
3. Will it take special measures and, for example, waive the Stability Pact, exempting the local authorities concerned?
4. Will it activate the Solidarity Fund?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(7 April 2014)

1. The Commission is aware of the events in Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia.
2. The European Regional Development Fund provides for the possibility to support risk prevention interventions under the 2007-13 programmes for the Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia regions. While the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development also provides for this possibility for 2007-13 so far these regions have not included this in their 2007-13 rural development programmes. Similar interventions will also be possible in 2014-20.
3. The Stability and Growth Pact contains a clause that permits the occurrence of unexpected events with a sizable impact on government finances to be taken into account, although it is doubtful that a recurrent event and costs which are related to recent happenings qualify for the application of such a clause. This means that public expenditure aimed at fixing lasting consequences of bad weather, as opposed to emergency relief costs, should be financed by the Member State within relevant limits.
4. The Solidarity Fund can only be mobilised following an application from the Member State within 10 weeks of the first damage. To date, no application has been submitted or announced. Whether the disaster could qualify can only be judged on the basis of a solid assessment of the damage and of its consequences on living conditions and the economy. Aid from the Fund could be used for emergency operations to assist the affected population, for temporary accommodation, the repair of damaged infrastructure, protection of the cultural heritage and cleaning-up operations. Private damage is not eligible for aid.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001241/14
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(6 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Política común de visados

En referencia a la pregunta E-011635/2013, la Sra. Malmström contestó: «La Comisión es consciente de la situación a la que se enfrentan los ciudadanos de Kosovo que desean viajar a España. La Comisión está estudiando actualmente la interpretación y aplicación que las autoridades españolas hacen de la política común de visados, para comprobar si están en consonancia con las disposiciones legales».

Pasados dos meses de dicha respuesta, ¿ha terminado la Comisión esta investigación?

En caso afirmativo, ¿puede indicar la Comisión las conclusiones a las que ha llegado?

Respuesta de la Sra. Malmström en nombre de la Comisión

(11 de abril de 2014)

Con referencia a la respuesta de 4 de diciembre de 2013 a la pregunta E-011635/2013, la Comisión ha analizado la cuestión de los procedimientos que deberá seguir un Estado miembro para la tramitación de una solicitud de visado por parte del titular de un documento de viaje expedido por un tercer país no reconocido por el Estado miembro de que se trate.

Según la normativa en vigor, la Comisión concluye que un Estado miembro que no reconozca un tercer país determinado no está obligado a examinar las solicitudes de visado admisibles (de conformidad con el artículo 19 del Código sobre visados ⁽¹⁾) presentadas por los nacionales de ese país. Puede considerarse que los titulares del documento de viaje mencionado no están en posesión de un documento de viaje válido para la entrada en el territorio de los Estados miembros de que se trate.

El Código sobre Visados contempla vías legislativas para evitar que la falta de reconocimiento, por razones políticas o técnicas, de los documentos de viaje expedidos por un país tercero determinado penalice a los viajeros. De conformidad con el artículo 25, apartado 3, un Estado miembro que no reconozca el documento de viaje de un solicitante de visado podrá expedir, no obstante, un visado que se colocará en un impreso separado (artículo 29, apartado 2), en vez de en el documento de viaje. Este visado solo será válido en el territorio del Estado miembro que lo haya expedido.

La Comisión observa que las autoridades españolas han optado por no aplicar estas disposiciones en los casos a los que alude Su Señoría.

⁽¹⁾ Reglamento (CE) n° 810/2009, DO L 243 de 15.9.2009, p. 1.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001241/14
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Common visa policy

With reference to Question E-011635/2013, Commissioner Malmström replied: 'The Commission is aware of the situation which Kosovar nationals wishing to travel to Spain face. The Commission is currently examining the Spanish authorities' interpretation and implementation of the common visa policy to verify whether they are in line with the legal provisions'.

Two months on from this answer, has the Commission completed this investigation?

If so, can the Commission state what conclusions it has reached?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission

(11 April 2014)

With reference to the reply given on 4 December 2013 to Question E-011635/2013, the Commission has further analysed the question regarding the procedures to be followed by a Member State in the handling of a visa application from the holder of a travel document issued by a third country not recognised by the Member State concerned.

On the basis of the legislation in force, the Commission must conclude that a Member State not recognising a given third country is not obliged to consider visa applications from the nationals of this country admissible (under Article 19 of the Visa Code⁽¹⁾). Holders of such travel documents may be considered as not holding a travel document valid for the entry into the territory of the Member States concerned.

The Visa Code provides for legislative means to prevent that the non-recognition, be it for political or technical reasons, of travel documents issued by a given third country penalises individual travellers. Under Article 25(3) a Member State not recognising a visa applicant's travel document may nevertheless issue a visa that will be affixed to a separate sheet (Article 29(2)) rather than in the travel document. Such a visa shall only be valid for the issuing Member State.

The Commission notes that the Spanish authorities have chosen not to apply these provisions in the case described by the Honourable Member of Parliament.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EC) 810/2009, OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p. 1.

(Dansk udgave)

Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-001243/14
til Kommissionen
Christel Schaldemose (S&D)
(6. februar 2014)

Om: Opfølgende spørgsmål til Kommissionen omkring soja-produktion

Det glæder mig, at Kommissionen er bekendt med problemstillingen omkring soja-produktion (jf. kommissær Tonio Borgs svar af 20.1.2014, E-012641/2013), og at man via bilaterale aftaler med EU's handelspartnere forsøger at bidrage til en miljømæssig forsvarlig praksis.

Jeg mener, vi har et særligt ansvar i EU for at sikre, at det, vi importerer (herunder soja), er bæredygtigt. Kommissionen beskriver, at det er tidskrævende og vanskeligt for EU at påvirke produktionsforholdene i tredjelande.

På denne baggrund er mit spørgsmål:

Vil Kommissionen — som et supplement — overveje at oprette en særlig EU-pulje, der kan bruges som støtte til dem, som importerer den bæredygtige soja?

Det vil give et incitament til europæiske landmænd til at vælge den bæredygtige soja, og det vil give et kontant bidrag til dem, der i tredjelande vælger en bæredygtig sojaproduktion.

Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Dacian Cioloș
(1. april 2014)

Kommissionen erkender, at de europæiske producenter og forbrugere har et ansvar for at sikre bæredygtige produktionskæder. Private virksomheder har i flere sektorer iværksat interessante initiativer, som tager sigte på en større indsats for at fremme en bæredygtig produktion for importerede produkter, som f.eks. palmeolie. For så vidt angår soja, planlægger Kommissionen for nuværende ikke at fremsætte et forslag om oprettelse af en særlig pulje, som giver mulighed for at yde støtte til importører af bæredygtig soja.

I forbindelse med den nylige reform af den fælles landbrugspolitik har EU åbnet nye muligheder for at fremme bæredygtig produktion af proteinafgrøder i EU. Medlemsstaterne kan nu anvende koblede direkte betalinger til at støtte proteinafgrøder, og de har endda fået et incitament til at yde et større bidrag: hvis de afsætter mere end 2 % af de bevillinger, de har til rådighed til direkte betalinger til koblet støtte, til proteinafgrøder, kan de øge deres samlede koblede støtte med 2 %. Dyrkning af kvælstoffikserende planter vil desuden medvirke til at opfylde betingelserne for visse grønne betalinger samt støtte fra instrumenter til udvikling af landdistrikterne og forsknings- og innovationsinstrumenter.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001243/14
to the Commission**

Christel Schaldemose (S&D)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Follow-up question to the Commission on soya production

I am pleased that the Commission is aware of the problems surrounding soya production — see Commissioner Borg's answer of 20 January 2014 to Question E-012641/2013 — and that attempts are being made via bilateral agreements with EU trading partners to contribute to environmentally sound practices.

In my opinion, we bear a special responsibility in the EU to ensure that what we import, including soya, is sustainable. The Commission states that it is time-consuming and difficult for the EU to influence production conditions in third countries.

Accordingly, will the Commission, by way of additional action, consider setting up a special EU fund for supporting importers of sustainable soya?

That would give EU farmers an incentive to opt for sustainable soya and provide a tangible contribution for soya producers in third countries who opt for sustainable methods.

Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission

(1 April 2014)

The Commission recognises the responsibility of EU producers and consumers for sustainable production chains. In several sectors the private sector has set up interesting initiatives to further promote sustainable production for imported products, such as palm oil. Concerning soya, the Commission currently does not intend to propose setting up a special fund for supporting importers of sustainable soya.

With its recent reform of the common agricultural policy, the European Union has introduced some additional options to develop the sustainable production of protein crops in the EU. Member States may use coupled direct payments to support protein crops, and they even have an incentive to give a significant support: if they dedicate more than 2% of their Direct Payment envelope for coupled support to protein crops, they may increase their overall coupled support by 2%. Besides, nitrogen fixing plants will be recognised for some greening requirements, as well as certain rural development and research and innovation instruments.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001246/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(6 Φεβρουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Ειδική μεταχείριση σε βάρος της Ελλάδας

Οι ευρωπαϊκές τράπεζες είναι υποχρεωμένες, εφαρμόζοντας σχετική απόφαση του Συμβουλίου (26.10.2011) και σύσταση της Ευρωπαϊκής Αρχής Τραπεζών (EAT — 8.12.2011), να έχουν σχηματίσει ένα κατώτατο όριο κεφαλαιακής επάρκειας 9%. Στην περίπτωση της Ελλάδας, σύμφωνα με τη σύσταση της EAT (8.12.2011), αυτή η υποχρέωση ρυθμίζεται από τις διατάξεις του Μνημονίου (βλέπε σελίδα 7, υποσημείωση 3).

Ωστόσο, στις 22 Ιουλίου 2013, η EAT με νέα της σύσταση, δίνει πλέον το δικαίωμα στις Εθνικές Εποπτικές Αρχές των κρατών μελών, να άρουν την απαίτηση για κεφαλαιακή επάρκεια 9% για τις τράπεζές τους, «όταν κρίνεται ότι τα κεφάλαια πλεονάζουν σε σχέση με τα κεφάλαια που απαιτούνται προκειμένου να καλύπτονται οι ελάχιστες απαιτήσεις ως προς τα κύρια βασικά ίδια κεφάλαια και τα αποθέματα ασφαλείας διατήρησης κεφαλαίου».

Με δεδομένο ότι η Ελλάδα και η αρμόδια εποπτική αρχή για τις τράπεζες, εξαιρούνται από τις συστάσεις της EAT για την κεφαλαιακή επάρκεια, με τη δικαιολογία ότι η Ελλάδα βρίσκεται υπό καθεστώς Μνημονίου, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Για ποιους λόγους η Ελλάδα βρίσκεται σε ένα «ειδικό δυσμενές καθεστώς» αναφορικά με την κεφαλαιακή ασφάλεια και επάρκεια των ελληνικών τραπεζών; Γιατί δεν συμβαίνει το ίδιο και με τα άλλα τραπεζικά συστήματα των κρατών μελών που βρίσκονται σε Πρόγραμμα Δημοσιονομικής Προσαρμογής, όπως η Ιρλανδία, η Πορτογαλία και η Κύπρος;
2. Θα ισχύσει το ειδικό δυσμενές καθεστώς για τις ελληνικές τράπεζες στα stress-tests και τα asset-quality-reviews, που θα διενεργηθούν από την EAT και την Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα; Δεν αποτελεί αυτό δυσμενή μεταχείριση των ελληνικών τραπεζών από την άποψη του ισότιμου ανταγωνισμού; Ποιο είναι το κόστος υπολογισμού της κεφαλαιακής επάρκειας στο 9%, αντί για 8%, για τις ελληνικές τράπεζες;
3. Θεωρεί η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή ότι η Ελλάδα αποτελεί κράτος μέλος της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης υπό ειδικό καθεστώς;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(3 Απριλίου 2014)

Από την 31η Δεκεμβρίου 2013, οι κεφαλαιακές απαιτήσεις για τις ελληνικές τράπεζες έχουν ευθυγραμμιστεί με τον κανονισμό (ΕΕ) αριθ. 575/2013 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, της 26ης Ιουνίου 2013, σχετικά με τις απαιτήσεις προληπτικής εποπτείας για πιστωτικά ιδρύματα και επιχειρήσεις επενδύσεων, ο οποίος ισχύει άμεσα για όλες τις τράπεζες της ΕΕ.

Όσον αφορά τις προσομοιώσεις ακραίων καταστάσεων, οι πληροφορίες που ζητεί ο αξιότιμος κ βουλευτής είναι ήδη διαθέσιμες στη δημοσιευθείσα έκθεση⁽¹⁾ της Τράπεζας της Ελλάδος (ΤτΕ). Συγκεκριμένα, στη σελίδα 9, η έκθεση της ΤτΕ αναφέρει: «Σκοπός της άσκησης ήταν να γίνει μια συντηρητική εκτίμηση των κεφαλαιακών αναγκών όλων των εμπορικών τραπεζών σε ενοποιημένη βάση, έτσι ώστε να πληρούνται τα ελάχιστα απαιτούμενα επίπεδα Κυρίων Βασικών Ιδίων Κεφαλαίων την περίοδο Ιουνίου 2013 - Δεκεμβρίου 2016 (βλ. Κεφάλαιο IV), δηλαδή:

- στόχος για τον Δείκτη Κυρίων Βασικών Ιδίων Κεφαλαίων (Core Tier 1 ratio — CT1 ratio) 8% στο Βασικό Σενάριο·
- στόχος για τον Δείκτη Κυρίων Βασικών Ιδίων Κεφαλαίων (CT1 ratio) 5,5% στο Δυσμενές Σενάριο.

Αυτά τα όρια συνάδουν με τα αντίστοιχα της επερχόμενης άσκησης προσομοίωσης ακραίων καταστάσεων που θα διενεργήσει η ΕΒΑ το 2014 σε επίπεδο ΕΕ και της Συνολικής Αξιολόγησης.»

(1) <http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BoGAttachments/2013%20Stress%20test%20of%20the%20Greek%20banking%20sector.pdf>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001246/14
to the Commission**

Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Special — unfavourable — treatment of Greece

Under a decision adopted by the Council on 26 October 2011 and a recommendation issued by the European Banking Authority (EBA) on 8 December 2011, European banks are obliged to maintain Core Tier 1 capital of 9%. According to the recommendation issued by the EBA on 8 December 2011 (page 7, footnote 3), Greece's obligation is regulated by the provisions of the Memorandum.

However, on 22 July 2013, the EBA issued a new recommendation granting the Member States' national supervisory authorities the right to waive the 9% nominal floor requirement for their banks 'where it is deemed capital is in excess of that needed to meet ...the minimum Common Equity Tier 1 requirements and the capital conservation buffer'.

In view of the fact that Greece and the competent banking supervisory authority are exempt from the EBA Core Tier 1 capital recommendations on the grounds that Greece is under memorandum status, will the Commission say:

1. Why is Greece under 'special unfavourable status' in terms of the Core Tier 1 capital and capital conservation buffer of Greek banks? Why does the same not apply to other banking systems in Member States in a Fiscal Adjustment Programme, such as Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus?
2. Will this special unfavourable status of Greek banks apply in stress tests and asset quality reviews carried out by the EBA and the European Central Bank? Does this not constitute unfavourable treatment of Greek banks from the point of view of fair competition? What is the cost of calculating Core Tier 1 capital for Greek banks at 9% rather than 8%?
3. Does the Commission consider that Greece is a Member State of the European Union under special status?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(3 April 2014)

Since 31 December 2013, the capital requirements for the Greek banks have been aligned with the regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms, which is directly applicable to all EU banks.

As regards the stress test, the information requested by the Honourable Member is already available in the published report ⁽¹⁾ of the Bank of Greece (BoG). Specifically, on page 9 the BoG report states: 'The objective of this exercise was to conservatively estimate the capital needs of all Greek commercial banks on a consolidated basis in order to ensure minimum Core Tier 1 capital levels over the June 2013 — December 2016 period (see Chapter IV), namely:

- Core Tier 1 target ratio of 8% for the Baseline Scenario;
- Core Tier 1 target ratio of 5.5% for the Adverse Scenario.

These capital thresholds have been aligned with those of the upcoming Comprehensive Assessment and of the 2014 EU-wide stress test to be conducted by the ECB and EBA respectively.'

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BoGAttachments/2013%20Stress%20test%20of%20the%20Greek%20banking%20sector.pdf>

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001248/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(6 Φεβρουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Νέες εκτιμήσεις για την πορεία των «κόκκινων» δανείων στην Ελλάδα

Σύμφωνα με πρόσφατες προβλέψεις του οικονομικού οίκου PriceWaterhouseCooper (PWC), τα μη εξυπηρετούμενα δάνεια (Non-Performing-Loans, NPLs) στην Ελλάδα θα αυξηθούν κατά 20 δις ευρώ, μέσα στο 2014. Η εξέλιξη αυτή θα σημαίνει για το ελληνικό τραπεζικό σύστημα ότι τα μη εξυπηρετούμενα δάνεια θα φτάσουν περίπου τα 88 δις ευρώ (περίπου 40% ως ποσοστό του συνολικού χαρτοφυλακίου) προκαλώντας, προφανώς, εκρηκτικές συνθήκες για τη βιωσιμότητα και την ισορροπία του χρηματοοικονομικού κλάδου.

Με δεδομένα τα παραπάνω, καθώς επίσης και την υφιστάμενη οικονομική κατάσταση της ελληνικής οικονομίας, σε συνδυασμό με τους περιορισμένους δημοσιονομικούς πόρους και τα συγκεκριμένα χρηματοδοτικά όρια του Ελληνικού Ταμείου Χρηματοπιστωτικής Σταθερότητας (ΤΧΣ), ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ποιες είναι οι προβλέψεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής αναφορικά με την πορεία των μη εξυπηρετούμενων δανείων στην Ελλάδα; Ανησυχεί για την αυξητική πορεία που συνεχίζουν να καταγράφουν τα κόκκινα δάνεια;
2. Ποιες είναι οι βασικές πολιτικές που προωθεί η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή και η τρόικα για τη διαχείριση των κόκκινων δανείων στην Ελλάδα, αλλά και στα άλλα κράτη μέλη που βρίσκονται σε καθεστώς Μνημονίου;

Απάντηση του κ. Kallas εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(16 Απριλίου 2014)

Η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή δεν προβαίνει σε προβλέψεις σχετικά με τα μη εξυπηρετούμενα δάνεια. Για το ζήτημα των πολιτικών διαχείρισης των μη εξυπηρετούμενων δανείων στην Ελλάδα παραπέμπουμε το αξιότιμο μέλος του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου στην τελευταία έκθεση σχετικά με την υλοποίηση του προγράμματος. «Το δεύτερο πρόγραμμα οικονομικής προσαρμογής για την Ελλάδα — Τρίτη Αναθεώρηση», που δημοσιεύθηκε τον Ιούνιο 2013 ⁽¹⁾ (σελίδα 118, παράγραφος 32).

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp159_en.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001248/14
to the Commission**

Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: New estimates for NPLs in Greece

According to recent forecasts by the accounting firm PriceWaterhouseCooper (PWC), non-performing loans (NPLs) in Greece will rise by EUR 20 billion in 2014. What this means for the Greek banking system is that non-performing loans will total approximately EUR 88 billion (approximately 40% of the total portfolio) and this will obviously create a very explosive situation in terms of sustainability and balance in the financial sector.

In view of the above and in light of the recession in the Greek economy, in conjunction with the limited fiscal resources and specific lending limits of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (FSF), will the Commission say:

1. What are the European Commission's forecasts for non-performing loans in Greece? Is it concerned about the persistent increase in non-performing loans?
2. What basic policies do the European Commission and the Troika favour for the purpose of managing non-performing loans in Greece and in other memorandum countries of the EU?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(16 April 2014)

The European Commission does not forecast non-performing loans. For discussion of the policies for managing non-performing loans in Greece we refer the Honourable Member of the European Parliament to the last report on programme implementation. 'The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece — Third Review' published in June 2013 ⁽¹⁾ (page 118 paragraph 32).

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp159_en.pdf

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001249/14

aan de Commissie

Auke Zijlstra (NI)

(6 februari 2014)

Betreft: Subsidiariteitsbeginsel slechts pro forma?

In haar mededeling over de heroverweging van het voorstel voor een verordening van de Raad tot instelling van het Europees Openbaar Ministerie (COM(2013)0851) concludeert de Commissie dat haar voorstel strookt met het subsidiariteitsbeginsel en dat zij het niet hoeft in te trekken of te wijzigen, ondanks het feit dat veertien kamers van nationale parlementen ter zake een gemotiveerd advies hebben uitgebracht.

1. Kan de Commissie bevestigen dat het bestaan van een rechtsgrond voor een Europese maatregel in de verdragen automatisch inhoudt dat deze maatregel niet in strijd kan zijn met het subsidiariteitsbeginsel, zoals in de mededeling wordt gesteld?
2. Is de Commissie van mening dat het negeren van de argumenten van veertien verschillende kamers van de nationale parlementen de juiste aanpak is om te komen tot betere wetgeving en om iets te doen aan het geringe vertrouwen van de Europese burgers in de EU-instellingen?
3. Wie bepaalt de reikwijdte van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel indien de Commissie dit begrip veel nauwer interpreteert dan de nationale parlementen?
4. Kan de Commissie aangeven hoeveel gemotiveerde adviezen nodig zijn alvorens zij besluit haar voorstel te wijzigen of in te trekken?

Antwoord van de heer Hahn namens de Commissie

(29 april 2014)

Wanneer de Commissie ontwerpwetgeving voorstelt, treedt zij op overeenkomstig artikel 5 van Protocol nr. 2 bij de Verdragen, dat vereist dat ontwerpen van wetgevingshandelingen worden gemotiveerd in het licht van de beginselen van subsidiariteit en evenredigheid. Het besluit van de Commissie om haar voorstel betreffende de oprichting van het Europees Openbaar Ministerie te handhaven, is het resultaat van een diepgaand onderzoek van de gemotiveerde adviezen van de nationale parlementen, overeenkomstig artikel 7, lid 2, van Protocol nr. 2 bij de Verdragen. Na een zorgvuldige en grondige toetsing van de argumenten van de nationale parlementen is de Commissie tot de conclusie gekomen dat haar voorstel in overeenstemming is met het subsidiariteitsbeginsel. Bijgevolg heeft de Commissie haar voorstel gehandhaafd. Zoals aangegeven in haar mededeling COM(2013)0851 van 27 november 2013, zal de Commissie rekening houden met de opmerkingen van de nationale parlementen tijdens het verdere verloop van de wetgevingsprocedure.

Overeenkomstig artikel 8 van Protocol nr. 2 is het Hof van Justitie bevoegd voor schendingen van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel door een wetgevingshandeling.

Het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie voorziet in een rechtsgrondslag voor de instelling van een Europees openbaar ministerie, waardoor dit laatste op zich niet in strijd kan worden geacht met het subsidiariteitsbeginsel.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001249/14
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(6 February 2014)**

Subject: Principle of subsidiarity a formality

In its communication on the review of the proposal on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (COM(2013)0851), the Commission concluded that its proposal complied with the principle of subsidiarity and that a withdrawal or amendment of the proposal was not required, despite the fact that fourteen chambers of national parliaments had submitted reasoned opinions on the matter.

1. Can the Commission confirm that the existence of a legal basis in the Treaties for a European measure automatically means that it cannot breach the principle of subsidiarity, as stated in the communication?
2. Does the Commission believe that ignoring the arguments of the fourteen different chambers of national parliaments is the right approach to better law-making and to reducing European citizens' lack of trust in the EU institutions?
3. Whose interpretation of the scope of the subsidiarity principle is the determining one if the Commission's interpretation is much narrower than that of the national parliaments?
4. Can the Commission specify how many reasoned opinions would have to be submitted in order for it to decide to amend or withdraw its proposal?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(29 April 2014)**

The Commission when presenting draft legislation acts according to Article 5 of Protocol 2 of the Treaties which requires that draft legislation acts shall be justified with regard to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The Commission's decision to maintain its proposal on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office is the result of an in-depth review of the Reasoned Opinions sent by national Parliaments according to Article 7 (2) of the Protocol No 2 to the Treaties. After a careful and thorough scrutiny of the arguments put forward by national Parliaments, the Commission concluded that its proposal complies with the subsidiarity principle. The Commission therefore maintained its proposal. As indicated in its communication COM(2013) 851 of 27 November 2013 the Commission will take into account the arguments submitted by national parliaments during the continuing legislative procedure.

The Court of Justice has jurisdiction on grounds of infringement of the subsidiarity principle by a legislative act in accordance with Article 8 of the Protocol No 2.

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for a legal basis to establish a European Public Prosecutor's Office and therefore, it cannot be considered *per se* to be in breach of the principle of subsidiarity.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001250/14
an die Kommission**

Monika Hohlmeier (PPE) und Gabriele Stauner (PPE)

(6. Februar 2014)

Betrifft: Bericht der Kommission über die Korruptionsbekämpfung in der EU — KOM(2014)0038

Als Nachfolgedokument zu ihrer Mitteilung zum Thema „Korruptionsbekämpfung in der EU“ (KOM(2011)0308), hat die Kommission den ersten von mehreren Berichten vorgelegt. Der Bericht bezieht sich auf Informationen über Korruption, die aus unterschiedlichen Abteilungen der Kommission, den relevanten Einrichtungen der EU (Europol, Eurojust und OLAF) sowie von Dritten stammen, und es werden Empfehlungen passend zu der jeweiligen Situation in den Mitgliedstaaten ausgesprochen.

1. Welche Rechtsgrundlage hat der Bericht und auf welcher Rechtsgrundlage ist die Kommission berechtigt, allgemeine Empfehlungen für mögliche Maßnahmen, die von den Mitgliedstaaten ergriffen werden sollen, abzugeben?
2. Warum gibt die Kommission — im Sinne dieses Berichts — keine Korruptions- und Missbrauchsanalyse in Form eines länderspezifischen Berichts heraus, in dem für jedes Land genaue Empfehlungen im Hinblick auf die Gelder und Programme ausgesprochen werden, die in den Verantwortungsbereich der Europäischen Kommission fallen? Warum hat sich die Kommission in den Vorjahren geweigert, einen solchen Bericht herauszugeben?
3. Welche Dritten hat die Kommission für den Bericht zu Rate gezogen? Bitte benennen Sie die beteiligten Nichtregierungsorganisationen, Interessenträger, nationalen öffentlichen Behörden, wissenschaftlichen Institutionen, unabhängigen Experten, Think-Tanks, Organisationen der Zivilgesellschaft, usw. Auf welche Weise hat die Kommission die Daten von Dritten überprüft?
4. Welche Kosten sind der Kommission durch die Erbringung von Daten durch Dritte entstanden? Bitte listen Sie die Kosten für die jeweiligen Dritten getrennt voneinander auf. Vergibt die Kommission in der Regel Finanzmittel an Dritte?

Antwort von Frau Malmström im Namen der Kommission

(7. April 2014)

Eingehendere Informationen zum EU-Korruptionsbekämpfungsbericht enthält das Schreiben, das den Damen Abgeordneten am 19. März 2014 übermittelt wurde.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001250/14
to the Commission
Monika Hohlmeier (PPE) and Gabriele Stauner (PPE)
(6 February 2014)**

Subject: EU Anti-Corruption Report — COM(2014)0038

The Commission has published the first in a series of reports as a follow-up to its communication entitled 'Fighting corruption in the EU' (COM(2011)0308). The report draws on corruption-related information from various Commission departments, the relevant EU agencies (Europol, Eurojust and OLAF) and third parties. It presents recommendations which fit the context of each Member State.

1. What is the legal basis for this report and on what legal basis is the Commission entitled to give general recommendations on possible action to be taken by Member States?
2. Why does the Commission, in the spirit of this report, not provide a corruption and misuse analysis in the form of a country-specific report with recommendations for each country regarding the funds and programmes that fall under the Commission's responsibility? Why has the Commission refused to do so in previous years?
3. What third parties did the Commission consult for this report? Please name the specific NGOs, stakeholders, national public authorities, academic institutions, independent experts, think tanks, civil society organisations, etc., that have been involved. How did the Commission verify the data provided by third parties?
4. What costs did the Commission incur for the provision of information by third parties? Please present costs separately by third party. Does the Commission generally provide third parties with financial means?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(7 April 2014)**

More information regarding the EU Anti-Corruption Report is provided in the letter sent to the Honourable Members on 19 March 2014.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001251/14
alla Commissione
Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(6 febbraio 2014)**

Oggetto: I rischi derivanti dalla mancata bonifica dell'area dell'ex miniera di Libiola in Liguria

Nella regione Liguria, nell'area un tempo occupata dalla miniera, oggi dismessa, di Libiola, nel comune di Sestri Levante (Genova), la cittadinanza lamenta da molti anni una situazione di inquinamento delle falde acquifere che, a causa della destabilizzazione dei solfuri, risultano ricche di elementi nocivi come il cromo esavalente.

Inoltre, nella stessa zona permangono altre problematiche come la mancata impermeabilizzazione di diverse discariche industriali e la mancata rimozione dell'eternit con cui sono rivestiti i capannoni industriali abbandonati.

Nonostante questi dati siano stati certificati già nel 2004 da ARPAL (l'Agenzia regionale per la protezione dell'ambiente ligure) e nonostante in un accordo di programma siglato nel 2005 il ministero dell'Ambiente, la regione Liguria e il comune di Sestri Levante avessero stabilito di stanziare la cifra di 450 000 euro, nessun intervento di bonifica è stato ancora avviato.

La Commissione è a conoscenza di questa situazione di grave pericolo che incombe sui cittadini e l'ambiente di Sestri Levante?

Considerato che la direttiva 2004/35/CE sulla responsabilità ambientale in materia di prevenzione e riparazione del danno ambientale, recepita nell'ordinamento italiano con il decreto legislativo n. 152 del 2006, stabilisce compiti e responsabilità precise, ritiene la Commissione che la mancata bonifica rappresenti una grave violazione di norme stabilite anche a livello europeo?

In caso affermativo, che azioni intende intraprendere la Commissione per costringere il governo italiano, la regione Liguria e il comune di Sestri Levante a porre in essere immediatamente i necessari interventi per mettere in sicurezza l'intera area coinvolta?

Risulta alla Commissione che tra i fondi stanziati e mai utilizzati per gli interventi di bonifica siano stati inseriti anche fondi europei?

**Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione
(30 aprile 2014)**

La direttiva sulla gestione dei rifiuti delle industrie estrattive ⁽¹⁾ ha imposto agli Stati membri di stilare entro il 1° maggio 2012 un inventario delle strutture di deposito dei rifiuti chiuse e abbandonate ubicate sul rispettivo territorio che hanno o possono avere gravi ripercussioni negative sull'ambiente o possono rappresentare una grave minaccia per la salute umana.

L'Italia ha trasmesso alla Commissione il proprio inventario, che include la miniera di rame dismessa di Libiola. Tale elenco e la documentazione aggiuntiva sul metodo utilizzato per la valutazione e la gerarchizzazione dei siti sono consultabili pubblicamente ⁽²⁾.

Per quanto riguarda la direttiva sulla gestione dei rifiuti delle industrie estrattive, spetta agli Stati membri decidere se e quando introdurre misure di risanamento specifiche. L'obbligo di agire potrebbe derivare da altri atti legislativi, ove applicabili. Tuttavia, dal momento che la miniera è abbandonata da oltre 40 anni, la direttiva sulla responsabilità ambientale ⁽³⁾ non è applicabile in virtù del suo articolo 17 relativo all'applicazione nel tempo.

Secondo le informazioni fornite dall'autorità di gestione del programma per la Liguria, cofinanziato dal Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale (FESR), il progetto di recupero in questione non è stato cofinanziato dal FESR durante i periodi di programmazione 2000-2006 e 2007-2013.

⁽¹⁾ Direttiva 2006/21/CE relativa alla gestione dei rifiuti delle industrie estrattive, GU L 102 dell'11.4.2006.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.isprambiente.gov.it/it/banche-dati/strutture-di-deposito-di-tipo-a>

⁽³⁾ GU L 143 del 30.4.2004.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001251/14
to the Commission
Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(6 February 2014)

Subject: Failure to rehabilitate the former mining area of Libiola in Liguria and resulting dangers

For many years the inhabitants of Libiola, formerly a mining area of Sestri Levante (Genoa) in Liguria, have been expressing concern at groundwater contamination resulting from the disturbance of acid sulphate soils and the high levels of harmful substances such as hexavalent chromium that have been detected.

Problems are also arising from failure to seal off industrial waste discharge sites or dispose of Eternit fibre cement sheeting from abandoned storage sheds.

Despite the fact that these findings were confirmed as early as 2004 by the ARPAL (Ligurian Regional Environmental Protection Agency) and although EUR 450 000 has been earmarked for rehabilitation of the area under a 2005 agreement between the Ministry for the Environment, the Liguria regional government and the Sestri Levante municipal authorities, no measures have yet been taken in this direction.

In view of this:

Can the Commission indicate whether it is aware of the serious danger to the residents of Sestri Levante and to the environment arising from this situation?

Given that directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, which was transposed into Italian law under Legislative Decree 152 of 2006, sets out precise tasks and areas of responsibility, does the Commission consider that failure to rehabilitate the area in question is a serious infringement of EU rules?

If so, what action will it take to oblige the Italian Government, the Liguria regional government and the Sestri Levante municipal authorities to take the necessary measures without delay to safeguard the entire area?

Does the Commission know whether the unused appropriations earmarked for rehabilitation purposes include EU funds?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2014)

According to the Mining Waste Directive ⁽¹⁾, Member States had to establish by 1 May 2012 an inventory of closed and abandoned mining waste facilities located on their territory which cause or may cause serious negative environmental impacts or a serious threat to human health.

Italy has communicated its inventory to the Commission and it includes the abandoned copper mine at Libiola. This list and additional documentation on the method used for the assessment and the prioritization of sites is publicly available. ⁽²⁾

As regards the Mining Waste Directive, it is up to Member States to decide whether and when to set up specific rehabilitation measures. Obligations to act may flow from other pieces of European law, where these are applicable. However, the mine having been abandoned more than 40 years ago, the Environmental Liability Directive ⁽³⁾ is not applicable by virtue of its Article 17 on temporal application.

According to the information provided by the Managing Authority of the programme for Liguria co-funded by the European regional development fund (ERDF), the reclamation project at issue was not co-financed by the ERDF either during the 2000-2006 or 2007-2013 programming periods.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2006/21/EC on the management of waste from extractive industries, OJ L 102, 11.4.2006.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.isprambiente.gov.it/banche-dati/strutture-di-deposito-di-tipo-a>

⁽³⁾ OJ L 143, 30.4.2004.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001252/14
do Rady**

Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)

(6 lutego 2014 r.)

Przedmiot: Unijno-rosyjskie konsultacje na temat umów stowarzyszeniowych z krajami Partnerstwa Wschodniego

W dniu 28 stycznia 2014 r. w Brukseli odbył się krótki szczyt Unia-Rosja. Strony omówiły między innymi kwestie związane ze wspólnym sąsiedztwem. W swoich uwagach po szczycie Przewodniczący Rady Herman Van Rompuy ogłosił pomysł unijno-rosyjskich konsultacji na poziomie ekspertów na temat zawieranych umów stowarzyszeniowych w ramach Partnerstwa Wschodniego.

W związku z powyższym zwracam się do Rady z prośbą o wyjaśnienie szczegółów funkcjonowania grupy ekspertów.

1. Jakie będą, w zamyśle Rady, główne założenia i ramy pracy wspomnianej grupy ekspertów?
2. Kto będzie nominował ekspertów po stronie unijnej oraz rosyjskiej?
3. Do jakich dokumentów związanych z procesem stowarzyszeniowym UE z jej wschodnimi partnerami będzie miała strona rosyjska dostęp?
4. Czy Rada nie uważa, że konsultacje z Rosją na temat umów, które Unia ma zamiar podpisać z państwami trzecimi, godzą w unijny interes i relacje z państwami, których owe umowy dotyczą?

Odpowiedź

(13 maja 2014 r.)

Na szczycie w dniu 28 stycznia 2014 r. UE i Rosja ustaliły, że zorganizują konsultacje ekspertów w sprawie porozumienia o Partnerstwie Wschodnim oraz konsekwencji gospodarczych dla obydwu stron ⁽¹⁾.

Podczas półtoradniowego posiedzenia w dniach 12-13 marca 2014 r. odbyły się w odpowiedzi na obawy Rosji kompleksowe, szczegółowe rozmowy. Stronę UE reprezentowali urzędnicy z Komisji Europejskiej i Europejskiej Służby Działań Zewnętrznych a stronę rosyjską – eksperci z Ministerstwa Rozwoju Gospodarczego i Ministerstwa Przemysłu i Handlu. Wymiana nie obejmowała udostępnienia dokumentów. Rozmowy skupiały się na obawach gospodarczych Rosji i nie naruszały interesów UE i relacji z jej partnerami wschodnimi. Teksty zarówno układu o stowarzyszeniu, jak i pogłębionej i kompleksowej umowy o wolnym handlu dostępne są w Internecie.

⁽¹⁾ Uwagi Przewodniczącego Rady Europejskiej Hermana Van Rompuy'a po 32. szczycie UE-Rosja, EUCO 27/14.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001252/14
to the Council**

Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: EU-Russia consultations on Association Agreements with Eastern Partnership countries

On 28 January 2014 a short EU-Russia summit took place in Brussels. Among a range of topics, the two sides discussed issues relating to their common neighbourhood. In his remarks following the summit the President of the Council, Herman Van Rompuy, mentioned the idea of EU-Russia consultations at expert level on the subject of Association Agreements concluded in the context of the Eastern Partnership.

In this connection, could the Council provide details about the workings of the group of experts:

1. What does the Council consider will be the main points and the terms of reference for the work of this group of experts?
2. Who on the EU and Russian sides will appoint these experts?
3. What documents relating to the EU association process with its Eastern Partners will Russia have access to?
4. Does the Council not consider that consultations with Russia on the issue of agreements which the EU intends to sign with third countries would be prejudicial to the EU's interests and relations with the countries concerned by those agreements?

Reply

(13 May 2014)

At the summit of 28 January 2014, the EU and Russia agreed to hold expert consultations on the Eastern Partnership Agreement and the economic consequences for both sides ⁽¹⁾.

Based on Russia's concerns, comprehensive and detailed discussions took place in a day and a half-long meeting on 12-13 March 2014. The EU side was represented by officials from the European Commission and the European External Action Service and the Russian side by experts from the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The exchange did not involve providing access to documents. The discussions focused on Russia's economic concerns and were not therefore prejudicial to the EU's interests and relations with its Eastern Partners. The Respective Association Agreement/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement texts are available on the Internet.

⁽¹⁾ Remarks by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy following the 32nd EU-Russia Summit, EUCO 27/14.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001253/14
do Komisji**

Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)

(6 lutego 2014 r.)

Przedmiot: Zatrzymania rosyjskich aktywistów przed igrzyskami w Soczi

Za dwa dni w Soczi rozpoczną się igrzyska olimpijskie, tymczasem rosyjskie władze starają się zrobić wszystko, by uciszyć aktywistów i krytyków olimpiady.

3 lutego Jewgienij Witiszko, rosyjski ekolog z Krasnodaru, który nagłośnił liczne nieprawidłowości przy budowie obiektów olimpijskich w Soczi, został aresztowany i skazany na 15 dni aresztu za „drobne chuligaństwo”. Wczoraj na 5 dni aresztu został skazany aktywista jednej z najbardziej znanych organizacji ekologicznych z regionu – „Ekologicznej wachty Kaukazu Północnego” (Eko Wachty), Igor Charczenko. Oskarżono go o „nieposłuszeństwo wobec funkcjonariuszy policji”.

Do aresztowań doszło tuż przed przybyciem sztafety ze zniczem olimpijskim do Krasnodaru. Jak podkreślają obrońcy praw człowieka, wszystko wskazuje na to, że władze w obawie przed akcjami protestu, zdecydowały się na „profilaktyczne” zatrzymania.

Pragnę przypomnieć, że rosyjskie władze wywierają ciągłą presję na krytyków igrzysk w Soczi. Jak informuje Komitet Obrony Dziennikarzy, policja regularnie blokuje organizację konferencji prasowych przez „Eko Wachkę”, a miejscowe oddziały FSB i Centrum MSW ds. walki z ekstremizmem wywierają presję na członków tej organizacji. Represjom poddawany jest również koordynator sieci „Migracja i prawo” – filii „Memoriału” w Soczi, Siemion Simonow, który głośno mówi o wykorzystywaniu migrantów.

W związku z tym zwracam się z zapytaniem, czy Komisja posiada informacje na temat prób uciszania i zastraszania aktywistów przed igrzyskami w Soczi i ma zamiar podjąć interwencję w tej sprawie?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Komisji Catherine Ashton w imieniu Komisji

(10 kwietnia 2014 r.)

Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca Komisji zna przypadki Jewgienija Witiszki, Igora Charczenki i Siemiona Simonowa. ESDZ i delegatura UE w Moskwie uważnie śledzą wydarzenia związane z powyższymi przypadkami, w szczególności aresztowanie i proces Jewgienija Witiszki, które doprowadziły do jego osadzenia w kolonii karnej, ponieważ w 2012 r. został on skazany na trzy lata pozbawienia wolności w zawieszeniu.

Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca Komisji przedstawiła stanowisko na temat sytuacji Jewgienija Witiszki za pośrednictwem biura rzecznika prasowego w Brukseli i w Moskwie. UE publicznie wyraziła obawy dotyczące decyzji zamiany wyroku trzech lat pozbawienia wolności w zawieszeniu na karę więzienia bez zawieszenia w związku z wykroczeniami, których miał się on dopuścić. UE podkreśliła, że wyrok taki wydawał się nieproporcjonalny oraz że prawdopodobnie miał na celu uniemożliwienie Jewgienijowi Witiszce przedstawienia sprawozdania na temat wpływu igrzysk olimpijskich na środowisko. UE ponownie przypomniała, że przywiązuje dużą wagę do tego, by Rosja przestrzegała zobowiązań z zakresu międzynarodowych praw człowieka odnośnie do wolności zrzeszania się, słowa i zgromadzeń przed igrzyskami olimpijskimi w Soczi, w trakcie igrzysk i po ich zakończeniu.

Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca Komisji i delegatura UE w Moskwie będą w dalszym ciągu dokładnie obserwować sytuację i podnosić wspomniane kwestie w kontaktach z przedstawicielami Rosji na wszystkich odpowiednich poziomach, zwłaszcza w ramach zbliżających się konsultacji w sprawie praw człowieka.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001253/14
to the Commission**

Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Arrests of Russian activists in the run-up to the Sochi Games

With two days to go until the Winter Olympics begin in Sochi, the Russian authorities are doing everything they can to silence activists and critics of the games.

On 3 February, Yevgeny Vitishko, a Russian environmental activist from Krasnodar who had exposed a number of irregularities relating to construction on the Olympic site in Sochi, was arrested and sentenced to 15 days detention for 'petty hooliganism'. Yesterday, Igor Kharchenko, an activist with Environment Watch North Caucasus, one of the best known environmental NGOs in the region, was sentenced to five days detention. He has been accused of 'disobeying police officers'.

The arrests took place just before the Olympic torch relay reached Krasnodar. Human rights defenders maintain that all this shows that the authorities, concerned at the prospect of protests, have decided to make 'preventative' arrests.

Critics of the Sochi Games are suffering constant harassment at the hands of the Russian authorities. The Committee to Protect Journalists has reported that the police regularly prevent Environment Watch from organising press conferences, and that local branches of the FSB and the Interior Ministry's anti-extremism unit are harassing members of the NGO. Semyon Simonov, the coordinator of the 'Memorial' NGO's Migration and Law Network in Sochi, who has spoken out about the exploitation of migrants, has also been harassed.

With this in mind, does the Commission have any information about attempts to silence and intimidate activists in the run-up to the Sochi Winter Olympics? Does it intend to take action on this matter?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(10 April 2014)

The HR/VP is aware of the cases of Mr Vitishko, Mr Kharchenko and Mr Simonov. The EEAS and the EU Delegation in Moscow have followed developments related to these two cases closely, in particular the arrest and the trial of Yevgeny Vitishko which triggered his detention in a penal colony, as he had been given a 3-year suspended sentence in 2012.

The HR/VP made her views known on the situation of Mr Vitishko through the spokesperson's office, in Brussels and in Moscow. The EU expressed publicly concerns with the decision to turn his 3-year suspended prison sentence into a fixed prison term on a basis of misdemeanour offences he allegedly committed. The EU stressed that this sentence appeared disproportionate and seemed aimed at preventing Mr Vitishko from presenting his report on the environmental impact of the Olympic Games. The EU reiterated the priority it attaches to Russia respecting its international human rights commitments on freedom of assembly, expression and association, before, during and after the Sochi Olympic games.

The HR/VP and the EU Delegation in Moscow will continue to follow these issues closely and to raise them with Russia at all appropriate levels, notably in the framework of the forthcoming human rights consultations.

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-001254/14
till kommissionen**

Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE)

(6 februari 2014)

Angående: Åtgärder mot dioxiner i Östersjön

Halterna av dioxiner i fet fisk i Östersjön är så höga att de överskrider EU:s gränsvärden. Sverige har ett undantag som gör att fisk med höga dioxinhalter ändå kan säljas i Sverige. Detta är ett oacceptabelt sätt att hantera hotet mot människors hälsa och mot djurlivet i Östersjön. EU måste samarbeta med andra stater vars utsläpp påverkar Östersjön för att strypa utsläppen vid källan.

I maj 2013 presenterade det svenska Naturvårdsverket en rapport med kunskap om källorna och orsakerna till de höga dioxinhalterna ⁽¹⁾. Sådan kunskap behövs för att kunna införa de mest effektiva åtgärderna mot dioxinutsläpp.

Resultatet visar att atmosfärisk deposition är huvudkällan till förorening av dioxiner i Östersjön. Det är enligt rapporten troligt att det största bidraget till dioxinförorening kommer från de östra delarna av Europa. Det finns indikationer på att årstidsbundna källor, som icke-industriell förbränning, är huvudorsaken till dioxinföroreningen.

1. Har kommissionen tagit del av denna rapport från Naturvårdsverket?
2. Vilka andra källor har kommissionen vad gäller kunskap om orsakerna till Östersjöns höga dioxinhalter?
3. Vad har kommissionen redan gjort för att minska tillförseln av dioxin till Östersjön?
4. Vad avser kommissionen göra framöver för att minska tillförseln av dioxin till Östersjön?

Svar från Janez Potočnik på kommissionens vägnar

(14 april 2014)

Kommissionen har inte studerat den rapport ni hänvisar till, men välkomnar all information om miljöhänsyn och miljöproblem i Östersjön. EU är part till Helsingforskonventionen (Helcom) och medlem i den arbetsgrupp som utvärderar fakta om utsläpp och andra föroreningar i Östersjön.

År 2001 offentliggjorde kommissionen ett meddelande om gemenskapens strategi för dioxiner, furaner och polyklorerade bifenyler ⁽²⁾, och genomförandet av strategin utvärderades i ett meddelande från 2010 ⁽³⁾, vilket tjänade som en tredje lägesrapport. 1998 års Århusprotokoll om långlivade organiska föroreningar omfattar bland annat dioxiner. EU stod bakom ändringarna till protokollet vid det 27:e mötet inom det verkställande organet för konventionen om långväga gränsöverskridande luftföroreningar (luftvårdskonventionen), vilket hölls i december 2009. Till ändringarna hör skärpta krav som ska sänka halterna av dioxiner, furaner och polyklorerade bifenyler genom att sätta gränsvärden för de mängder som får släppas ut från avfallsförbränningsanläggningar, sinterverk och sekundära stålverk. Den föroreningsbelastning som orsakas av långlivade organiska föroreningar, bl.a. dioxiner, mäts och bedöms regelbundet inom ramen för luftvårdskonventionen. För EU-länderna runt Östersjön styrs genomförandet av de gällande kraven till stor del av EU-lagstiftning, t.ex. direktivet om industriutsläpp ⁽⁴⁾ och förordning (EG) nr 850/2004 ⁽⁵⁾ som har till syfte att genomföra Stockholmskonventionen, vilken även Ryssland har ratificerat.

Kommissionen kommer att fortsätta att uppmana sina partner utanför unionen att ratificera Århusprotokollet, för att få ner dioxinnivåerna i Östersjön. Den kommer också att fortsätta samarbeta med medlemsstaterna för att, där så är möjligt, skriva in bestämmelser i genomförandeakterna för direktivet om industriutsläpp om att bästa tillgängliga teknik för att få ner föroreningsnivåerna ska användas.

⁽¹⁾ Wiberg, K. et al. 2013. Managing the dioxin problem in the Baltic region with focus on sources to air and fish, Naturvårdsverket, rapport 6566, ISBN 978-91-620-6566-9.

⁽²⁾ KOM(2001) 593, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0593:FIN:SV:PDF>

⁽³⁾ KOM(2010) 562 slutlig <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/SV/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0562>

⁽⁴⁾ Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2010/75/EU av den 24 november 2010 om industriutsläpp (samordnade åtgärder för att förebygga och begränsa föroreningar) (EUT L 334).

⁽⁵⁾ Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 850/2004 av den 29 april 2004 om långlivade organiska föroreningar och om ändring av direktiv 79/117/EEG (EUT L 158).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001254/14
to the Commission**

Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Measures against dioxin in the Baltic Sea

Dioxin levels in oily fish in the Baltic Sea are so high that they exceed the EU's limit values. Sweden has a derogation allowing the sale of fish containing high levels of dioxin in Sweden. This is an unacceptable way of dealing with a threat to human health and the lives of fauna in the Baltic Sea. The EU should cooperate with other States whose emissions affect the Baltic in order to control emissions at source.

In May 2013, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency presented a report containing information about the sources and causes of the high dioxin levels⁽¹⁾. This information is needed to enable the most effective measures to be taken against dioxin emissions.

The findings indicate that atmospheric deposition is the main source of dioxin pollution in the Baltic Sea. According to the report, it is likely that the biggest contribution to dioxin pollution comes from the eastern regions of Europe. There are indications that seasonal sources, such as non-industrial combustion, are the main source of dioxin pollution.

1. Has the Commission studied the report from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency?
2. What other sources of information does the Commission have regarding the causes of the high dioxin levels in the Baltic Sea?
3. What has the Commission already done to reduce the amount of dioxin entering the Baltic Sea?
4. What does the Commission intend to do in future to reduce the amount of dioxin entering the Baltic Sea?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(14 April 2014)

The Commission has not studied this particular report but welcomes all information shedding light on the environmental issues affecting the Baltic Sea. The EU is a Helcom Contracting Party and a member of the Working Group that considers evidence presented on emissions and other pollutants of the Baltic Sea.

In 2001, the Commission published a Community Strategy for dioxins, furans and polychlorinated biphenyls⁽²⁾ and monitored its implementation, with a communication in 2010⁽³⁾ serving as a third Progress Report. The 1998 Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) covers, *inter alia*, dioxins. The EU promoted amendments to the POPs Protocol at the 27th session of the Executive Body for the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) in December 2009. These include further requirements for reductions of dioxins, furans and PCBs by setting emission limit values for waste incinerators, sinter plants and secondary steel plants. The pollution load of POPs, including dioxins, is regularly assessed under the CLRTAP. For EU MS around the Baltic Sea, implementation of the relevant requirements is largely covered by existing EU legislation; this includes the Industrial Emissions Directive⁽⁴⁾ (IED) and Regulation (EC) no. 850/2004⁽⁵⁾ that implement the Stockholm Convention, which is also ratified by Russia.

The Commission will continue to encourage ratification of the Aarhus Protocol amongst non-EU parties to achieve reductions of dioxin in the Baltic Sea. It will also continue work with Member States on including, where appropriate, best available techniques associated with emission levels in implementing acts to be adopted under the IED.

⁽¹⁾ Wiberg, K. et al. 2013. Managing the dioxin problem in the Baltic region with focus on sources to air and fish, Naturvårdsverket, report 6566, ISBN 978-91-620-6566-9.

⁽²⁾ COM(2001) 593, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0593:FIN:EN:PDF>

⁽³⁾ COM(2010) 562 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0562:EN:NOT>

⁽⁴⁾ Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control), OJ L 334.

⁽⁵⁾ Regulation (EC) No 850/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on persistent organic pollutants and amending Directive 79/117/EEC, OJ L 158.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001255/14
a la Comisión
Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE)
(6 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Paquete clima/energía

El presidente de la Empresa Nacional de Residuos Radiactivos (Enresa), Francisco Gil-Ortega, ha confirmado los planes del Gobierno de ampliar el plazo de vida útil de las centrales nucleares de 40 años a 50 o 60 años, siguiendo así la línea de otros países como Estados Unidos. La energía nuclear supone alrededor del 20 % de la demanda eléctrica en España.

El Parlamento Europeo votó el 5 de febrero de 2014 el paquete clima/energía fijando los objetivos para 2030, unas semanas después de que la Comisión presentara unas propuestas mucho menos ambiciosas. Hay que recordar que los Estados miembros no cumplen los objetivos no vinculantes de ahorro de energía para 2020.

Los Estados con objetivos energéticos poco ambiciosos como España serán señalados acusado en la Conferencia Internacional sobre el Clima de París en 2015.

¿Considera la Comisión que la política del Estado español es bastante ambiciosa?

¿Piensa la Comisión dar un seguimiento al nuevo voto del Parlamento Europeo sobre el paquete clima/energía?

Respuesta del Sr. Oettinger en nombre de la Comisión
(7 de abril de 2014)

La evaluación de los avances logrados en pos de la consecución de los objetivos nacionales para 2020, incluidos los relativos a la energía renovable, la realiza anualmente la Comisión en el marco del Semestre Europeo ⁽¹⁾. En su Comunicación «Renewable Energy: a major player in the European energy market» ⁽²⁾ (La energía renovable: un elemento principal en el mercado energético europeo), la Comisión expresó sus preocupaciones sobre las medidas de alternancia y retroactivas que afectan a los proyectos de energía renovable en España, unas preocupaciones que siguen siendo válidas. Además, aunque España logró importantes avances en su trayectoria para alcanzar el objetivo nacional del 20 % hasta 2010 ⁽³⁾, los recientes acontecimientos mencionados anteriormente suponen que la consecución del objetivo nacional para 2020 dista de ser cierta actualmente y que podrían necesitarse nuevas políticas.

Con respecto al marco sobre política energética y climática para 2030, la Comisión propuso, el 22 de enero ⁽⁴⁾, un planteamiento equilibrado que combina una gran ambición y mayor flexibilidad por parte de los Estados miembros para alcanzar los objetivos. La Comisión se congratula de la resolución del Parlamento de 5 de febrero de 2014 sobre un marco para 2030, en cuanto elemento importante del debate. La próxima etapa será el seguimiento del primer examen del marco para 2030 realizado en el Consejo Europeo de marzo.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/index_es.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_spain_en.pdf

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/communication_2012_en.htm

⁽³⁾ La cuota de energía renovable dentro del consumo final de energía fue del 13,8 % en 2010, última cifra oficial disponible (Eurostat).

⁽⁴⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/energy/2030_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001255/14
to the Commission**

Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Climate/energy package

The president of the Spanish National Radioactive Waste Company (Enresa), Francisco Gil-Ortega, has confirmed the government's plans to extend the operating life of nuclear power plants from 40 years to 50 or 60 years, following the policies made by other countries such as the USA. Nuclear power accounts for around 20% of the electricity demand in Spain.

On 5 February 2014, the European Parliament voted in favour of the climate/energy package which sets targets for 2030, just a few weeks after the Commission submitted proposals that were much less ambitious. Let us not forget that Member States are not meeting the non-binding energy-saving targets for 2020.

States with unambitious energy targets, like Spain, will be singled out for criticism at the International Climate Conference in Paris in 2015.

Does the Commission think that Spain's policy is ambitious enough?

Does the Commission intend to follow up on the European Parliament's new vote in relation to the climate/energy package?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission

(7 April 2014)

The Commission's assessment on progress towards national targets for 2020, including targets on renewable energy is done every year through the European Semester package. ⁽¹⁾ In its communication 'Renewable Energy: a major player in the European energy market' ⁽²⁾ the Commission expressed concerns about stop-and-go and retroactive measures affecting renewable energy projects in Spain. These concerns remain valid. Moreover, although Spain made good progress on its trajectory to reaching the national target of 20% until 2010 ⁽³⁾, the recent developments mentioned above mean that the achievement of the national 2020 target is far from certain at this point, and that new policies might be required.

As far as the 2030 framework on energy and climate policies is concerned, the Commission proposed on 22 January ⁽⁴⁾ a balanced approach combining a high ambition and more flexibility for Member States in achieving the targets. The Commission welcomes the Parliament's resolution of 5 February 2014 on a 2030 framework as an important element in the debate. The next step will now be the follow-up on the first discussion of the 2030 framework held by the March European Council.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/index_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_spain_en.pdf

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/communication_2012_en.htm

⁽³⁾ The share of renewable energy in final energy consumption was 13.8% in 2010, which is the last official figure available (Eurostat).

⁽⁴⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/energy/2030_en.htm

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001257/14
a la Comisión**

Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE)

(6 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Emisiones de radio en lenguas regionales y minoritarias

El pasado 16 de octubre de 2013 se celebró en la sede del Parlamento en Bruselas la conferencia «Las radios y las lenguas regionales y minoritarias». Las conclusiones de dicha conferencia fueron presentadas ante el Intergrupo de Minorías Tradicionales, Comunidades Nacionales y Lenguas el pasado 16 de enero.

Las conclusiones señalan, entre otros aspectos, la importancia de las radios comunitarias y del trabajo que estas están realizando en el ámbito de las lenguas regionales y minoritarias. Las conclusiones también demandan acciones por parte de las autoridades de la Unión de cara a diseñar un marco común para las radios comunitarias, que tienen diferentes estatus según el Estado miembro.

En concreto, demandan:

1. Un marco europeo común para garantizar el desarrollo, el crecimiento y la sostenibilidad de las radios comunitarias,
2. Que se impulse que los Estados Miembros reserven un 33 % de las frecuencias de radio para las radios asociativas que emitan en lenguas regionales o minoritarias;
3. Que se garantice la igualdad en el acceso a potencia de emisión en relación a otras emisoras públicas o comerciales;

¿Qué opinión le merecen a la Comisión las tres propuestas arriba señaladas?

¿Considera la Comisión conveniente la existencia de un marco regulatorio común o de unas directrices comunes para el ámbito de las radios asociativas?

En caso afirmativo, ¿tiene previsto algún calendario para su desarrollo?

Respuesta de la Sra. Kroes en nombre de la Comisión

(23 de abril de 2014)

La Comisión remite a Su Señoría a su respuesta a la pregunta parlamentaria E-1258/2014.

En particular, la Comisión desea subrayar que no tiene competencias específicas en materia de contenidos de radiodifusión. La Comisión no tiene actualmente planes para desarrollar un marco regulatorio específico de directrices comunes para las radios asociativas.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001257/14
to the Commission**

Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Radio broadcasting in regional and minority languages

On 16 October 2013, the conference on 'Radio stations and regional and minority languages' was held at the seat of the European Parliament in Brussels. The conclusions of this conference were presented to the Intergroup for Traditional Minorities, National Communities and Languages on 16 January 2014.

Among other things, these conclusions emphasise the importance of community radio stations and the work that they do with regard to regional and minority languages. Action is also demanded from Union authorities, with a view to developing a common framework for community radio stations, which have different statuses depending on the Member State.

Specifically, they are asking for:

1. A common European framework to guarantee the development, growth and sustainability of community radio stations;
2. Member States to be encouraged to set aside 33% of radio frequencies for community radio stations that broadcast in regional or minority languages;
3. A guarantee of equal access to emission power in relation to other public or commercial broadcasters.

What are the Commission's thoughts on the three proposals mentioned above?

Does the Commission think it would be appropriate to establish a common regulatory framework or common guidelines for community radio stations?

If so, does the Commission have a schedule for developing this?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission

(23 April 2014)

The Commission would like to point the Honourable Member to its response given to the Parliamentary Question E-1258/2014.

In particular the Commission would like to underline that it has no specific competences with regard to content of radio broadcasting. The Commission has currently no plans to develop a specific regulatory framework for common guidelines for community radio stations.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001258/14
a la Comisión**

Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE)

(6 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Emisiones de radio en lenguas regionales y minoritarias (2)

El pasado 16 de octubre de 2013 se celebró en la sede del Parlamento en Bruselas la conferencia «Las radios y las lenguas regionales y minoritarias». Las conclusiones de dicha conferencia fueron presentadas ante el Intergrupo de Minorías Tradicionales, Comunidades Nacionales y Lenguas el pasado 16 de enero.

Las conclusiones señalan, entre otros aspectos, que a los hablantes de lenguas minoritarias, en muchos casos, les es negado el derecho a recibir información en su propia lengua, por lo que los derechos señalados en el protocolo 12 de la Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos no están suficientemente protegidos. El Protocolo no ha sido implementado de manera que asegure el acceso de los hablantes de una lengua minoritaria a licencias de emisión que les permita desarrollar medios de comunicación en su propia lengua.

Por otra parte, el Parlamento Europeo aprobó el pasado 11 de septiembre el informe sobre las lenguas europeas amenazadas de desaparición y la diversidad lingüística en la Unión Europea, cuyo punto 13 señalaba la necesidad de impulsar las emisiones de radio en las lenguas regionales y minoritarias.

¿Tiene la Comisión intención de proponer a los Estados Miembros algún tipo de medida para garantizar las emisiones de radio en las lenguas regionales y minoritarias de la Unión?

¿Piensa la Comisión dar pasos concretos para garantizar el derecho de los hablantes de lenguas regionales y minoritarias a recibir y producir información en su propia lengua y, en concreto, a licencias de emisión radiofónicas?

Respuesta de la Sra. Kroesen en nombre de la Comisión

(1 de abril de 2014)

La Comisión vela por garantizar el respeto de la libertad de los medios de comunicación y el pluralismo consagrados en la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea en el marco de sus competencias. La Carta también establece que la Unión respetará la diversidad cultural, religiosa y lingüística. La disponibilidad de contenidos en distintas lenguas puede ser ciertamente un elemento que contribuye al pluralismo de los medios de comunicación. Con arreglo a su artículo 51, apartado 1, las disposiciones de la Carta atañen a los Estados miembros únicamente cuando apliquen el Derecho de la Unión Europea. No obstante, la Comisión no tiene competencias específicas en lo que se refiere a los contenidos de radiodifusión. Además, por lo que se refiere a las actividades de información y comunicación, la Comisión no tiene previsto actualmente proponer medidas específicas o apoyo por lo que respecta a la radiodifusión en lenguas regionales y minoritarias de la UE. Tampoco ha previsto por el momento la adopción de medidas en lo que respecta a los derechos de los hablantes de lenguas regionales y minoritarias.

La Comisión financia, desde diciembre de 2012, la red de radios europeas Euranet Plus, que trata cuestiones de la UE desde una perspectiva europea ⁽¹⁾ y emite en 13 lenguas oficiales de la UE. Euranet Plus está abierta a la adhesión de nuevos miembros. Los candidatos deben contar con una audiencia de al menos 300 000 oyentes al día o una cobertura de cómo mínimo el 5 % de la población del Estado miembro en el que transmiten. Por consiguiente, la participación de radios comunitarias es técnicamente posible si se cumple dicho requisito.

⁽¹⁾ Se trata de una red paneuropea que reúne a 14 estaciones de radio internacionales, nacionales y regionales de catorce Estados miembros de la UE.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001258/14
to the Commission**

Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE)

(6 February 2014)

Subject: Radio broadcasting in regional and minority languages (2)

On 16 October 2013 the seat of the Parliament in Brussels hosted a conference under the heading 'Radio and regional and minority languages'. The conclusions of the conference were presented to the Intergroup for Traditional Minorities, National Communities and Languages on 16 January last.

These conclusions indicate, among other matters, that speakers of minority languages are often denied the right to receive information in their own language, which means that the rights covered by Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights are not being properly protected. The Protocol has not been implemented so as to ensure that minority language speakers have access to broadcasting licences and are thus able to develop media programmes in their own languages.

Furthermore, on 11 September last year the European Parliament approved a report on endangered European languages and linguistic diversity in the European Union. Article 13 of the report highlights the need to promote radio broadcasting in regional and minority languages.

Does the Commission intend to propose any measure to Member States with a view to guaranteeing radio broadcasting in the EU's regional and minority languages?

Is the Commission considering taking specific steps to guarantee the rights of regional and minority language speakers to receive and produce information in their own languages and, in particular, to radio broadcasting licences?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission

(1 April 2014)

The Commission seeks to ensure respect for media freedom and pluralism enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union within its competences. The Charter also foresees that the Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. Availability of content in various languages can indeed be an element contributing to pluralism within the media. According to its Article 51(1), the Charter applies to Member States only when they are implementing European Union law. However, the Commission has no specific competences with regard to content of radio broadcasting. Furthermore, as far as information and communication activities are concerned the Commission has currently no plans to propose specific measures or support regarding radio broadcasting in the EU's regional and minority languages. Neither does it currently foresee measures in this respect regarding the rights of regional language speakers and minority language speakers.

The Commission is funding, since December 2012, the European radio network, Euranet Plus, which takes on EU affairs from a European perspective ⁽¹⁾. It broadcasts in 13 official EU languages. Euranet Plus is open to the inclusion of new members. Candidates should have an audience of at least 300 000 daily listeners or a reach-out of at least 5% of the population of the Member State where they broadcast. Thus, the participation of community radios is technically possible if that entry condition is fulfilled.

⁽¹⁾ This is a pan-European network bringing together 14 international, national and regional radio stations from 14 EU Member States.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001262/14
a la Comisión**

Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE)

(7 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Fomento del conocimiento de la política regional

Los datos recogidos por «TNS Political & Social» demuestran que aproximadamente un 70 % de los ciudadanos europeos no conoce la política regional de la UE ni su labor de colaboración.

Teniendo en cuenta que, entre los ciudadanos que sí conocen de su existencia y acción, un 70 % considera que la política regional de la Unión Europea ha tenido un impacto positivo en el desarrollo de su ciudad o región,

Habida cuenta de que promover su conocimiento podría contribuir a que los ciudadanos europeos consideraran a la Unión Europea como una institución cercana y efectivamente colaboradora en la vida diaria, paliando así el creciente «euroescepticismo»,

1. ¿Está llevando a cabo la Comisión algún tipo de acción para fomentar el conocimiento de la política regional de la Unión Europea y de su impacto positivo por parte de los ciudadanos, haciéndola así más visible?
2. ¿Qué medidas recomienda la Comisión a los Estados miembros, así como a sus regiones y entes locales para promocionar el conocimiento y visibilidad de la política regional europea?

Respuesta del Sr. Hahn en nombre de la Comisión

(9 de abril de 2014)

1. Para la Comisión, la promoción de los Fondos Estructurales y de Inversión Europeos (Fondos ESI) es una prioridad. Las normas de información y comunicación de los Fondos ESI se han aclarado y reforzado, tal como se pone de manifiesto en el Reglamento (UE) n° 1303/2013 ⁽¹⁾. Esto incluye una lista de proyectos más accesible, un portal web para la política de cohesión de la UE, que pondrá énfasis asimismo en diversos proyectos en otra de las lenguas más utilizadas de la UE.

La Comisión trabaja en estrecha colaboración con las diferentes redes de comunicadores de los distintos Fondos ESI, responsables en primer lugar de comunicar los logros de los programas de la UE.

En diciembre de 2013, con ocasión de la primera conferencia conjunta sobre comunicación, «Relatar la historia» de los Fondos ESI, más de ochocientos participantes procedentes de los 28 Estados miembros compartieron buenas prácticas y recibieron valiosas ideas para sus actividades de comunicación.

Por otra parte, la Comisión ha reorientado su estrategia de comunicación y ha tenido en cuenta los resultados del estudio del Eurobarómetro sobre la concienciación y el conocimiento de los ciudadanos respecto de la política regional de la UE (*Citizens' awareness and perceptions of EU Regional policy*) y en 2014 centrará sus actividades de comunicación en los países que detentan las tasas de de concienciación y percepción más bajas.

2. En 2014, tanto el Acuerdo de Asociación como como la puesta en marcha de los nuevos programas supondrán ocasiones de comunicación particularmente adecuadas. La Comisión colabora estrechamente con las representaciones de la Comisión y los Estados miembros a fin de garantizar que estas oportunidades para la publicidad reciban una amplia cobertura en los medios de comunicación. Se prevén actos organizados conjuntamente y se recuerda que todos los programas deben llevar a cabo un acto de presentación dirigido al gran público y a los medios de comunicación.

⁽¹⁾ Artículos 115 a 117 y anexo XII.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001262/14
to the Commission**

Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE)

(7 February 2014)

Subject: Promoting awareness of regional policy

Data collected by TNS Political & Social shows that approximately 70% of European citizens are unfamiliar with the EU's regional policy and its collaborative work.

However, 70% of those citizens who are aware of the existence and work of the EU's regional policy feel that it has had a positive impact on the development of their city or region.

Promoting public awareness could encourage European citizens to feel closer to the EU and that it effectively contributes to their daily life, as a counterweight to rising euro-scepticism.

In light of this:

1. Is the Commission taking any action to promote citizen awareness of EU regional policy and its positive impact, thereby rendering it more visible?
2. What measures does the Commission recommend to Member States, their regions and local bodies, to promote awareness of European regional policy and increase its visibility?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission

(9 April 2014)

1. The Commission regards the promotion of the European Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds as a priority. The information and communication rules for the ESI Funds have been clarified and strengthened as evidenced in EU Regulation 1303/2013⁽¹⁾. This includes a more user-friendly list of projects, a web portal for EU cohesion policy, which also has to highlight several projects in another widely spoken EU language.

The Commission works closely with the different networks of communicators of the different ESI Funds who have the primary responsibility to communicate about the EU programmes' achievements.

In December 2013, at the first ever joint communication conference: 'Telling the Story' of ESI Funds, more than 800 participants from all 28 Member States shared good practices and received valuable ideas for their communication activities.

Moreover, the Commission has refocused its communication strategy taking into account the findings of the Eurobarometer study on 'Citizens' awareness and perceptions of EU Regional policy' and will focus its communication activities in 2014 on countries with lower awareness and perception rates.

2. In 2014, the Partnership Agreement as well as the launch of the new programmes will be particularly suitable communication occasions. The Commission is working closely with Member States and Commission representations to ensure these publicity opportunities will receive wide media coverage. Jointly organised events are envisaged and all programmes are reminded to make a programme launch event which is targeted at the general public and media.

⁽¹⁾ Articles 115-117 and Annex XII.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001268/14
to the Commission
Emer Costello (S&D)
(7 February 2014)

Subject: Persons with disabilities in the labour market

Further to its answer of 12 July 2012 to Written Question E-005338/2012 on best practice in the area of people with disabilities in the labour market, has the Commission received the results of the four pilot projects underway under the call for proposals on projects for employment of persons with autism spectrum disorders (VP/2010/017)? If so, what action is the Commission now considering on foot of these results?

What EU funding programmes planned for the period 2014-2020 would now be of interest to national organisations seeking to support the employment of people with disabilities? When does the Commission expect calls for proposals to be made under these programmes?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2014)

The Commission has finalised the report on the results of the four pilot projects that were launched following the call for proposals on employment of persons with autism spectrum disorders (VP/2010/017). The report will be published online on 2 April 2014, the World Autism Awareness Day ⁽¹⁾.

The report will be distributed by the Commission at appropriate events. The Commission will also encourage relevant employers and civil society organisations to make use of the findings.

Autism Europe ⁽²⁾ is among the beneficiaries of grants under the 2007-2013 Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity (PROGRESS) ⁽³⁾. Under the 2014-2020 Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme ⁽⁴⁾, a call for proposals for framework partners to support EU networks in the area of disabilities is planned to be launched in 2014.

Within the framework of the European Social Fund, the relevant Regulation provides that Member States shall allocate at least 20% of ESF resources to the thematic objective 'promoting social inclusion, combating poverty and any discrimination', under which support for the employment of people with disabilities could be programmed in the context of the Operational Programmes that Member States will establish in the course of 2014-early 2015.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/document/index_en.htm#h2-5 under the title 'Studies and reports'.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.autismeurope.org/>

⁽³⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=327>

⁽⁴⁾ Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme for the period 2014 to 2020, OJ L 354, 28.12.2013, p. 62.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001271/14
to the Commission
Emer Costello (S&D)
(7 February 2014)**

Subject: Lyme disease

Further to its answer of 28 September 2010 to Written Question E-6490/2010 on Lyme disease, could the Commission indicate whether, in the intervening period, the Irish authorities have reported any outbreak of Lyme disease? What were the main outcomes of the project on the surveillance of Lyme borreliosis in the EU, initiated by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, as mentioned in the answer of September 2010? What action has been taken or is under consideration in relation to this project?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2014)**

Ireland did not report on Borreliosis (Lyme disease) between 2010 and 2012 within the reporting obligations of Annex I to Directive 2003/99/EC⁽¹⁾. However it should be noted that the scope of the directive only covers monitoring along the food chain including data from primary production, however does not cover data on human cases.

Concerning the project launched by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) the key findings confirm that the disease is a significant and emerging problem. The different case definitions, diagnostic tests and surveillance approaches, do not allow providing harmonised data for the EU.

Information that is currently available is taken from available literature. Data on distribution of *Ixodes ricinus* ticks, which is one of the primary carriers of Lyme borreliosis in Europe, have been collected by the Vector Borne Network study and are crucial for understanding the risk zones in Europe⁽²⁾.

To better understand the impact of climate change on Lyme disease, the ECDC has developed the European Environment and Epidemiology Network to connect data on environmental change, climate change, and land use patterns to strengthen European efforts to model how these factors could impact Lyme disease and other communicable diseases in the future.

On the basis of the scientific information available so far a number of options for surveillance are under discussion, including sentinel surveillance or reporting of erythema migrans. However, each option needs to be further assessed in term of sensitivity, specificity and feasibility, in particular taking into consideration the difficulty of having a harmonised approach at European level.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 325, 12.12.2003.

⁽²⁾ Medlock et al.: Driving forces for changes in geographical distribution of *Ixodes ricinus* ticks in Europe. *Parasites & Vectors* 2013 6:1.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001272/14
to the Commission
Emer Costello (S&D)
(7 February 2014)

Subject: Fostering the internationalisation of SMEs and micro-SMEs

What action has the Commission taken, or is it taking, on foot of Parliament's resolution of 11 December 2012 on financing SMEs' trade and investment (P7_TA(2012)0469), most notably Paragraph 1, which urges the Commission 'to foster the participation of SMEs, and where relevant microenterprises, in global markets by implementing appropriate measures for their internationalisation and in particular their further integration into the EU single market, including easier access to capital and regularly updated information on business opportunities abroad, as well as efficient TDIs aimed at ensuring their rightful protection against unfair dumping and subsidies in order to safeguard fair competition with third countries, while ensuring that human, labour and social rights and the environment in third countries are protected'; Paragraph 13, which calls on the Commission to 'study the European business angel market and similar markets worldwide in order to learn from and build up the capacity of business angel network managers in the EU'; and Paragraph 22, which calls on the Commission 'to promote exchanges between the heads of EU and third-country SMEs along the lines of the "Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs" programme that currently exists at European Union level'?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2014)

The Commission's actions focus on facilitating market access by providing relevant information, effective resolution of market-entry barriers through negotiations with third countries and supporting programmes that are complementary to existing support frameworks provided by Member States and private organisations. Several 'Missions for Growth' reinforced EU's industrial relations and helped European companies (SMEs) to develop business activities in selected third country markets.

The Commission will continue to support the Enterprise Europe Network and maintain actions to foster international business cooperation. To raise awareness of support programmes, a SME Internationalisation Portal will be launched in April.

A pilot exchange of entrepreneurs between the EU and Brazil later this year will test the concept and practice of such exchanges.

On access to finance, EUR 1.4 billion of the COSME (SMEs) and EUR 2.84 billion of the Horizon 2020 programme budgets are earmarked for mobilising loans and equity financing.

Financial support for SMEs will also continue through the programmes co-financed with European Structural and Investment Funds, Creative Europe, the Programme for Employment and Social Innovation and the European Investment Bank.

With regard to Business angels, in 2012 the Commission published a study 'Evaluation of EU Member States' Business Angel Markets and Policies' ⁽¹⁾.

Last year the Commission adopted a communication on the modernisation of trade defence instruments (TDI) ⁽²⁾. The communication upgraded the SME helpdesk, and included a TDI guide for SMEs and specialised awareness raising seminars and workshops.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/dg/files/ba-rep_en.pdf
⁽²⁾ COM(2013) 191 final.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001273/14
to the Commission
Emer Costello (S&D)
(7 February 2014)**

Subject: EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement

What action has the Commission taken, or is it planning to take, in response to Parliament's resolution of 10 December 2013 on the EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement, most notably to Paragraph 2, which calls for representatives of Parliament to have the opportunity to attend meetings of the joint committee provided for under Article 10 of the Fisheries Agreement as observers, and for Parliament to be provided with documentation on the guidelines, objectives and indicators concerning the chapter relating to support for the fisheries sector in Morocco, and all the information necessary for the proper monitoring of the aspects included in Article 6 of the Protocol, including the final report that Morocco is to submit on the implementation of the sectoral support programme?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2014)**

Representatives of the European Parliament can attend the meetings of the Joint Committee provided for under Article 10 of the Fisheries Agreement as observers in accordance with the rules and provisions of the inter institutional agreement between the Commission and the European Parliament, as they did under the previous Protocol. The dates for the next Joint Committee have not been set yet, but the Parliament will be informed as soon as they become available.

The Parliament will be provided with documentation on the guidelines, objectives and indicators concerning the chapter relating to support for the fisheries sector in Morocco, and all the information necessary for the proper monitoring of the aspects included in Article 6 of the Protocol, including the final report that Morocco is to submit on the implementation of the sectoral support programme, as they become available.

The European Parliament will be also systematically provided with all the minutes and reports of the Joint Committee meetings which will be held under the Fishery Protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001275/14
to the Commission
Emer Costello (S&D)
(7 February 2014)**

Subject: Commission infringement procedure 2009/2039

Further to its answer of 14 August 2012 to Written Question E-006421/2012, what is the current situation with regard to the Commission's long-standing infringement proceedings against Ireland in relation to the working time of junior doctors (infringement procedure 2009/2039)?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2014)**

The Commission referred Ireland to the Court of Justice of the EU under Article 258 TFEU on 20 November 2013 ⁽¹⁾ in connection with the infringement procedure to which the Honourable Member refers.

It is also waiting for the Irish authorities to provide an updated action plan setting out clear steps and a timeline for achieving compliance with the Working Time Directive as regards the working conditions of junior doctors ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ See Press release IP/13/1109, at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1109_en.htm

⁽²⁾ Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ L 299, 18.11.2003.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001278/14
to the Commission
Emer Costello (S&D)
(7 February 2014)**

Subject: Animal welfare in Bosnia

Further to its answer of 4 February 2013 to Written Question E-011063/2012, what action has the Commission taken to encourage the Bosnian authorities to fully implement the Bosnian Law on Animal Welfare? What technical assistance is being given to Bosnia to transpose and implement EU legislation on animal welfare?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(7 April 2014)**

The Law on Animal Welfare in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was prepared in 2008 with the assistance of experts from an EU twinning project, as part of general assistance in transposition of the EU *acquis* in the area of veterinary policy. The EU assistance focused on the conditions for killing of animals in slaughterhouses and those kept for farming purposes. The meetings with the BiH authorities addressed also the treatment of stray dogs to a lesser extent and it was reiterated that these provisions should be based on international practices. EU experts concluded in 2009 that before measures to control the stray population are implemented, there should be an assessment of the stray-dog population and the impact of any regulation. ⁽¹⁾

Within the area of animal health, the EU is implementing a substantial 5-year animal disease control programme in BiH, including the eradication of rabies. In addition to a country-wide rabies vaccination programme which targets red foxes as the reservoirs of the disease, the assistance from IPA 2012 includes financing to supply a certain number of rabies vaccines and microchips for stray dogs, to be applied by local veterinarians. In discussions with the BiH authorities, we have also proposed to make use of the TAIEX instrument to organise workshops on the stray dog/cat population management topic, which would facilitate exchange of experiences with the Member States' experts.

⁽¹⁾ The minutes of the relevant workshops can be found here: <http://www.vet.gov.ba/?q=en/node/788>

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001279/14

à la Commission

Isabelle Thomas (S&D)

(7 février 2014)

Objet: Impacts de la directive-cadre sur l'eau sur les moulins à potentiel hydro-électrique

Il apparaît que les États membres mettent en œuvre la directive-cadre sur l'eau de manière relativement différente d'un État à un autre, et que certaines dispositions de ce texte prêtent dès lors à interprétation.

Les moulins à potentiel hydro-électrique soulèvent une question nécessitant arbitrage. Certains États considèrent qu'ils doivent être détruits parce qu'ils constituent un barrage à la continuité écologique. D'autres considèrent que l'absence de rejet de CO₂ justifie leur maintien pour produire de l'électricité. Nous sommes confrontés à deux exigences écologiques: le rétablissement de l'état physique des cours d'eau et la production hydro-électrique sans émissions de CO₂.

Le bilan environnemental des moulins devrait donc également être effectué à la lumière de leur capacité de production d'énergie propre, voire de leur valeur patrimoniale.

1. La Commission peut-elle indiquer si, à la lecture de la directive-cadre, les moulins doivent automatiquement être considérés comme des barrages à la continuité écologique?
2. Peut-elle préciser si le potentiel hydro-électrique des moulins est reconnu dans la législation de l'Union en matière d'énergie ou s'il est prévu qu'il le soit prochainement?

Réponse donnée par M. Potočník au nom de la Commission

(26 mars 2014)

Les moulins à eau sont généralement exploités par un débit d'eau détourné d'un cours d'eau par un barrage. En fonction de la taille et de la configuration du moulin à eau et du cours d'eau, le moulin peut en effet constituer un obstacle à la migration des poissons et, partant, empêcher la réalisation de l'objectif de bon état écologique des masses d'eau concernées fixé par la directive-cadre sur l'eau⁽¹⁾ (DCE). Dans certains cas, il peut être possible de mettre en œuvre des mesures d'atténuation (par exemple, en installant une passe à poissons). Il appartient aux États membres d'évaluer la manière dont les objectifs de la DCE doivent être atteints dans chaque cas.

La législation de l'Union sur l'énergie reconnaît l'énergie hydroélectrique (directive 2003/54/CE concernant des règles communes pour le marché intérieur de l'électricité et directive 2009/28/CE relative à la promotion de l'utilisation de l'énergie produite à partir de sources renouvelables). Les États membres sont libres de décider dans quelle mesure l'énergie hydroélectrique est nécessaire pour atteindre l'objectif de 2020 en matière d'énergies renouvelables (c'est-à-dire pour faire passer à 20 % la part de la consommation énergétique de l'Union provenant de sources renouvelables).

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2000/60/CE, JO L 327 du 22.12.2000.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001279/14
to the Commission**

Isabelle Thomas (S&D)

(7 February 2014)

Subject: Effects of the Water Framework Directive on water mills with hydroelectric potential

It would seem that the way Member States are implementing the Water Framework Directive differs somewhat from one country to another, and that some provisions are consequently open to interpretation.

Water mills with hydroelectric potential raise a question requiring arbitration. Some Member States consider that they should be demolished because they are an obstacle in the way of ecological continuity. Others cite their lack of CO₂ emissions as justification for keeping them to generate electricity. We are confronted here with two ecological demands: restoring the physical condition of watercourses and producing CO₂-free hydroelectricity.

The environmental performance of water mills ought therefore to be assessed equally in the light of their capacity to produce clean energy, and even on their heritage value.

1. Can the Commission say whether, from reading the framework directive, water mills must automatically be viewed as obstacles to ecological continuity?
2. Can it clarify whether the hydroelectric potential of water mills is recognised in the EU's energy legislation or whether this is planned for the near future?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(26 March 2014)

Typically water mills are operated by a water flow diverted from a river using a weir. Depending on the size and configuration of the water mill and the river it can indeed be an obstacle to fish migration and hence prevent the achievement of the Water Framework Directive⁽¹⁾ (WFD) objective of good ecological status in the affected water bodies. In some cases it may be possible to implement mitigation measures (for example by installing a fish pass). It is for the Member States to assess how the objectives of the WFD are to be achieved in each case.

EU's energy legislation recognises hydropower in both the directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and the directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources. Member States are free to decide to what extent hydropower is developed to meet the 2020 target for renewable energy (i.e. raising the share of EU energy consumption produced from renewable resources to 20%).

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2000/60/EC, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001280/14
alla Commissione
Aldo Patriciello (PPE)
(7 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Terra dei veleni, rifiuti tossici industriali in Calabria

Considerando che:

- nella città di Crotona una vasta zona è in fase di bonifica dal 2001, come richiesto dalla commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul ciclo illegale di rifiuti, poiché sono stati trovati rifiuti tossici industriali;
- l'impatto ambientale più dannoso è stato causato dalle tre maggiori attività produttive della zona, tra cui lo stabilimento ex Pertusola che per circa settant'anni ha prodotto zinco, acido solforico e cadmio ed altre sostanze altamente tossiche dalle quali si ricavava la «scoria cubilot»;
- alcune di queste sostanze tossiche, come C.I.C. (conglomerato idraulico catalizzato), cadmio e «scoria cubilot», sono state utilizzate per costruire opere pubbliche, infrastrutture e scuole, mettendo a rischio la salute degli abitanti;
- in seguito ad un'indagine, questi rifiuti sono stati classificati come speciali e pericolosi e 18 aree urbane sono state sequestrate nei comuni di Crotona, Cutro e Isola di Capo Rizzuto;
- le indagini hanno rilevato un alto livello di contaminazione, prevalentemente da metalli pesanti, del suolo e delle acque di falda e, nonostante questo, parte dei terreni contaminati è stata destinata all'agricoltura, all'allevamento e al pascolo di animali da macello;
- l'incidenza di tumori e malattie nell'area è aumentata rapidamente, superando del 15-20 % la media italiana, come testimoniato dall'Organizzazione mondiale della sanità, secondo cui tali eccessi, soprattutto per quanto concerne i tumori polmonari, sono collegati alle attività industriali dell'area;
- una messa in sicurezza è stata predisposta, ma non è stata attuata ancora nessuna attività concreta, e attualmente la bonifica può quindi definirsi in fase di start up.

Si chiede alla Commissione:

1. se sia a conoscenza di tale situazione e se ritenga che ci sia stata negligenza da parte dell'Italia in materia di politiche ambientali comunitarie;
2. se la programmazione 2014-2020 prevede programmi e fondi europei da destinare alla bonifica dei territori contaminati, oltre al Fondo sviluppo e coesione specializzato nel finanziamento di grandi opere infrastrutturali.

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione
(10 aprile 2014)

La Commissione è al corrente della situazione e prende atto del fatto che le autorità italiane stiano già intervenendo per il risanamento del suolo contaminato nella regione Calabria e per conformarsi alla normativa dell'UE in materia di ambiente.

In questa fase del processo di negoziazione relativo al periodo di programmazione 2014-2020 in cui si attende la presentazione, non ancora ufficialmente avvenuta, dell'accordo di partenariato con l'Italia e del programma regionale della Calabria, la Commissione non è in grado di indicare se e in che misura i finanziamenti del FESR saranno assegnati al progetto specifico menzionato dall'onorevole parlamentare in Italia e Calabria.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001280/14
to the Commission
Aldo Patriciello (PPE)
(7 February 2014)

Subject: Soil contamination by toxic industrial waste in Calabria

Since 2001, large tracts of land around the city of Crotona have been undergoing reclamation in response to the findings of a parliamentary committee of inquiry into illegal waste disposal following the discovery of toxic industrial waste. The greatest environmental damage has been caused by three principal activities in the area, including the production for over 70 years by what was previously the Pertusola plant of zinc, sulphuric acid and cadmium, together with other highly toxic substances found in cupola furnace residue. A number of these toxic substances, including catalysed hydraulic conglomerates, cadmium and cupola furnace residues, have been used for public works, infrastructures and schools thereby creating a public health hazard for local residents.

An investigation has revealed that this waste is indeed particularly hazardous, prompting special containment measures in 18 urban districts in Crotona, Cutro and Isola di Capo Rizzuto, as well as bringing to light high levels of soil and groundwater contamination, chiefly by heavy metals. Despite this, some of the contaminated land is still being used for agriculture, stockbreeding and pasture for animals intended for slaughter.

The incidence of tumours and related illnesses in this area has rapidly increased to a level 15-20% above the average for Italy, as confirmed by the World Health Organisation, which has indicated that such health problems, in particular pulmonary tumours, are attributable to local industrial activity.

No specific action has yet been taken to implement the containment plan and rehabilitation measures are still in the start-up phase.

In view of this:

1. Is the Commission aware of this situation and does it consider that the Italian authorities have been guilty of negligence in implementing EU environmental policies?
2. Have programmes been drawn up and European funding earmarked for reclamation of the contaminated areas for the period 2014-2020, in addition to the regional development and cohesion funds intended for major infrastructural works?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2014)

The Commission is aware of the situation and understands that the Italian authorities are already taking steps towards the remediation of the contaminated soil in the region of Calabria and to achieve compliance with EU environmental legislation.

At this stage of the negotiation process for the 2014-2020 programming period, pending the submission of Italy's Partnership Agreement and Calabria regional Programme which have not been officially submitted yet, the Commission is not in a position to indicate if and to what extent ERDF funding will be allocated for the specific project mentioned by the Honourable Member in Italy and Calabria.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001286/14
alla Commissione**

Mario Borghezio (NI)

(7 febbraio 2014)

Oggetto: Sbarchi in Italia

Nella sua audizione del 4 febbraio u.s. dinanzi alla commissione immigrazione dell'Assemblea parlamentare del Consiglio d'Europa, il viceministro dell'interno italiano, Filippo Bubbico, ha fornito dati eclatanti sulla moltiplicazione esponenziale degli sbarchi di clandestini sulle coste italiane.

Nel 2013, infatti, ben 20 925 imbarcazioni di vario tipo hanno raggiunto le coste italiane, con un aumento del 35 % rispetto al 2012, per un totale di 42 925 migranti irregolari e/o clandestini, di cui 3 818 minori.

Non intende la Commissione indagare al fine di individuare i motivi che hanno aperto una simile gigantesca falla nell'azione di contenimento del flusso dei clandestini attraverso le coste italiane?

Può la Commissione indicare quali urgenti interventi intende attuare in merito?

Risposta di Cecilia Malmström a nome della Commissione

(8 aprile 2014)

La Commissione è a conoscenza degli sbarchi di migranti sulle coste italiane, che rientrano in un più ampio fenomeno costantemente monitorato dalla Commissione stessa tramite le agenzie dell'UE e in cooperazione con il servizio europeo per l'azione esterna.

L'Unione europea affronta tale fenomeno attuando il suo piano d'azione sulla pressione migratoria, nonché tramite le 37 azioni operative realizzate dalla Task Force «Mediterraneo». A tale proposito, l'onorevole parlamentare può consultare la comunicazione della Commissione, del 4 dicembre 2013, sull'attività della Task Force «Mediterraneo» ⁽¹⁾.

Le misure adottate durante la presente legislatura riflettono l'impegno della Commissione ad affrontare le sfide dei crescenti flussi migratori. Nel settore della gestione delle frontiere è stato istituito il sistema europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere (EUROSUR), operativo dal 2 dicembre dello scorso anno, ed è prevista entro la fine della legislatura l'adozione di un progetto di regolamento recante norme che disciplinano le operazioni marittime coordinate da Frontex, che garantirà un funzionamento efficace delle operazioni dell'agenzia stabilendo regole vincolanti in materia di intercettazione, ricerca e salvataggio e sbarco. Si tengono inoltre regolarmente numerosi dialoghi con paesi terzi che producono risultati concreti, tra cui la conclusione di accordi di riammissione con paesi come la Turchia.

La quinta relazione annuale su asilo e migrazione, di prossima pubblicazione, fornirà una panoramica delle misure adottate nel 2013 in questo settore allo scopo di reagire al suddetto fenomeno.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2013) 869 final.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001286/14
to the Commission
Mario Borghezio (NI)
(7 February 2014)**

Subject: Illegal migration to Italy

At his hearing of 4 February 2014 before the Committee on Migration of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Italian Deputy Interior Minister Filippo Bubbico provided some striking data on the exponential increase in the number of illegal migrant landings on the Italian coast.

In 2013, as many as 20 925 vessels of various kinds reached the Italian coast — a 35% increase compared to 2012 — accounting for a total of 42 925 illegal migrants, including 3818 children.

Will the Commission not carry out an investigation in order to identify the reasons why such a huge number of illegal immigrants are slipping through the net and migrating to the Italian coast?

Can the Commission say what urgent measures it intends to take in this regard?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(8 April 2014)**

The Commission is aware of the arrivals on the Italian coast which are part of a wider phenomenon, which is constantly monitored by the Commission through EU agencies and in cooperation with the External Action Service.

The EU addresses this phenomenon by implementing the EU Action Plan on Migratory Pressure, as well as the 37 operational actions emerging from the work of the Task Force Mediterranean. The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its communication of 4 December 2013 on the work of the Task Force Mediterranean ⁽¹⁾.

The measures adopted during this legislature reflect the Commission's commitment to address the challenges of growing migratory flows. In the area of border management, there was the establishment of a European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), which became operational on 2 December last year. The adoption of a draft regulation establishing rules for sea operations coordinated by Frontex is expected before the end of this legislature. This measure will ensure the effective functioning of Frontex operations by establishing binding rules on interception, search and rescue and disembarkation. Numerous dialogues with third countries also take place on a regular basis, with concrete results including the conclusion of Readmission Agreements with countries such as Turkey.

The upcoming 5th Annual report on Asylum and Migration will provide an overview of the measures taken during 2013 in the area of migration and asylum to respond to this phenomenon.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2013) 869 final.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001293/14
a la Comisión**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(10 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Malnutrición infantil en Catalunya

Considerando que la Secretaría de Salud Pública del Departamento de Salud de la Generalitat de Catalunya ha reconocido esta semana que en Catalunya hay 751 menores de 16 años con diagnóstico de malnutrición; 660 de ellos se deben a situaciones de pobreza definidas «por circunstancias personales y sociales de riesgo por alimentación inadecuada» y 91, a patologías que les impiden asimilar los nutrientes. De estos 660, diez son por «problemas relacionados con la falta de alimentos», 95 por «problemas relacionados con pobreza extrema» y 555 por «problemas relacionados con ingresos bajos» ⁽¹⁾.

Estos datos desmienten las declaraciones hechas hace cinco meses por el conseller de Salud, que afirmaba que en Catalunya no había malnutrición por cuestiones económicas, sino por malos hábitos u obesidad.

Considerando que un informe elaborado por la Secretaría de Salud Pública a petición del Defensor del Pueblo afirma que para valorar de manera adecuada la problemática de la malnutrición infantil sería conveniente hacer estudios epidemiológicos de base poblacional especialmente dirigidos a valorar la situación y que, como consecuencia, el Gobierno de la Generalitat trabaja en un protocolo para mejorar la detección de casos de malnutrición infantil.

Considerando que la Comisión afirmó, en respuesta a una pregunta presentada el pasado mes de noviembre, que «está muy preocupada por el fuerte aumento de la pobreza infantil en España y considera que la lucha contra la pobreza infantil es de máxima importancia política» (E-013209/2013 ⁽²⁾),

¿Está informada la Comisión de la situación de desnutrición infantil debida a situaciones de pobreza en Catalunya?

¿Piensa adoptar la Comisión nuevas medidas para detectar, controlar y finalmente erradicar dichas situaciones de malnutrición infantil?

Respuesta del Sr. Andor en nombre de la Comisión

(7 de abril de 2014)

La Comisión está naturalmente muy preocupada por la existencia de numerosos casos de malnutrición entre los niños en Cataluña. Asimismo, describió las medidas que puede tomar en su respuesta a la pregunta de Su Señoría de noviembre de 2013 (E-13209/2013 ⁽³⁾).

A raíz de la propuesta COM(2012) 617 de la Comisión, el 11 de marzo de 2014 el Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo adoptaron el Reglamento (UE) n° 223/2014 ⁽⁴⁾ por el que se crea el Fondo de Ayuda Europea para las personas más desfavorecidas, con un presupuesto general de 3 400 millones EUR (a precios de 2011) para el período de 2014 a 2020. La asignación correspondiente a España asciende a 499,9 millones de euros (a precios de 2011) para el período 2014-2020. Este fondo apoyará los programas de los Estados miembros destinados a mitigar las peores formas de pobreza proporcionando a las personas más necesitadas, y en particular a los niños, alimentos o asistencia material básica, así como actividades de inclusión social destinadas a la integración social de las personas más desfavorecidas.

En el marco de las negociaciones relativas a la aplicación de los Fondos Estructurales y de Inversión Europeos durante el período 2014-2020, la Comisión anima a los Estados miembros a asignar una parte de los fondos de los programas operativos al objetivo temático n° 9 «Promover la inclusión social y luchar contra la pobreza».

⁽¹⁾ http://www.ara.cat/premium/societat/Salut-malnutricio-infantil-culpa-pobresa_0_1079892044.html

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2013-013209+0+DOC+XML+V0//ES>

⁽³⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2013-013209+0+DOC+XML+V0//ES>

⁽⁴⁾ Reglamento (UE) n° 223/2014 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 11 de marzo de 2014, relativo al Fondo de Ayuda Europea para las personas más desfavorecidas (DO L 72 de 12.3.2014, p. 1).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001293/14
to the Commission**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(10 February 2014)

Subject: Child malnutrition in Catalonia

This week, the Catalan Regional Government's Public Health Department recognised that 751 minors under the age of 16 have been diagnosed with malnutrition in Catalonia. Of these, 660 cases are due to situations of poverty which place them at 'personal and social risk owing to inadequate diet' and 91 are due to pathologies which prevent them from absorbing nutrients. Out of these 660 cases, 10 are due to 'problems linked to lack of food', 95 are because of 'problems associated with extreme poverty' and 555 due to 'problems linked to low income' ⁽¹⁾.

These data give the lie to the Catalan Health Secretary's statement five months ago that there was no malnutrition in Catalonia caused by economic circumstances, only as a result of poor eating habits or obesity.

A report drawn up by the Department of Public Health at the request of the Ombudsman found that in order to properly assess the problem of child malnutrition, epidemiological population studies specifically targeting the issue would have to be carried out. It said that the Catalan Government was therefore working on a protocol to improve the detection of cases of child malnutrition.

In its answer to a question for written answer presented in November 2013 (E-013209/2013 ⁽²⁾) the Commission stated that it 'is deeply concerned by the sharp increase in child poverty in Spain and it considers the fight against child poverty of the utmost political importance'.

Is the Commission aware of the situation with regard to child malnutrition as a result of poverty in Catalonia.

Does the Commission intend to adopt new measures to detect, monitor and ultimately eradicate such situations?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(7 April 2014)

The Commission is indeed very concerned to hear of the many cases of malnutrition among children in Catalonia. It outlined the measures it can take in its answer to the Honourable Member's question of November 2013 (E-13209/2013 ⁽³⁾).

Following the Commission proposal COM(2012)617, on 11 March 2014 the European Parliament and the Council have adopted the regulation ⁽⁴⁾ 223/2014 setting up the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived with an overall budget of EUR 3.4 billion (in 2011 prices) for the period 2014 to 2020. The allocation for Spain is EUR 499.9 million (in 2011 prices) for the period 2014-2020. The Fund will support Member State schemes to alleviate the worst forms of poverty by providing the neediest, and in particular children, with food and/or basic material assistance, as well as social inclusion activities aiming at the social integration of the most deprived persons.

In the framework of the negotiations for the implementation of the ESI Funds 2014-2020 the Commission encourages Member States to allocate part of the funds in the operational programmes to thematic objective 9 promoting social inclusion and combating poverty.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.ara.cat/premium/societat/Salut-malnutricio-infantil-culpa-pobresa_0_1079892044.html

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2013-013209+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>

⁽³⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2013-013209+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>

⁽⁴⁾ Regulation (EU) No 223/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 on the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, OJ L 72, 12.3.2014, p. 1.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001294/14
a la Comisión**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(10 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Muertes en Ceuta: intervención de Frontex y de RABIT

El pasado 6 de febrero, 13 personas murieron en España cuando intentaban llegar nadando a Ceuta mientras las fuerzas del orden los repelían con material antidisturbios. Según denuncias de distintas ONG y de los propios inmigrantes, las fuerzas de seguridad llegaron a disparar balas de goma y balines contra personas que se encontraban en el mar y que intentaban llegar a territorio europeo ⁽¹⁾.

Tanto Frontex como Eurosur son mecanismos que se basan en normativas que protegen los derechos fundamentales y que garantizan el derecho de asilo y la protección frente a la expulsión o el retorno (artículo 11 del Reglamento Eurosur) ⁽²⁾.

¿Podría señalar la Comisión si tiene noticias de algún tipo de implicación por parte de Eurosur y Frontex en los hechos mencionados en Ceuta?

¿Considera la Comisión que Frontex y Eurosur están violando su mandato y sus reglamentos? En caso afirmativo, ¿podría indicar qué consecuencias tendrá esta situación sobre dichos mecanismos?

¿Tiene constancia la Comisión de que se ha recurrido al mecanismo relativo a los equipos de intervención rápida en las fronteras (RABIT) ⁽³⁾ al haber considerado la llegada de inmigrantes a Ceuta como una situación excepcional y un «flujo masivo de inmigrantes»? En caso afirmativo, ¿qué evaluación hace de la intervención? ¿Tiene intención la Comisión de dar hacer público el informe sobre dicha intervención?

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001295/14
a la Comisión**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(10 de febrero de 2014)

Asunto: Muertes en las fronteras exteriores de la UE (Ceuta)

Denunciando que el día 6 de febrero en España 13 personas murieron intentando entrar nadando a Ceuta mientras las fuerzas de orden las repelían con material antidisturbios y que llegaron, según las denuncias de algunas ONG y los propios inmigrantes, a disparar balas de goma y balines contra personas en el mar que intentaban llegar a territorio europeo ⁽⁴⁾,

Considerando la Resolución del Parlamento Europeo sobre Lampedusa ⁽⁵⁾ donde se hace mención explícita de la obligación de la UE de cumplir con la Convención de Ginebra de 1951 sobre el Estatuto de los Refugiados y desarrollar sus políticas en función del artículo 79 del TFUE,

¿Tiene conocimiento la Comisión Europea de estos hechos y de la actuación de las autoridades españolas? ¿Acaso esta decisión de agredir a las personas migradas con técnicas de expulsión en caliente, expulsión express o «push-back» ha llegado a conocimiento de la Agencia Frontex y de Eurosur que actúan en el área de Ceuta? ¿Sabe si se realizan de conformidad con el acuerdo bilateral entre España y Marruecos?

En el Manual de Eurosur, sistema en vigor desde el 2 de diciembre de 2013, ¿insistirá la Comisión en sus recomendaciones para que se prohíba el uso de material antidisturbios, balas de goma y balines contra personas que intentan llegar a suelo europeo?

¿Qué acciones se tomarán para reparar a las familias de las víctimas?

¿Considera que España, y por consiguiente Europa, está violando la Convención sobre el Estatuto de los Refugiados ⁽⁶⁾, la Convención de Ginebra, el artículo 63 del TFUE y el artículo 18 de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la UE?

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20140207/54400948474/video-demuestra-inmigrantes-ceuta-si-tocaron-territorio-espanol.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2004R2007:20111212:ES:PDF>

⁽³⁾ http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/14124_es.htm

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20140207/54400948474/video-demuestra-inmigrantes-ceuta-si-tocaron-territorio-espanol.html>

⁽⁵⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2005-0138+0+DOC+XML+V0//ES>

⁽⁶⁾ <http://www2.ohchr.org/spanish/law/refugiados.htm>

Respuesta conjunta de la Sra. Malmström en nombre de la Comisión*(4 de abril de 2014)*

En respuesta a la solicitud, por parte de la Comisión, de explicaciones sobre el incidente de Ceuta, las autoridades españolas confirmaron la puesta en marcha de una investigación a fondo. La Comisión está a la espera de los resultados de dicha investigación, que evaluará cuidadosamente.

Según la información de que dispone la Comisión, Frontex ⁽⁷⁾ no estuvo implicado en el incidente al que hace referencia Su Señoría. Tal como exige el Reglamento Eurosur, el Centro nacional de coordinación español informó sobre el incidente a Frontex, que difundió la información a los demás centros nacionales de coordinación a través de la Visión de la situación europea y de la red de comunicación Eurosur.

El Reglamento Eurosur establece que los Estados miembros deben respetar los derechos fundamentales al aplicarlo, así como establecer procedimientos para controlar el funcionamiento de Eurosur en relación también con el respeto de los derechos fundamentales. La Comisión, en estrecha cooperación con los Estados miembros y con Frontex, está preparando el Manual de Eurosur, que contendrá un capítulo específico sobre los derechos fundamentales en el que se describe detalladamente cómo los Estados miembros deben cumplir estas obligaciones.

Frontex coordina únicamente actividades operativas en las fronteras exteriores de los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea cuando un Estado miembro solicita la ayuda de Frontex para una operación conjunta o para el despliegue de una misión de intervención rápida en las fronteras. Las autoridades de control de las fronteras españolas no han solicitado la ayuda de la Agencia Frontex y no se produjo despliegue de una misión de intervención rápida en las fronteras en la zona geográfica donde se produjo el incidente.

⁽⁷⁾ Agencia Europea para la Gestión de la Cooperación Operativa en las Fronteras Exteriores de los Estados Miembros de la Unión Europea.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001294/14
to the Commission**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(10 February 2014)

Subject: Deaths in Ceuta: Frontex and RABIT intervention

On 6 February 2014, 13 people died while trying to enter Spain by swimming to Ceuta while the law-enforcement authorities were driving them back with riot gear and, according to reports from a number of NGOs and the immigrants themselves, were even firing rubber bullets and pellets at people in the sea who were attempting to reach European territory ⁽¹⁾.

Frontex and Eurosur are mechanisms based on legislation to protect fundamental rights and guarantee the right to asylum and protection against deportation or return (Article 11 of the Eurosur Regulation) ⁽²⁾.

Could the Commission tell us if it has news of whether Eurosur and Frontex were in any way involved in the abovementioned incidents in Ceuta?

Does the Commission believe that Frontex and Eurosur are violating its mandate and regulations? If so, could it tell us what consequences this will have for these mechanisms?

Is the Commission aware that the mechanism relating to the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) ⁽³⁾ has been invoked as the arrival of immigrants at Ceuta has been deemed to be an exception situation and a 'massive influx of immigrants'? If so, what is its view of the intervention? Does the Commission intend to publish the report on said intervention?

**Question for written answer E-001295/14
to the Commission**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(10 February 2014)

Subject: Deaths at the EU's external borders (Ceuta)

In the wake of reports that, on 6 February, 13 people died while trying to enter Spain by swimming to Ceuta while the law-enforcement authorities were driving them back with riot gear and, according to reports from a number of NGOs and the immigrants themselves, were even firing rubber bullets and pellets at people in the sea who were attempting to reach European territory ⁽⁴⁾;

Having regard to the European Parliament resolution on Lampedusa ⁽⁵⁾ which explicitly refers to the EU's obligation to comply with the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and form its policies in accordance with Article 79 TFEU;

Is the European Commission aware of these incidents and of the actions of the Spanish authorities? Are the Frontex Agency and Eurosur, which operate in the Ceuta area, aware of this decision to attack migrants with these impromptu, express or 'push-back' deportation techniques? Does it know whether they are being conducted in accordance with the bilateral agreement between Spain and Morocco?

In its recommendations in the Eurosur Manual, a system which has been in force since 2 December 2013, will the Commission ban the use of riot gear, rubber bullets and pellets against people who are trying to reach European soil?

What actions will be taken to compensate the families of the victims?

Does it believe that Spain, and by extension Europe, is violating the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees ⁽⁶⁾, the Geneva Convention, Article 63 TFEU and Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights?

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20140207/54400948474/video-demuestra-inmigrantes-ceuta-si-tocaron-territorio-espanol.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2004R2007:20111212:EN:PDF>

⁽³⁾ http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/114124_en.htm

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20140207/54400948474/video-demuestra-inmigrantes-ceuta-si-tocaron-territorio-espanol.html>

⁽⁵⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2005-0138+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>

⁽⁶⁾ <http://www2.ohchr.org/spanish/law/refugiados.htm>

Joint answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission*(4 April 2014)*

In response to the Commission's request for explanations about the incident in Ceuta, the Spanish authorities confirmed that they have launched a full inquiry. The Commission awaits the outcome of the inquiry and will assess it carefully.

According to the information available to the Commission, Frontex ⁽⁷⁾ was not involved in the incident referred to by the Honourable Member. As required by the Eurosur Regulation, the Spanish national coordination centre reported the incident to Frontex, which disseminated this information to the other national coordination centres via the European Situational Picture and the Eurosur communication network.

The Eurosur Regulation stipulates that Member States need to comply with fundamental rights when applying it and to establish procedures for monitoring the functioning of Eurosur also with regard to the respect for fundamental rights. The Commission is currently preparing the Eurosur Handbook, in close cooperation with the Member States and Frontex, which will contain a dedicated chapter on fundamental rights, describing how Member States should comply with these requirements in detail.

Frontex only coordinates operational activities at the external borders of the Member States of the European Union when a specific Member State requests the assistance of Frontex for a joint operation or the deployment of a rapid border intervention. The Spanish border control authorities have not requested the assistance of the Frontex Agency, nor was there deployment of a rapid border intervention in the geographical area where the incident took place.

⁽⁷⁾ European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.